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**ENDURANCE, GREEK AND EARLY CHRISTIAN**  
**THE MORAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE GREEK IDEA OF ENDURANCE,**  
**FROM THE HOMERIC BATTLEFIELD TO THE APOSTLE PAUL**

by

(Monk) Themistocles Anthony Adamopoulos

B.A. (Hons), University of Melbourne (Australia), 1973

Dip. Ed., Hawthorn Institute of Education (Australia) 1973

B. Theol. Melbourne College of Divinity (Australia) 1980

M.T.S., Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (U.S.A.) 1984

Th.M., Princeton Theological Seminary (U.S.A.) 1985

Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Religious Studies, in the  
Early Christianity program at Brown University

May 1996

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
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
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
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**1996**

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is accepted in its present form by the  
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as satisfying the dissertation requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

Date..... 9-26-95 .....  
  
Stanley K. Stowers

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date..... 9-27-95 .....  
  
Susan Ashbrook Harvey

Date..... 9-19-95 .....  
  
John T. Fitzgerald

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date..... 10/31/95 .....  


---

**VITA**

---

***Br. Themistocles ADAMOPOULO, B.A. [Hons.], Dip. Ed., B.Theol., M.T.S.,  
Th.M., Ph.D. [Brown]***

---

**Name:** Themistocles Anthony ADAMOPOULO  
**Date of Birth:** 18/12/1945  
**Place of Birth:** Alexandria, Egypt (Greek parents)  
**Immigration to Australia:** 1956  
**Nationality:** Naturalized Australian Citizen  
**Religion:** (Greek) Orthodox Christian  
**Ecclesiastical Office:** Monk (Tonsured 1988)  
**Academic Position:** Lecturer in Biblical Studies and Christian Origins  
**Institution:** St. Andrew's G.O. Theological College (Sydney, Australia)

**Tertiary Academic Record:**

1971 Bachelor of Arts (Honours)  
University of Melbourne  
Political Science Major

1973 Diploma of Education  
Hawthorn Institute of Education (Victoria, Australia)

1981 Bachelor of Theology  
Melbourne College of Divinity  
(Catholic Theological College)

1984 Master of Theological Studies  
Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology  
(Boston, U.S.A.)  
Major Field: Biblical Studies

1985 Master of Theology  
Princeton Theological Seminary (Princeton, U.S.A.)  
Area of Specialization: New Testament

1995 Doctor of Philosophy (Candidate)  
Brown University (Providence, U.S.A.)  
Area of Specialization: N.T. / Early Christianity

Teaching Appointments:

- 1971 Tutor, University of Melbourne,  
Dept. Political Science  
Public Administration / Organization Theory
- 1971 Part-Time Lecturer (Politics),  
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
- 1974-77 School Instructor,  
Victorian Education Department (Victoria, Australia)  
English / Social Studies
- 1984 Teaching Assistant (Patristics)  
Holy Cross G.O. School of Theology Summer School  
(Boston U.S.A.)
- 1985 Teaching Assistant  
St. Vladimir's Orthodox Seminary  
(New York U.S.A.)
- 1986 Part-time Lecturer  
Catholic Institute of Education (Melbourne, Australia)
- 1987 Teaching Assistant  
Brown University (Providence, U.S.A.)
- 1988- Lecturer  
St. Andrew's Greek Orthodox Theological College  
(Sydney, Australia)  
Biblical Studies & Languages (Hebrew)  
and Christian Origins  
1994 (Feb.) - 1995 (August) Leave of Absence
- 1990 Guest Lecturer  
University of Sydney  
Semitic Studies, M.A. students
- 1991 Guest Lectures  
University of Sydney School of Divinity Students  
Introduction to (Sahidic) Coptic
- 1993 Guest Lecturer  
University of Sydney  
New Testament course



Academic Awards:

- 1983 *WHO'S WHO AMONG STUDENTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES & COLLEGES*  
Holy Cross G.O. School of Theology
- 1983 *THE STAMATOS SFIKAS AWARD*  
Holy Cross G.O. School of Theology
- 1983-84 *NATIONAL DEAN'S LIST, U.S.A.*  
Holy Cross G.O. School of Theology
- 1985 (Nominated for) *OUTSTANDING YOUNG MEN IN AMERICA*  
Princeton Theological Seminary

Ecclesiastical Appointments:

- 1988-1993 Greek Orthodox Representative  
Executive Committee of N.S.W. Ecumenical Council  
(Sydney, Australia)
- 1988-1991 University Chaplaincy  
University of Sydney

More Recent Conferences, Seminars

Papers Presented:

- 1990 '*Apocalyptic Judaism. Cradle of Gnosticism?*'  
Society for Early Christianity Seminar  
("Apocalyptic in Antiquity"),  
Macquarie University (Sydney, Australia)
- 1990 '*St. Paul the Traveller and Greek Epic Motifs.*'  
St. Andrew's G.O. Fellowship Seminar (Sydney, Australia)  
"St. Paul and Hellenism."
- 1991 (Sept.) '*The Gnostics and Gospel of St. John,*'  
Symposia 1991, Ancient History Documentary  
Research Centre,  
Macquarie Univ. (Australia)
- 1991 (Nov.) '*Coptic: A New Christian Beginning for Egyptian.*'  
Symposia 1991 of the Ancient History Documentary  
Research Centre,  
Macquarie University (Australia)  
"Christianity in Egypt: Character and Significance"
- 1992 '*The Much-Enduring Paul, Odysseus and the Rhetoric of  
Comparison in 2 Corinthians,*'  
1992 S.B.L. International Congress  
The Pauline Epistles Seminar  
(Melbourne), Australia.

Publications:

- 1984                    *'The Forgotten Orthodoxy'*  
"Sitz im Leben," Princeton Seminary student journal
- 1986                    *'Jesus, Tradition and Metamorphosis,'*  
*Greek Orthodox Youth of Australia in Dialogue*, Edition 1
- 1988                    *The Valentinian Gnostic Interpretative and Exegetical*  
*Processes: The Case of Ptolemy's Exegesis of the*  
*Johannine Prologue,'*  
*Phronema*, Vol. 3, (Sydney, Australia)
- 1993                    *'Σοφία, the Creator and the Created Cosmos: Early Christian*  
*Cosmogonic and Cosmological Polemics'*  
*Phronema*, Vol. 8
- 1995                    *'Θεός, Δημιουργός, Σοφία, Ὑλικός Κόσμος:*  
*Early Christian Orthodox and (Ptolemean)*  
*Valentinian Cosmogonic & Cosmological Polemics*  
*and their Abiding Implications'*  
*Greek Orthodox Theological Review* (Boston, U.S.A.)  
[forthcoming]

**Dedicated to my Parents**

**Eleftherius and Helen**

**May God Keep Them in Health and Happiness**

## FOREWORD

---

This century despite its enormous scientific and technological advancements, still remains as perhaps the most barbaric in its record on war. More people have been the victims of war and terrorism in the twentieth century than in any other period of human history. And yet the lesson has not been learned even now in the last decade of the century and millennium. In the wake of this irrational and alarming current increase in the international mood, both in the West and the East, in the First and Third worlds, towards aggressiveness, militarism, terrorism and the barbaric disrespect for the dignity of human life, I wish to make it unambiguously clear, that while my dissertation deals in part with certain aspects of the history, values and ideas of the ancient Greek military world, this is not meant in any sense to give the reader the impression of a glorification of the harsh tragedy of war or military solutions, a sentiment that even shocked and appalled such ancients surrounded by the everyday realities of war such as the Greek poet who chronicled the Trojan War in his *Iliad*, and who nevertheless resolved his dilemma by simply adopting a fatalistic view. It is interesting however that in his *Odyssey* Homer depicts a peaceful, gentle and idyllic utopian society, the island monarchy of the Phaeacians - free of war and violence. My own interest in the ancient physical battlefield is historical and academic and directed primarily towards an understanding and appreciation of the evolution and transformation of a military idea into a nobler moral concept as employed by the ancient Greek sages from Democritus and Socrates onwards, to describe their moral warfare and eventually as appropriated by the apostle Paul to describe the Christian spiritual battle. Indeed the latter in a unique and unprecedented paradoxical and ironic twist manages to subdue and tame this originally battlefield notion into an essential aspect of Christian love. My own perspective on war and cavalier nationalistic military solutions is not a popular one in the present mood, but it is that which is found as the most natural conclusion of the teachings of Jesus and the apostle Paul - Christian pacifism!

(Somerville, Massachusetts, 1995)

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---

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The dissertation began earnestly in 1989, as part of the final requirements towards a Doctor of Philosophy Degree at Brown University. I am indebted to my academic supervisor and instructor in matters Pauline, Prof. S.K. Stowers, for the original idea to investigate the concept of endurance in the letters of the apostle Paul. I am also grateful for his patient and meticulous corrections, invaluable suggestions concerning the dissertation's construction, draft and final text. Of course I take full responsibility for any shortcomings in the final version.

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There are many more people who assisted, in one way or another, during the laborious days of the completion of this dissertation - including my sister Mary Adamopoulo, Dr. Eng-Wong (Brown Univ.), Mrs. M. von Kriegenbergh (Brown Univ.), Dean J. Lusk (Brown Univ.), Ms. G. Tetreault (Brown Univ.), Mrs. K. Pappas (Brown Univ.), Rev. A. George (Cranston, RI), and Jim and Janet Aelo of Cranston (RI). Time and space prevents me from compiling a complete list, but God knows. To all I remain most grateful.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

### 1. Modern Publications

AB	Anchor Bible
ABR	<i>Australian Biblical Review</i>
ACNT	Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament
BDB	F. Brown, S.R. Driver & C.A. Briggs, <i>A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament</i> (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 1951 edition.
BHT	Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie
BST	Basel Studies in Theology
CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
CH	<i>Church History</i>
CHCL	Cambridge History of Classical Literature Series
CP	Classical Philology
CP	Corpus Paulinum
EB	Etudes Biblique
Exp.	The Expositor
GOTR	<i>Greek Orthodox Theological Review</i>
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
HCHCB	Hermeneia - A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible
HELB	<i>Hebrew English Lexicon of the Bible</i> (1975, New York, Schocken Books) based on E.F. Leopold, <i>Lexicon Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in Veteris Testamenti</i> (1832, Leipzig).
HkNT	A. Schmoller (ed.), <i>Handkonkordanz zum Griechischen Neuen Testament</i> (1973 reprint of 1938 Württembergische Bibelanstalt Stuttgart).
HNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HNTC	Harper's New Testament Commentary
HTKNT	Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
HTR	<i>Harvard TheologicaJ Review</i>
HTRHDR	Harvard Theological Review Harvard Dissertations on Religion
ICC	International Critical Commentary
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JBLMS	Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
JHP	<i>Journal of the History of Philosophy</i>
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies</i>
KEK	Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar über das Neuen Testament
LEC	Library of Early Christianity
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LS	H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>Greek-English Lexicon</i> (Revised edition by H.S. Jones and R. McKenzie) Oxford
MBS	Message of Biblical Spirituality
NCBC	New Century Bible Commentary
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIDNTT	C. Brown (ed.), <i>New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology</i> 3 Volumes (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1975).
NovT	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NTM	New Testament Message
NTS	<i>New Testament Studies</i>
OTM	C. Stuhlmueller, M. McNamara (eds.), <i>Old Testament Message</i> , 23 volumes (Wilmington, Michael Glazier)

<b>OTP</b>	J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), <i>Old Testament Pseudepigrapha</i> , 2 Volumes (Garden City, Doubleday, 1985)
<b>PVTG</b>	A.M. Denis and M. de Jonge (eds.) <i>Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graece</i>
<b>RB</b>	<i>Revue Biblique</i>
<b>RFIC</b>	<i>Rivista di Filologia a di Instruzione Classica</i>
<b>RM</b>	<i>Review of Metaphysics</i>
<b>RSPT</b>	<i>Revue de Sciences Philosophique et Theologique</i>
<b>RSR</b>	<i>Recherches de Science Religieuse</i>
<b>SBLDS</b>	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
<b>SBL SBS</b>	Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
<b>SBLSS</b>	Society of Biblical Literature Semeia Studies
<b>SNTSMS</b>	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
<b>SVTP</b>	Dennis A.M. and M. de Jonge (eds.) <i>Studia in Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigrapha</i>
<b>TAPA</b>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<b>TDNT</b>	G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (eds.), <i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i> , 10 Volumes, ET by G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1964-76)
<b>TNTC</b>	Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
<b>TOTC</b>	Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries
<b>WUNT</b>	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
<b>YCS</b>	Yale Classical Studies
<b>ZNW</b>	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i>

## 2. Ancient Texts

### (a) Biblical (MT & Septuagint)

<b>LXX</b>	Septuagint
<b>MT</b>	Masoretic Text
<b>Gen.</b>	Genesis
<b>Exod.</b>	Exodus
<b>Lev.</b>	Leviticus
<b>Numb.</b>	Numbers
<b>Deut.</b>	Deuteronomy
<b>Job.</b>	Job
<b>Jer.</b>	Jeremiah
<b>Prov.</b>	Proverbs
<b>Ecc.</b>	Ecclesiastes
<b>Dan.</b>	Daniel
<b>Wisd. Sol.</b>	Wisdom of Solomon
<b>Sus.</b>	Sussana
<b>1 Macc.</b>	1 Maccabees
<b>2 Macc.</b>	2 Maccabees
<b>3 Macc.</b>	3 Maccabees
<b>4 Macc.</b>	4 Maccabees



(b) New Testament & Other Early Christian Writings

<i>NT</i>	New Testament
<i>Rom.</i>	Romans
<i>1 Cor.</i>	1 Corinthians
<i>2 Cor.</i>	2 Corinthians
<i>Gal.</i>	Galatians
<i>Eph.</i>	Ephesians
<i>Phlp.</i>	Philippians
<i>Col.</i>	Colossians
<i>1 Thess.</i>	1 Thessalonians
<i>2 Thess.</i>	2 Thessalonians
<i>Jas.</i>	James
<i>Apoc.</i>	Apocalypse
<i>1 Clem.</i>	1 Clement

(c) Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha & Other Early Jewish Texts

<i>BJ</i>	Josephus <i>Jewish Wars</i>
<i>Jos. Asen.</i>	Joseph and Asenath
<i>T. Job</i>	Testament of Job
<i>TTP</i>	Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs
<i>T. Reub.</i>	Testament of Reuben
<i>T. Sim.</i>	Testament of Simon
<i>T. Levi</i>	Testament of Levi
<i>T. Jud.</i>	Testament of Judah
<i>T. Iss.</i>	Testament of Issachar
<i>T. Zeb.</i>	Testament of Zebulun
<i>T. Dan.</i>	Testament of Dan
<i>T. Naph.</i>	Testament of Naphtali
<i>T. Gad.</i>	Testament of Gad
<i>T. Ash.</i>	Testament of Asher
<i>T. Jos.</i>	Testament of Joseph
<i>T. Ben.</i>	Testament of Benjamin
<i>1 QH7</i>	Qumran, <i>Thanksgiving Hymns</i>
<i>1QM</i>	Qumran, <i>War Scroll</i>

(c) Greek, Latin Texts & Authors

Here I follow the available or listed relevant abbreviations employed by the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*

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**INTRODUCTION**

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**PROLOGUE, SCOPE, AIMS AND METHODOLOGY**

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## INTRODUCTION

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### I. Prologue and Synopsis

#### *A. Wars and Warriors - The Μοῖρα and Paradox of the Greeks*

The unprecedented contribution of the ancient Greeks in the history of ideas and the development of western culture is well known.<sup>1</sup> Despite the awesome attainment of such a level of civilization and intellectual sophistication, ancient Greek society in its diversified cultural expression was also built, established and perpetuated essentially upon a military ethos. This is the Greek paradox. War appears as one of the most powerful and abiding realities of the Greeks. Indeed for Plato's Socrates, the patriarch of western philosophy, it was considered as "honourable" or "good" (καλόν).<sup>2</sup> Pacifism as an intellectual and moral idea, was not an invention of the Greeks - though Homer came close with his nostalgic portrayal of a peaceful utopian Phaeacian society.<sup>3</sup> From the Mycenaean age until the invasions of the Romans, war, whether in terms of a large scale battle or a minor military skirmish, was constantly a real and imminent threat to the Greeks. Tragically, even when not facing a foreign menace, the ancient Greeks always found or at times created opportunities for intra-Hellenic warfare. Even Athens, at the period of its cultural zenith, on the average enjoyed peace in only one out of three years.<sup>4</sup> Yet it would be a serious error to conclude that no critics of the tragedy of war and its excesses existed in ancient

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<sup>1</sup> The late and eminent British classicist H.D.F. Kitto goes as far as to make the claim that one particular aspect of ancient Greek civilization, namely classical Athenian culture, ought to be viewed as the loftiest pinnacle of human civilization: 'Athens from . . . . 480 to 380 was clearly the most civilized society that ever existed.' H.D.F. Kitto, *The Greeks* (Hammondsworth, Penguin, 1981) reprint, 96.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Prot.* 359E.

<sup>3</sup> *Od.* 8.

<sup>4</sup> P. Ducrey explains that in the Classical Age, the ' . . . . concept of "peace" corresponded to that of a "truce" . . . . ' P. Ducrey, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* [ET by J. Lloyd, *Guerre et Guerriers dans la Grèce Antique*] (New York, Schocken Books, 1986) 9. Perhaps the best modern parallel would be western culture of the twentieth century which despite its spectacular technological and intellectual achievements, can nevertheless be simultaneously characterized, in terms of human toll, from WWI to the Bosnian War, as the most militaristic and aggressively destructive century in the entire history of humanity, thus far. This too is our paradox.

Greece. They did! Homer had already observed and studied this obsessive Greek propensity towards military conflict, and sought to interpret it in metaphysical terms. Here we encounter, however, a pessimistic or perhaps fatalistic attitude towards the inevitability of the tragedy of irreconcilable human conflict, which as it were, he found indelibly inscribed in the very nature and fabric of the universe itself. Thus while for Homer war extended beyond the parameters of Greek society, it was also *par excellence* the μοῖρα or fate of the Greeks.<sup>5</sup> Thucydides, the celebrated chronicler of this most-lamentable ancient Greek predilection, clearly pointed to the self-destructing and deplorable ravages inflicted by the Peloponnesian war upon the Hellenic people. Likewise both Euripides and Aristophanes did not hesitate to draw their public's attention to the drama of warfare and its consequences. Hope that wisdom and intelligence can overcome brute force and can restrain massacres of war is certainly evident in Greek literature, beginning with Homer. For instance, Zeus is said by Homer to despise Ares the divine embodiment of war (*Il.* 5.890-91). Homeric Athena does not hesitate to apply wisdom and intelligence in her effort to overcome Ares.<sup>6</sup> Yet, the paradox continues, for in the final analysis the gods of the ancient Greeks also provoke conflict between men, and it was their will that war should erupt. Thus already in the lament-filled opening

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<sup>5</sup> Besides its belief in the Olympian pantheon, the Greek society reflected in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* also subscribed to a supernatural power called μοῖρα (or αἴσα). This concept, while by no means clear, refers to a form of fatalism or pre-destination whose force is superior to the pantheon. Man dies when and how he does, because to a large measure it was ordained by μοῖρα. Thus the Cyclops, Polyphemus, after being blinded by Odysseus seeks and invokes his revenge from Poseidon his father, that Odysseus may never reach Ithaca. But he realizes that if Odysseus' μοῖρα has fore-ordained the opposite, then all that he can reasonably expect from Poseidon is that his voyage be filled with hardships and delays. In other words while μοῖρα may not be altered in its broad parameters some room exists for manipulation. Thus Polyphemus cries out: ' . . . . grant that Odysseus the sacker of cities, may never reach his home . . . . but if it be his fate (μοῖρα) to see his friends again and come to his well-built house and native land, may he come home late and in sorry plight, after losing all his comrades in a ship that is another's, and may he find woe in his house.' [*Od.* 9.530-35.]. Within the broad spectrum of Odysseus' μοῖρα, Polyphemus believes he can manipulate through Poseidon, the general direction of events in Odysseus' life. However an event such as death is non-negotiable, unless a time has not been determined by fate. Furthermore only if the time of his home-coming is not guaranteed or pre-determined by μοῖρα can Poseidon have a free hand. Thus he is at liberty to prolong the voyage and cause much suffering, but not unto death (cf. *Job*). Adkins sums up the issue of Homeric μοῖρα thus: 'The world under the influence of moira, in fact, is not so much like a piece of clockwork as it is like a game of celestial snakes and ladders. Most moves are free; but should one alight at the foot of one's particular ladder or at the head of one's personal snake, the next move is determined.' A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press, 1960) Midway reprint, 19. On the other hand as Adkins points out, the issue is not always so clear cut. At times μοῖρα / αἴσα can be subservient to the celestial will. Thus Hector's appointed time of death is altered by Zeus, much to Athena's disgust: ' . . . . what a thing to say! Will you (i.e. Zeus) snatch from death a mortal man long subject to fate (αἴση)? Do it then, but we other gods do not approve.' [*Il.* 22.178-181]. However such a reprieve from μοῖρα seems the exception rather than the rule. For a fuller discussion of Homeric μοῖρα see Adkins *op. cit.* pp. 17-25.

<sup>6</sup> Vide Ducrey, *op. cit.* 225.

verses of the *Iliad* we find both Zeus and Apollo implicated in the promotion of military conflict and woeful human destruction:

'Sing O goddess, concerning the wrath of Achilles son of Peleus, that baneful wrath that brought countless woes upon the Achaeans, and sent forth to Hades many valiant souls of heroes, and made themselves to be a spoil for dogs and all manner of birds; and thus the will of Zeus (Διός βουλή) was being brought to fulfilment. Begin with the time of the angry parting between Atreus' son (i.e. Agamemnon) lord of men and the great Achilles. Who then among the gods was it that brought these two into conflict (μάχεσθαι)? The son of Leto and Zeus (i.e. Apollo).' [*Il.* 1.1-9].

Inevitably and tragically for the Greeks, war was unavoidable. In a very real sense therefore, in accordance with this μοῖρα the prototypical icon of the ancient Greek is perhaps more quintessentially that of the ὀπλίτης rather than the πολίτης! The warrior on the battlefield protecting the security and liberty of the πόλις stood at the very center of Greek political and cultural reality, rather than the gentle sage. This is certainly another aspect of the tragic Greek paradox. Ironically and paradoxically, however, it would be upon the anvil of the Greek tragedy of war, needless human suffering, the battle sweat and blood of the warrior, that certain of the noblest and most heroic components of Greek ethical values and ideals would be forged, such as courage, freedom, and the concept which is of primary concern for the present study - endurance!

### *B. Boats, Travelers and Explorers - Maritime Greece*

Besides the call of the battlefield, for many reasons, not the least geographical and geological, the sea had always exercised a spell over the Greeks, and to a large extent shaped and dominated their lives, from the Minoan and Mycenaean age until even today.<sup>7</sup> The ship and the seafarer were among the most common symbols of ancient Hellenic life. Indeed, with the relatively temporary exception of the Phoenicians, the ancient Greeks, including the Hellenistic empires, had become the maritime power *par excellence* of the ancient Mediterranean, until the emergence of Rome as the dominant naval power of what became the "Roman Lake." Indeed, the ancient Greeks were directly responsible for revolutionizing shipbuilding, the establishment of new settlements in the

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<sup>7</sup> The geographical structure of Greece is such that no portion of the land is very far from the sea. When one includes the Aegean Islands into the picture, which in recorded history had always been populated by Hellenic tribes, then it is not difficult to understand the Greek fascination with the sea. Furthermore, the soil of Hellas has always been poor in quality and unable to nourish a great population. The sea however presented no such limitations and provided abundant food as well as other supplies.

western Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as serving the role of what Casson describes as "the advance guard of Western civilization" to these regions.<sup>8</sup>

With the breakdown of order and instability in the Mediterranean region following the new aggressive migratory patterns from the north, and which initiated an interim and turbulent period in Greek history, when Mycenaean civilization had lost its potency, the so-called Dark Ages (ca. B.C. 1200 - 900),<sup>9</sup> some Greeks looked to the sea again for their livelihood, though now in a new role, as sea-raiders plundering the coastal towns of Asia Minor, a much-weakened Pharaonic Egypt, as well as the settlements of the Aegean Islands.<sup>10</sup> Some became explorers, venturing westward into unknown waters, far beyond the limits of the Sicilian Mediterranean, familiar in an earlier period to the Cretan (Minoan) and Mycenaean sailors,<sup>11</sup> towards the Pillars of Hercules,<sup>12</sup> or eastward beyond the Bosphorus, into the unknown and threatening waters of the Πόντος "Ἄξεινος (the "Unfriendly Sea," the earliest Greek name for the Black Sea) with its "crushing sea-mountains" (floating ice?) and its hostile inhabitants, as the legend of Jason and his Argonauts suggests.<sup>13</sup> Indeed one of the legends built around the voyage of the Argonauts, depicts them

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<sup>8</sup> L. Casson, *The Ancient Mariners. Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1991) 2nd edition, 67. Indeed the present sub-section draws almost exclusively from his work.

<sup>9</sup> Vide V. Desborough, *The Greek Dark Ages* (London, 1972).

<sup>10</sup> The *Odyssey* which largely reflects the values and customs of the Hellenic Middle Age, makes several mentions of Greek sea-raids or piracy. For instance, as Casson points out, not long after sailing from Troy, the Odysseus' contingent sacked a city in Thrace (*Od.* 9.40-42). Thucydides many centuries later describes this early period of Greek maritime life as a time of "chronic piracy." (*Pelop. Wars* 1.5-7). Vide Casson, *op. cit.* 46. For a detailed study of piracy in the antiquity, vide H. Ormond, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool, 1924).

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion on the earliest international trade and associated ship movements in the Mediterranean, vide, Casson, *op. cit.* ch. 2.

<sup>12</sup> It is to be noted that while the western Mediterranean beyond Sicily was unknown to the Greeks, the Phoenicians were already colonizing it and even traversing the Pillars of Hercules along the Atlantic coast of Africa, using Carthage as their base. Vide D. Harden, *The Phoenicians* (London, 1962) *passim*, Casson *op. cit.* 62-66.

<sup>13</sup> Beginning from a kernel of historical fact, most likely based on an exploratory journey into the Black Sea from Iolcus, at the dawn of the first millennium before Christ, so impactful did this voyage prove that the legends built around Jason and his Argonauts in search of the Golden Fleece extended over a millennium. Many were the literary legendary versions or remarks, concerning the adventures of the voyage of the *Argos* beginning with Homer, who places the legend in the words of Circe as she advises Odysseus concerning the dangers that await him if he takes the sea passage which Jason took: 'One (passage) leads to the sheer cliffs which the felicitous gods know as the Wandering Rocks . . . . For any sailors who bring their ship to the spot, there is no escape whatever. They end as flotsam on the sea timbers and corpses tossed in confusion by the waves . . . . Of all ships that go down to the sea one only has made the passage, and that was the celebrated *Argos*. (*Od.* 12.55-70.) The legend of Jason is further elaborated by Pindar, Sophocles, and that of the most celebrated version, namely that of Apollonius of Rhodes' *Argonautica*.

returning back to Greece, having first travelled to the North Sea and then southwards through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.<sup>14</sup>

In the wake of Greek marine exploration in the east and west, and following the abating of piracy, about 250 years after the dawn of the first millennium (B.C.), when order returned to the Mediterranean, a renewed Hellas emerges, a Hellenic civilization with ample historical attestation for posterity. Most Greek cities, though most notably Corinth and Miletus,<sup>15</sup> would now begin an energetic colonization program in the west - eventually acquiring the south Italian peninsula and Sicily, in addition to the coastal regions of southern Gaul - as well as in the east in the regions surrounding the Black Sea, becoming a "mother city" or μητρόπολις of the colonial or "daughter cities."<sup>16</sup> Here they would send their unique pottery (as well as to the Levant),<sup>17</sup> in merchantmen, colonial immigrants in galleys as well as their culture, in addition to their warriors in fighting ships, to regions extending from the Scythian Black Sea to the Pillars of Hercules.<sup>18</sup> And when the very existence of Greek civilization was threatened by the Persian Xerxes, it was in the building of Themistocles' ships, the "wooden walls,"<sup>19</sup> that they eventually averted an impending national catastrophe, at the naval battle fought deliberately in a narrow stretch of water, the Straits of Salamis (B.C. 480).<sup>20</sup> The newly-designed Greek triremes emerged from the wreckage of the

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<sup>14</sup> Vide Casson, *op. cit.* 59.

<sup>15</sup> Other important cities engaged in colonization programs including Athens and Megara. Sparta was one of the few Greek cities not to actively and extensively engage in colonization endeavours abroad.

<sup>16</sup> The acme of the Greek colonization of west and east occurred between B.C. 750 - 550, and included the establishment of such port centers as Neapolis (Naples), Massilia (Marseilles) and Syracuse in the west, as well as in B.C. 658, Byzantium (later Constantinople) a natural harbour dominating the entrance to the Black Sea. According to Casson, in sum, some 250 colonial sites were founded by the Greek seafarers and promoted the spread of Hellenic values and culture throughout these regions, becoming, as I mentioned above, Casson's "advance guard of western civilization" *op. cit.* 67.

<sup>17</sup> The Greeks maintained very active trading with the Phoenicians sending their wares by merchantmen to the most prosperous port-cities of the eastern Mediterranean such as Byblos, Tyre and Sidon. Vide *ibid* 61.

<sup>18</sup> The marine archaeological evidence of the shipwrecked Greek ships which litter the coast of Asia Minor as well as France, attest to the vast trading networks of the Greeks. For a discussion on the impact of marine archaeology on reconstructing ancient history, vide, G. Bass (ed.), *A History of Seafaring Based on Underwater Archaeology* (London, 1972).

<sup>19</sup> A few years before the battle of Salamis, when the Persian forces were invading northern Greece and threatening Athens, Themistocles the Athenian admiral, interpreted the oracle which exhorted Athens to build "wooden walls" as a reference to a wall of ships. Vide Casson, *op. cit.* ch. 8.

<sup>20</sup> Themistocles was a master of sea tactics in warfare. He readily recognized that to face the Persian navy in the open sea would be impossible. The Greek fleet was hopelessly outnumbered. He therefore placed his fleet within the

Persian fleet at Salamis as the dominant naval force of the Mediterranean. The sea, ships, sailors, and ingenious though risky sea tactics, had salvaged Hellas once again! By and large, therefore, throughout their recorded history, the Greeks have always been a maritime people,<sup>21</sup> a people who were not afraid to venture across the sea into the unknown, a people who were willing to endure the hardships associated with travel and new settlement. Consequently, it is not surprising that besides warriors the ancient Greeks hailed pioneer and much-enduring seafarers and epic travellers, such as Jason and Odysseus, among their most celebrated heroes.

*C. The Warrior and the Traveller.  
Archetypical Homeric Figures of Heroic Endurance*

It is already evident within the earliest extant Greek literary corpus, namely the epic poetry of Homer, that the *warrior* and the *traveller* represent the two most recognizable and legitimate paradigms of human heroism. Within this tapestry of Greek heroism the figures of the philosopher, the athlete and the martyr, had not as yet either been fully conceived or distinctly woven.<sup>22</sup> These two Homeric fields of human endeavour, then, are the first most basic categories for the possibility of the heroic quest, within the earliest extant Greek traditions of literary thought. Indeed they may be described as the earliest European literary archetypical icons of the human hero - the epic hero *par excellence*. Thus while the *Iliad* provides us with the first attested European list of heroic warriors, their military exploits, their combats, their hardships, their wounds, their death or their victories, the *Odyssey* records the adventures of a heroic seafarer-traveller involved in another struggle, the dangers and sufferings associated with epic travel. Both endeavours are necessarily linked and yet also represent separate dimensions of the Greek quest for excellence and fame. Warrior and traveller face situations of adversity, hardships, pain, fearsome dangers including life and death struggles as an unavoidable consequence of the very nature of their activities, and it is because of the perilous character of their lives that men and bards can bestow

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narrow Straits of Salamis, hence choosing the site of battle, precisely because the Persians could only manoeuvre a few ships at a time against his navy. In this manner he systematically demolished the Persian fleet.

<sup>21</sup> Even in periods of foreign domination, the Greeks still maintained their maritime industry. Most recently in (Greek history this occurred during the Ottoman period.

<sup>22</sup> Vide chs. 2, 3 & 4 of the present study.



upon them epic and heroic stature. Of course both must possess those two most fundamental qualities which best equip the protagonist to face these situations of hardship and adversity, which characterize and constitute the Homeric epic hero - *endurance* and courage. It is precisely the possession of endurance and courage that endows both warrior and traveller with the guarantee of either a heroic survival against the hardships, conflicts and dangers, or the assurance of a noble death. The absence of these two basic attributes or hesitancy of their constant display, necessarily disqualifies the candidate from the possibility of heroic status whether on the battlefield or the seas and invite the accusations of dishonour and shame - cowardice, inconsistency and weakness!<sup>23</sup> These qualities then, elevate warrior and traveller from the realm and the ranks of the ordinary, the common, to that of the heroic. They are therefore the manifest badges of the Greek hero.

Within the Homeric literary corpus, the idea of noble endurance is perhaps best embodied and illustrated by the figure of Odysseus. In the *Iliad* Odysseus is constantly described as possessing and displaying endurance (and courage) in battle. Indeed he is an exhorter of endurance among his fellow warriors, when they are gripped and paralyzed by momentary battle panic or fear. Likewise, in the *Odyssey*, among the most constant Homeric epithets describing his attitude as heroic traveller is that of endurance - he is the "much enduring" (πολυτλάς) Odysseus! To that extent, and particularly as embodied in Odysseus, endurance must be seen in its earliest expression as a twin concept.<sup>24</sup> Yet warrior and traveller are also presented as separate categories. While the opposition which confronts the Greek warrior is basically the armament and skills of the opposing military forces - though at times aggravated by antagonistic and capricious patron gods or goddesses - an epic traveller such as Odysseus must face, beside violent human opposition, the additional and thoroughly unpredictable ferocious forces of nature, at times magnified by a vindictive Zeus or a hostile Apollo, or supernatural dangers such as the dangerous straits between the rocks inhabited by the monstrous Scylla and Charybdis (*Od.* 12.235-251) where he stands firmly waiting on his

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<sup>23</sup> I am not employing the term "heroic status" in its technical religious sense, namely incorporation within the "cult of the hero." Rather I am using it in its more popular sense of outstanding achievements against all odds.

<sup>24</sup> Within the Homeric poems, the vocabulary of endurance, designates a basic idea - standing firm or unyieldingly in danger - with a dual application, most normally within the experience of epic travel and / or heroic battle engagement.

ship's deck, armed, against Scylla's imminent ravenous attack upon his crew (*Od.* 12.225) or endure the irresistibly seductive and bewitching Sirens' "honey-sweet" song (*Od.* 12.185). Furthermore while the warrior may intermittently be involved in actual battle situations, the traveller *qua* traveller is by definition constantly involved in his epic journey, at times alone. Here again, the nature of the warrior's endurance and that of the traveller's also shifts its focus. The heroic warrior's endurance (and courage) is demonstrated for the most part and *par excellence* when confronted by the enemy warrior(s), that is in the dangers of combat situations. The epic traveller's endurance, however, needs to be displayed against antagonistic personal forces (human or divine) as well as against ferocious natural forces,<sup>25</sup> for the most part unpredictable and uncharted in their constitution.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, both categories of heroic endurance left an indelible cultural mark upon the ancient Greeks in their understanding and development of the idea of endurance.

*D. The Derivative Nature of Greek Endurance:  
The Impact of the Epic Traveller's Endurance*

Beginning with Odysseus the figure of the much-enduring epic traveller who faces enormous dangers and woes, the notion of the heroic traveller's fortitude, one of the two major prototypical realms of heroic endurance within the Greek world will eventually impact upon and inspire various aspects of Greek and Roman thinking about fortitude. Subsequent epochs will also hail a further hero of endurance in epic travel, with dramatists, novelists and poets re-inventing new heroes of epic endurance such as Apollonius of Rhodes' Jason. In Roman times, Virgil in the *Aeneid*, found it necessary, in rejecting Odysseus as the founding figure of Roman culture, to substitute and re-create another Homeric hero, a Trojan prince who would be cast as an epic traveller.<sup>27</sup> Another important impression which the much-enduring epic traveller would leave upon the Greek psyche

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<sup>25</sup> In the *Odyssey*, such awesome natural opposition is quite often unleashed by hostile divine forces seeking to delay or halt Odysseus' journey towards Ithaca.

<sup>26</sup> Thus not only does Odysseus face a hostile sea, but he must also face a hostile Cyclops.

<sup>27</sup> It is interesting that the first-century novelist, Chariton, invented a much-enduring travel heroine Callirhoe along an Odyssean mould. In this oldest extant European novel, Chariton narrates the travel adventures of the young Callirhoe as she visits Persia, endures many hazards including shipwrecks and battles. Vide, G.P. Goold (ed.), *Chariton, Callirhoe* LCL (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1995).

would be upon moral philosophy. It was appropriated by the moralists, within the broader "storm" or "journey" motifs which would become by the Greco-Roman period a universally-employed philosophic topos also affecting early Jewish literature (e.g. *4 Macc.* 3.11), and Roman philosophy. It was used metaphorically to denote the need for moral endurance in the sage's or his disciples' "epic journey" along "life's treacherous road" (Seneca *Ep.* 44.7) or through the "uncharted" and "little navigated" waters, facing "storms" (Seneca *Ep.* 28.7) or "Scylla or Charybdis or their storied strait" (Seneca *Ep.* 45.2)<sup>28</sup> and other dangers, towards his path or maintenance of wisdom (e.g. Teles *On Self-Sufficiencies* 10H).<sup>29</sup> In this "journey" the "traveller's" endurance and courage are indispensable ;against the alluring song of the "sirens" (Seneca *Ep.* 31, 56.15) that is the passions which endanger navigation. At times philosophers made use of the notion of endurance or resistance in travel metaphors for various didactic or illustrative purposes.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, it also tended to be employed by the Greek tragedians.<sup>31</sup> In the Greco-Roman period this motif was also incorporated within Greco-Jewish literature to figuratively describe the sage-martyr's endurance under the "waves" and "cataclysms" of torture (e.g. *4 Macc.* 7.1-3; 15.30; 15.31. Their "rational" resistance is like a tower against the storms in a harbour ( 13.6-8). The notion of the heroic traveller's endurance also served the Greek philosopher to function as the authenticating credential of his sagacity. Even in the era of the *pax Romana* where epic travel was still considered a dangerous endeavour, endurance remained as one of the most admired qualities of the one who constantly dared the dangers of the high seas and the

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<sup>28</sup> The impact. of the *Odyssey* in travel metaphors or illustrations is very pronounced in Seneca's moral essays and letters.

<sup>29</sup> At times the metaphor of the "hazardous journey" was employed not to designate the sage's "journey" but rather the wasted effort in the quest for unworthy pursuits. For example Seneca in one instance portrays the sage's journey, because it is in accordance to Nature, as "pleasant" and "safe" in comparison to the wasted rigours of the perilous "journey" in pursuit of worldly honours: "'But how," you ask, "does one attain that goal?" You do not need to cross the Pennine or Graian hills, or traverse the (Candavian waste, or face the Syrtes, or Scylla or Charybdis, although you have travelled through all these places for the bribe of a petty governorship. The journey for which Nature has equipped you is .safe and pleasant. She has given you such gifts that you may, if you do not prove false to them, rise level with God.' (Ep. 31.9).

<sup>30</sup> Hence Seneca compares the human body in advanced age to a ship on the high seas which springs many leaks and hence is rendered incapable of resisting the incoming gushing water: 'Just as in a ship that springs a leak, but when many holes begin to open and let in water, the gaping hull cannot be saved.' (*On Conquering the Conqueror / Ep.* 30.2).

<sup>31</sup> Vide, M. Hadas, *The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953) 183 n.1-3.

unprotected rugged hinterland, as one of the proofs of the sage's authenticity or wisdom. This was revealed in the demeanour of a serene endurance in moments of danger in actual travel, as a sign of the possession of wisdom. Thus the authentic wise man on a sea journey remains calm and undisturbed in the middle of a life-threatening storm. A persistent model was Pyrrho (B.C. 360-270).<sup>32</sup> While I categorize several notions of Greek endurance - whether physical or moral - as originally derived from the symbol of the epic traveller, nevertheless, it would appear, that the philosophic theme of the traveller's endurance, whether as an authenticating sign or as a metaphor for moral fortitude does not seem to have had the same degree of intellectual impact upon Greek philosophy, as did the archetypical icon of the warrior's endurance.

*E. The Abiding Impact of the Warrior's Endurance  
And the Derivative Nature of Greek Moral Endurance*

Given the centrality of warfare in ancient Hellas, indeed one may describe it as a perennial institution, it affected, dominated and interacted intensively with several significant layers of Greek life, culture, institutions, literature, religion and thought. Most notably it affected athletics and education which were employed by the *polis* to physically and mentally prepare the warrior in courage and endurance and other martial skills or attributes necessary to face the stress and strain of battle.<sup>33</sup> It affected music which was used to encourage and inspire the warrior marching into

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<sup>32</sup> Diogenes Laertius preserves a fragment from Posidonius relating a story concerning Pyrrho's extraordinary serene endurance in the face of a life-threatening storm: 'When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the undisturbed state in which the wise man should keep himself.' (Diog. L. *Pyrrho* 68 [= IX.68]). The Lucan Paul, whose travels bear an epic Odyssean mould is described in a similar demeanour of serene endurance in situations of life-threatening storms and imminent shipwreck, particularly in his fourth missionary journey towards Rome (*Acts* 27.1-28.1). A similar Odyssean epic mould is also implicitly present, I suggest, in Paul's own construction of certain aspects of his hardship list (2 *Cor.* 11.25-12.5). Here as part of an *inclusio* (2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12) whose overall theme deals with wise and foolish endurance, Paul in accordance to certain Greco-Roman rhetorical conventions compares himself to his opponents in Corinth, in part, with his "boasting" about his epic travel endurance. Like Odysseus Paul demonstrates an epic endurance on dangerous sea journeys (2 *Cor.* 11.26b) and shipwrecks (2 *Cor.* 11.25cd), on dangerous land journeys (2 *Cor.* 11. 26g) and river travel (2 *Cor.* 11.26b), he travels through hostile cities (2 *Cor.* 11.26f), and hostile regions, where narrow and dramatic escapes become necessary (2 *Cor.* 11.32a-33b). Like Odysseus his epic journeys transcend the boundaries of earth - while Odysseus made a journey to Hades, Paul experienced a celestial journey to the third heaven (2 *Cor.* 12.1-5). For a discussion of this Pauline *inclusio*, vide ch. 5 of the present dissertation.

<sup>33</sup> Indeed as I argue in ch. 3 of the present study, the very origins of Greek athletics may be traced to the Greek battlefield. For a discussion of the military character of Greek athletics, vide discussion in chapter 3.

the battle fray.<sup>34</sup> Poets and dramatists made consistent use of the theme of war, where the exploits of military heroes were often hailed. At times Greek literature was deliberately employed as a vehicle to inspire the military psyche, as an "ancillary to the art of war," as is the case, for instance, with the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus who praised military courage and endurance as supreme human values,<sup>35</sup> or the Athenian dramatist Aeschylus who saw a necessary marriage between literature and the military ethos.<sup>36</sup> Like poetry and drama, art was also dominated with themes of war and the Greek warrior was a constant motif on vases, paintings and sculptures.<sup>37</sup> War profoundly affected the writings of the Greek historiographers, which basically became chronicles of celebrated wars and battles in which Greek warriors participated.<sup>38</sup> Politics as an institution in

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<sup>34</sup> The Spartans, for instance when they marched into battle, did so in step to the sounds of many flutes. This is attested both by literary (e.g. Thucydides) as well as archaeological evidence (e.g. seventh century B.C. Corinthian vase - the Chigi Vase; illustration in Ducrey *op. cit.* 63.). It is interesting that the creative impact of the military upon music has continued up to the modern period. For instance the incorporation of percussion instruments in European classical music only occurred in the seventeenth century. Subsequently Mozart would introduce the triangle and other Greco-Turkish military percussion instruments into his compositions by way of the influence of the gennasaret bands of Constantinople. Bethoven introduced the idea of "canon shots!" and snare drums into classical music as late as 1812, in his "Wellington's Victory," as a result of the inspiration of Wellington's defeat of Napoleon.

<sup>35</sup> F.A. Wright comments that the poems of Tyrtaeus were regarded by the ancient Spartans as '...one of the chief causes of their military success . . . . ' in *Greek Athletics* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1925) 46.

<sup>36</sup> Tyrtaeus the Spartan poet in his poetry emphasized the superiority of the warrior's virtues, especially courage and endurance, over all other qualities and pursuits, and many of the dramatists shared this perspective. As Wright explains, 'Tyrtaeus . . . . regarded the art of poetry as ancillary to the art of war, and the greatest of the dramatists shared his views. The real gravamen of Aeschylus' attack upon Euripides in the *Frogs*, is that the latter did not sufficiently exalt the martial spirit . . . . ' in *op. cit.* 46-47.

<sup>37</sup> From the Mycenaean period right till late Hellenistic times, Greek art (vases, statues) was dominated with military themes and the depiction of the warrior. Concerning the abiding military nature of Greek art Wright writes: 'Upon the silver ware of Mycenae we see the Minoans fighting . . . . The statues from Aegina are all of men arrayed for battle with lance, shield, and sword. Even Pallas Athene, the goddess of wisdom . . . . the decorations of her temple are mostly pictures of battle or of preparation for the fray . . . . Painters like sculptors found their chief subjects in war, either in the ancient combats of the epic . . . . or in the actual life of the parade-ground and the guard-room. The Attic vases of the sixth and fifth centuries, the best example we possess of truly popular art, repeat the warrior motif almost to satiety, and they did so because the potter knew that of this subject at least his clients would never be weary.' *Op. cit.* 44. Indeed archaeological evidence attests that the warrior took art: into battle, in terms of exquisite shield decorations.

<sup>38</sup> Historiographers such as Thucydides, as we have already seen, and Xenophon, regarded history almost exclusively as a sequence of battles. Concerning this martial reading of Greek historiography Wright observes: 'Of the social history of their time they [i.e. Thucydides and Xenophon] tell us scarcely anything, but they will dilate with the most intense interest on the smallest details of a skirmish.' *op. cit.* 47. It must also be remembered that, unlike contemporary trends, most of the writers and intelligentsia were also, at some point of their lives, warriors, and in most cases having served with heroism and for considerable periods. For instance, Aeschylus was a hero of Salamis. Not long after the first performance of his *Antigone*, Sophocles served in the capacity of an admiral of the Athenian navy. Socrates, as will be discussed in the ensuing chapter, served with distinction at Delium, while, Thucydides had assumed command of the Athenian army at Thrace. Even Euripides the greatest critic of Hellas' military psyche was no pacifist having offered some forty years of military service for Athens.

large measure functioned for the organization of warfare, the inculcation of the ideals and training of the citizen-warrior,<sup>39</sup> while religion served, not in small part, for divine protection, to predict the outcome of battle,<sup>40</sup> to emotionally assist the warrior or even, in the case of outstanding displays of bravery and endurance in the battlefield, to deify him.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, among the Greeks, the most admired heroes of the Hellenic world were primarily warriors. Thus, for instance, we are informed by Arrian that Alexander's conquest of the Near East was in part inspired by his admiration for Achilles and his zeal to imitate him as a warrior.

Given this multi-dimensional impact of the military upon the Hellenes, from Homer to Alexander to the Ptolemies and Seleucids, it is not surprising to find the notion of the warrior's endurance also exercising a contributory, profound and complex effect, upon most of these military-affected dimensions of Greek life and culture. Consequently, its impact and influence is manifestly and indelibly evident in many significant dimensions of the Greek psyche historiographical and poetic literature, art, athletics and education, philosophy and religion.

Despite his pessimistic view of war, it is clear that Homer admires and praises the warrior's heroic display in battle. Among the list of military attributes which he isolates for comment and

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<sup>39</sup> In Athens, for example, the warrior was the citizen *par excellence*. In this connection Y. Garlan writes: ' . . . . a citizen is by definition a soldier . . . . ' in his *War in the Ancient World: A Social History* (I.a Guerre dans l'Antiquite) ET by J. Lloyd (New York, Norton & Company, 1975) 91.

<sup>40</sup> Many of the extant written replies of the Pythian (Delphic) Apollo relate to military matters. Typically the question addressed to the Delphic oracle would be "Will they win?" (εἰ νικήσουσιν). The oracular responses were never as straightforward as the question, and were usually cloaked in verbal ambiguities demanding imaginative interpretation. A celebrated instance, to which I have alluded earlier, is Themistocles' interpretation of the Delphic instruction to the Athenians (in the period preceding Salamis), to build "wooden walls" as the expansion of the fleet (Herodotus 7.141). A list of other elements of the inter-connection between the military and ancient Greek religion would include the fact that several of the Hellenic deities were acclaimed as warrior gods or goddesses - 'Αθηνά, she who "delights in tumults and wars and battles" (Hesiod, *Theogony* 926.) In fact the fuller description by Hesiod reads: 'the awful, the strife-seeking, the host leader, the unwearying, the queen, who delights in tumults and wars and battles.' 924-926). Aphrodite was also a goddess linked with war, as the *Iliad* attests. Artemis is designated as "war-encouraging," while the very personification of war, Ἄρης was described as "the scourge of humanity." For a discussion of Ares as war god, vide W. Burkert *Greek Religion* ET by J. Raffan (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1985) 169-170. Among the Olympian deities these were the most frequently invoked before a battle or for the protection of an endangered city. For a useful discussion of the impact of warfare and the warrior on Greek religious expression, vide Ducrey *op. cit.* 258-278: also Burkert, *op. cit.* passim.

<sup>41</sup> The Christian writer, Theodoretus, in caricaturing the deification process of historical personages among pagans, lists within the criteria of divinization, battle heroism: 'Afterwards they deified those who had done anything well or had demonstrated bravery in battle . . . . The Greeks also made Herakles a god because he was noble and brave.' [Graecarum *Affectionum Curatio* 3.24]. I Likewise Lysander the Spartan general was deified (Plutarch, *Life of Lysander* 18) as was the most celebrated warrior of the Hellenistic era, Alexander the Great (Arrian *Anab. Alex* 7.23.2,6).

praise, endurance features prominently. This is most evident of course in the *Iliad*. The same admiration for the much-enduring warrior *is also* revealed in the extant poetic fragments of Tyrtaeus, as well as in Greek historiography, such as Thucydides' monumental account of the Peloponnesian War and the Greco-Roman Arrian's account of Alexander's military exploits during his conquest of the Near East. Greek art also glorified the warrior's endurance, and several surviving statues, mosaics or vases depict the Greek warrior in classical battle posture reflecting his courage and endurance. Thus he is portrayed as standing firm in battle position, advancing energetically into battle or dying with shield still attached, all visually suggesting the negation of cowardice or the absence of endurance - retreat or flight.<sup>42</sup>

The value and admiration of military endurance would also leave an abiding impact upon Greek athletics. Indeed, Greek athletics owes its origins to the world of the warrior and the battlefield. This is plainly evident from the earliest recorded athletic event, namely the funeral games of Patroclus (*Il.* 23.256-897). At this stage of Greek history the athlete is the warrior. His values are exclusively military. Accordingly the concept of athletic endurance is born out of the warrior's sporting competition to be the most excellent among his peers, to obtain the "prize" and win the acclaim of his fellow warriors for his ἀρετή. It is warriors who become the first athletic judges, and it is warriors like Achilles who "award" the prizes. The competitor's endurance and skills as a warrior are now translated onto the competition of the games as would their language and notions. Accordingly Homer describes athletic terms with military concepts, for as yet the world of athletics was not fully formed. Nevertheless even with the gradual separation between the battlefield and the athlete the militarized language and concepts remained as a permanent feature of Greek athletics, including the notion of the athlete's καρτερία or ὑπομονή, which, because of the close liaison between athletics and education, were also inculcated into Greek παιδεία.

But, from the perspective of the history of European thought, perhaps the most significant impact of the image of the Greek warrior's endurance is to be found upon Greek philosophy. The

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<sup>42</sup> I deal in some detail with the impact of the warrior's endurance upon Greek poetry, historiography and art in ch. 1 of the present study.

Greek sages would be quick to recognize, appropriate and transform this military notion into a distinct moral attribute, one of the aggressive and heroic virtues within their various ethical systems. Beginning with the presocratics it would appear that the notion of endurance had already been transformed into a moral attribute. Yet given the extant literary evidence, it seems more admissible to view that Athenian sage and ex-warrior, namely Plato's Socrates (as attested in the *Laches*) as the first Greek philosopher to most clearly, systematically and indelibly appropriate and transform the notion of the warrior's endurance into a philosophic ideal, albeit in conjunction with courage (ἀνδρεία).<sup>43</sup> As a consequence of this demilitarization process, moral concept now becomes an integral and legitimate aspect of ethical discussion. Viewed in its new format as a superior and more perfect expression of endurance (and courage) than that demonstrated by the warrior in battle, moral endurance was now qualified by Plato and followed by his pupil Aristotle as "wise" or "rational" endurance, becoming one of the "aggressive" or masculine attributes of the wise man in circumstances of adversity. Indeed, while the Cynics described moral endurance as one of the "perfect goods," the Stoics viewed endurance as a basic element of one of the primary goods and virtues, namely courage. In some eclectic Hellenistic and Greco-Roman circles endurance was even personified as a mythological entity, much like Σοφία.<sup>44</sup> It is very important to note that in this demilitarization process, the Greek sages could refer to moral endurance in either rhetorical forms. He could present the notion figuratively in a military context. I call this "militarized" endurance. On the other hand he could refer to it in a thoroughly demilitarized conceptual and linguistic framework. I call this expression of moral endurance, "demilitarized" endurance.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless hints of its original military matrix abided in the practice and discussion

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<sup>43</sup> It is important to remember that in the extant fragments of the presocratic Democritus, the idea of endurance is already being employed in a fully-fledged ethical fashion. Nevertheless the point I wish to stress here is that it is only in the dialogues of Plato, that this notion is clearly and systematically seen to undergo a manifest transition from the military world to that of the sage - a process which, the evidence suggests, had already occurred prior to Socrates. It is simply that in the writings of Plato, especially the *Laches*, this development / evolution is unmistakably evident.. and repeating itself before our eyes, albeit in a Socratic direction.

<sup>44</sup> Vide Section 1: Conclusion,' in the present study.

<sup>45</sup> By the term "demilitarization" of endurance I mean that process by which military endurance was appropriated by the Greek philosophers. An alternative term would be the "philosophication" of endurance. By "militarized" endurance I mean that expression of moral or philosophic endurance which still reveals hints of its original military



of the wise man's endurance. This manifested itself in at least two ways. (1) The persistent juxtaposition of the twin military attributes of the heroic warrior, courage and endurance was now being presented as inseparable moral qualities of the sage. For instance Plato's Socrates viewed "rational" endurance as a category of courage, a tendency which was essentially followed by Aristotle. Likewise in Stoic treatises the idea of endurance in hardship, pain and danger was often juxtaposed with courage (cf. Cynics). (2) Another, and perhaps more dramatic attestation to the continued "militarized" nature and origins of Greek moral endurance was the philosophers' usage of this motif in military metaphors. In a culture so imbued with military values such as that of classical and Hellenistic Greece, it is not surprising that for various reasons, philosophers would describe the soul as the arena of a "battle" (πόλεμος, μάχη) or "struggle" (ἀγών) between the noble dispositions (courage, endurance, wisdom, self-mastery etc.), against various "enemies," hostile to the well-being, tranquillity, rationality and happiness of the ψυχή. These antagonists of the rational soul (which in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophy came to be identified with the sage himself or moral "prototypes" like Odysseus or Herakles), were most usually characterized in two categories (though they sometimes overlapped). (1) The soul's internal "enemies" which included the passions (πάθοι), desires (ἐπιθυμίας) or vainglory (δόξα). (2) The external threats or "enemies" which could be the adverse and harsh circumstances of life (in accordance to Seneca's *maxim vivere militare est*). These hostile circumstances or "attacks" may have human or divine instigation - Stoics spoke of the attacks of whimsical Tyche / Fortuna. In the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period, the sage in "combat" was not infrequently depicted as a "warrior" exhibiting the heroic attributes of endurance and courage in facing suffering, the passions, hardships, toils, afflictions, dangers, opposition or assaults of Tyche. Philosophy also began to ascribe military metaphors of endurance to its martyr-sages, a tradition initiated in Plato's *Apology* and *Phaedo*. In his disregard for public opinion or the despot's favour, and by his παρρησία or bold and frank

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background (vide below). By "demilitarized" endurance I mean that expression of moral or philosophic endurance which reveals no manifest hint of military overtones. Essentially that means any mention of philosophic endurance which is not associated with such other moral virtues as courage or strength; or, is not found within a military metaphor. It must be borne in mind however, that all dimensions of ancient Greek moral endurance still have in common a context of hardship, conflict, and / or danger. To that extent all dimensions of philosophic endurance still retain a "militarized" tone.

speech expressing conscience, exposing injustice or evil practices, the sage would often evoke hostile opposition, persecution or even "martyrdom." Beginning with Plato's Socrates, endurance became a martyrological concept and the sage-martyr could figuratively be described in military categories as a much-enduring warrior. Thus, whether describing the heroic attribute of a sage or a martyr, the notion's original military context, and its abiding impact even after its essential moral transformation by philosophy, was revealed through its military metaphors of heroic endurance (and courage). The continued "military" link, however, also served the Greek sage with a useful didactic or illustrative device. To begin with, it functioned as an emphazier. It vividly highlighted the sheer intensity and suffering involved in the authentic sage's and martyr's unyielding and persevering attitude displayed in the "struggle" or "combat" against the passions or Tyche, and towards a victorious self-mastery, in a manner that the demilitarized vocabulary of philosophical endurance might not have been able to achieve as persuasively. Linguistically and conceptually, to say "I endure hardship," or "I endure persecution and torture with courage," might not be as immediate, as compelling or as powerful in conveying the gargantuan suffering involved in the experience as would the statement "I am as a warrior standing firm before the attacks of the enemy as I fight the battle of freedom, with the weapons of courage and truth, no matter the danger or the personal cost." In the latter case, the noble and courageous dimensions of the sage's endurance are highlighted and conveyed in a more dynamic and accessible format to the reader or hearer, who lived in an ancient military culture such as Greece, the Hellenistic empires or imperial Rome, and whose list of heroes included much-enduring warriors such as Achilles, Odysseus, Alexander or Marcus Cato. Furthermore, the sheer power of the military symbolism helped to evoke and illustrate, in a dramatic manner the unsung heroic and epic proportions of the sage's or martyr's moral endurance in confronting situations of opposition, danger, toil and hardship. While the populace might acclaim the endurance of an Achilles or a Hercules, the rhetorical or literary metaphor of martial endurance (and courage) helped to instruct them concerning the significance of the struggle for moral excellence which also possessed a heroic texture, indeed as the ultimate heroic struggle. Furthermore it served pictorially to describe related functions of moral endurance.

Accordingly, the image of the wise man or martyr portrayed as a much-enduring "warrior" emphasized the heroic, victorious, noble, aggressive and masculine nature of the Greek quest or preservation of wisdom and moral perfection. Indeed, in Greek philosophical circles, beginning with Plato, the heroic sage in mortal combat, because his endurance and courage are controlled by a life in accordance to Reason or Nature, and hence possessing a superior version of the heroic virtues, would be considered as the new archetype of the "virile man," the authentic new "warrior." In effect, because of the moral transformation of brave endurance from the battlefield to the Academy, a paradigm shift in Greek heroic values was initiated, which in time would find its way into the earliest Christian literature, namely the letters of the apostle Paul, where the believer was depicted as a much-enduring "warrior."

On the other hand this is not to suggest that the demilitarized form of moral endurance, that is endurance devoid of associated military imagery or language, was in any sense less frequent]y employed by the sages. Nor am I suggesting that the use of demilitarized moral endurance was intended to portray a lesser heroic form of endurance. Rather the sage's choice between the mention of a militarized or demilitarized moral endurance, in his treatises or moral exhortations, was in large part a subjective one. Perhaps among ancient types of audiences a demilitarized expression of endurance might have proven more persuasive to the argument. Indeed certain dramatic rhetorical conventions were available to the rhetor or sage when dealing with the vocabulary of endurance when expressed in non-militarized language. Quite frequently, however, the ancient Greek and Roman sages tended to mix their usage of the concept of moral endurance. Accordingly in a moral treatise it is not unusual to find the idea of endurance portrayed in a metaphoric military context, while a few sentences subsequently it might be expressed in its demilitarized form.

What of the role of women concerning the possession of rational and heroic endurance? In the quest or defence of moral perfection, the majority of Greek sages excluded women. The exclusion of the female was based intrinsically on a prevalent view of the very nature of woman who was considered to belong to the morally weaker gender. A few philosophers, however, such as Crates,

Pseudo-Crates and Musonius Rufus, were quite revolutionary on this subject. They allowed for the possibility of the participation of women in the "life of endurance." Indeed they even described them in the vocabulary of the masculine and heroic much-enduring "warrior."

There remains another important dimension of Greek moral endurance. As I have already briefly alluded, the notion of the warrior's endurance also impacted upon the world of the Greek athlete, and was swiftly incorporated as an athletic virtue - the athlete's endurance. Having begun in the battlefield, then appropriated into the gymnasium or stadium, as a praiseworthy athletic attribute though it never quite lost the impact of its military matrix nor its ethos - this athletic version of the warrior's endurance also came into philosophical parlance. Accordingly the sage, having appropriated the warrior and his endurance as a prototypical icon metaphorically describing his own "battles" now also turns to the athlete - who as a Greek heroic figure, originated from the battlefield, and hence remained in the Greek psyche as a type of the "warrior" - in order to describe his own endurance in the moral ἀγών in which he is engaged against (most notably vice or the passions of the soul). The mixed metaphor of the sage as both athlete and warrior of endurance further re-enforces the original martial nature of endurance. likewise the martyr-sage's endurance and demeanour in his heroic suffering could also be described in (combative) athletic images, in order to emphatically illustrate the nature of the sage's tortures and his "noble death."

In a society where military and athletic heroes were very popular and where athletic struggles and military conflict was readily understood, such dramatic images of heroic endurance would serve as useful popular illustration. Furthermore it also re-enforced the fact that sages were also wounded and sometimes even died for their causes, just as a soldier might in the cause of his state.

*F. The Widespread Impact of the Greek Sage's  
"Militarized" and "Agonistic" Endurance<sup>46</sup>*

As a consequence of the Hellenization of the Mediterranean world and the spread of Greek and Hellenistic ideas, the notion of the sage's moral endurance expressed in its (i) militarized and demilitarized format, as well as (ii) the rhetoric and psychagogy of demilitarized endurance,

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<sup>46</sup> By "martial endurance" I mean any form of endurance ascribed to a warrior and athlete. By "agonistic endurance" I mean the expression of moral endurance exclusively in athletic imagery or metaphor(s).

became universalized. It would affect Roman thinking, as is quite evident in the writings of the Roman Stoics, especially in the ethical treatises of the "Roman Socrates" Musonius Rufus as well as those of Seneca. Furthermore, with the intensive assimilation of Greek ideas within the early Judaisms,<sup>47</sup> the notion of militarized moral endurance, which is quite unique in its origins and development to Greek philosophy, left an indelible imprint upon certain circles of early Jewish theological expression.<sup>48</sup> Besides inheriting traditional biblical traditions of endurance, Jewish thinkers now inserted Greek elements of "militarized" or "agonistic" endurance and expressed them with the use of Greek rhetorical conventions. This is especially evident in such first-century martyrological documents as *4 Maccabees*,

*Testament of Job*<sup>49</sup> as well as the essays of Philo of Alexandria, all of which are among the finest literary examples of how far Greek thinking had affected the early Jewish mind. While the impact of Greek philosophical ideas is inter-woven with the religion of Israel, nevertheless their understanding of moral and martyrological endurance remains essentially Greek.<sup>50</sup> In the universalization of the philosophic use of militarized and demilitarized endurance, the apostle Paul

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<sup>47</sup> The Jewish world of the first century was not isolated from the dominant culture of the time, a culture dominated by Roman institutions and Hellenistic thought, vide, M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism. Studies in their encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic Period* (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1974) one volume edition. In other words, Paul lived and interacted within a Greco-Roman world, within which the early Judaisms formed an integral dimension. Both diaspora and Palestinian Jews were affected by this process of cultural transformation. Concerning diaspora Jews S.K. Stowers, explains that by the first century (A.D.), the century of the apostle Paul's missionary and epistolary activity, '...more Jews lived in cities of the Roman empire outside Galilee and Judea than within. Most of these Jews spoke Greek and were just as Greek in culture as Jews living (today) in the United States are American in culture; they were also at least as diverse in their forms of Judaism,' Vide Stowers, *Letter Writing in (Greco-Roman Antiquity*, Philadelphia, 1986, 41. Even in Jerusalem, the location of Judaism's sacred temple, a first century Jew could not altogether escape the impact of Hellenism, whether intellectually, architecturally, linguistically or even theologically - its impact was ubiquitous. C. Osiek (R.S.C.J.) explains that during the Hellenistic and Roman occupation of Palestine, '... the Jerusalem (Jewish) aristocracy realized that . . . the only way to prosper was to adopt certain aspects of Greek culture: language, dress, . . . theatre and athletics, assuming Greek names . . . . Cultured Greeks of the period tended to see themselves as racially and culturally superior to "barbarians" . . . . who then felt it necessary to prove themselves by demonstrating how Greek they could be.' Vide, *What Are They Saying About the Social Setting of the New Testament*, New York, 1984, 13. Indeed under Herod I, Jerusalem received something of a Hellenic "atmosphere" and style, through his Greek-inspired architectural projects. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of Hellenistic culture on Jewish Palestine, vide Hengel, *op. cit.* Also by the same author, *Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians. Aspects of the Hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian Period* Philadelphia, 1980.

<sup>48</sup> That is certain forms of Judaism expressed during the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period.

<sup>49</sup> Henceforth abbreviated. Vide 'Abbreviations.'

<sup>50</sup> It is of course difficult to determine how to classify the works of a Philo, or that of the author of *4 Macc.* or *T. Job.* Does one classify them as "Greek" or "Jewish?" In this study I treat them as "Greco-Jewish" works.

was also affected. Indeed some of those documents which according to ecclesiastic tradition were also associated with the name of "Paul" and which I will refer to as the *Corpus Paulinum (CP)*<sup>51</sup> the notion of agonistic moral endurance was also appropriated. From the Greek battlefield to the Gymnasium, to the Academy, to the Lyceum, to the Stoa, to the Church - by way of the letters of Paul - such was the moral and spiritual transformation, evolution and spread of a concept which in accordance with our extant literary sources, originally and for the most part, simply described an essential attribute of the heroic warriors (and epic travellers) of Greece.

## II. Scope and Aims

### A. Section I Theses

From these two archetypal and heroic dimensions of endurance military and epic - I suggest that most other Greek conceptualizations or traditions of the notion eventually derive and evolve or receive their original inspiration, yet of the two categories, the symbol of the warrior's endurance will wield the widest and most powerful intellectual and cultural impact upon the Greek psyche, and beyond.<sup>52</sup> The history, nature and process of this impact upon the Greeks, in particular on the world of the athlete, the sage and the martyr, becomes the overall interest of section 1. My theses in this section are the following:

[1] *That the notion of the warrior's endurance exercised a considerable impact among the earliest Greek historiographers, poets, dramatists and artists and who in their various expressions considered it a noteworthy and praiseworthy attribute. Accordingly it would seem that in its earliest most widespread employment, the idea of endurance among the Greeks, was originally understood*

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<sup>51</sup> Most of the early Christian documents which would eventually be recognized as constituting the canon of the New Testament were composed before the turn of the first Christian century. While there is debate among New Testament scholars concerning the dates of much of the New Testament literature, there appears to be almost universal consensus that the undisputed letters of Paul constitute the earliest extant written documents preserved in the New Testament. Furthermore there appears to be some consensus concerning which of the canonical documents were the latest to be composed, that is in the second century. critical scholars include in this list the Johannine epistles as well as *2 Peter*. For a discussion vide, W.G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* [ET by H.C. Kee] Nashville, Abingdon, 1981) 4th printing.

<sup>52</sup> The notion of the traveller's endurance, will of course, continue to be employed from Homer's time on. Both literally and figuratively, it was to a large extent dominated by the figure of Odysseus. As Socrates became the prototypical martyr of endurance so Odysseus became the archetypal "much-enduring" traveller, as Homer's epithet consistently announces in the *Od.* In Greco-Roman times, when travel and endurance are raised in the extant literature, the figure of Odysseus is often mentioned (e.g. Seneca). On the other hand, the notion of the Greek warrior's heroic endurance (and courage) was not as particularized and identified with any one particular warrior.

*as a military value, describing in conjunction with courage a central and heroic attribute of the warrior, and becomes the ultimate criterion of masculinity. Furthermore, flight in battle, the opposite of endurance, was considered among the most shameful human acts.*

[2] *That among those Greek historiographers, poets, dramatists and artists upon which the notion of the warrior's endurance held the most powerful impact, an ethnographic principle was devised whereby the Greek warrior was considered as innately more courageous and capable of endurance in battle than the barbarian warrior .*

[3] *That the notion of military endurance, as praised, understood and defined among the ancient Greek poets, historiographers, tragedians and artists, possessed a certain anthropological dimension. Women were considered as innately incapable of possessing either courage or endurance in warfare, hence rendering the battlefield as the exclusive domain of the Greek male.*

[4] *From the perspective of the history of ideas, that the most significant impact of the notion of the warrior's endurance (and courage) would be exercised upon the (Greek philosophers. That the philosophic notion of endurance as a moral virtue or as a subordinate virtue (of courage) derives for the most part, in its inspiration, from this impact, and consequently inherits many of its military traits, though now in a morally transformed direction.*

Among the few modern scholars who have perceived this conceptual link between the notion of moral endurance and its military matrix, one would include the biblical scholar Leon Morris. In his commentary on the apostle Paul's letter to the church at Rome (Rom. 2.7) in interpreting the term ὑπομένειν, - one of the chief terms in the colony of Greek words denoting endurance - writes: 'His word for persistence denotes an active, manly fortitude. It is used of the soldier who, in the thick of a hard battle, gives as much as he gets; he is not dismayed by the blows he receives, but fights on to the end'<sup>53</sup> While Morris is correct to make this conceptual link, nevertheless in the context of his exegesis, the idea is used by Paul in a thoroughly demilitarized form. While, as I have suggested the moral notion of endurance even in its demilitarized form, does eventually derive from the world of the military, Morris does not elaborate or substantiate the reasons for his acute

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<sup>53</sup> L. Morris, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids, 1988). 116.

observation. The present study represents the first detailed analysis and explanation of this link and its ramifications.

[5] *That the concept of moral endurance became a significant notion within the ethical systems of Platonic, Aristotelian, Cynic and Stoic philosophy as one of the aggressive (cf. gentle) and masculine moral attributes in situations of conflict, danger, struggle and hardship.*

[6] *In its literary expression, beginning with Plato, moral endurance is depicted both in a "militarized" and "demilitarized" form. Accordingly, locating the place and function of this new philosophic value, namely moral endurance whether "militarized" or "demilitarized" - within the overall ethical structures of the various major Greek, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophic systems becomes another aspect of my investigation.*

[7] *That in its demilitarized form moral endurance is characterized by several features. (i) it is recognized as one of the sage's most commendable aggressive virtues in a wide range of circumstances of hardship. (ii) It is usually associated with other gentler virtues,<sup>54</sup> rather than as a sole attribute of the soul. (iii) Several rhetorical conventions became associated with the notion of endurance, in particular the hardship list, the comparison, the model of imitation and the list of virtues. (iv) Its character was evaluated as praiseworthy if it was a wise form of endurance, and foolish if it was not governed by reason. These elements of moral endurance are uniquely Greek in origin and are not found in the Hebrew Scripture.*

[8] *That the abiding impact of the Greek warrior's endurance upon the writings of the Greek (and subsequently Roman) sages is clearly evident upon that literary form of moral endurance which I call militarized. Here its old military association with courage continues in a transformed moral sense, a tendency which with the notable exception of the Cynics, became popular among those schools which commended the virtue of moral endurance. Furthermore, the depiction of military endurance in a transformed moral sense, was also quite frequently set within military (and athletic) metaphors. The sage becomes the much-enduring "warrior."*

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<sup>54</sup> For a discussion of the gentler Greek virtues in Greek antiquity (e.g. charity, mercy, pity, wisdom, etc), from Homer to Socrates, vide G.H. MacGurdy, *The Quality of Mercy: The Gentler Virtues in Greek Literature* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1940).



[9] *Beginning with the late Cynics these metaphors incorporate the idea of the sage as military commander exhorting his disciples to "stand firm" in "battle." An implicit connotation in this figurative exhortation is the "commander's" own proven record of heroic "military" endurance. Without such a reputation he could not expect to be effective in this cry for combat.*

These two tendencies of philosophic endurance (i) the association of endurance with courage (i.e., military language and (ii) the use of diverse military imagery (i.e., military metaphors) not only reflect the martial origins of Greek moral endurance, but tend, within the history of ideas, to be uniquely Greek, in their original usage.

[10] *I find no compelling evidence to the contrary within the extant writings of the ancient Mediterranean (including the Hebrew Bible)<sup>55</sup> to the view that moral endurance, employed within military or athletic imagery, was used in any substantial and systematic fashion prior to Greek philosophy. I propose that the concept of moral endurance, set within a transformed military framework, and applied as a description of the struggles of the lives of righteous individuals, is essentially a Greek idea.<sup>56</sup>*

[11] *That the function of presenting the sage's moral endurance in military language or imagery, served to dramatically highlight the heroic and masculine nature of the sage's moral struggle and combat, as well as an authenticating illustration.*

[12] *That from the world of the military the notion of endurance enters into Greek athletics, and from the latter into the language and metaphors of the Greek philosophers. The much-enduring sage or novice philosopher is like an athlete of endurance striving against his opposition.*

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<sup>55</sup> I am only aware of one major exception within the Hebrew Bible, namely *Jer.* 1.17-19, and repeated in abbreviated manner at 15.20).

<sup>56</sup> Johannes Leipoldt in a brief essay, a few decades ago, made the general assertion that in antiquity the use of military metaphors *per se*, when applied to individuals in a moral or spiritual sense, is essentially a Greek rather than a Jewish notion. Vide J. Leipoldt, 'Das Bild von Kriege in der griechischen Welt,' in *Gott und die Götter. Festgabe für Erich Fascher zum 60. Geburtstag* [ed.] G. Deling et al. [Berlin, Evangelische Verlaganstalt, 1958] 16-30. My dissertation deals exclusively with the notion of endurance and hence I am not in a position to evaluate Leipoldt's general thesis, a thesis which A. Malherbe has fairly recently rejected as "overstated" [vide A. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis Fortress Press, 1989) 96], but nevertheless in the case of the origins and usage of military metaphors of moral endurance applied to the character and lives of individuals, his general thesis is correct.

[13] *That, beginning with Plato's Socrates, martyrological endurance (including persecution, exile and non-capital punishment) was not infrequently depicted in "militarized" and / or "athletic" language and metaphors of brave endurance. This again was to demonstrate the heroic character of the sage who like the warrior could also suffer physical wounds and even death. Such brave endurance governed by reason., indeed marked a paradigm shift in the philosopher's conception of "heroic man." The new archetype of heroic endurance and courage and hence of masculinity, was the sage or sage-martyr.*

[14] *That, with certain isolated exceptions, within the traditions of the Hebrew Bible, the concept of martial endurance as a spiritual value expressed in metaphoric martial frameworks and language is by and large missing, as a consistent and traditional theme. The same is true of early Jewish apocalyptic tradition. When it does appear it does not appear to be part of a systematic and consistent biblical tradition. That the continued and organized conceptualization of moral endurance in its transformed "martial" framework is primarily a Greek philosophic creation, which eventually becomes an aspect of moral exhortation in the eclectic Greco-Roman ideological universe.*

[15] *That the "martial" employment of moral endurance, understood as a heroic, aggressive, masculine virtue affected early Jewish literature most profoundly in the first century (B.C. / A.D.), and especially in Jewish martyria literature such as represented by T. Job and 4 Macc. reflecting most of the nuances conveyed by the Greek and Roman conception of martyrological endurance.*

### *B. Section 2 Theses*

The apostle Paul is the first attested writer, in the history of early Christianity, to make use of the idea of moral endurance in a relatively consistent literary manner, and it would seem that through his influence, this concept in large measure, slipped into early Christian parlance and thought, with reference to a wide context of hardships.<sup>57</sup> It is therefore interesting that already before the turn of the first century, in certain ecclesiastical circles, the apostle Paul had come to be identified as an exemplar of endurance in much affliction. Thus in a Roman Christian letter (*1*

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<sup>57</sup> It is important to note that the concept of endurance in association with martyrdom entered into early Christian thought, *par excellence*, as a result of the impact of the sufferings and crucifixion of Jesus (e.g. *Heb.* 12.2), and only secondarily through the influence of the letters of Paul (e.g. *Phlp.* 1.27-30).

*Clement*)<sup>58</sup> sent to the Corinthians a few decades after the martyrdom of Paul, the author would remind them, in a style and vocabulary reminiscent of the apostle's catalogue of hardships in 2 *Corinthians* 11.23-33, of the apostle's exemplary endurance particularly in terms of his capacity to endure exile, travel, persecution, conflict, jealousy, physical and psychological pain:<sup>59</sup>

'Through jealousy and strife Paul showed the way to the prize of endurance (ὑπομονῆς βραβεῖον ὑπέδειξεν); seven times he was in bonds, he was exiled, he was stoned, he was a herald both to the east and the West, he achieved the noble fame of his faith, he taught righteousness to all the world, and when he had reached the limits of the West, he gave his testimony before the rulers and thus passed from the world and was taken onto the Holy Place - the greatest example of endurance (ὑπομονῆς γενόμενος μέγιστος ὑπογραμμός).' [*I Clem.* 5.5-7].

If by the turn of the first century the apostle Paul was already being characterized in terms of the vocabulary of endurance and hailed as the "greatest example of endurance," and one who shows the way towards "the prize of endurance," it is clear that at least in some Christian circles, his teachings and example of endurance had exercised a profound effect. How then did he understand and use this notion? Clearly the reality and need for moral endurance is not unique to Paul's apostolic experiences. Likewise among the writings of antiquity, this notion is not exclusively found in his letters. Paul did not invent the idea of endurance! Accordingly any discussion of the apostle Paul's usage of the concept of endurance cannot operate *ex nihilo* because he did not function within an *ex nihilo* psychological, psychagogic, social or intellectual vacuum. Paul was not somehow immune from the human experience of suffering nor shielded from the influence of any established conceptual framework within which to express and communicate this experience.<sup>60</sup> Consequently it seems unreasonable to assume that Paul would have been unaware

<sup>58</sup> The name of the writer of *I Clement* is not mentioned in the letter. Indeed the internal evidence suggests a collective Roman Christian authorship rather than that of an individual. Nevertheless according to subsequent ecclesiastical tradition, the letter was attributed to Clement, a bishop of Rome in the final years of the first century.

<sup>59</sup> It is interesting that the apostle Paul is metaphorically described here as an "athlete" of great endurance. While Paul does use military metaphors to describe his endurance, nevertheless nowhere in his letters does he employ athletic imagery to describe his apostolic endurance. His use of athletic imagery is directed to other purposes.

<sup>60</sup> Clearly the idea and reality of endurance was not unique to Paul nor the early Church. As Festugière correctly observed in 1931, in a brief discussion dealing exclusively with one of the key words from the ancient Greek vocabulary of endurance - ὑπομονή, both pagan and Christian understood it since it is ' . . . . un sentiment commun - et nécessairement commun, car païen et chrétien, l'on souffre . . . . ' A.M. Festugière, 'Υπομονή dans la tradition Grecque,' in RSR, Tome XXI (Paris, 1931) 477. Common sense suggests that the need for perseverance, patience, steadfastness, endurance, fortitude is no respecter of culture or even chronological eras. In a very real sense it is universal and diachronic since all "normal" human experience various levels or combinations of trepidation, fear, hesitation or confusion in the face of the unknown, danger, pain, illness or hardship or in the confrontation of death. Hence the need for survival by what is referred to in contemporary American colloquialism as "hanging in there" /

or unaffected by the various views concerning endurance of his own time. It is legitimate therefore to ask, what was the relationship between Paul's understanding and expression of his apostolic endurance and that of other literary expressions of antiquity? Can any inter-dependence be suggested? I therefore ask, what influenced his conceptualization of this concept? The second section of the present study addresses this issue, and concentrates upon investigating the possible impact of the Greek and Roman philosophical understanding and employment of moral endurance, on the letters of Paul. In other words, in Section 2 I ask, are there any discernible patterns in Paul's usage of the idea of endurance? If so, do these patterns suggest a participation in the established rhetorical and conceptual traditions associated with the Greek (and Roman) philosophical understanding of moral endurance, as outlined in Section 1?<sup>61</sup> My analysis of the letters of Paul offers the following general thesis, namely that *Paul's usage and understanding of the moral concept of endurance, displays numerous striking similarities with the patterns, rhetorical conventions and conceptual features associated with the notion of moral endurance as found in Greek and Roman philosophy. More specifically, it appears that for the most part (especially in the Corinthian correspondence), that the Pauline employment of demilitarized moral endurance is far better understood if read against the eclectic background of the Greek philosophical tradition of transformed moral endurance. Furthermore, I suggest that without exception the Pauline usage of endurance within a figurative military framework, also reflects a participation with Greek thought (rather than the Hebrew Scripture), where it forms an integral and systematic aspect of philosophical dialogue and moral exhortation. On the other hand the unique Pauline contribution to*

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"hanging on" i.e. not collapsing under the pressure of adversity, is equally known by contemporary Australian aboriginal culture, as it was to Plato and classical Athenian culture. The diachronic and cultural difference lies in the manner and vocabulary in which the idea is / was conceptualized and intellectualized within an overall cultural and ethical *weltauchauung*. For a treatment of the archetypal hero's endurance in his various initiatory trials, vide J. Campbell, *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*, Bollingen Series XVII (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973) third printing, ch. 2. The unique contribution of the Greeks in the development of this notion is its transformation and expansion within primarily a fundamentally military setting into a wider philosophical framework, vide ch. 2.

<sup>61</sup> While most of my treatment of the moral transformation of the Greek idea of endurance is treated in Section 1, nevertheless, in this dissertation, I treat the Greek rhetoric of moral endurance in Section 2, as a direct background to my analysis of the rhetoric of Pauline endurance.

*the history and evolution of this notion is its Christocentric focus and its alliance with the idea of love (ἀγάπη).*<sup>62</sup>

In terms of demilitarized moral endurance, the most noteworthy parallels include the following elements and observations:

[1] Like the Greek or Roman sage Paul understands the display of moral endurance in situations of hardship as a most commendable character attribute or virtue.

[2] Like the pattern established by the Greek or Roman sage, Paul tends to associate demilitarized moral endurance with several other gentler virtues, rather than associating it with aggressive attributes, or treating it as a sole virtue.

[3] Like the Greek or Roman sage Paul also tends to distinguish between a form of endurance associated with wisdom (wise endurance) and one which is not (foolish endurance).

[4] Like the Greek and Roman sage Paul employs those same rhetorical devices associated with the literary or oral descriptions of the notion of endurance for various purposes of persuasion. The most significant in terms of the portrayal of a wide range of hardship contexts is the *peristasis catalogue*. In terms of associating endurance with other virtues Paul also makes use of the list of virtues. Other rhetorical devices employed by Paul (re-echoing the sage) includes the personal example, the comparison, the *inclusio*, praise and self-praise.

*Within the Pauline letters, these Greek features of moral endurance are most apparent, most pronounced and most concentrated in the Corinthian correspondence (esp. 2 Cor. 6.4-10 and 11.1-12.12). In the light of these similarities with established Greek philosophic traditions concerning demilitarized moral endurance, I suggest a new reading for these two significant Pauline texts.*

In terms of Paul's usage of militarized moral endurance, it is interesting that he makes almost exclusive usage of the "stand firm" exhortations, already encountered in my discussion of the military metaphor in Greek and Roman philosophy. Here again, while no comparable and

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<sup>62</sup> I am not suggesting that Paul made a conscious and deliberate decision to be "Greek" in his use, for instance, of militarized endurance. The philosophers' metaphor of the much-enduring (and courageous warrior or athlete now belonged to the eclectic moral and intellectual universe of the Greco-Roman world, including Greco-Jewish matyrologies. These metaphors of endurance were known to the gentile world to which Paul wrote, and were part of a long philosophical and psychagogic tradition. On the other hand they were not part of a systematic Scriptural tradition.

developed Scriptural tradition of metaphoric military endurance, the parallels with Greek militarized moral endurance are striking. I suggest therefore that *the various Pauline ἵστημι exhortations in the newer linguistic form of "στήκετε,"*<sup>63</sup> (esp. 1 Cor. 7.37 & 16.13, Phlp. 1.27, 4.1, Gal. 5.1, or its infinitive usage in the older linguistic form of στήναι (Eph. 6.13,14), are best understood in the light of the developed Greek psychagogic metaphor of the military "stand firm" exhortation. Attempts to interpret Paul's στήκετε exhortations as part of an architectural metaphor (e.g. Grundmann)<sup>64</sup> do not explain fully the content and theme of the passages in their context. As in the case of the Greek sage, Paul exhorts his "troops" towards endurance in "battle" in his self-defining role as heroic and much-enduring "commander."

By reading the Greek and Roman philosophic vocabulary and metaphor of militarized moral endurance in Paul against the background of my discussion in Section 1, I am able to demonstrate a new reading and understanding of two Pauline instances of the "stand firm" exhortation (*Gal. 5.1 & 1 Cor. 16.13*). A similar detailed analysis of *Phlp. 1.27-30* as well as *Eph. 6.10-17* would prove equally as revealing.<sup>65</sup>

### III. Methodology

#### A. Word and Concept

How does one proceed to analyze such an overarching concept in antiquity? Does one simply chose a key word underlining the idea of endurance and restrict the study to that single word? Does one limit the study to word investigations? In view of certain errors in linguistic analyses committed in the past by biblical exegetes both in content and methodology and in accordance with the warnings issued by various contemporary linguistic theorists my investigation of this concept, both in Section 1 & 2, will not be (i) a one-word study nor (ii) restrict itself exclusively to words but take into account themes or motifs suggesting the idea of endurance. Therefore instead of isolating a key (Greek) word designating the idea of endurance, I will rather focus on the *concept*

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<sup>63</sup> The imperative of στήκω.

<sup>64</sup> W. Grundmann, "ἵστημι" in G. Friedreich (ed.) *TDNT*, ET and ed. by G.W. Bromley, vol. 7 (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans) 643-653.

<sup>65</sup> While the idea of agonistic endurance does not appear in the Pauline letters it does appear *par excellence* in *Heb. 10.32 & 12.1-7*.

(*Begriff*) of endurance in its various semantic shades — *steadfastness, fortitude, standing firm, long-suffering* or *perseverance* in the face of severe adversity without breaking<sup>66</sup> - as reflected explicitly by a range or colony of semantically associated terms or implicitly by the suggestion of the concept. Such a conceptual or multi-word approach prevents certain dangers indicated by contemporary semantic theorists:

[1] *It does not impoverish the study*: A conceptual approach renders the enquiry richer.<sup>67</sup> Silva warns that ' . . . . concentrated study on one word seldom leads to the very important examination of semantically related terms.'<sup>68</sup>

[2] *It does not limit the investigation exclusively to word studies*: A further benefit arises from a conceptual approach. This assures the avoidance of restricting the presence of a concept or idea exclusively to an author's explicit verbal usage.<sup>69</sup> Such an approach would be limiting and would not necessarily reflect the reality of an author's total description or understanding of a particular concept. Quite frequently an idea is expressed in terms of a motif format or by the message of a

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<sup>66</sup> Vide, for instance, J.P. Louw, E.A. Nida (eds.), *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains*, Vol. 1 (New York, 1988) 307-8. The collective designation of these various dimensions by the generic English noun *endurance* is simply a convenient one. In other words it is not meant to reproduce an exact conceptual equivalent suggested by a related domain of words in Greek and Latin antiquity (inc. the apostle Paul), but simply to offer a functional starting point. On the other hand such "convenient" translations are fraught with linguistic problematics. We need to ask whether this is a legitimate usage or whether it might be more profitable to offer a collective conceptual equivalent in a chronological and linguistic closer system, namely in Latin, e.g. "*patientia*" "*sufferentia*" "*constantia*" or the verbal "*sustenire*". As such instead of referring in this study to the English word-concept of "endurance," I would refer to "*constantia*." Perhaps even more appropriately I could chose a representative Greek term such as "ὑπομονή" or "καρτερία." Such an approach is perhaps less hazardous and is certainly the way in which Spicq chose to write on the subject in 1930; vide C.S. Spicq "Ἰπομονή, Patientia," in *RSPT* (1930) 95-106). But even this approach is limiting. When one is investigating a concept one is dealing with a linguistic family rather than one word - "ὑπομονή" or "καρτερία" are single terms, one of many words signifying an overall concept. Consequently if I were to nominate the entire endeavour in terms of a single Greek (or Latin) word it would be possible to confuse the particular for the generic idea. An alternative might be to find a suitable Greek word, not used by Paul, to express the collective idea under study (e.g. εὐσταθία). I have chosen however to employ the English term *endurance* to designate the over-arching concept as the more convenient method. This decision relieves the study from a possible misunderstanding, for it does not necessarily suggest a specific Greek or Latin word study. On the other hand the choice of a Greek or Latin word, even in a generic sense would give that impression.

<sup>67</sup> J. Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London, S.C.M. Press, 1987), e.g. 206ff. Also, M. Silva *Biblical Words & Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1983).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid* 26. In referring to some of the methodological problems associated with Kittel's *TDNT*, Silva explains '...if the word we are interested in is ἀμαρτία, it must be clear in our minds whether we want to know all that the Bible teaches concerning the doctrine of sin (the "concept") or the range of meanings covered by the specific word ἀμαρτία. But these two things are constantly confused.' 26-27.

<sup>69</sup> Thus Silva warns, ' . . . . if we are interested in *ideas*. . . . it is not reasonable to base our study primarily on words.' *op. cit.* 27. I would amend Silva slightly to read as follows: ' . . . . if we are interested in *ideas* . . . . it is not reasonable to base our study exclusively on words.'

passage. Thus as Silva explains, while the word *hypocrisy* is nowhere found in *Isaiah* 1.10-15, nevertheless the idea is unmistakable in the context of the passage.<sup>70</sup> Likewise a study of Pauline psychagogy would not be possible if the analyst was to be restricted exclusively to Paul's usage of the term ψυχραγωγία or its cognates. Accordingly, not only will I examine the idea of endurance, where the ancient authors communicate it in an explicit verbal form (through the language of endurance), but I will also consider relevant implicit (non-terminological) motif expressions of the idea.<sup>71</sup>

[3] *It diminishes the possibility of applying an enforced meaning to a word:* Another problematic tendency associated with one-word studies has been described by Barr as the "illegitimate totality transfer." Barr explains that: "The error that arises, when the "meaning" of a word (understood as the total series of relations in which it is used in the literature) is read into a particular case as its sense and implication there, may be called "illegitimate totality transfer." <sup>72</sup> Another danger in reading the meaning of words concerns "original meanings" or etymological readings.<sup>73</sup> For instance in Section 2, I will avoid forcing an etymological meaning of ἀνέχεσθαι

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<sup>70</sup> Silva *op. cit.* 27.

<sup>71</sup> Perhaps the clearest example, in the Pauline literature of a non-verbal expression of the concept of endurance occurs in *2 Cor.* 11.23-33 & *Philp.* 3.16ff.

<sup>72</sup> Barr, *op. cit.* 218. Silva explains this danger with the inclusion of a specific N.T. example: ' . . . . any one instance of a word will not bear all the meanings possible for that word. It would be admittedly invalid to overload Acts 7:38 with all the senses in which ἐκκλησία is used by the apostles; some of these senses . . . . would actually be contradictory in this verse. However, it is easy . . . . to comment on the broad meanings of a word at the risk of obscuring its specific function in a given text.' *op. cit.* 25-26. It is interesting that the *NIDNTT* pays heed in its introduction to this methodological danger, Vol. 1, 10.

<sup>73</sup> Etymology in part seeks to determine the origins or "original meaning" of a word. This can be done through an analysis of the component elements of a word. In a synthetic language such as Greek (as well as in German) as Silva points out, thousands of such words are made up of prepositions and verb. ὑπομένειν is such a term constructed from ὑπο (under) and μένειν (to remain) whose etymological sense = "to remain under" (Silva, *op. cit.* 39). There are dangers however associated with the wrong use of etymology. Etymology is meant to decipher the meaning of rare words or words whose meanings are unknown or opaque (though it is important in the process of tracing a word's semantic changes). When used with words whose meaning is clear it requires care (unless one is conducting a diachronic investigation of the history of a word). Hence applying the earliest "etymological" meaning of a word onto a current usage of that term is misleading for it does not allow for the semantic changes which may have occurred in the dynamics of the historical evolution of that term - unless the term is deliberately employed in an archaic sense. Therefore to conclude that in Paul's letters the meaning of any particular term from his language of endurance was necessarily intended in its etymological sense has to be demonstrated by its specific context rather than simply pre-supposed. The Indo-Europeanist J. Vendryes explains that, 'Words always have a *current* value, that is to say, limited to the moment when they were employed, and a *particular* value relative to the momentary use made of them.' J. Vendryes, *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1925) 176, quoted from Silva *op. cit.* 46-47. Concerning the dangers of reading a word etymologically see also Barr *op. cit.* 107-160 and Silva *op. cit.* 44-51. The latter in his section "Etymology and Exegesis" makes specific reference to ὑπομένειν; 44-51.



onto *1 Cor.* 4.12 or ὑπομένειν / ὑπομονή onto *2 Cor.* 6.4 & 12.12 - unless the transparent nature of the term and the immediate textual context suggest a deliberate etymological usage was intended by Paul.<sup>74</sup>

### *B. Diachronic and Synchronic Analyses*

In order to more readily and accurately locate the most likely conceptual background to the Pauline understanding of moral endurance, as set out in Section 1, it is important to pay further heed to the warnings of modern linguistic theory, namely a concern which deals with chronological issues. The Saussurian branch of linguistic theory,<sup>75</sup> suggests that a synchronic linguistic analysis - and hence by implication a conceptual analysis (which is more relevant to the present study) - has priority and is of more value than diachronic studies.<sup>76</sup> Accordingly I seek to locate Pauline endurance, conceptually, in the first place (though by no means exclusively) within a relevant *synchronic* conceptual milieu(x). This does not mean that I am not interested in comparing Pauline endurance to similar Homeric, Platonic and Aristotelian conceptual nuances and semantic parallels. On the contrary given the universal impact of Homer upon the Greco-Roman world, I shall treat the notion and motif of Homeric endurance as a living tradition in Paul's time. Furthermore I shall

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<sup>74</sup> Etymology in part seeks to determine the origins or "original meaning" of a word. This can be done through an analysis of the component elements of a word. In a synthetic language such as Greek (as well as in German) as Silva points out, thousands of such words are made up of prepositions and verb. ὑπομένειν is such a term constructed from ὑπο (under) and μένειν (to remain) whose etymological sense = "to remain under" (Silva, *op. cit.* 39). There are dangers however associated with the wrong use of etymology. Etymology is meant to decipher the meaning of rare words or words whose meanings are unknown or opaque (though it is important in the process of tracing a word's semantic changes). When used with words whose meaning is clear it requires care (unless one is conducting a diachronic investigation of the history of a word). Hence applying the earliest "etymological" meaning of a word onto a current usage of that term is misleading for it does not allow for the semantic changes which may have occurred in the dynamics of the historical evolution of that term - unless the term is deliberately employed in an archaic sense. Therefore to conclude that in Paul's letters the meaning of any particular term from his language of endurance was necessarily intended in its etymological sense has to be demonstrated by its specific context rather than simply pre-supposed. The Indo-Europeanist J. Vendryes explains that, 'Words always have a *current* value, that is to say, limited to the moment when they were employed, and a *particular* value relative to the momentary use made of them.' J. Vendryes, *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1925) 176, quoted from Silva *op. cit.* 46-47. Concerning the dangers of reading a word etymologically see also Barr *op. cit.* 107-160 and Silva *op. cit.* 44-51. The latter in his section "Etymology and Exegesis" makes specific reference to ὑπομένειν; 44-51.

<sup>75</sup> F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (edition critique par R. Engliet (Wiesbaden, 1967).

<sup>76</sup> Diachronic linguistic or concept studies have an interest in historical analysis. Synchronic investigations are interested in discovering the current employment of words or concepts rather than its historical evolution (diachronic). I therefore treat the epoch in which the letters of Paul were composed as Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times, as the measurement of synchronicity.

also be interested in comparing Pauline endurance with both Platonic and Aristotelian categories, since their formulations and categorization of moral endurance became the stepping stone of the later Cynic and Stoic traditions of moral endurance.

Accordingly, in terms of the overarching patterns of Paul's usage of militarized and demilitarized moral endurance, I ask - to which particular philosophical tradition of endurance does he most closely resemble? According to my analysis of Greek and Roman philosophy I offer the following thesis: *The evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that it is more precise to align Paul's overall understanding of militarized and demilitarized moral endurance, for the most part with two active, synchronic and popular "schools," the Cynics and the Stoics. On the one hand I find that many of the important features, employment, place and function of Paul's moral endurance, appear to reflect several of the elements of later Cynic endurance. For instance both have a pre-occupation with practical ethics. Both treat moral endurance as a more central and significant virtue than courage within their respective ethical systems. Indeed courage as a moral virtue is not frequently featured in both ethical systems. Both understand the demonstration of moral endurance as a sign of a revitalized human race. For the Cynics it is the "natural human" (life in accordance to Nature). For Paul it is the "redeemed human" (life in Christ). Both feature the idea of the psychagogue as a "military commander" exhorting his "warriors" to "stand firm" in their "moral warfare." Both allow for the possibility of women to become a "much-enduring warrior." Both employ the rhetoric of endurance such as the peristasis catalogue and the personal example. On the other hand several aspects of Paul's military metaphors incorporating the idea of endurance do share certain similarities with synchronic Stoic metaphors (esp. Seneca). However with reference to Paul's emphasis on wise and unwise endurance, the parallels could point to a diachronic coincidence with a central Platonic and Aristotelian theme, through perhaps mediated through the eclectic Greco-Roman intellectual world.*


On the other hand, from the perspective of the history of ideas and the evolution of a concept, the canons of Saussurian theory do not prohibit one from undertaking, for its own sake, rather

than as a prolegoumenon, a diachronic analysis of the language and notion of endurance. Indeed it is quite justified.<sup>77</sup> This becomes one of the pursuits of Section 1.

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<sup>77</sup> While acknowledging the primacy of the synchronic over historical or diachronic approaches to linguistics, Silva also notes that, '....the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.' *op. cit.* 38. The same may be said concerning the investigation of a concept.

**Table 1**  
**(Greek) Heroic Endurance**



\* Documentary titles represent the first extant occurrence, and / or at least, the earliest most developed instance, as far as I can ascertain, of a specified facet of endurance, in Greek or European literary expression

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**SECTION 1**

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**THE IMPACT OF THE WARRIOR'S ENDURANCE AND ITS  
TRANSFORMATION FROM BATTLEFIELD VIRTUE TO THE  
GYMNASIUM, THE ACADEMY, THE LYCEUM AND THE STOA AS ONE  
OF THE AGGRESSIVE GREEK VALUES OF MASCULINITY IN  
SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT, HARDSHIP AND SUFFERING**

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***PART ONE  
BATTLEFIELD ENDURANCE***

# CHAPTER 1

## POETS, HISTORIOGRAPHERS AND ARTISTS IN PRAISE OF THE WARRIOR'S NOBLE AND HEROIC ENDURANCE

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### I. A Diachronic Analysis

#### A. Greek Epic Poetry in Praise of the Warrior's Endurance: *Endurance and the Homeric Heroic Ideal*

i. **Endurance and the Warrior's Pursuit of Honour:** Among the several commendable or praiseworthy qualities or ἀρεταὶ which constitute the Homeric heroic ideal,<sup>1</sup> endurance, employed in all its positive dimensions, forms an essential aspect of the code of the hero. In this code which reflects and defines an aristocratic warrior culture,<sup>2</sup> where the various ἀρεταὶ lead to "honour" (τιμῆ) as the aim of life,<sup>3</sup> endurance forms a vital quality or ἀρετὴ of the "prowess" of the hero<sup>4</sup> which facilitates him in his quest and competition for the attainment of "honour."<sup>5</sup> Those who possess these qualities (ἀρεταὶ) are the ἄριστοι or ἀγαθοὶ. They are the "aristocrats" of

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<sup>1</sup> For example, physical might, social standing, wealth, military skills, courage etc. For a thoroughgoing treatment of the values of the Homeric world and its heroic ideal, vide: A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Chicago, London, 1960 & 1975 reprint, esp. chs. 2-4; also, M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, revised edition (New York, Viking Press, 1978), esp. ch. 5; H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, ET (New York, 1956) ch. 1.

<sup>2</sup> The martial foundations and character of Greek society are already evident in the *Iliad*. Here we find a knightly feudal society. A king, a court of elder aristocratic knights, the young warriors drawn for the most part from the nobility and the serf-warriors who constituted the under-privileged class. Such was the essential shape of the social structure of the Hellenic Middle Ages (somewhat reminiscent of Carolingian society). This was a knightly-warrior culture. It was from this highest ranks of this society - kings, princes and warrior noblemen, that is the aristocracy (the ἄριστοι) that the great Homeric heroes such as Achilles, Agamemnon, Ajax, Hector and Odysseus (though in the *Odyssey* as I shall explain in chs. 3 & 6, he is primarily a traveller). These warrior-knights were the paradigms of "excellence" or ἀρετὴ. Indeed even up to the time of Alexander and beyond these warrior heroes, had inspired many a soldier. Vide Finley *op. cit.* ch. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem* 113.

<sup>4</sup> ' . . . . the main theme of a warrior culture is constructed on two notes - excellence (ἀρεταὶ) or prowess and honour. The one is the hero's essential attribute, the other his essential aim.' *idem* p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> "Honour" in Homeric society was seen as exclusive and limited, *idem* p. 118. This is also true of other ancient cultures including first-century New Testament culture; vide B.J. Malina, *The New Testament World Insights from Cultural Anthropology* [Atlanta, John Knox, 1981], Adkins *op. cit.* esp. chs. 2-4; also Finley *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 5; Marrou, chs. 1, 2 & 4. C. Osiek, summarizes this perception of honour in NT culture thus: ' . . . . any acquisition, any improvement in status is at someone else's expense . . . . The poor are not those without money but those deprived of honour . . . .' in *What are they Saying About the Social Setting of the New Testament?* (New York, Paulist Press, 1984) 30-31.

Homeric society. They are the heroes of whom Achilles, Ajax, Agamemnon, Hector and Odysseus are the prototypical representatives. While primarily and overwhelmingly military (and athletic) in character within the *Iliad*, nevertheless, the ἀρεταὶ which define the Homeric hero, including the capacity for endurance or perseverance, are also exhibited in various other "peacetime" contexts throughout both epic poems, though especially in the *Odyssey*.<sup>6</sup>

**ii. Endurance and the Warrior's Ἄρετή:** Within the *Iliad*,<sup>7</sup> endurance is primarily understood in a military context and is regarded, in conjunction with courage, as one of the warrior's attributes *par excellence*. It is an irreplaceable ἀρετή of the hero's status in the battlefield. It is an indispensable excellence of his "prowess" which elevates him from "commoner" to "aristocratic hero" in the fierce competition towards honour<sup>8</sup> in the battlefield.<sup>9</sup> Not to possess endurance (and courage) would lead to acts contrary to valour or the heroic ideal, such as "running away" (φευγεῖν) or "fear" in the face of an enemy charge. Such exhibitions of lack of endurance or fortitude, are thus described as αἴσχροσ or ἔλεγχος within the framework of the Homeric language of social condemnation, shame, contempt or failure. Thus Odysseus exhorts Diomedes not to abandon or surrender the fight against the Trojans for that would bring "shame" ἔλεγχος. Diomedes takes up the challenge by responding in the language of endurance:

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<sup>6</sup> The most significant such Homeric "peacetime" expression of endurance would be the traveller's endurance, displayed most splendidly by Odysseus.

<sup>7</sup> The debates and problematics associated with the composition and authorship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and which precedes the other, lie clearly outside the scope of the present study. Indeed on this matter it is best to heed Seneca's advice to Paulinus not to indulge in such types of literary conjectures, which are best left to others with affordable leisure time (*De Brev. Vit.* 9.1-2). "Homer" will be a convenient reference point, in this dissertation, under whose nomenclature the legends and oral traditions assembled and redacted in the texts of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* shall be ascribed to. It is assumed here, that a common hand belongs to both these epic poems.

<sup>8</sup> The Iliadic ethic sought to capture and glorify the finest elements of the noble warrior. In short, it was a warrior ἀρετή. Such nouns as ἀρετή, ἀγαθός and χρηστός in conjunction with the superlatives ἄριστος and βέλτιστος belong to the language of supreme commendation in Homeric society (as well as later Greek culture). Certainly in Iliadic society they describe the most valued qualities, in the first place in a martial setting, and only by transfer to times of peace. Essentially they are the qualities most needed to secure the safety of the state against foreign aggression or vendetta for offended honour and hence as a method of settling disputes. By necessity they refer to the qualities of military prowess and skills which best promote and ensure victory. As such the ἀρετή within the *Iliad* reflects supremely those qualities which constitute and define the successful warrior. Clearly then honour, excellence or ἀρετή is most evidently made manifest in battle (*Il.* 13.277; 15.642).

<sup>9</sup> While the Homeric warrior belongs to a collective, whether Achaean or Trojan, the honour he seeks is primarily individual and only then does the glory attained reflect on his kin and fellow warriors. The same is true of athletic contests; vide Finley *op. cit.* 120. It is in later Greek culture: ' . . . . when the community principle gained mastery, the *polis* shared in the glory. and in turn it arranged for victory songs and even public statues to commemorate the honour it, had gained . . . . ' (*idem*).

Irreparable disaster now threatened the Achaeans who in their fleeing (φεύγοντες) would have soon reached the ships and flung themselves there had not. Odysseus called to Diodes, son of Tydaeus:

"Son of Tydaeus what has come over us that we have forgotten our furious valour? Come here good friend and make your stand (ἵσταο) by my side, for truly it will be a situation of shame (ἔλεγχος) if Hector of the flashing helm takes over the ship." [Il. .11.310-315].

**iii. Endurance and "Strength:"** A significant ingredient in the Homeric aristocratic ideal consists of tests of "strength" or "might." A hero *qua* hero had to constantly demonstrate his "strength." Paris or Achilles? Ajax or Iliadic Odysseus? The mightier one would acquire victory in an athletic show of strength or armed combat. The loser would demonstrate an insufficient ἀρετή while the victor simply manifests his superior strength (καρτερία) by might (ἴφι). Survival against adverse odds was an authenticating sign of ἀρετή and καρτερία. The Homeric ideal, within the *Iliad*, might well be captured by a Darwinian slogan such as "survival of the strongest" which in war translated into naked force. Thus, in the *Iliad*, endurance was one of the qualities or ἀρεταὶ which guaranteed the warrior's survival. As such the twin concepts of endurance and strength figure prominently towards the attainment of the Homeric ideal. Indeed the Homeric term for a "strong man" (καρτερός) would in a subsequent period of Greek history acquire the meaning of "endurance." Iliadic endurance was therefore a function of strength, essentially physical military strength and was manifested in concrete and tangible forms. It is this quality which assisted in the survival of the hero and the gaining of honour.<sup>10</sup>

**iv. Facets of the Warrior's Endurance in the Iliad:** In the primarily military context of the *Iliad*, the Greek vocabulary of endurance is normally rendered in English versions, and usually supported by Liddell and Scott,<sup>11</sup> by the sense of "standing one's ground unflinchingly," "standing firm," "standing fast," "enduring," most typically in the face of an oncoming enemy charge. Usually the Homeric Greek verbs to describe such military endurance include ἵστημι, τλάω, ὑπομένειν or μένειν sometimes qualified by ἔμπεδον. Thus Hector, stung by Sarpedon's exhortation to courage, rallies the Trojans to "face the Achaeans"

<sup>10</sup> In the *Odyssey* endurance is also one of the commendable qualities necessary for survival. Yet here this ἀρετή is employed against hardships and perils of travel. That Odysseus is able to survive the hardships of travel is no less a function of his endurance as of his μοῖρα.

<sup>11</sup> LS *op. cit.* passim.



while the Greek forces<sup>12</sup> "held their ground" (5.498)<sup>13</sup> without fear:<sup>14</sup> 'As a result [of Hector's urgings] they [the Trojans] rallied and took their stand facing the Achaeans. But the Argives closed their rank, held their ground (ὑπέμειναν) and were not afraid (οὐδ' ἐφόβηθεν)' [Il. 5.496-498].

In the ensuing ferocious advance of the Trojans, the Greeks (Danaans) aided by Odysseus, are described as "standing their ground" (5.522)<sup>15</sup> and "withstanding steadfastly" (5.527).<sup>16</sup>

Typically military endurance, in the *Iliad* is associated with the absence of fear or "shaking:"

"The Danaans, on the their side, were spurred on towards combat: by the two Aiantes, with Odysseus and Diomedes. But these even of themselves, were neither shaken before the violence nor the onset of the Trojans, rather they stood their ground (ἔμενον) . . . . Thus the Danaans withstood steadfastly (μένον) [Il. 5.522, 527].

Accordingly, within the *Iliad*, the warrior's endurance is closely allied to that other heroic military attribute, courage or daring. Thus when Odysseus volunteers to accompany Diomedes on a dangerous mission of espionage behind enemy lines, he is described in the dual vocabulary of endurance (τλήμων) and courage (θάρσος, τολμή, ἐσθλός): ' . . . . and the enduring (τλήμων) Odysseus also desired to steal into the Trojan encampment. Forever daring / courageous (ἐτόλμαι) was his character.' [Il. 10.231-32].

As stated previously, the refusal to show endurance, that is the act of retreating, departing or fleeing (φευγεῖν) in a battle without making an effort for victory would result in αἴσχος — shame or disgrace.<sup>17</sup> Thus the wise of counsel such as Nestor and Odysseus make exhortations

<sup>12</sup> The Greeks in the *Iliad* are referred to by their tribal names - Achaeans, Argives, and Danaans; vide, R. Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (1951) p. 19; also M.M. Wilcock, *A Companion to the Iliad* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press. 1976) 4, 6.

<sup>13</sup> So E.V. Rieu's translation of ὑπέμειναν, *Homer. The Iliad*, Penguin Classics (Hammondsworth, Penguin, 1980) reprint, 105.

<sup>14</sup> Not infrequently, the Homeric Warrior's endurance is associated with the notion of courage. Vide below.

<sup>15</sup> So A.T. Murray's translation of ἔμενον, *Il. 5.522, Homer the Iliad*, LCL no. 120 (Cambridge Harvard U.P. 1978) 233. Lit. - "but stood their ground."

<sup>16</sup> Translation for μένον ἔμπεδον, *Ibid.* lit. - "withstood. . . . steadfastly." Also Liddell and Scott *op. cit.* p. 543.

<sup>17</sup> It is interesting that, in Greek literature the notion of armed warriors fighting against unarmed or helpless opposition (the aged, women and children), to my knowledge this is seldom if ever described in terms of the language of endurance (incl. strength or courage).

toward perseverance and / or constancy of purpose (ἀτεμφέα βουλήν) against abandonment of the military campaign against the Trojans (*Il.* 2.298, 344; 11.314-15)<sup>18</sup>

**v. Exhortations to Stand Firm in Battle:** An important aspect of military endurance in the *Iliad* is the exhortation to "stand firm" in battle issued by a military leader either prior to or during battle, characteristically in moments of crisis. The exhortation is meant to direct, motivate and encourage the warrior(s) towards victory. The only one however who is entitled to issue such an exhortation is one who himself has an acknowledged record or reputation for endurance (and courage). Among the Homeric military elite, while some of the heroes (e.g. Agamemnon) are reported to lack perseverance in certain military matters (*Il.* 2.344) other heroes are characterized by their constant endurance. A list would include Hector, Nestor, Diodes and Odysseus. But it is Odysseus, who, among all the warriors mentioned in the *Iliad*, is repeatedly identified by this quality, with epithets, framed in the vocabulary of endurance in abundance - "Odysseus of the enduring soul" (τλήμονα θυμόν),<sup>19</sup> "Odysseus of the steadfast soul" (ταλασίφρονος)<sup>20</sup> or "steadfast Odysseus" (ὁ τλήμων Ὀδυσσεύς).<sup>21</sup> These epithets are almost exclusively preserved to describe Odysseus in various military settings.<sup>22</sup> It is therefore not surprising to find in the text of the *Iliad* Odysseus issuing exhortations for battle endurance. In the passage quoted previously where the Greeks were in full flight before Hector's courageous charge, Odysseus makes a desperate call upon Diomedes to stand firmly against the Trojans beside him. The poet portrays Diomedes responding favorably and using the language of military endurance in his affirmation to combat Hector and his armies. Diomedes will "stand fast" (11.317a)<sup>23</sup> and "endure" (11.317b):<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Vide, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> For example, *Il.* 5.670.

<sup>20</sup> *idem* 11.466 et al.

<sup>21</sup> *idem* 10.231, 498 et. al.

<sup>22</sup> Endurance also appears as a divine attribute. The Homeric gods, who are in the image of humans, are described as possessing this quality, especially Hera. They are also dispensers of this virtue to selected humans during crisis situations. Within the *Iliad* these situations are by and large military in context. Other instances of endurance within the *Iliad* include fortitude in physical or moral pain, initiated by martial situations. Thus Dione exhorts Aphrodite to endure her suffering (*Il.* 5.360, 382).

<sup>23</sup> LS *op. cit.* translate μένειν in a battle setting as "stand fast" 1103.

<sup>24</sup> τλάω in Homeric Greek is often rendered in English translations, as well as LS, by "to endure" or "to show fortitude." In the case of *Il.* 5.11.317b, Murray *op. cit.* renders the future τλήσομαι as "endure" 505.

'Irreparable disaster would have threatened the Achaeans now, who in their flight would soon have reached the ships and fallen there, had not Odysseus called to Diomedes . . . . "come here and take your stand (ἵστατο)" . . . Then mighty Diomedes answered: "Indeed I will stand fast (μενέω) and endure (τλήσομαι). . . . "' [Il. 11.310-317].

Even the Homeric gods recognize and acknowledge Odysseus as a much-enduring warrior. Thus when Athena is sent to restrain the Greeks from abandoning and fleeing Ilium after a nine-year campaign and return to Hellas, Odysseus of all the heroes is chosen to instill endurance and perseverance among the Greeks (Il. 2.173 ff.). Thus Odysseus exhorts the assembled army employing the language of endurance: 'Endure (τλήτε) my friends and persevere (μείνατ') for a time. . . . ' [Il. 2.299]. The Homeric gods can also act as military commanders instilling military endurance and courage to their elect. Thus, it is Athena who by her urgings and awesome presence among the assembled Achaean warriors, instills strength, perseverance and a taste for war (Il. 2.452):

' . . . . in their midst was the flashing-eyed Athene, bearing the priceless aegis. . . . she flew through the rank of warriors, dazzling, urging them to go forth. and in the heart of every man she roused strength to war and to battle with perseverance (lit. without ceasing).' [Il. 2.446,450-52].

Likewise Apollo exhorts the Trojans not to "give ground" (μηδ' εἴκετε) before the Greeks, for they are human and cannot endure (ἀνασχέςθαι) the Trojan spear (Il. 4.509-11):

'And Apollo looking down from Pergamus, was filled with indignation, and called with a shout to the Trojans: "Rouse yourselves horse-taming Trojans, do not yield ground (i.e. stand fast) in battle before the Argives; they are not made of stone nor of iron. Their flesh cannot endure the penetrating bronze when they are hit.'" [Il. 4.507-511].

*B. Greek Elegiac Poetry and Legal Codification  
in Praise of the Spartan Warrior's Endurance  
as a Collective Ideal of Polis-Consciousness*

**i. Endurance, the Spartan Military and Legal Ideal and its Collective**

**Implications:** At the zenith of its culture, between the eighth and sixth centuries (B.C.), Sparta was primarily a military society. Nevertheless unlike the world of the *Iliad*, the warrior was no longer an individual hero-knight facing another knight in combat and motivated by the pursuit of personal glory or fame. Few developments in warfare (and politics) transformed war from an atomistic endeavour into a collective event - hence the birth of "classical" Greek and western

warfare.<sup>25</sup> It was the line of soldiers (ὄπλίται) facing and collectively combating the enemy line which determined victory. The Spartan military ideal was a corporate one and the warrior now fought for the glory of his *polis*.<sup>26</sup> It was the *polis* which trained, disciplined and inculcated its uniform and collective military ethos upon its youth. Yet the supreme values they sought to inculcate were the Iliadic military virtues of courage and endurance. Now, however, these were taught and expressed within the context of the new military condition where the collective endurance of the ὄπλίται rather than the individual valour of the knight was stressed, and where death in battle was no longer regarded as a failure. Rejecting all the frill of the Iliadic ἀρετή, and concentrating exclusive]y upon a key aspect of it - courage and endurance, the Spartan elegiac poet Tyrtaeus, summarized the Spartan ideal thus:

I should not consider a man worthy to be remembered nor think highly of him, merely because he was a good runner or wrestler even though he was big and strong as the Cyclops, swifter than Boreus the Thracian . . . . richer than Midas, . . . . stronger than King Pelops . . . . unless he was also valorous in arms, **unless he could stand fast in battle . . . .** That is the true virtue (ἀρετή) the highest reward that a man can obtain from his fellows. It is a good common to all, a service to the city and the people as a whole, **when every man can stand firm on his two feet in the front line and rid his heart of all idea of flight.** [Frag. 12.1-10, 13-18].

Here we are in touch with the Spartan idea in a crystal clear tone. According to the Tyrtaeus fragment, the highest value or virtue (ἀρετή) of Spartan society was that of the warrior's endurance. By the demonstration of endurance in combat, the Spartan warrior is not only providing security to his fellow citizen-warrior (ὄπλίται), but is offering the most valued and acclaimed social service or function to the Spartan collective - the security of his *polis* and its citizen. From this fragment we see that within the hierarchy of Spartan cultural values, the warrior's endurance evoked greater social admiration than athletic prowess, physical strength or social status. Unless a man of military age could stand firm in battle, that is demonstrate endurance in the battlefield, all other qualities become worthless, and he is of no use to his city. Indeed the institutional and social dimensions of the Spartan warrior's endurance - standing firm, enduring

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<sup>25</sup> Vide J. Keegan's introduction to V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989) p. xii and passim.

<sup>26</sup> Elizabeth Rawson observes that, 'Tyrtaeus . . . . preached courage in war and readiness to die for one's city - a relatively new ideal for Greeks, for Homer's heroes cared only for individual glory . . . .' *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969) 13. Vide Tyrtaeus Frag. 12.13-14 below.

pain and wounds and not fleeing from the battlefield - is perhaps even more dramatically confirmed by virtue of its enshrinement even within Sparta's legal code. Thus the first-century (A.D.) Stoic philosopher, Musonius Rufus, in one of his essays praises Lycurgus the Spartan lawgiver precisely because of his emphasis on promoting endurance in πόνους (hardship, pain) not only among those training for the military class (ephebes) but also among Spartan society in general. Indeed this Spartan emphasis on military endurance was even praised by Musonius as possessing a salvific quality (σωτήριο) to the State:<sup>27</sup>

'Now we should find that the best lawgivers - and I think first of all of Lycurgus who drove extravagance out of Sparta and substituted frugality, who preferred a life of deprivation as a means of producing courage (πρός ἀνδρείαν) to a life of excess, and who did away with luxury as a corrupting influence and considered the will to bear hardship the salvation (ὡς σωτήριο) of the state. Testimony to this is the endurance (καρτερήσεις) of the Spartan ephebe who are made accustomed to bear (fevrein) hunger, and thirst, and cold and even wounds and other hardships (πονου)".' [*On Furnishings*, (XX) 2.4-10 ].

Likewise in Herodotus' attestation of a warning issued to Xerxes by the exiled Spartan monarch, Demaratus, concerning the supreme valour of the Spartan warrior, he proceeds to explain that: ' . . . . they [the Spartans] obey law and fear it more than your men fear you. And it orders them never to flee but to conquer or die in battle.' [*Herod.* 7.102-4].

The legal aspect of Spartan combat endurance is also confirmed by the epitaph composed by Simonides commemorating the fallen Leonidas and the Thermopylae 300: 'Go tell the city [i.e. Sparta], stranger, that here we lie, obedient to her decrees (ρήμασι πειθόμενοι).' [*Herod.* 7.228].<sup>28</sup> While both Iliadic and Spartan societies equally admired the warrior's fearlessness and fortitude, nevertheless there was something new now not found in Iliadic society. Sparta aimed not so much at producing an individual Iliadic hero endowed with courage and endurance but rather a community of heroes endowed with courage and endurance.

**ii. The Warrior's Endurance, Co-Operative Warfare, the Exhortation to Stand Firm and the Survival of Sparta:** The shift in the style of warfare from the individual warrior to the collective military prowess of the *polis*, nevertheless, also meant a new emphasis upon the

<sup>27</sup> Musonius here describes the endurance of the Spartan ephebe by use of a rhetorical convention most usually associated with endurance, the *peristasis catalogue*. For a discussion of this rhetorical convention in antiquity, vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>28</sup> Rawson explains that ρήμασι πειθόμενοι may in this context have a precise legal meaning. Spartan laws or decrees, being called ρητήρι. Later sources quote the line-ending as πειθόμενοι νομίμοις. *op. cit.* 15.

value of each warrior's endurance. Whereas a lapse in the courage and endurance of the Homeric warrior brought shame upon him, its military repercussions, beyond the individual, by and large, were not as severe as in Spartan warfare. Now, warriors encountered the enemy and fought in disciplined lines. The warrior on the right protected with his shield and combat the vulnerable and exposed right side of the fellow-warrior on his left, and so on down the line.<sup>29</sup> A case of individual panic and / or absence of endurance, was disastrous since it not only affected the security and welfare of individual warriors, but that of the entire line of ὀπλίται. Consequently, each warrior's survival in combat rested not only upon his own martial skills, but to a large extent upon the trust he had towards his fellow warrior on the right! A lapse of endurance by one affected the survival not only of the warrior on the left, but through a chain reaction, that of the collective. This was another reason why military endurance was held in such great esteem in Sparta. Sparta's very survival and liberty depended upon this collective endurance on the battlefield. It is not therefore surprising to read in a Tyrtæus fragment the following combat exhortation towards endurance addressed to the young Spartan warriors: 'O Young men, remain beside one another and fight. Do not begin shameful flight or panic . . . . Let man stand firm and remain, fixed with both feet. on the ground . . . . " [*Frag.* 10]. Likewise, concerning the merit of Spartan warriors as a collective and how this translated into the protection, survival and salvation of the entire community, we read in Plutarch's *Sayings of the Spartans* (Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικὰ),<sup>30</sup> a report in the sayings of Agesilaus the Great, concerning the "walls" of Sparta: 'When someone else wished to know why Sparta was without walls, he [i.e. Agesilaus] pointed to the citizens in full armour and said, "These are the Spartans' walls.' [*Apoph. Lac.* 210E]. In keeping with the Spartan ideal, discussed above, it would not be untenable to suggest that it is the fully-armed Spartan warriors' courage and endurance which is being metaphorically referred to here as symbols of the protective walls of Sparta.

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<sup>29</sup> Vide J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. California Press, 1970), 13-15; for a summary vide, W.B. Tyrrell, *Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking* (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984) 50.

<sup>30</sup> Henceforth *Apoph. Lac.*

**iii. The Inculcation of the Warrior's Endurance:** Towards the socialization of the young in this ideal - endurance (and courage) in battle - as I have already briefly mentioned, the Spartan *polis* developed a communal program of extremely rigorous military training or *agoge* (ἀγωγή).<sup>31</sup> At the very center of this Spartan warrior training was the inculcation of endurance. Thus Megillus, the Spartan spokesman, describes in Plato's *Laws* some details concerning Spartan youth training. Here, it is also important to notice the close inter-connection between military and athletic endurance. The emerging Spartan warrior's endurance is, in part, inculcated and maintained through the use of rigorous athletic training and contests:

' . . . . the training, widely prevalent among us, in endurance of pain (καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδοχῶν), by means both of manual contests (ταῖς χειρῶν μάχαις) and of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound drubbing; moreover, the "Crypteia" (κρυπτεία) [i.e. secret service] as it is called, affords a wonderfully severe training in endurance / fortitude (πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις), as they go barefoot in winter and sleep without covers and have no attendants but wait on themselves and rove through the whole countryside both by night and day. Moreover in our [athletic] games / contests, we have severe tests of endurance (δεινὰι καρτερήσεις) . . . . ' [Leg. 633 B.C.].

This harsh disciplinarian style of Spartan *paideia*, with its emphasis on courage and endurance, subsequently within the Greek world, became the *topos* of some classical, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophical admiration, idealism and utopianism. Sparta was romanticized, in certain philosophical circles, as an ideal state with an ideal educational structure capable of producing men of courage and endurance in a way that no other Greek *polis* could!<sup>32</sup> Other philosophers were ambiguous, drawing on the nobility of Spartan values but decrying their one-sided martial intent. Plato appropriated certain aspects of the Spartan educational model as the basis for his educational blueprint in the character formation of the philosopher-king, the future leaders of his just *πολιτεία* (*Resp.*).<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, he, followed by Aristotle, severely criticized the militaristic spirit of Sparta. He found it too one-sided in its emphasis on war. Likewise Plato also lamented the

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<sup>31</sup> In an effort to nurture these basic military values within the consciousness of its young, Spartan educators sought to instill these twin qualities from young age, training their students towards endurance in the face of pain and hardship. This was accomplished by a process of severe social engineering, namely through the removal of the male child from "comfortable" family life and the adaptation of a harsh, disciplined and rigorous barrack community lifestyle. For a useful discussion, on the topic of Spartan youth training, vide Jean-Pierre Vernant 'Between Shame and Glory: The Identity of the Young Spartan Warrior' in his *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays* (ed.) F.I. Zeitlin (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1991) 219-243.

<sup>32</sup> Vide, E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 1 (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wicksell, 1965) 228-309.

<sup>33</sup> For a discussion of this, vide Jean-Pierre Vernant *op. cit.* esp. 222-223.

militaristic goal of Spartan education - though not its discipline. Consequently, the values it inculcated in its young men - endurance and courage - if they were only directed towards the battlefield, were pseudo-virtues. Plato sought a nobler goal for these military values.<sup>34</sup> Like Plato, some Cynics also criticized Spartan courage and endurance for almost the same reasons. Thus in a letter pseudonymously ascribed to Diogenes of Sinnope (*Pseud-Diog. Ep. 27*)<sup>35</sup> the author boasts of his greater philosophical endurance, in comparison to the Spartan military values. It is interesting that in his critique of the inability of the Spartan military values to defend them against the "passions", Pseudo-Diogenes continues to militarize endurance and courage in a metaphoric and philosophic framework.

'For I do not know whether anyone has practiced simplicity of life more than I. Who would boast of endurance under frightful circumstances (ὕπομονήν) with Diogenes present? It follows that, although they seem to live in unwall'd Sparta by relying on their courage (ἀνδρείαν) for their defense, they have actually surrendered their unprotected souls to the passions, setting up no auxiliary force against them.' [Pseud. Diog. Ep. 27.17-21].

And of course, it is no coincidence, as I will argue in the ensuing section of this study, that Plato would play a pivotal role in the eventual philosophical adaptation of both these central Spartan military values of endurance and courage. Furthermore, as I will also suggest, neither of these two values, in their philosophical state, will ever wander completely away from their original military matrix.

**iii. Spartan Endurance Beyond the Battlefield:** While primarily admiring endurance in its military context, the Spartan ideal also praised this quality in whatever context it was manifested. The evidence would suggest therefore that within this Spartan ideal, endurance outside the battlefield or military setting takes on a greater impetus in the Greek world, albeit in an, as yet, unphilosophical sense.<sup>36</sup> This is attested in Plutarch's collection of Spartan sayings (*Apoph. Lac.*)

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<sup>34</sup> In this philosophic criticism of Spartan education Plato was not only followed by Aristotle but by other sages.

<sup>35</sup> ca. 2nd century A.D.

<sup>36</sup> I am not suggesting that in the pre-Spartan era of Greek history, the notion of endurance did not exist at all outside the world of the warrior or the epic traveller. Indeed in the *Od.* the idea of "patient endurance" is applied to Penelope by Homer as a moral quality: 'Certainly she is still at home, answered him the swineherd, a leader of men, Yes, truly, she perseveres (μένει) with a steadfast heart (τερλήσῃ θυμῷ) in the halls . . . . ' [*Od.* 16.36-37]. However it would seem that in the Spartan era the idea of endurance outside the battlefield becomes more prominent.



where constantly the concept of endurance is often mentioned outside the battlefield.<sup>37</sup> The following illustrations will suffice to show the centrality of this virtue for the Spartan military mind, which revered it wherever it appeared:

'When a criminal endured (ὑπομείναντος) torture without flinching, Agesilaus said, "What an out and out villain the man is, devoting his endurance (ὑπομονήν) and fortitude (καρτερίαν) to such base and shameful purpose." ' [Plut. *Apoph.* Lac. 208C].

Yet in the Spartan ideal, the supreme expression of endurance was reserved for martial settings. Thus to Agesilaus the Spartan king, such valuable endurance was wasted and would have been better served if directed rather to military endeavours. Indeed for the Spartan king, endurance and courage served as infallible indicators of military leadership: 'He was continually saying that the commander ought rightly to be superior to the private not in softness and luxury, but in fortitude (καρτερία).' [Plut. *Apoph.* Lac. 210A].

### *C. Thucydides in Praise of the Greek Warrior's Endurance in the Peloponnesian War*

**i. Thucydides, Xenophon & the Abiding Value of Endurance:** Anxiety by Corinth and Sparta over the expanding power of Athens, led to a series of intra-Hellenic wars, the most significant lasting between B.C. 431 - 404. Our single most important literary source for these series of brutal and devastating conflicts, the so-called Peloponnesian War,<sup>38</sup> is the unfinished account recorded by the celebrated Athenian historian Thucydides<sup>39</sup> and subsequently supplemented by Xenophon.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> F.C. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, Vol. 3, ET and Greek text, LCL (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1989) reprint, pp. 243-421.

<sup>38</sup> Vide, A.W. Gomme & N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Peloponnesian War,' in *OCD*, 795-96; also, R. Sealy, *A History of the Greek City States 700 - 338 B.C.* (Berkeley, Univ. California Press, 1985 printing) chs. 10-14.

<sup>39</sup> Thucydides (B.C. ca. 460-400) recorded 21 of the 28 years of the Peloponnesian War. His account represents a combination of a first-hand eyewitness account as an Athenian naval commander, as well as Peloponnesian reports which he obtained during his years as an exile from Athens. In addition to narrative description of battles, Thucydides also included in his account speeches attributed to celebrated Athenian or Peloponnesian leaders. Concerning these cycles of speeches, Sealy *op. cit.*, explains, ". . . . These were substantially free compositions by the historian; only the general thrust of each speech can be taken as true to fact.' p. 33. For modern discussions and commentaries on Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* refer to, A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I-III* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1945-56); A.W. Gomme, A. Andrews and K.J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides IV* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1970); J.D. Denniston, 'Thucydides,' in *OCD* 1067-1070; Sealy *op. cit.* 233-34; the English translation used in this study is essentially based upon C.F. Smith, *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1975-1980 reprints) LCL, 4 volumes.

<sup>40</sup> Ca. B.C. 430-350. His *Hellenica* (Ἑλληνικά) sought to begin the description of the Peloponnesian War at the point where Thucydides had broken off his narrative B.C. 411). He brought the completion of his description

By the time of the Peloponnesian War, however, several new developments in warfare produced a military context in which some of the traditional Homeric martial values had now been modified. For example the increasing of mercenary forces meant that complete loyalty in battle might not often be guaranteed. Consequently when faced with an overwhelming enemy charge the mercenary warrior might consider flight rather than standing his ground (i.e. endure) and risk death. Greeks also faced non-Greeks whose code of honour in the battlefield might be quite different to that expounded in the ancient Homeric or Spartan ideal. Consequently as Thucydides explains through Brasidas, the "barbarian" warrior ' . . . . considers flight and attack as equally honourable . . . . ' (*Pelop. War* 4.126.5). Likewise, the introduction of the peltast whose very effectiveness in battle relied upon hit and run tactics<sup>41</sup> or even the idea of strategic retreat (whether in naval or land battles) were now becoming inherent aspects of successful warfare. Thus traditional military values concerning endurance — not fleeing in the face of an enemy charge but standing one's ground — became somewhat modified or compromised in favour of tactical warfare. At times this involved "honorable retreat." Yet one senses that both Thucydides and Xenophon were uncomfortable with retreats whether "tactical" or otherwise. In Thucydides' time any form of retreat which was instigated through fear or lack of endurance was still shameful. It is in this vein that Thucydides describes the Peloponnesians' dishonourable flight by the Acarmanians:

'When finally the armies were at close quarters and the Peloponnesians outflanked with their left the right wing of their opponents and were about to encircle it, the Acarmanians, coming upon them from their ambush, . . . . and routed them, so that they did not stand to make resistance (ὑπομείναι) and panicking in fear caused the greater part. of their army to take to flight also . . . . ' [Thuc. *Pelop. War* 3.108.11.

It is not surprising therefore, within Thucydides account of the events of the Peloponnesian War, to find passionate appeals to the more traditional qualities of the warrior — such as courage and endurance — often in the speeches of celebrated generals, whether Peloponnesian or Athenian.

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(seventh book) to the battle of Mantinea (B.C. 352). Vide, Sealy *op. cit.* 269-70; D.J. Mosley, 'Xenophon, ' in *OCD* 1142.

<sup>41</sup> For a discussion of the *peltast* as well as new developments in Greek warfare in the classical period, vide, JACT, *The World of Athens. An Introduction to Classical Athenian Culture* (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987) reprint, pp. 256-260.

Here, courage and endurance, are portrayed as the most commendable virtues of the individual warrior, combat unit<sup>42</sup> or warring *polis*. They still represent the most admired qualities of the warrior. In Book II of his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides reports a speech of Pericles in which the latter, in the face of increasing Athenian sentiment to abandon the war and make peace with the Spartans, offers an apologia for his commitment to the war. He does this by appealing to the ancient and celebrated Athenian capacity for endurance in adversity and war:

'But the right course is to endure (φέρειν) with resignation the affliction sent by heaven and to endure with courage the hardships that come from the enemy, for such has been the practice of this city in the past and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And realize that Athens has a mighty name among all mankind because she has never yielded . . . . Make no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let them know that you are burdened by the present afflictions; for those in the face of calamities show less distress of spirit and in action endure resist (ἀντεχούσιν) indeed, these are the strongest, whether they be states or individuals.' [Thuc. *Pelop War* 2.64.2-3, 6].

**ii. Endurance as an Indispensable Military Virtue:** Despite strategies and new technological developments in warfare, during the Peloponnesian War, according to Thucydides the display of the ancient military virtue of endurance was still crucial if not indispensable in Greek warfare. The very survival of a military contingent often hinged upon its display in battle. Thus in the face of an imminent Spartan naval and military assault at Pylos, Thucydides describes Demosthenes as exhorting his hoplites which he had strategically placed along the shore, in a call for endurance as the sole hope for survival:

' . . . . I call now upon you, who are Athenians and know by experience that it is impossible to force a landing from ships against an enemy on shore, if the latter but stand their ground / endure (ὑπομένει) and do not give way through fear of the splashing oars and of the awe-inspiring sight of ships bearing down upon them - I call upon you in your turn to stand your ground (μεινῆναι) and warding off the foe at the very water's edge, to save both yourselves and the stronghold.' [*Pelop. War* 4.10.5]

In situations of apparent military hopelessness, Greek generals did not hesitate to exhort courage and endurance from their soldiers as the sole means of victory. Here as in no other military situation one realizes the admiration of the Greeks for endurance (and courage) in battle. The more hopeless the situation, the more honourable and admired were displays of endurance. Two battles from Thucydides' account are illustrative. Observing the fear and hesitancy of the Peloponnesian naval contingent to engage the more skilled and more experienced though not as

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<sup>42</sup> Whether naval or military.

numerous Athenians in battle and having already tasted defeat by the latter, Brasidas and Cnemus sought to drive away their anxieties by appeals to the intertwined, traditional and honourable military virtues — courage and endurance. These are considered sufficient to overcome any odds, whether it be the enemy's greater skills, experience or renown. While courage receives the main stress by the Spartan commanders, nevertheless endurance understood as remaining in one's assigned post, is applauded as an allied desirable quality necessary for victory. Alternatively cowardice in terms of lack of endurance (abandonment of one's position) is considered by the Spartan commanders as the ultimate disgrace of the warrior, deserving punishment:

' . . . . you ought to reflect that although men may suffer reverse in their fortunes yet in their character brave men are rightly considered always brave, and when courage is present no inexperience can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards under any circumstance . . . . your inexperience is more than counterbalanced by your superiority in daring . . . . Be of good courage then, and let each man, both helmsman and sailor follow our lead as best he can, not abandoning the post to which he may be assigned. We . . . . shall give no one an excuse to act as a coward; but if anyone should be inclined that way, he shall be punished with the penalty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with rewards such as befit their valour (ἀρετῆς) [*Pelop. War* 2.87.3,5,8-9].

Likewise the Athenian naval forces, had always been instructed by their admiral Phormion, that despite the enemy's numbers their superior endurance could overcome all adversity in battle:

. . . . Phormio . . . . had always told them . . . . that there was no number of ships, however great, whose attack men such as they could not endure / withstand (οὐχ ὑπομενετέον); and his sailors had long since held among themselves the conviction that they being Athenians, must never give ground (ὑποχωρεῖν) before any number of Peloponnesian ships. [*Pelop. War* 2.88.1,2].

## **II. A Synchronic Analysis: The Endurance of the Hellenistic and Roman Warrior**

### *A. Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Historiography in Praise of Alexander's and the Hellenistic Warrior's Endurance*

By the time of the Hellenistic era, the concept of endurance had already been appropriated from the Greek military world into the world of the sage. In this "demilitarized" or "militarized" philosophical form it became an ethical value. Nevertheless its military value never abated as is evident for the records attesting and praising the value of the Hellenistic warrior's battlefield endurance, and especially for the much-enduring Alexander.

*D. Artists in Praise of the Greek Warrior's Endurance***Figure 1****Corinthian Hoplite Statue at Sanctuary of Dodona**

This sixth-century bronze statue dedicated to Zeus at the Sanctuary of Dodona, of a Corinthian hoplite in combat, visually captures in the posture the military virtue of endurance. The warrior stands firmly on his left leg, while his right leg is poised to advance towards his adversary. There is no hint in the statue's body language of the possibility of flight. His left hand holds a shield in protection from enemy attack, while his right arm is raised to strike with spear. This hoplite graphically represents the very embodiment of the Greek military ideal - standing firm in battle.



**Figure 2**  
**Statue of Dying Greek Warrior at Aegina**

This early fifth-century marble statue from the Temple of Aphaeat Aegina, displays a bearded Greek warrior dying in battle. The artist depicts the warrior still wearing his helmet and holding his shield. This is the Greek image of the courageous and much-enduring warrior - a warrior who did not throw away his shield or helmet in order to execute a rapid flight from battle. The continued wearing of the helmet and the shield are clear symbols suggesting the character of the warrior - a man who is willing to die rather than flee in danger.

**i. Arrian's *Anabasis Alexandri*:** Arrian (Flavius Arrianus),<sup>43</sup> a military man, sometime Roman governor of Cappadocia as well as disciple of the early-Empire Stoic philosopher Epictetus, among his many writings<sup>44</sup> compiled a detailed historiographical account of Alexander's adult life, which described for the most part, the Asian military campaigns, known as the 'Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀναβάσεως (*Anabasis Alexandri*).<sup>45</sup> Unlike the many highly-fanciful Alexander "romances" which flourished during the Greco-Roman period, Arrian's *Anab. Alex.*<sup>46</sup> relies heavily upon two much earlier and reliable Hellenistic eye-witness documentations, namely the accounts of Ptolemy<sup>47</sup> and Aristobulus,<sup>48</sup> both of which in relation to the time of Alexander's military campaigns represent contemporaneous literary sources.<sup>49</sup> Here the notion of military

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<sup>43</sup> Ca. A.D. 90-170.

<sup>44</sup> For more details concerning the life and / or works of Arrian consult, P.A. Brunt, *Arrian. History of Alexander and Indica*, I, LCL, No. 236 (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976); P.E. Easterling & B.M.W. Knox (eds.), *The Hellenistic Period and the Empire*, Vol. 1, Part 4, CHCL (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989) 143-147; H. Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament: History, Culture and Religion in the Hellenistic Age* (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1982); W.W. Tarn 'Arrian,' in *OCD* 122-23.

<sup>45</sup> Out of his admiration for Xenophon, Arrian entitles his history of Alexander in imitation of Xenophon's *Κύρου Ἀνάβασις*, an account of the exploits of (10,000) Greek mercenary warriors in the service of Cyrus, and their long, arduous though successful return to Hellenic soil. Arrian also sought a literary imitation of Xenophon, adopting old Attic as his linguistic vehicle for his *Anab. Alex.*

<sup>46</sup> Arrian himself had senior military experience having both served and written on matters military. In his capacity as Governor of Cappadocia (A.D. 132-137) and hence military commander of two legions (20,000 men) he succeeded in repelling an Alan invasion in A.D. 134. Arrian wrote about his preparations for war in his *Ectaxis contra Alanos*, vide also, P.A. Brunt, *op. cit.* xi. Shortly after (137) Arrian wrote another military tractate (*Tactics*) which dealt in large measure with the training of cavalry. Like his *Anab. Alex.*, this work draws heavily from previous sources.

<sup>47</sup> Ptolemy wrote his account of Alexander's campaign after the death of Alexander. As one of Alexander's best friends and chief generals it is almost certain, however, that he kept notes during the military campaigns in which he also participated. hence Ptolemy's account ranks as a contemporary source of the highest rank, for it represents the account of a participant eye-witness.

<sup>48</sup> Aristobulus of Cassandria was a participant in Alexander's campaigns and travels. His eye-witness account was completed a little earlier than Ptolemy's. His history also served as a source for Strabo's work on Alexander; vide W.W. Tarn, 'Aristobulus,' in *OCD*, 111; also Brunt, *op. cit.* xxii.

<sup>49</sup> Many contemporaneous accounts of Alexander's life and military exploits were composed but none survive in their original form. A list of the most significant accounts would include that of (1) Callisthenes of Olynthus: he accompanied Alexander and wrote on the early part of his campaign (ca. B.C. 333-329); (2) Anaximenes of Lampsacus, and (3) Chares of Mitylene a servant in Alexander's court. The accounts of (4) Ptolemy and (5) Aristobulus also represent eye-witness narratives. Because so much of Arrian's account. of Alexander's military campaign draws from these two latter contemporaneous and generally reliable Hellenistic accounts (as well as other incidental material), the account has been described by scholars as preserving among the surviving accounts ' . . . . the most reliable material about Alexander the Great.' (Koester, *op. cit.* 350); this re-echoes Brunt's view who observed that 'Arrian unquestionably provides us with the best evidence we have for Alexander . . . . ' Brunt *op. cit.* XYi. Thus in its skeletal form it preserves a Hellenistic perspective on military values. Arrian himself declares in his preface that he followed both Ptolemy's and Aristobulus' text wherever the two accounts were in common agreement and used only one which he evaluated as more reliable when divergences occurred:

endurance (as well as *courage*) figures fairly frequently as a most significant, integral and praiseworthy aspect of early Hellenistic warfare.

**ii. Alexander and Hellenistic Military Values - Courage and Honour:** Several new developments had occurred in military and naval warfare by the Hellenistic era, most of them being of a technological and tactical nature.<sup>50</sup> A new element however, which might be described as psychological is now linked with the person of the commander of the Greco-Macedonian forces. With the possible exception of Hannibal,<sup>51</sup> never before in the chronicles of ancient European warfare does one find a military commander at the forefront and thick of battle charges risking his life so frequently<sup>52</sup> (e.g. *Anab. Alex.* 1.15.6; 1.21.5). His very presence in battle was unmistakable, invoking terror and dread for the enemy but awe and enthusiasm to his own troops. He lifted the morale of his forces by simply being there. Thus just prior to the battle of Granicus Arrian informs us of Alexander's "charismatic" presence:

'The Persians had about 20,000 cavalry and little short of the same number of foreign mercenary infantry . . . . . When they observed Alexander himself - he was unmistakable, from the splendour of his equipment, and the awesome enthusiasm of the men in attendance round him . . . . .' [*Anab. Alex.* 1.14.4].

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'Wherever Ptolemy....and Aristobulus . . . . . have both given the same accounts of Alexander son of Philip, it is my practice to record what they say as completely true, but where they differ, to select the version I regarded as more trustworthy.' [Arrian, *Anab. Alex.* 1.1].

Accordingly I shall treat Arrian's narrative first in the sequence of synchronic analysis, even though it was compiled in the second century (A.D.). It is of course true that Arrian's text does not preserve a word for word recount of the original sources, and, as Brunt points out ' . . . . . the speeches in his work . . . . . are his own literary compositions based on the material he found in his sources.' *op. cit.* .xxvii, yet the nucleus Arrian's text basically re-echoes its Hellenistic sources and their values. For a discussion of the now-lost contemporary sources of Alexander's life and campaigns, vide Brunt *op. cit.* xx-xxi.

<sup>50</sup> Vide W.W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military & Naval Developments* (Chicago, Ares, 1984) reprint, *passim*.

<sup>51</sup> For a discussion of Hannibal and selected bibliography, vide H.H. Sculland, 'Hannibal,' in *OCD* 487; also Polybius.

<sup>52</sup> Within *Anab. Alex.* Arrian contrasts this attitude with Darius' predisposition for seeking the protection and refuge of a secure position among his troops, and never at the front line. Parallel to this is Darius' propensity to panic and flee at the slightest sense of danger (e.g. *Anab. Alex.* 3.13.3). Furthermore by the first-century Hannibal as an ideal warrior of courage and endurance was being criticized by such sages as Seneca, who found his one winter of "relaxation" at Campania, prior to his Italian campaign, as a sign of weakness and softness (Seneca, *Ep.* 51.5); for Seneca's perspective on Hannibal vide my discussion in 'Stoic Endurance in Moral Warfare,' in ch. 2 of the present study.



Again, when Alexander joined in a skirmish against a party from the besieged city of Halicarnassus, who were seeking to burn down Alexander's siege engines, the sight of Alexander made them run in retreat:<sup>53</sup>

'But when Alexander also appeared in the sally, they dropped the torches with which they had rushed out to attack, and most cast away their arms and escaped within the walls.' [Anab. Alex. 1.21.5].

Likewise his strategic decisions were not always based on conventional military wisdom. Rather he was motivated by an indefatigable and indestructible sense of self-destiny,<sup>54</sup> challenge, a 'passionate pursuit of the glory of success,' (Anab. Alex. 4.18.6), prestige, reputation or honour (cf. "shame"). Consequently this led Alexander to initiate and engage in military challenges where the dangers and risks were overwhelming. When facing the Persian force on the opposite bank of the Granicus River, and being warned by Parmenio not to take the risk of the first charge across the steep-banked river, Alexander's decision was couched in the language of honour and shame:<sup>55</sup>

'Alexander however, replied: "All this I know, Parmenio, but I should feel ashamed if after crossing the Hellespont easily this petty stream (. . . . . the Granicus) hinders us from crossing, just as we are. I consider this unworthy either of the prestige of the Macedonians or of my own celebrity in dealing with dangers...." ' [Anab. Alex. 1.13.6-7].

Not surprisingly, therefore, within this system of Hellenistic military honour, facing dangers (κίνδυνος)<sup>56</sup> with determination and boldness - that is *courage* - becomes an indispensable military attribute. In Arrian's narration of Alexander's military campaigns, where it is described both as a collective virtue as well as an individual quality, it is clear that this quality of the warrior

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<sup>53</sup> Similarly, Arrian preserves an account of the impact of Alexander's awesome presence upon enemy forces in the third book of his *Anab. Alex.* While pursuing the defeated Darius, who by now was under arrest and kept in a wagon by a small mutinous Persian contingent, Alexander came within sight of them. Arrian then explains that when the Persian force saw Alexander most of them fled: ' . . . . . as soon as they (i.e. the Persians) saw Alexander himself, most of them did not even wait to come to close quarters but took to flight . . . . . ' [3.21.9].

<sup>54</sup> When he exhorted his officers prior to the decisive battle of Issus, he reminded them that while the Persians had Darius as their leader they had Alexander: ' . . . . . you have Alexander commanding you against Darius.' (Anab. Alex. 2.7.5). That he considered to be a decisive factor.

<sup>55</sup> Similarly on the eve of his final and decisive battle, in Persia, against Darius' numerically superior force, Alexander was advised by Parmenio to attack by night and hence take advantage of the darkness as well as the element of surprise. This proposed strategy however, meets with Alexander's firm disapproval, on the grounds that such a victory would not be "honourable:" "They say that Parmenio . . . . . advised him to attack the Persians at night; they would be surprised, confused and more prone to panic in a night attack. Alexander however replied . . . . . that it was dishonourable (αἰσχρόν) to steal the victory, and that Alexander had to win his victory openly and without stratagem.' [Anab. Alex. 3.10.2]. For a discussion of the concepts of "honour" and "shame" in Mediterranean Hellenistic culture, vide Melina *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> In Arrian's text this term is constantly employed in relationship to Alexander's boldness. For instance, Alexander is reported to say typically prior to his encounter with the Scythians, that it would be, ' . . . . . better to go to any extremity of danger (κινδύνου ἐλθεῖν) . . . . . than to be . . . . . ' [4.4.3].

was held in the highest esteem. Alexander's admiration for courage in battle is evident in Arrian's text in several instances. Thus when Alexander seeks to inspire his troops prior to the battle of Issus, he chooses courage as a key theme of his exhortative address. This he does by reference to (1) the pre-condition for a courageous character, namely the constant exposure of a warrior to danger and hardship (cf. soft and luxurious living) and (2) personal examples of courage, both his or others<sup>57</sup> He also spoke of other things which "at such a time, before dangers, a brave general would naturally tell brave men." It is not unreasonable to suggest that deeds of endurance were told by way of inspiration:

'We Macedonians . . . . are to fight Medes and Persians, nations long steeped in luxury, which we have now long been inured to danger by the exertions of campaigning . . . . (the Persian forces being) . . . . the most indolent and softest tribes of Asia . . . . he reminded them of all they had already achieved with brilliant success . . . . and cited any noble act of personal courage / daring (τετολμημένον) naming both the deed and the man; with the utmost delicacy he mentioned the dangers he himself had faced in battles . . . . He also told them of anything else which at such a time, before dangers, a brave general would naturally tell brave men by way of encouragement. They crowded round and clasped their king's hand, and with cries of encouragement, urged to lead them at once.' [*Anab. Alex.* 2.7.7,9].<sup>58</sup>

In Arrian's text not only does Alexander praise courage in words motivating his men towards great boldness, but also through his personal example of fearlessly rushing towards battle in the vanguard, in total disrespect for enemy danger,<sup>59</sup> he simultaneously inspires his troops to follow him. Thus in a battle against the Scythians Arrian records that Alexander defied a prophecy of doom entering the river towards the opposite bank (towards the Scythians) first: 'Alexander . . . . began the crossing of the river, himself in the van; the rest of the army followed him.' (4.4.2.5).

**iii. *Anab. Alex.* and the Warrior's Endurance:** In light of this new psychological level of bold risk-taking warfare where courage becomes an unquestionable military quality, in fact the

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<sup>57</sup> The use of a positive personal example would become in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman popular philosophical circles a rhetorical device employed for psychagogic purposes. It was also used in early Christian writings, for similar purposes, esp. in Pauline and deuterio-Pauline literature (e.g. 1 *Cor.* 4.14-17; 2 *Tim.* 1.5 and implicitly in 1 *Thess.* 1-3). For an introductory discussion vide, A. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook*, LEC (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1986) 135-138. For a more detailed treatment of the function of the personal example in the Greco-Roman period (in terms of a comparison between early Christian and pagan writings), vide, B. Fiore, *The Function of the Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles*, *Analecta Biblica* 105 (Rome, Biblical Institute Press, 1986), *passim*.

<sup>58</sup> Also *Anab. Alex.* 2.10.2.

<sup>59</sup> This is probably best summarized in a short phrase within Arrian's text where it is almost casually reported that Alexander '....commonly faced danger (κινδυνεύοντι) in battle....' [*Anab. Alex.* 3.10.3].

given norm of battle, inspired by the very personal example and fearless involvement of the commander himself, do the traditionally allied military attributes of *strength* or *endurance* also figure as prominently in the value system of Ptolemy's and Aristobulus' military world - at least as preserved by Arrian?<sup>60</sup> Given the preceding diachronic analysis one would reasonably expect that these two hitherto associated attributes would be lauded and prominently mentioned in the chronicles of both these Hellenistic historiographers. To the extent that Arrian preserves the basic essence of these two Hellenistic military men<sup>61</sup> it is interesting that whereas *strength* which was such a prominent attribute, both in admiration and in frequency in the pre-Alexander annals of warfare, now while still lauded is no longer mentioned as frequently in battle descriptions.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, in the few occasions where it is mentioned in the *Anab. Alex.*, it is as often meant to designate an impersonal quality such as the numerical superiority of an army, strategic advantage or the level of a city's, nation's or empire's political might (e.g. 1.5.7; 1.8.3; 4.27.7), rather than as a reference to the physical prowess of an individual warrior in combat - which is usually referred to in terms of *ῥώμη*! Why these changes have occurred within the Hellenistic military world represented by *Anab. Alex.* is, by and large, beyond the parameters of the present study. What is most relevant however, is that *endurance* as an allied quality to *courage*, is viewed as a most admirable and indispensable military attribute, indeed the very quality of the honourable and successful Hellenistic warrior-king.

Within the *Anab. Alex.* endurance in battle is most usually designated in terms of *ἀντέχειν* (e.g. 1.23.1), *ἀντισχεῖν* (e.g. 1.9.2), *μένειν* (e.g. 1.8.7; 1.28.5), (and esp.) *ὑπομένειν* (e.g. 1.6.5; 2.14.9) or their cognates. As in earlier traditions of war so too in *Anab. Alex.* it denotes the capacity of an army (or fleet) and / or a warrior "standing his / their ground" in the face of an

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<sup>60</sup> Consult the sections of the present chapter referring to Homeric and Israelite military values.

<sup>61</sup> While Ptolemy was a warrior Aristobulus did serve in Alexander's military expeditions as a technician, as such he too may be classified as a military man.

<sup>62</sup> In Arrian's text, a warrior's "strength" is still undoubtedly a positive and desirable quality. For instance during Alexander's frustrating siege of Halicarnassus, two Macedonian warriors in a solo act of bravado attacked the walls in order to intimidate the enemy by their "strength" described as *ῥώμη*: 'Not many days after, two Macedonian members of Perdicas' battalion . . . . were each boasting of his own prowess and actions: rivalry arose assisted by the heating fumes of wine, so they armed themselves and attacked the walls . . . . their idea being to exhibit their strength (*ῥώμης*) . . . . ' [*Anab. Alex.* 1.21.1]; vide also 1.15.5.

enemy charge, and represents the opposite of λείπειν, ἐπαναγαγεῖν, φεύγειν (or cognates) - "withdrawing," "fleeing," "deserting" or "abandoning" one's position. An illustrative instance within *Anab. Alex.* employing the concept and language of military endurance concerns Alexander's combat at Pellium:

The enemy long bewildered both at the smartness and the discipline of the drill did not await the approach of Alexander's troops, but abandoned (λείπουσι) the first hills. Alexander ordered the Macedonians to raise their battle-cry and clang their spears upon their shields, and the Taulantians even more horrified at the noise, hastily withdrew back (ἐποσνήγαγον) to the city. Alexander saw that a few of the enemy were holding a hill on his line of march, and ordered his bodyguards and the Companions with him to take their shields, mount and charge the hill; reaching it, supposing those who held it should stand their ground (ὑπομένοιεν), half were to dismount . . . . . But the enemy observing Alexander's onset abandoned (λείπουσι) the hill and withdrew to the mountains . . . . . ' [*Anab. Alex.* 1.6.3-6].

### III. «Stand Firm, do not Flee» / «Ἵπομείνας, μη Φεύγε» The Shameful Absence of Endurance

#### A. *The Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Warrior and the Shameful Absence of Endurance Due to Fear*

**i. Prologue:** So far, I have discussed the elements which compose the portrait of the much-enduring, courageous and hence heroic or honourable Greek warrior. A significant question that emerges out of these discussions, is this - if in Greek culture, endurance in battle is understood as both a praiseworthy and necessary attribute of military heroism, then what does the absence of endurance in combat imply? How did the poets, historiographers and artists depict it?

With the exception of strategic retreats, that is, tactical withdrawals from the battlefield compelled upon the warrior by his military superiors, there are several major situations or circumstances where the absence of the warrior's endurance, in a battlefield situation, is considered as shameful or αἰσχρόν (dishonourable). I have already described certain aspects of the dishonourable absence of battle endurance arising from fear. Such an attack of fear or panic, either based upon the enemies' numerical or technological superiority or simply through a lack of confidence in one's skill as a warrior, would lead to the αἰσχρόν of ("flight," "running away"), λείπειν ("withdrawal") or surrender without any real attempt at resistance. Here, the primary motive is preservation of one's own life without regard to fellow soldiers or the warrior's ethos of

*B. Artists in Praise of Alexander's Courage and Endurance in Battle*




Figure 3

**Alexander - Detail from Pompeian Mosaic**

Alexander's daring and endurance in battle became legendary in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period. This detail from the Pompeian mosaic (a copy of a fourth-century fresco believed to be the work of Philoxenus of Eretria) portrays Alexander in full combat at the Battle of Issus. The artist depicts Alexander in an advancing, attacking mode, without trace of fear or intent to retreat (cf. Darius), either in his eyes, face or bodily gestures. His eyes are wide open and eager for action. Here the absence of helmet or shield is rather a sign of his disrespect for injury or death. In some other artistic depictions of Alexander he is portrayed in combat without the protection of even his armour, but rather attired in tunic, as a sign of his heroic fearlessness.

honorable courage and endurance. Under these circumstances the warrior would incur the description of αἰσχρόν. Indeed, this absence of the demonstration of the warrior's honourable endurance, in accordance to Hellenistic, Roman, as well as Jewish military codes, affects all ranks without exception, from a king to an ordinary soldier. The ensuing Persian, Hellenistic and Roman examples illustrate this ancient universal attitude.

**ii. The Case of the Αἰσχρῶς Fleeing Darius:** In continuity with the older traditions of war, within *Anab. Alex.* the warrior's endurance is considered, parallel to courage, as a most significant and laudable quality. Hence, not surprisingly, constantly throughout Arrian's text the language of endurance forms part of battle descriptions.<sup>63</sup> Indeed for Alexander himself, the most successful warrior of the Hellenistic era, endurance is admired above all other military virtues as the ultimate criteria of the genuine and honourable warrior-king. Without this attribute a king has no claim to power over his kingdom. Thus, according to *Anab. Alex.*, when Alexander was encamped at Marathus, he was in receipt of a letter from Darius pleading for the release of his captive relatives as well as an offer of alliance. In his response Alexander accuses Darius of shattering peace in Hellas and hence of initiating the conflict. Furthermore if he desires the release of his relatives he must approach him not simply as the prince of the Hellenes but as the "lord of all Asia" including the territory he now temporarily holds. As such he cannot treat Alexander as an equal. If he does not acknowledge him as his king then he must prove his own kingship by demonstrating "endurance" in battle and not "fleeing" in panic and defeat. Accordingly Alexander exhorts him to "stand firm (ὑπομείνας) and fight, as is fitting for one who claims to be "lord of Asia:"

'You must then regard me lord of all Asia and come to me . . . . Ask for your mother, wife and children and what you will when you arrive and you will receive them . . . . And in future when you send to me make your addresses to the king of Asia and do not correspond as an equal, but tell me as lord of all your possessions what you need; otherwise I shall make plans to deal with you as a wrongdoer. But if you claim the kingship stand your ground / endure (ὑπομείνας) and fight for it and do not flee (μὴ φεύγε).' [2.14.8-9].

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<sup>63</sup> e.g. 1.6.5; 1.8.7; 1.9.2; 1.23.1; 1.28.5; 2.14.9 etc.

Indeed in Arrian's text it is this very incapacity of Darius, in his role as commander, to "stand firm" or endure Alexander's ferocious military charges, which disqualify him from being a "successful" and "honourable" king over the Persian empire. Instead, his constant "fleeing" from battle in panic render him as a "dishonourable" (αἰσχρόν) warrior-king:

This was the end of Darius . . . . no man showed less spirit or sense in warfare . . . . Next came his defeat at Issus, where he saw his mother with his wife and children taken prisoners; then Phoenicia and all Egypt were lost; and then he himself was among the first to flee dishonourably (ἔφυγε τε ἐν πρώτοις αἰσχρῶς) . . . . ' [3.22.2,4].

Within the military world reflected by the text of *Anab. Alex.*, Darius' lack of military endurance, manifested by his constant "fleeing," renders him an unworthy or αἰσχρόν warrior-king for several reasons: (1) Unlike Alexander, Darius is unable to exercise a legitimate and heroic military leadership through his own personal example. Consequently he is unable to inspire his troops to greater endurance (and courage); (2) His inability to ὑπομείνας ἔτι ἀγώνισαι, that is to "stand his ground / endure and fight" becomes a causal factor in his troops' inefficiency on the battlefield. Indeed it has a disastrous effect upon their own morale and capacity to endure the enemy's battle charges for it causes them also to falter in their endurance, giving way prematurely in combat. Thus, according to *Anabasis Alexander* at a critical moment at the battle of Issus, while the Persian troops were "standing their ground" (ἤσθοντο) in battle against Alexander, Darius' "fleeing" discouraged his soldiers, causing them also to flee. The implication here being that with another commander possessing military endurance (and courage) the Persian forces would have "stood firm" and hence fared much better against Alexander and his warriors: 'The Persians stood their ground (ἤσθοντο) till they realized that Darius had fled (πεφευγότα) . . . . ' [2.11.2]. In fact, Darius is described by Arrian's sources and / or Arrian himself, as a hopeless coward, totally devoid of any capacity for military endurance, to stand his ground, preferring to leave the battle at the first and slightest sign of danger, and persistently among the first to do so: ' . . . . As for Darius the moment his left-wing was panic stricken by Alexander . . . . he fled just as he was in his chariot, in the van of the fugitives (τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφυγε).' [2.11.4]. Consequently, according to *Anab. Alex.* it is Alexander who in the ἀγών of battle demonstrates himself as a much-enduring warrior, who together with his great courage in the face of dangers (κινδύνοι) never "flees" or

"deserts" the battle, but on the contrary often leads his troops in charges. This endurance or capacity to stand firm in battle become among the most significant, consistent and praiseworthy catalysts of the Greco-Macedonian victories, over vastly numerically-superior forces. Within the military and culturo-political ideology of the *Anab. Alex.* it is Alexander rather than Darius who is therefore the more "honourable" warrior-king deserving the title "king of Asia" precisely because of his heroic military endurance.<sup>64</sup> For *Anab. Alex.* military endurance is both an indispensable source of victory as well as a royal attribute!

**iii. The Honourable Much-Enduring Roman Warrior and Just Combat:** In a report by the first-century Jewish historiographer, Flavius Josephus, pertaining to the Roman general Vespasian's single-handed endurance displayed against an overwhelmingly superior force of Jews in a military encounter, Vespasian evokes Josephus' greatest praise and commendation. Indeed it would seem that around the time of the apostle Paul, a warrior's endurance displayed against seemingly overwhelming odds, also aroused the admiration of the enemy. Being outnumbered the fighting Vespasian considered it "dishonourable" to run, rather he preferred to "stand firm" (ἐπέμεινε) and fight:

'Thinking it now neither safe nor honourable to turn, and mindful of the hardships he had endured from his youth and his innate valour (ἀρετῇ) . . . . and so undaunted by the multitude either of men or missiles, he stood his ground / endured (ἐπέμεινε) until the enemy impressed by such inspired courage relaxed their ardour.' [BJ 4.5].

For Vespasian, flight or retreat in battle motivated by cowardice (rather than strategy), is still regarded as shameful. Furthermore even the enemy cannot continue, in all honour, to wage a just combat under such circumstances. Though Vespasian was displaying heroic endurance, he was nevertheless alone and hence hopelessly and overwhelmingly outnumbered. A fair and honourable combat could not therefore ensue. As such, his Jewish opposition display proper honour by relaxing their combat and hence permit him to leave honourably, having proven his endurance and courage.

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<sup>64</sup> Yet Arrian's text is not shy to record Alexander's lack of self-control and endurance outside the battle field in non-military settings. Indeed this failure is described as a serious character flaw. Such is the case of Alexander's killing of his friend Clitus (4.7.5).



*B. Artists and Shameful Flight in Combat*



**Figure 4**  
**Warrior in Flight (6th century cup)**

This Greek painting on a late sixth-century cup, depicts an ὀπλίτης in flight from battle. The painter, Scythes, portrays the shameful warrior, looking behind, estimating his distance from danger, as he runs away from the enemy. His helmet is removed to facilitate his running, or about to be discarded, while his spear is being carried rather than poised for combat, perhaps also to be thrown away. Another method of escaping death was to throw away one's armaments, shield and helmet and beg for mercy from the pursuant foe. In a related statement in the *Apol.* (39AB), Plato's Socrates remarks: ' . . . . neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man plan to escape death by every possible means. In battle it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy from his pursuers, and there are many other means of escaping death. But . . . . I persevere . . . . ' This painting pictorially embodies the elements of dishonourable cowardice and the shameful absence of endurance in battle.



Figure 5

**Pompeian Mosaic of Battle of Issus**

This is a fuller view of the Pompeian mosaic [Fig. 3]. Not only does the artist depict the Persian army in flight, but dominating the centre stage, the panic of Darius is unmistakable on perceiving the advancing Alexander. The multitude of long spears (sarissas) in the background of this battle scene (Battle of Issus), serve to symbolically display the military superiority of Alexander's forces.

#### IV. The Social Dimensions of the Warrior's Endurance

##### A. *The Warrior's Endurance and Ethnicity: A Popular Greek Stereotype*<sup>65</sup>

While already in Homer the term βαρβαροφῶνοι is employed as a linguistic concept for the ethnic "otherness" of the Carians, since they did not speak a Hellenic dialect,<sup>66</sup> it would be in fifth-century Athens, perhaps as a consequence of the defeat of the Persians, that the pejorative and standard stereotype of the "barbarian" had been fully invented by the Greeks, whereby all non-Greeks were generalized under that category.<sup>67</sup> For an Aristotle, as he explains in his *Politics* (1327-32), the Greek world was situated in the "golden mean" between the two geographical and ethnic polarities of humanity - on the one hand the Europeans north and west of Greece, and Asians or the Persians on the east. According to Aristotle, one of the distinguishing marks which characterize the Greek from the non-Greek was his innate sense of freedom (ἐλευθερία), his status as a free citizen, in contrast to barbarian servility, a motif perhaps also re-enforced by the socio-economic structure of the Greek *polis*, wherein the preponderance of slaves were of non-Greek origin.

More relevant, and even earlier, in this unpleasant form of ethnocentric "ethnology" was the issue of war. In one of his medical essays, where Greeks are now understood as part of the "European" race, in contrast to "Asiatics," Hippocrates (*Airs, Waters, Places*), hypothesizes that the small variation of climate, and hence inability to endure extreme hardship, renders "Asiatics" unsuitable and cowardly warriors. Furthermore, according to the same author, their despotic or monarchical governmental style also contributes to their cowardice and lack of endurance, for even

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<sup>65</sup> This sub-section draws in some measure from the recent work of the British historian, P. Cartledge in his *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others* (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), specifically ch. 3.

<sup>66</sup> The most usual Greek term for a "stranger" or "alien" was ξένος. However that could equally be applied to a Greek or a non-Greek. On the other hand βάρβαρος had a clear ethnic thrust. Etymologically, the βάρβαρος was one whose language was non-Greek, and hence to the Greek ear made "βάρ βάρ" sounds. Concerning the Greek vocabulary of "barbarism" vide A.J. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), 58-64.

<sup>67</sup> Following E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarians. Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), P. Cartledge in his *op. cit.*, explains that ' . . . . by the time of Aeschylus' *Persians*, produced at the Athenian Great Dionysian festival of 472, the process of "othering" and indeed inventing "the barbarian" as a homogenized stereotype was well underway in Greece...' 39.

if a man is born brave, this bravery cannot be fostered or nourished by the very nature of the authoritarian socio-political system within which he has been socialized and enculturated:

The small variations of climate to which the Asiatics are subject, extremes both of heat and cold being avoided, account for their flabbiness and cowardice . . . . They are less warlike than Europeans, and tamer of constitution, for they are not subject to these physical changes and the mental stimulation which sharpen tempers and induce recklessness and hot-headedness . . . . a contributory cause lies in their customs; for the greater part is under monarchical rule . . . . Even if a man be born brave and of stout heart, his character is ruined by the form of government.' [*Airs, Waters, Places* 16].<sup>68</sup>

Despite a few interesting voices of protestation against the existence of an innate barbarian-Greek dichotomy,<sup>69</sup> a basic presupposition of the ancient Greek writers, especially classical times to the period of early Hellenism, whether, poets or tragedians, was the conviction that the Greek warrior *qua* Greek warrior innately possessed a superior form of military endurance and courage than his non-Greek ("barbarian") counterpart.<sup>70</sup> The "barbarian" for the Greek by virtue of the undisciplined and "uncouth" or "despotic" nature of their society could only give the appearance of courage or endurance. But, in reality, it was considered that such counterfeit endurance would easily break when confronting the Greeks, for it was not innate to them. Consequently, in the extant literature, Greek commanders, especially Spartans, do not shy away from making pre-battle appeals to racial superiority. Thucydides reports that when the Spartan forces were abandoned by their Macedonian allies, and facing an overwhelming number of Illyrians, Brasidas reminded the panic-stricken Spartans of "the most important considerations" relating to victory — endurance and

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<sup>68</sup> Cited from Cartledge *op. cit.* 40.

<sup>69</sup> Antiphon the Sophist had argued against the existence of an innate or generic barbarian nature. For Antiphon all humans, whether Greek or non-Greek, participated and shared in the one human nature (φύσις) and hence possessed the same intellectual and physical potential. An Antiphon would argue that, if the Greeks were better warriors than the Persians, this ought to be attributed to training and social conventions (νόμος), rather than a generic superiority. However, within the sweep of the history of ideas, it would be the Stoics, who would follow Antiphon a few generations later. With the effective demise of the power of the Greek *polis* and the rise of the Hellenistic empires, the world was now perceived more in ecumenical or global terms - man belonged as a citizen of the cosmos. He became "cosmopolitan." Furthermore they postulated the principle of the universal "brotherhood of man." Within this Stoic cosmology and anthropology, race was not necessarily a factor. It was an "indifferent," vide 'The Place of Moral Endurance in Stoic Ethics,' in the ensuing chapter.

<sup>70</sup> What of the Macedonian warriors, were they considered as "Greeks"? What of Alexander himself? In classical times several significant thinkers considered the Macedonians as a crucial aspect of the pan-Hellenic ideal, the most noteworthy being Isocrates. This view was also held by Aristotle. Furthermore, all the Greek panegyrics of Alexander and the Macedonian warriors on the Asian campaign, as much-enduring and courageous, clearly suggests their recognition as Έλληνες, for in accordance to popular belief and the orthodox ethnologies, such endurance was not generic to "barbarians. It is interesting that, according to Herodotus (5.22), the King of Macedonia, by virtue of being the monarch, was also entitled to participate in the Olympic Games, and hence would automatically be regarded as Greek. Alexander's dedication to Hellenic culture is of course well known and needs no elaboration, here.

courage! Such brave endurance will confuse the "barbaric" Illyrians. There is a clear suggestion in Brasidas' speech that non-Greeks (i.e. barbarians) do not possess the same exalted military code of honour concerning courage and endurance as the Greeks:

'Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus that you are in a state of panic because you have been left alone, and because your assailants are barbarous and numerous . . . . in view of our abandonment by our allies and of the multitude of our opponents, I shall try by a brief reminder and by advice to impress upon you the most important considerations. For it is proper that you should be brave in war . . . . because of innate valour; nor should you be afraid of any number of aliens . . . .

Now as for these Illyrians . . . . the menace of their attack has terror; for their number is indeed dreadful to behold and the loudness of their battle-cry is intolerable, and the idle brandishing of their arms has a threatening effect. But for hand to hand fighting, if their opponents endure (ὑπομένουσιν) such threats, they are not the men they seem; for having no regular order, they would not be ashamed to abandon any position when hard pressed; and since flight and attack are considered equally honourable with them, their courage cannot be put to the test.' [Thuc. *Pelop. War* 4.126.1-2,5].

Thucydides brings out further examples of this innate "barbarian" predisposition for cowardice and the absence of military endurance. One instance (7.29.4-5, 30.3) deals with Athenian mercenaries from Thrace (modern Bulgaria), who were hired by the Athenians and employed during the Peloponnesian War and whom Thucydides clearly perceives as "barbarians."<sup>71</sup> Under an Athenian commander they were marched northwards with instructions to attack any of Sparta's allies in Boiotia. However at Mycalessos, Thucydides reports, they went wild, slaughtering "every living creature in sight" including women and children. Thucydides was horrified by this carnage. This incident, however re-enforced his "ethnology of war." He concludes that the barbarian warrior is the most ferocious, when aroused by their inferior brand of daring. The implication here, as Cartledge points out is that only when facing women and children does the barbarian warrior become daring: 'If we are to translate that observation in cultural terms, Thucydides is implying that in a fair fight with adult male Greek citizen soldiers, barbarians do not have even *thrasos*, let alone truly Greek "courage" . . . . but when taking on women, children, old men, farm

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<sup>71</sup> The Greek citizen-warrior did not fight for a fee, nor was he hired. His military services were an integral aspect of his duties as a citizen. During the intra-Hellenic Peloponnesian War, both sides employed mercenaries. It must be noted however, that by the fourth-century a breakdown in this system is becoming evident. Already in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, we find thousands of Greeks willing to hire out their "innate" military prowess, to the highest bidder, whether it be barbarian or Greek, in disregard to the traditional convention of the citizen-warrior. On the other hand, the Ten Thousand were involved in an intra-Persian affair and were not fighting fellow-Greeks. Furthermore, old habits die hard, for even on the march, as M. Austin and P. Vidal-Nauquet point out (quoting H. Taine), Xenophon considered them as a "moving polis," vide, M. Austin and P. Vidal-Nauquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece. An Introduction* (London, 1977) 380. For Xenophon, the Ten Thousand were the "πολίτευμα" of a new Greek "πόλις" to be founded on the shores of the Black Sea.

animals, household pets, and so forth, they do get their inferior form of boldness . . . .<sup>72</sup> To Cartledge's list of Thucydides' barbarian traits, I would also suggest, that in the light of the present discussion, for the Greek historiographer, the absence of authentic endurance was also implicit in this passionate condemnation of the barbarian warrior.<sup>73</sup> A further point concerning Thucydides' perspective of the "non-enduring" and cowardly barbarian warrior, is noteworthy in this discussion, and prepares us for the ensuing chapter. For Thucydides, among all barbarians, the Scythians are most savage and the strongest. This military prowess would be unequalled in the world, including their courage and endurance, if only for one factor, namely their absence of wisdom (εὐβουλία).<sup>74</sup> This deprivation is generic Thucydides argues, and hence their potential as courageous and much-enduring warriors is hampered. This linkage between a warrior's prowess in battle (inc. ἀνδρεία and ἀνδρεία), and a cognitive or epistemological factor, is precisely what Plato's Socrates would claim is the very criterion for considering moral or philosophical endurance superior to a warrior's endurance and courage, which for Plato (followed by Aristotle) does not necessarily involve wisdom.<sup>75</sup>

### *B. The Warrior's Endurance and Gender*

Besides the racial suggestion in Thucydides' account, that endurance as a martial virtue is more "innate" to the Greek warrior than the "barbarian," there is also a gender dimension in his historiographical narrative. In this he is not unique.<sup>76</sup> Throughout Greek antiquity, from the time

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<sup>72</sup> Cartledge, *op. cit.* 53.

<sup>73</sup> To the question - why did the Greeks hire mercenaries given such pejorative views? To begin with not all mercenaries who fought in the Peloponnesian war were racially "barbarians." Many were recruited from small rural Greek communities such as in Arcadia. On the other hand, due to an acute shortage of manpower, many "barbarians" were enlisted. However, they were trained and led by Greeks, perhaps with the hope of instilling some courage and endurance no matter how innate they considered their incapacity. It is interesting however that Thucydides fears the "barbarization" of the conduct of the Greek warrior himself, as a result of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>74</sup> Vide Cartledge, *op. cit.* 54.

<sup>75</sup> Vide 'The "Demilitarization" and "Philosophication" of the Warrior's Endurance,' in ch. 2 of the present study. Aristotle also argues that whatever endurance and courage the "barbarian" may possess it is not a "rational endurance" but tainted with passion (*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.25).

<sup>76</sup> It must be borne in mind that, with minor exceptions, all the extant Greek literature dealing with women was written by males. Indeed, as Cartledge points out, even in tragedy or comedy, whenever a woman speaks, a man wrote the lines, and there were many celebrated plays featuring women as protagonists (most notably Euripides' *Medea* and Sophocles' *Antigone*). In Greek theatre it would actually be males who played female roles. It was simply the use of masks which designated the dramatic persona; vide Cartledge, *op. cit.* 65. Accordingly with our available

of Homer to that of the apostle Paul, it was widely held that war was the exclusive domain of the male. This was based on the belief that the male "by nature" was more courageous, indeed the very term describing courage - ἀνδρεία - which literally means "manliness" etymologically excluded women.<sup>77</sup> Likewise it was also felt that males had a greater capacity for endurance than females. Consequently, and not surprisingly, with few exceptions such as the legends of the Amazons and the personification of the goddess Athena as a much-enduring warrior,<sup>78</sup> the Greek warrior was thought of exclusively as male. When exceptions to the rule were evident attention was drawn precisely because they were considered exceptional and hence noteworthy. Typically, in these cases the courageous and much-enduring heroine "warrior" would be described as exceeding the parameters of her allocated "nature" (φύσις), as going beyond her gender "contrary to their nature" or displaying endurance and courage "despite her gender".<sup>79</sup> Thus in one military situation

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Greek sources, we are basically dealing with a male perspective of women, and not necessarily accessing the reality of the Greek woman's world. For a convenient collection of extracts from ancient literature dealing with women in Greece and Rome, vide, M.R. Lefkowitz & M.B. Fant, *Woman's Life in Greece and Rome* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). For a discussion of women in Hellenistic Egypt, vide, S.B. Pomeroy, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt. From Alexander to Cleopatra* (New York, Schocken Books, 1984). I deal with the topic of women and the warrior's endurance whether literal or metaphorical in ch. 5 of the present study, vide 'Female Sages and Martyrs as Much-Enduring Warriors.'

<sup>77</sup> Aristotle had argued that only a male can achieve perfect masculinity or ἀνδρεία. On the other hand he also argued that only a woman can achieve perfect femininity. However for Aristotle, "masculine" and "feminine" are not equal categories. According to Aristotle, by nature women are inferior to men, vide Cartledge, *op. cit.* 69.

<sup>78</sup> The military connotations of Athena are already evident in the Homeric war epic, where she is in part cast as a warrior-goddess. Furthermore, her name may also suggest military origins. It seems more plausible that Athena (Athene) derives her name from the city of Athens than vice versa, vide W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, ET by J. Raffan (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1985) 139, consequently she is the *Pallas Athenai* (i.e. the Pallas of Athens). While the meaning of "Pallas" is obscure, one interpretation renders it within a military framework as "weapon brandishing." But it is her association as protectress of Athens and her association with the walls of the city that are of special interest, for here she is understood as a female deity who in war can resist or endure the enemy attack. As late as the fourth century (A.D.) the myth of Athena as much-enduring protectress of Athens was still apparently alive. Thus the pagan Byzantine historiographer, Zosimus, in an apparent polemic against the increasing influence of Christianity in the empire (which he describes as a "contemporary impiety"), records that when Alaric sought to capture and ravage the city, in A.D. 396, it would be Athena's awesome military appearance about the walls of the city (an appearance which is in part couched in the vocabulary of endurance) which would intimidate him. As Zosimus explains, she gave Alaric the impression of being able to militarily "resist" or "withstand" attack upon the city: 'But this ancient city won some divine protection for itself, despite contemporary impiety and thus escaped destruction . . . . When Alaric and his whole army came to the city, he saw the tutelary goddess Athena walking about the wall, looking like a statue, armed and ready to resist attack.' (Zosimus, *New History*, 5.6), cited from V. Limberis, *The Virgin Mary and the Creation of Christian Constantinople* (London, New York, Routledge, 1994) 126.

<sup>79</sup> In the apostle Paul's time a Greco-Jewish document known as *4 Maccabees* depicts woman by nature as incapable of demonstrating endurance in a martyrological context. The example of endurance displayed by the martyrs' mother is applauded precisely because the author believes it was superhuman. i.e. despite her gender, vide 'Female Sages and Martyrs as Much-Enduring Warriors,' in ch. 4 of the present study.

described by Thucydides, where the Kerkyran population was involved in a civil war against the party of the oligarchs, military endurance is ascribed to females. In this description of women in war, which was not a conventional battle in an open field but rather street fighting in Kerkyra, and hence not a "normal" war situation, Thucydides feels compelled to explain that such manifestations of endurance were most unusual for women. He thus describes their endurance as being *παρὰ φύσιν* ("beyond their gender"):<sup>80</sup>

'After a day's interval another battle occurred, and the people won . . . . The women also boldly took part with them in the fight, hurling tiles from the houses and enduring / withstanding (*ὑπομένουσαι*) the (battle) uproar in a manner beyond their gender.' [*Pelop. War* 3.74.2].

## V. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, through the use of certain significant and representative texts, I have outlined, dcourage), as most worthy of historical record (*ἀξιόλογον*). Furthermore, I outlined several elements which characterized their definition and understanding of what constituted the warrior's endurance and its nature.<sup>81</sup> Certain aspects of this military value nevertheless remained constant, from Homer up to the years of the apostle Paul's writing activity.<sup>82</sup> I suggest, therefore, that the following elements concerning the value of endurance in warfare were still known in Greco-Roman times, and indeed were still respected and praised as heroic:

[1] Endurance represents one of the two indispensable and aggressive virtues of the Greek warrior and consequently, for the most part, is exclusively identified as a masculine attribute (cf. the Amazons). It is perceived as a vital element in military victory, precisely because it is regarded

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<sup>80</sup> P. Cartledge, has observed: 'As if to underline the topsy-turvy abnormality of the Kerkyra civil war, Thucydides points out that not only the women but also slaves fought on the democrats' side. The very conjunction of women and slaves, open]y active in a public civic context, was antinomian.' P. Cartledge, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others* (Oxford, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) 71-72.

<sup>81</sup> Most of these texts can be described as war chronicles and reflect their culture's military values *par excellence*, whether the protagonist was a Homeric Greek (*Iliad*), classical Greek (*Peloponnesian War*) or Hellenistic Greco-Macedonian (*Anab. Alex.*).

<sup>82</sup> However the most significant diachronic document expressing its society's military values, namely Homer's *Iliad*, may also for good reasons be considered as synchronic. This literary unit was a living tradition in Greco-Roman times. Needless to say knowledge of Homer and his heroes was ubiquitous throughout the apostle Paul's Greco-Roman world including Jewish writers such as Josephus. Likewise, the impact of Thucydides in Greco-Roman times cannot be underestimated, particularly in the writings of Greco-Roman historiographers, and none more so than in the literary output of the apostle Paul's Jewish contemporary, Josephus. As Aune points out, a comparison between Josephus' preface to his B.J (1.13-15) and that of Thucydides (1.21) would suggest the former's conscious imitation; Aune *op. cit.* 107.





Figure 6  
Birth of Athena the Warrior

This detail from a sixth-century pyxis, attributed to the "C" painter, depicts Athena the goddess of the Greek armies, in her military mode. The artist depicts her springing forth from the head of Zeus, fully armed, with helmet and shield in an attacking posture. She is further portrayed emitting a fearsome war cry, typically restricted as a function of the male warrior.

as that crucial ingredient which renders the warrior capable of not retreating in battles or skirmishes. The army which first "flees" or abandons their allotted posts or stand in battle, is always described as incurring a devastating defeat in the panic of retreat.

[2] From Homer to Arrian, endurance in the Greek military world, is understood as the capacity to "stand firm" or "withstand" unyieldingly and persistently, before the oncoming charge and resultant engagement of the enemy, as well as the other rigours and hardships associated with warfare (e.g. imprisonment, wounds, hunger etc.). For the most part, however, it is a battle virtue, a description of the warrior's unyielding state of mind and heart on the battlefield, as well as of his physical prowess.<sup>83</sup> It (together with courage) represents the opposite of "fleeing," "deserting" or "abandoning" one's position during the enemy's actual or expected charge. It is obedience to the call of honour and the code of the hero.<sup>84</sup>

[3] The demonstration of endurance in battle is regarded as a most admirable and honourable quality for a warrior or army. Indeed within the Greek world, beginning with Homer it was regarded as one of the necessary attributes for "heroism".<sup>85</sup> The greater the endurance the greater the heroism. When the warrior stands his ground against overwhelming numerical, strategic or technological odds and through his endurance manages to survive and even achieve victory from this apparently hopeless situation then this is regarded as the finest and most praised expression of the Greek warrior's endurance. Diachronically and synchronically, the warrior's endurance aroused the admiration and the praise of the major Greek and Hellenistic historiographers, poets, tragedians and artists.

[4] Within the Greek world, the commander of warriors or warrior-king ought himself be a model of endurance and courage (e.g. Arrian's Alexander).

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<sup>83</sup> This was especially so in Homeric culture where the hero's endurance was also a function of his "strength."

<sup>84</sup> With reference to Homeric culture, Finley explains: 'The two central figures of the *Iliad*, Achilles and Hector, were both fated to live short lives and both knew it. They were heroes not because at the call of duty they marched proudly to their deaths . . . . on the contrary, they railed openly against their doom . . . . but because at the call of honour they obeyed the call of the hero without flinching . . . . ' *op. cit.* 113.

<sup>85</sup> In the Iliadic world view, one of the essential elements in the formation of a hero is the ἀρετή of battlefield endurance.

[5] The warrior's display of endurance appears to have been universally admired in the ancient Mediterranean. Nevertheless there do appear to be certain differences in the understanding of military endurance among ancient Mediterranean people. For instance the biblical attestation of ancient Israelite war, namely the Deuteronomistic Historian (DH) (*Joshua - 2 Kings*) as well as the relevant early Jewish literary records (e.g. *1 Macc.*), the warrior's endurance is linked to the notion of "holy war." The endurance and resultant victory in battle of the Israelite is not necessarily related to any of their skills but occurs as a consequence of direct intervention or empowerment from God, who in these texts is described as "warrior." DH's Divine Warrior theology (inc. *1 Macc.*), understands these military attributes such as endurance (as well as courage and strength) as Yahweh's gifts to His elected warrior(s). Furthermore, in the biblical attestation to warfare, accounts of solo combat are not as common as in the Greek record.

[6] A warrior's flight or retreat from the battlefield when motivated by an absence of endurance (and fear) would be looked upon, even by the pursuant enemy, as a shameful (αἰσχρόν) and unworthy act (unless part of a strategic retreat)<sup>86</sup> This shame in retreat or lack of endurance is particularly more shameful when committed by a military commander.

[7] An important element in Greek (and Hebraic) warfare was the commander's exhortatory speech, imminently prior to the actual battle. The exhortatory speech, was intended to arouse the soldiers' focus onto the battle, encourage them often by pejorative remarks about the enemy's prowess, and instill a sense of endurance. The cry for endurance generally took the formulaic structure of "stand firm" and may be accompanied by its negative form "do not flee." However, since endurance tended to be associated with other key military attributes - most usually courage and often with strength, these three qualities also often appear together in the exhortations of military commanders (or kings) prior to a battle - the "cri de guerre."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> We find a similar understanding of endurance within the Hebraic military world as attested by the Deuteronomistic Historian.

<sup>87</sup> While this is a common element to various military traditions of the ancient Mediterranean nevertheless it does appear that the length and content of this pre-battle exhortation for courage, strength and endurance, tends to be larger and more elaborate when voiced by Greek military commanders. This may be in part explained by the fact that the pagan texts tend to be in themselves longer and more detailed than biblical texts, which tend to be more compact in their narrative descriptions. As I will elaborate subsequently, what is interesting is that while the pre-battle

[8] The idea of the Greek warrior's endurance also carried certain social dimensions. (a) One dealt with the notion of the citizen-warrior. From Homeric to Spartan times and beyond, an interesting shift is noticeable in social conceptions of military endurance, from the atomistic to the collective. The warrior is part of a "team" as well as a *polis*. Because of new military tactics in battle a warrior's lack of endurance in battle would lead directly to the actual endangering of his immediate fellow warriors fighting by his side, exposing them to death. Furthermore the warrior's endurance now carried a civic function. The individual warrior's endurance in battle was perceived not only as one safeguarding his fellow-combatant, but also one of his most honourable civic obligations, for it directly affected the security and the freedom of his *polis*. This was an aspect of his πολιτεύειν, or proper behaviour as a citizen. Indeed in Greco-Roman times, a Spartan tradition preserved by Musonius Rufus, hails the warrior's endurance as an act of "salvation" (ὡς σωτήριον) for his city. (b) The notion of the warrior's endurance also carried ethnic implications. The same writers and artists who hailed the innate Greek warrior's endurance (and courage), also considered the βάρβαροι as innately incapable of possessing that quality of endurance (and courage) in battle. The "barbarian" warrior only appeared to be courageous and much-enduring, but when threatened by the Greek readily abandons his position and flees. (c) As an aggressive masculine attribute identified with warfare, the idea of military endurance clearly carried gender implications. According to such historiographers of warfare as Thucydides, women were by "nature" (κατὰ φύσιν) incapable of demonstrating battle endurance. In exceptional demonstrations of military endurance by women (e.g. the Kerkyra women) they would be described as going "beyond their gender".

Having analyzed the impact of the Greek warrior's endurance upon certain aspects of Greek literature and thinking, in the ensuing chapter as well as chapter 4, I turn my attention, respectively, to the impact of the warrior's endurance upon the Greek world of philosophy and its inheritors. Here I analyze the origins of a philosophic virtue, and hence the process of the

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exhortation did become an aspect of the Greek and Roman metaphor of "moral / spiritual warfare" we find no such trend within the Hebrew Bible or the LXX, with the possible exception of *Jer.* 1.17-19, 15.20.

"philosophication" (and "martyrologization") of creating an ethical or moral value no longer grounded in an actual military context. To that extent I analyze the "demilitarization" of the Greek warrior's endurance. On the other hand the clues of its former militarized nature are evident both in the very functions as well as character of moral endurance as portrayed by the philosophers. This persistent "militarized" character of moral endurance is most clearly evident in military metaphors and language describing the sage's heroic, masculine and aggressive fortitude, in moral "warfare," a theme which becomes a central focus of my subsequent investigations.

**CHAPTER 2:  
MILITARIZED AND DEMILITARIZED MORAL ENDURANCE:  
THE IMPACT OF THE GREEK WARRIOR'S ENDURANCE ON  
GREEK PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT: ITS MORAL  
TRANSFORMATION INTO AN AGGRESSIVE, MANLY  
ETHICAL VIRTUE:**

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**I. Diachronic Analysis: The Impact of the Warrior's Endurance  
Upon Greek Philosophy**

*A. Prologue*

From the framework of the history of ideas, that is from a diachronic perspective, perhaps the single most significant impact of the warrior's endurance upon the Greek psyche, was that exercised upon the Greek sage, for it is precisely through his agency that this idea had its most universal impact. In this philosophic process the conceptual parameters of the idea of endurance is now broadened from the purely physical or military level to that of the ethical. That is, it is now appropriated by the philosopher and re-directed from the barrack or battlefield to the intellectual and psychagogic functions of the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, the Garden or the Agora and eventually into that of Pauline Christianity! In this process of moral transformation, it is possible to discern three clear trends:

[1] A "*demilitarization*" process - By this tendency the idea of the warrior's endurance once appropriated by the sage is so thoroughly demilitarized, as a moral value, in its transformation within a systematic ethical system as one of the important qualities of the rational soul, that any obvious and manifest vestiges, and hence clues, of its original military or martial context have been erased. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that even as thorough as the "demilitarization" process may have been, moral endurance by its definition was still considered as among the more aggressive virtues and almost evoked in situations of hardship, conflict or moral danger. As such it never quite sheds its military past. The basic features of this non-militarized understanding of

moral endurance includes the following characteristics (i) It represents one of the most praiseworthy or commendable virtues of Greek and Roman moral philosophy. (ii) It is most usually mentioned in a wide variety of hardship situations as an authenticating manifestation of the sage's wisdom and reason. Among the rhetorical devices most commonly employed in these instances is the list of hardships. (iii) Among the other various popular rhetorical conventions employed by the sages to describe great endurance (whether his or others'), one finds the commendation, self-praise, the comparison, the virtue list and the model of imitation. These served various psychagogic, apologetic or illustrative functions. (iv) Endurance is most usually associated with other virtues rather than expressed as a solitary attribute. (v) One of the sage's most basic categorization of the concept of endurance was in terms of a meritorious or wise (rational) endurance in contrast to an irrational or "foolish" expression of fortitude. (vi) The sage's capacity for endurance was considered to be limitless precisely because of his life according to reason.

Two further inter-related tendencies, in the moral transformation of the warrior's endurance, are to manifestly preserve some of its most obvious original military traits. I call this "militarized" moral endurance and it usually occurs in two modes - linguistic and metaphoric.

[2] *"Militarized" language or conceptualization of moral endurance (i)* - In this instance, the traditional conceptual military link between courage and endurance (at times the addition of "strength"), are still preserved, though now no longer applicable to the actual military but transformed into moral and intellectual values. This is certainly the case with younger Plato's and Aristotle's ethical systems, and is followed by the Stoics, where moral endurance is for the most part, never separated from moral courage, and indeed forms an integral aspect of the virtue of ἀνδρεία.

[3] *"Militarized" metaphor of moral endurance (ii)* - A third tendency in the philosophication of military endurance is its consistent presence in military metaphors relating to issues of morals and ethics. In these metaphors two trends can be discerned. (i) The sage is depicted as a "much-enduring warrior," who "stands firm." He is "armed" with his various virtues as "weapons" in a victorious "battle" against both an "internal enemy" (usually the passions) or an "external enemy"

(for the Stoics, Fortune), in defence of his virtues or in testing. (ii) The sage is depicted as a much-enduring "military commander" or "general" rather than an ordinary "soldier" or "guard." Here the sage in his capacity as "general" issues the "pre-battle" exhortation to "stand firm," which as I have already shown, was widely used in Greek and Hellenistic warfare.<sup>1</sup> This philosophic *cri de guerre*, is usually addressed to the novice philosopher (the Stoic *proficiens*) or to an immediate disciple being advised on the ways of wisdom. This time the "imminent combat" concerns the "battle" towards virtue. From a sociological perspective, this exhortation towards "battle endurance" in the face of impending hardship or conflict situations, is spoken by a "superior" (the sage as "commander") to a "subordinate" (the novice as "soldier"). These two allied metaphoric tendencies, which are simultaneously a second aspect of what I describe as "militarized" moral endurance, are by and large more popular among the philosophers of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period (though they are already evident in an extant fragment of Democritus the presocratic). They served as a vital illustrative, didactic or psychagogic function.

*B. The Presocratics, and the Philosophication of Endurance and Courage:  
"Militarized" Courage and Endurance*

It is true that neither Socrates nor Plato invented philosophy. The philosophical enterprise had already been active for over a century prior to Socrates in varying degrees of sophistication, by the so-called "presocratics."<sup>2</sup> Yet the Ionian presocratics, to whom the birth of Greek philosophy is generally ascribed, primarily concerned themselves with that branch of philosophical endeavour which would eventually be described as *physics*.<sup>3</sup> Ethics and logic as aspects of philosophical inquiry were not their dominant concern. Nevertheless it would be an error to overlook the contribution to moral philosophy which some of the presocratics offered, especially Democritus. The problem is that the presocratic teachings on moral or ethical matters are neither as systematic

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<sup>1</sup> Vide ch. 1 of the present study.

<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless our extant literary evidence for that period of the "presocratics" is unfortunately somewhat fragmentary and at times secondary. Vide J. Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy* (Penguin Classics, London, 1987).

<sup>3</sup> While the School philosophers tended to divide the philosophical enterprise into a tripartite system - ethics, logic and physics, their predecessors, the Presocratics tended to concentrate for the most part on Physics - φύσις, i.e. issues concerning the study and understanding of nature or the natural world.



nor as ample, for the most part surviving in brief fragmentary form. For the beginnings of the systematization of ethics and logic as branches of philosophical endeavour we must turn to Socrates (and Plato), followed by the other School philosophers<sup>4</sup>, who would eventually involve the Greek mind, on a broader level, in questions of ethics and logic, an endeavour which would reach its systematic apex with Aristotle. As such the forceful and creative impact of Socrates (and Plato) upon the development of Greek moral philosophy and philosophy in general is obviously undeniable.<sup>5</sup> Indeed the agenda of post-Socratic (and post-Platonic) philosophy was indelibly marked by their influence. It is therefore not surprising to discover, given our present level of information, that this process of the philosophical appropriation of endurance, first becomes most strikingly apparent within one of the earliest Platonic dialogues, the *Laches*.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> It is convenient to partition the history of Greek philosophy into three periods, beginning with Thales and ending with the Byzantine emperor Justinian prohibiting the instruction of (pagan) philosophy in Athens: (i) The "Presocratics" (ca. B.C. 585 - 410). (ii) The period of the Schools, that is from Socrates and Plato to the development of the various philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period (ca. B.C. 410 - 100), and (iii) The syncretistic period, characterized, in general, by commentaries and interpretations of the preceding School philosophers rather than innovation (ca. B.C. 100 - A.D. 529); vide Barnes, *op. cit.* 9-10. I make slight modifications to Barnes' analysis.

<sup>5</sup> A few centuries later, Cicero reflected that 'Socrates . . . . was the first to call philosophy down from the sky and put her in cities, and bring her even into homes and compel her to inquire about life and ethics, and good and evil.' *Tusculian Disputations* 5.4.10, quoted from T.J. Saunders (ed.), *Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues*, Penguin Classics (1987, Penguin Books), 15. Furthermore such was the impact of Socrates upon philosophy, that Hellenistic philosophical schools, with some exception sought to trace their origins with the historical Socrates (so Stoics, Cynics).

<sup>6</sup> Concerning the Platonic dialogues, there is a certain degree of uncertainty among scholars about their dates of composition, their sequence, which precede the establishment of the Academy (in fact even the latter is uncertain), and what was the nature of the intended readership. However, even at this level of ambiguity certain levels of probability can be ascertained. Those writings which, for various reasons, a majority of scholars have determined to be post-Academy, are deemed to be small in number and intended for a philosophically "sophisticated" or "elite" audience. On the other hand, those dialogues which scholars have by and large identified as pre-Academy, that is the early dialogues, are presumed to be aimed at a wider and more popular audience. Scholars deduce this from some of the elements which characterize the "earlier dialogues." Saunders identifies several elements which characterize the early dialogues, among which is the *Laches*. Here I shall only note one such element, namely the absence or presence of the Platonic theory of the Forms in the dialogues. While all of Plato's dialogues, to a certain degree, represent a synthesis between Socrates and Plato, the earlier dialogues tend to preserve more of the historical Socrates and his "elenchus" than the latter writings. In the later writings Plato's creative mind becomes more obvious and dominant. Thus, for example, whereas the earlier writings preserve what was most likely the Socratic attempt to define the essence or essential quality of moral terms, Plato developed this into a systematic and schematized theory of Forms, as is evident in the later dialogues (e.g. the *Republic*). Furthermore, as best can be ascertained, whereas in the early dialogues it appears that the historical Socrates believed that the essential quality was present within all the particular acts or instances of a virtue or moral concept, Plato developed the notion of a separate, authentic and autonomous existence of this essence which he entitled the Form or Idea. For a discussion on Plato's theory of the Forms, vide, W.D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1952). Accordingly, in dealing with the ethical notion of endurance in the early dialogues, one tends to be closer to what the Socratic treatment and understanding might have been, than in the middle and later periods of Plato's dialogues. Consequently, in the *Laches*, the ethical notion of endurance (as well as courage), is not to be seen or interpreted as an aspect of the Platonic theory of the Forms.

Nevertheless that is not to say that military language and metaphors nor the concept of moral endurance are missing from the presocratics. Indeed I suggest that the earliest discernible hint of the appropriation of the warrior's endurance within Greek philosophy and its incorporation as a moral concept, is already evident in the moral fragments of Democritus (b. B.C. 460). In other words the philosophical transformation of the idea of the warrior-athlete's endurance had already begun with the presocratics. It is evident from some of his extant fragments that Democritus envisaged the sage's attempt to live a life according to φύσις as a "battle" between the impulses of pleasure (ἡδοναί) and the emotions, on the one hand, against reason (λόγος). In this context Democritus employs and anticipates concepts which will eventually form a constant aspect of classical, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophy, especially the understanding of the wise man as a "manly" "warrior" in his "internal battle:"

Truly manly / courageous (ἀνδρεῖος) is the one who is not only mightier / victorious (κρέσσων) against his enemies (πολεμίων) but also over his desires (ἡδονών) It is indeed difficult to battle (μάχεσθαι) over the emotions, but it is the activity of men to obtain the victory.<sup>7</sup>

Democritus, in another fragment, speaks about the preparation (παρασκευάζουσιν) in endurance which pain / hardships (πόνου) produce. The nature of this "preparation" appears to draw upon a martial image of the training of the warrior-athlete.<sup>8</sup> With Democritus' appropriation of the warrior's endurance and courage, it is apparent that a "militarized" form of moral endurance already existed in the earliest phases of Greek philosophy, that is prior to the composition of Plato's dialogues. However the absence of any surviving substantial continuous moral treatises by the presocratics necessarily prohibits any systematic analysis of the history of the philosophical transformation of the concept of endurance, at least at its most germinal stage. Consequently I now turn to Plato. Nevertheless, an important point to note is this - at the presocratic stage of Greek philosophy we find both military metaphors and the idea of endurance being used within moral discussion. Consequently, given the fragmentary nature of presocratic moral philosophy, when

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<sup>7</sup> H. Diels - W. Kramz (ed.), *Die Fragmenter der Vorsokratiker* II, p.192 lines 17 ff., p. 193 lines 12 f. cites from Pfitzner *op. cit.* 25 n.4. Here I find more conceptual / linguistic evidence for a military motif than an athletic one (cf. Pfitzner *op. cit.* 25).

<sup>8</sup> Diels *op. cit.* II 193 lines 12f.

and where precisely the introduction of the notion of the warrior's or the athlete's endurance first became incorporated within Greek philosophy cannot be pinpointed with precision.<sup>9</sup> With Plato however, we can trace this appropriation, which was already underway, in a far clearer and more systematic manner.

*C. Plato and the Moral Transformation of the Warrior's Endurance:  
The Place and Understanding of Moral Endurance in Plato's Ethical System*

**i. The Military Context of the *Laches*:** While no precise date of composition has been established, by scholars, for the *Laches*, scholarly consensus accepts it, nevertheless, as one of the earliest Platonic texts.<sup>10</sup> This dialogue is set within an overarching military framework: (1) The three leading dialogists, Laches, Nicias and Socrates are all men of tested and exemplary military experience and courage. Laches and Nicias are both elderly, aristocratic and distinguished Athenian generals<sup>11</sup> while the relatively younger Socrates, is described as fairly recently having taken part in the battle at Delium.<sup>12</sup> (2) Military men are sought after as pedagogues precisely because of their military experience and knowledge. Two anxious fathers, Lysimachus and Melesias consult the two generals concerning the content of their teenage sons' education or παιδεία. Both parents seek advice from the two distinguished warriors concerning the type of pursuits that would lead their sons to the highest attainable excellence (179D). Towards this pursuit of excellence they trust the

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<sup>9</sup> I do not even preclude the possibility that the idea of moral endurance, inspired from the battlefield, already existed prior to the presocratics in some form. To that extent the "demilitarization" of endurance may have occurred prior to the philosophers. Nevertheless it is only in the record of Greek philosophy that this process is preserved in some detail, esp. in Plato's *Laches*.

<sup>10</sup> Hoerber summarizes the situation thus: ' . . . . there seems to be general agreement . . . . that the *Laches* is probably an early dialogue, although its specific relation to certain other early compositions remains a moot point.' R.G. Hoerber 'Plato's *Laches*, in CP LXIII, No. 2, 1968, 97; most scholars therefore assign it several years before the historical Socrates' death. An acceptable assignment would be ca. B.C. 406 - 404. For a discussion of the scholarly dating of this Platonic dialogue, vide *idem* 96-97. Concerning the dialogue's dramatic date, scholars on the basis of internal evidence tend to locate it ca. B.C. 420-421. Hoerber explains that: 'The dialogue itself furnishes both a *terminus a quo* and a *terminus ad quem*. The reference to the battle at Delium . . . . set the one date at 424 B.C.; the presence of Laches, who fell in battle at Mantinea, limits the other extreme to 418 B.C. . . . . The references to Damon as still living and to Socrates as relatively young . . . . offer no obstacle to a dramatic date of approximately 421.' *ibid.* 95, 96; Hoerber also offers a valuable summary of other scholarly opinion concerning the *Laches*' dramatic date, 95-96.

<sup>11</sup> According to Thucydides (5.43.2) both Laches and Nicias were prominent agents in the negotiations leading to the Peace of Nicias.

<sup>12</sup> Concerning Socrates relative youth and his recent military experience, Hoerber writes: 'Socrates would be under fifty, and Plato correctly depicts him as relatively young - younger than Nicias and Laches (181D) . . . . Of Socrates' vigor his prowess at Delium, only a few years previous, is a proof.' *idem* 96.

counsel of the warriors. The two generals applaud the parents' concern and upon Laches' initiative suggest that Socrates also be consulted (180BD). His credentials as a suitable pedagogue are stressed by Laches in terms of his noble and courageous military exploits (181B; 189B) making an impression upon Lysimachus (181B). (3) Furthermore the context and the theme of the introductory discussion which sets the scene leading up to the first cycle of dialogue between Laches and Socrates,<sup>13</sup> possesses a thoroughly military tone. Should they train their sons in the new military style of armour combat? Would this constitute a sound foundation for their military career towards generalship? Alternatively, should they consider this new combat style simply another fleeting military fashion, as may be indicated by the Spartan rejection of this combat style? What is the inter-relationship between military training and advanced education? Indeed Socrates' initial proposed topic of discussion with Laches, in the first cycle of dialogue, clearly appears to suggest an analysis of military courage (190D).

However with the inclusion of Socrates the potential for the transformation of the theme of the dialogue from an apparently simple military-oriented pedagogic issue into a more general philosophic debate soon becomes apparent in the text, but not before several subtle and gentle rhetorical manoeuvres by Socrates. And, it is by these Socratic manoeuvres that we have access, to at least one tradition concerning the philosophical transformation of the Greek notion of the warrior's endurance and courage.

Socrates begins the possibility for this transformation by drawing attention to what is at stake. It is no longer an issue of the youths' career but rather the youths' acquisition of virtue and hence the therapy of their soul. Drawing from the medical metaphor of the sage as a therapist of the soul,<sup>14</sup> Socrates lays down the initial context for the possibility of a philosophic investigation:

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<sup>13</sup> The literary structure of the *Laches* may be understood as quartopartite: (1) An introductory segment dealing with the value and place of military training in education (178A-190C). (2) The first cycle of dialogue dealing with an attempt to define the nature of "courage." In this discussion endurance appears as a constituent element of courage. This discussion which occurs between Laches and Socrates (190D-194B) concludes in aporia. (3) The second cycle of dialogue between Nicias and Socrates on the inter-relationship between courage and knowledge (194C-199E), and (4) a brief "inconclusive" conclusion (200A-201C). I.R. Lane supplies a useful summary of the content of the text, 'Laches: Translated and Introduced,' in Saunders *op. cit.* 81; also Hoerber *op. cit.* 99.

<sup>14</sup> Concerning the use of medical language, concepts and metaphors in Greek philosophy and beyond, vide M. Nussbaum, 'Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle,' in *The Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics*, (ed.), M. Schofield & G. Striker, (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986) 31-74; W.H.S. Jones, *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*, (Chicago, Ares, 1979); P. Laian-Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity*, ET by L.J. Rather & J.M. Sharp (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1970); for its appropriation within early

Soc.: 'So what we have to consider is whether one of us is an expert (τεχνικός) in the therapy of the soul (περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν) and is able to treat / heal it (θεραπεύσαι) correctly...' [Lach. 185E].

'...our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue (ἀρετή) may be joined to their sons' souls and so improve them.' [Lach. 190B].

Having succeeded in establishing this psychagogic and philosophical framework, Socrates now feels free to guide the discussion into an inquiry of the nature of virtue or ἀρετή:

Soc.: 'Then our first requisite is to know what virtue is? For surely if we had no idea at all as to what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult with anyone as to how he might best acquire it.' [Lach. 190B].

Apparently bearing in mind the proposed training of the youths in armour combat, Socrates deems the discussion in the general nature of virtue as too broad and propose, a dialogue on what appears to be the most relevant topic in this instance, namely a specific aspect of virtue, courage (ἀνδρεία).<sup>15</sup> Yet the starting point of the first cycle of discussion is deliberately ambiguous, appearing to Laches to be an inquiry into the nature of military courage. But as Socrates will subsequently admit, he had "wrongly structured" the question (191C). He in fact intended it as a general inquiry into courage (191CD):<sup>16</sup>

Soc.: 'Let us not therefore . . . . inquire about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us . . . . Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly I think that which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to promote; and that of course, is generally supposed to be courage (ἀνδρεία) . . . . ' [Lach. 190CD].

The starting point of Socrates' deliberate "error" is to give the impression that the discussion on courage is associated with military matters. Having initiated the discussion within an apparent military context, with the introduction of the notion of ἀνδρεία as an essential aspect of "virtue" and by the eventual admission of an "error" in his questioning, Socrates will soon open up the

Christianity vide, A Malherbe, 'Medical Imagery in Pastoral Epistles,' in his *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1989), 121-136.

<sup>15</sup> The virtue of courage appears to pre-occupy the interest of the earlier Platonic dialogues. Thus besides the *Laches*, where courage is the central theme, a significant portion of the *Protagoras* is dedicated to a discussion concerning the affinity between courage and knowledge (349D-360). On the other hand, as Devereux points out, discussions on "temperance" which is the focus of the *Charmides* and "holiness" - τὸ ὁσιον which preoccupies the dialogue in *Euthyphro* find no major re-echoes in the other early dialogues; D.T. Devereux, 'Courage and Wisdom in Plato's *Laches*,' *JHP*, Vol. XV, April 1977, No. 2, 129.

<sup>16</sup> It would seem that this Socratic "error" into what precise aspect of courage was intended for discussion, was deliberate. This "error" subsequently allows for the possibility of a broader investigation of courage (and endurance) with Laches: 'And this is what I meant just now by saying that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly. For I wanted to have your view not only of courageous infantrymen, but also of courage in cavalry and the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war . . . . ' [Lach. 191CD]. Refer to the discussion below.

possibility for the discussion to engage in broader ethical and philosophical parameters and hence of the moral transformation of the concept of the warrior's courage and endurance. His method is typically that of the "elenchus" (ἔλεγχος):<sup>17</sup>

'Then let our first endeavour be Laches, to say what courage (ἀνδρεία) is: after that we may proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies.' [*Lach.* 190D].

Laches offers the first definition of ἀνδρεία precisely in terms of a specific instance of endurance (or its absence). Not surprisingly the Athenian general, being led by Socrates into initiating the discussion from a military perspective, without hesitation offers a definition within a military context, by citing a specific situation of a warrior's endurance. In this, Laches re-echoes the definitions and descriptions of the Greek warrior's endurance as found in the historiographers, tragedians, poets and artists, namely as the capacity to stand firm in battle:

' . . . . this is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to remain at his post (ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων) and face the enemy and does not run away (καὶ μὴ φεύγοι) you may be sure is courageous (ἀνδρείος ἂν εἴη).' [*Lach.* 190E].

For Laches courage is a military matter. It involves the warrior's capacity to stand firm / endure in his appointed post without fleeing upon the enemy's attack. At this point of the discussion, for Laches courage is explicable solely in terms of the language and conceptualization of military endurance - standing fast in the face of an enemy charge! Socrates, however, unlike Laches is not

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<sup>17</sup> The ensuing summary description of the Socratic "elenchus" draws heavily from J.T. Sanders *op. cit.* 29-32. Among the doctrines found in the early dialogues is that *virtue is knowledge* whereas error or immorality derives from ignorance. Building on the assumption that virtue is teachable, Socrates in the early dialogues (and later) considers it his mission to shatter the conceited, misguided and unenlightened false knowledge whenever he encountered it. This he achieves through the methodology of a dialectical procedure known as the "elenchus." This method forms the pre-condition for the beginning of the acquisition of true knowledge and hence virtue. It takes the form of an inquiry or questioning in an attempt for a definition of a concept, typically of a moral character. Accordingly Socrates will ask "what is X? In the case of the *Laches* the question is what is courage? When, in the early dialogues, the interlocutor offers a specific example of X, Socrates demands not a particular demonstration of X but rather the essence which constitutes the ontological nature or character of X. For Socrates a single instance of X may be insufficient and misleading for it may not grasp what all instances of a particular moral value, X, have in common. Socrates demonstrates this by showing through a series of successive questions and arguments the inherent inadequacies or contradictions of the interlocutor's original definition. This dialectic is the process of elenchus, refutation, and it continues until either an appropriate statement defining what constitutes the essence of X is attained or else the discussion ends in "aporia" (ἀπορία) or perplexed inconclusion. Whereas the middle and later dialogues seek to reach a definitional conclusion (incorporating it within the overall theory of the Forms), the early dialogues tend to end in aporia. Such is the case of the *Laches*. G. Vlastos provides a detailed discussion on the Socratic elenchus in his 'The Socratic Elenchus,' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, I (Oxford, 1983) 27-58.

satisfied to keep the discussion on bravery solely within the confines of a military setting - even though he has given Laches the opposite impression initially. He desires to broaden the conceptualization of courage (and hence endurance) towards a more general or universal application. As such begins the first recorded *systematic* literary attempt to philosophize courage and endurance and render them into moral or philosophical concepts. Alternatively phrased, the *Laches* preserves and captures a significant moment in the history of ideas, namely the demilitarization of a moral concept, albeit if this process had already been initiated by the presocratics. Socrates however will necessarily need to gently lead Laches, the military man in that direction.

**ii. The Initial Steps in Plato's Socrates' Philosophication of the Warrior's Endurance and Courage:** The first step in this process requires Socrates to continue with his "error," allowing Laches to persevere in his military understanding of courage and endurance. However, in keeping with his method of "elenchus" he will offer counter-arguments drawn from Greek (Homeric) and Scythian military history, where not standing firm in one's post before an enemy attack, in preference to a tactic of retreat and attack, was considered as militarily more efficacious: 'But what of the other kind of man *who* fights the enemy while fleeing (φεύγων μάχεται) and not staying (μὴ μένων)?' [*Laches* 191A]. To the objection that this might represent a different mode of warfare characteristic of cavalry or chariot combat but not applicable to infantry warfare, Socrates mentions the case of the Spartan infantrymen, who while celebrated thought Hellas for their indisputable military courage, did not stand firm (οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας) in their posts at the battle of Plataea but fled instead, and because of this tactic won a decisive victory against the Persians:

They say at Plataea when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields they did not wish to **stand firm** (οὐκ . . . . μένοντας) and fight against these but fled (ἀλλὰ φεύγειν); when however the Persian ranks were broken, the Spartans kept turning around (ἀναστρεφομένος) and fighting like cavalry and so won the great battle.' [*Lach.* 191C].

In this manner Socrates shows the shortcomings of Laches' strictly military answer. For Laches the Athenian general, courage and endurance can only be seen within the exclusive confines of a specific military instance. In this sense, Laches represents the traditional Greek view of

courage in terms of endurance - "standing firm" in battle an attribute which was hailed by all kinds of Greek writers and artists. Socrates, however, presents the new and emerging understanding of these two twin concepts within a moral framework. As such, under the rubric of the military pedagogy of ἀνδρεία Plato through Socrates, introduces the earliest most extensive and profound treatment on the concept of endurance (expressed by καρτερεῖν, καρτερία, μενεῖν and ὑπομένειν) produced in Greek thought, if not in the history of ideas, albeit through the related notion of courage (ἀνδρεία). Laches, in the first cycle of discussion, becomes a literary foil for the possibility by which the early Plato's Socrates rejects false impressions of these two ancient and related military virtues, though now to be transformed and understood within an ethical or moral framework.

### iii. The Search for an Essential Understanding of Courage (and Endurance):

Having brought Laches to a stalemate, Socrates now takes the opportunity, in accordance with his dialectic methodology to push the debate into the "essential" nature of courage - away from its military context. He seeks to transform it in a philosophical direction through the unwitting agency of military men. Accordingly he constructs a hypothetical list of hardships.<sup>18</sup> In this list of hardships and dangers, Socrates begins with the two archetypical endeavours of Greek heroism where courage is required - warfare and travel<sup>19</sup> - and then proceeds to include poverty and politics.<sup>20</sup> In this passage, Socrates makes two facts possible, which will have enormous repercussions in the subsequent understanding of the idea of moral endurance, including the

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<sup>18</sup> The peristasis catalogue is a rhetorical device, used very frequently by Greek and Roman philosophy, to demonstrate, among other virtues those of courage and endurance, by listing a successive order of hardships suffered by the wise man. The definitive contemporary treatment on the use of the *peristasiskatalog* in Greek and Roman antiquity is by Fitzgerald *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> Vide the discussion in this study's Introduction esp. the sub-section dealing with 'The Warrior and the Traveller: Archetypical Homeric Figures of Heroic Endurance.'

<sup>20</sup> I have argued that prior to the philosophication of the concept of endurance into a moral virtue or attribute, that endurance was originally praised within the Greek world, for the most part, as a military virtue (vide ch. 1) as well as a necessary attribute of the epic traveller (vide Introduction). "For the most part" however does not mean "exclusively." I do not preclude the possibility that in the pre-philosophy era of Greek thought and culture, the notion of endurance was also employed in a social contexts (e.g. poverty), medical affliction (disease) or in certain political situations (as attested by Socrates). However my point is that the moral or philosophical transformation of this concept, is primarily influenced or derived from the abiding impact of the notion of military endurance upon Greek culture - as is attested by Socrates' arguments in the *Laches*.



manner in which the early Jews as well as the apostle Paul employed it in several of his letters.<sup>21</sup> To begin with, he uses many of the elements found in military courage and endurance in a metaphoric manner, essentially understood as "standing firm," to describe the actions of the sage as an "awesome warrior" in his "inner battle" against the internal "foe" - the passions or desires. This tendency, as I have pointed out, is already evident in Democritus. Yet, with Socrates, the military metaphor, the sage as a "warrior" in "battle," is raised to full-fledged "philosophic status." One might say it is legitimized as a philosophic motif. Within the language and imagery of the military metaphor, Socrates incorporates the notion of endurance or "standing firm" (μένοντες) against the internal "enemy," as well as, in imitation of the military world, the strategic "turning back."<sup>22</sup> Secondly, it is clear that in these earliest Socratic phases of the Greek process of the moral transformation of the warrior's endurance and courage, that the idea of moral courage and endurance is still carries military nuances. Not only is the idea of endurance, expressed as "standing firm" and / or being courageous against the internal "foe" (desire and pleasure) used in a military metaphor, but it is still indissolubly linked with courage. Socrates attempts to "demilitarize" courage and endurance but he does so in a "militarized" direction. It is also interesting, that in Socrates' effort to widen the meaning of courage (and hence endurance) in reference to its context, a common denominator is revealed - conflict, danger, distress or hardship, and this is emphasized by the use of a peristasis catalogue:<sup>23</sup>

Soc. For I wanted to have your views not only of courageous infantrymen (τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ) but also of it in cavalry and the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the dangers of the sea (θάλασσαν κινδύνους), and all those in disease (νόσους) and poverty (πείνας), or again in public affairs (πολιτικά) are courageous (ἀνδρείοι) and further, all who are not merely courageous against distress (λύπας) or fear, but awesome fighters (δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι) against desire and pleasures (ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονῶς), whether standing firm (μένοντες) or turning back (ἀναστρέφοντες) upon the foe . . . they are courageous people in all these kinds.' [*Lach.* 191D].

For Socrates, endurance in terms of a specific instance, namely an infantryman's capacity in "standing firm" (μένειν), cannot offer a comprehensive or "essential" definition of ἀνδρεία.

<sup>21</sup> Vide chs. 4 & 5 of the present study.

<sup>22</sup> This is not to be confused with a "warrior's" lack of courage or endurance but rather a deliberate ploy to trap the enemy, as, in Socrates' earlier example, was exercised by the Spartans in the battle of Plataea.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the repetitive use of κίνδυνος within the Pauline peristasis catalogue in 2 Cor. 11.26, where the notion of endurance (as well as courage) is a key theme in the Pauline inclusio 11.-12.12.

Socrates now seeks a more overarching, profound and consistent principle or quality (δύναμις) with which this attribute is permanently identified or associated in all circumstances of danger, conflict and affliction:

**Soc.** ' . . . . what quality (δύναμις) is it the same whether in pleasure or pain or in any of these things which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage (ἀνδρεία)? [*Lach.* 192B].

Laches is now obliged to abandon the popular and specifically military understanding of courage and hence endurance, in terms of μένειν (standing firm), in favour of another form of endurance, namely as an attribute of the soul in all situations of danger, conflict or affliction (καρτερία ψυχῆς):

**Lach.** 'Well then I take it to be a certain endurance (καρτερία) of the soul (ψυχῆς) if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in all of them.' [*Lach.* 192B].

Καρτερεῖν and its cognates will subsequently appear on some nineteen occasions within the text of the *Laches*, marking it clearly as the most dominant term for Socratic endurance. In its usage above by Laches and subsequently by Socrates it appears as the broadest term for endurance in a general sense applicable to any particular contingency of human endeavour where courage is required and not simply within a military context. In this sense the *Laches* demilitarizes the notion of the warrior's endurance. However, at this stage of his discussion Socrates will begin to discriminate between various forms of καρτερία which are meritorious, and his criterion for praiseworthy endurance remains that which is associated or identified with courage: 'Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance (πᾶσα . . . . καρτερία), as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage (ἀνδρεία).' [*Lach.* 192C].

**iv. Wise and Foolish Endurance:** Socrates in his pursuit of an overarching (i.e. non-military) definition of courage (and hence by implication endurance), will proceed to identify two forms of endurance - desirable and undesirable. In this distinction, endurance is now associated with another virtue, wisdom understood as φρόνησις: (1) Desirable endurance he describes as "virtuous" or "good" καρτερία namely when it is associated with wisdom (φρόνησις). (2) "Foolish" or "unwise" is manifested when it is not in accordance with (φρόνησις). In this latter instance, endurance is according to Socrates, actually "criminal" (κακοῦργος) and hurtful

(βλαβερόν). Consequently, to the best of my knowledge, Plato's Socrates becomes the first Greek (and hence European) thinker to consider endurance (as an aspect of courage) in association with "wisdom." To that extent we may now consider military endurance as "philosophized." He initiates this new dimension in his discussion on courage (which for the dialogists is still inextricably associated with endurance), by asking Laches a "rhetorical question" concerning the nature of endurance itself:

**Soc.** ' . . . . endurance joined with wisdom (μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία) is noble (καλή) and good (κάγαθή)?

**Lach.** 'Very much so.'

**Soc.** 'But what of it when joined with folly (μετ' ἀφροσύνης)? Is it not on the contrary hurtful (βλαβερὰ) and evil (κακοῦργος)?

**Lach.** 'Yes.' [*Lach.* 192CD].

Socrates therefore now leads Laches to conclude that only "wise endurance" can be associated with courage. This "wise endurance" accordingly becomes for Socrates' the distinctive and noble quality of the soul whose manifestation in any action determines and defines its courageous nature:

**Soc.** 'Then you will not admit that such an endurance (καρτερία) is courage (ἀνδρείαν), seeing that it is not noble (οὐ καλή). Whereas courage is a noble quality (καλόν).'

**Lach.** 'That is true.'

**Soc.** 'So by your account wise endurance (ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία) will be courage.' [*Lach.* 192D].

But what constitutes "wise endurance?" Having suggested a definition of noble endurance in terms of wisdom, Socrates will next focus his attention, through examples, upon what this noble form of endurance is not. In a sense this becomes the earliest philosophical treatment on the subject of endurance per se in Greek antiquity:

**Soc.** 'Now let us see in what it (i.e. endurance) is wise (φρόνιμος). In all things whether greater or small? For instance if a man endures (καρτερεῖ) in spending money wisely because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous (ἀνδρεῖον)?'

**Lach.** 'On my word not I.'

**Soc.** 'Or what would you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and legs, for something to eat or drink inflexibly and enduringly (καρτεροῖ) refuses?'

**Lach.** 'That is no case of it . . . . either.' [*Lach.* 192E].

By not providing a positive example of noble endurance, the discussion concerning what precisely constitutes reasonable or wise endurance becomes inconclusive and falls into aporia or bewilderment.<sup>24</sup> However in this Socratic aporia, the philosopher does not preclude the possibility

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<sup>24</sup> A dialogue which does not reach a definitive conclusion on the meaning of terms or concepts. This does not necessarily imply, within the Socratic dialogues, that what had been agreed upon, prior to the final state of aporia, is now refuted.

of arriving at a definition of moral endurance and hence courage. He remains consistent in his definition in at least two elements - endurance is an integral aspect of noble courage when it is associated with wisdom, and it is precisely the possibility of associating endurance and courage with such "gentler" virtues as wisdom, that marks a significant phase in the Greek sages' appropriation of these old military virtues - a tendency which reaches its culmination in antiquity with the association of aggressive moral endurance with the gentle virtue of love by the apostle Paul.<sup>25</sup> Wisdom now becomes a moral standard by which to evaluate courage and endurance - even on the battlefield. Drawing on a military instance, by comparing and contrasting two forms of military endurance: (1) a calculated and reasoned form of endurance (φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, καρτεροῦντα), (μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα), in which a warrior estimates his chances as good for survival in combat, and then proceeds to demonstrate endurance, in contrast to (2) a warrior who is willing to stand firm (ὑπομένειν) against an overwhelming opposition, (i.e. what was popularly described by historiographers, poets and artists, as a heroic brand of endurance), Laches is asked to select which of these two warrior's of endurance better represents manly courage. It is no surprise that the traditional Greek warrior, Laches, who reflects and represents the popular military values of his time, will quite naturally select the heroic warrior's endurance - the warrior who is willing to stand firm against a mounting opposition which also has a strategic advantage. Yet Socrates by applying the new standard of moral endurance will force him to ponder whether he has indeed made the "wiser" selection. It is interesting that in the illustration cited by Socrates, ὑπομένειν designates the popular image of heroic endurance, namely the popular heroic notion of ("standing firm") while καρτερεῖν designates the wiser and hence more courageous form of endurance:

**Soc.** Well now, when a man endures (καρτεροῦντα) in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise reasoning (φρονίμως λογιζόμενον) whereby he knows that others will come to his assistance and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when, besides, he has the advantage of position, would you say of this man if he endures with such wisdom and preparation (μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα), that he, or a man in the opposition army who is willing to stand firm (ὑπομένειν) against him and endure (καρτερεῖν) is more courageous (ἀνδρειότερον)?

**Lach.** The man opposed to him, I should say Socrates.'

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<sup>25</sup> Vide ch. 5.

**Soc.** 'But yet his endurance is less wise (ἀφρονεστέρα καρτερία) than that of the first man,' [*Lach.* 193AB].

Two points arise from the preceding important text. In the first place, Plato's Socrates does not dismiss the possibility of a rational or wise form of endurance (and hence courage) on the battlefield. For Plato's Socrates the warrior may display a wise form of endurance and courage under certain circumstances, namely by the exercise of "a wise reasoning (φρονίμως λογιζόμενον)." To that extent, unlike his student Aristotle who categorizes and evaluates various levels or types of courage and endurance (demoting military courage and endurance to a lower ethical echelon), Plato's ethical system does not designate the good man's moral endurance as necessarily and categorically superior to the warrior's wise endurance. Both the military and the non-military man can exercise wise or unwise endurance in the course of their activities. There is only one universal form of authentic courage and endurance, namely one exercised in wisdom, preparation and knowledge, and this is possible for both warrior and good man. For Plato's Socrates war is "honourable" or "good" (καλόν) (*Prot.* 359E) - pacifism would not be considered an honourable moral stance within the Platonic ethical system, and on the stage of European intellectual history it was only made possible by the spread of early Christianity through the Roman empire, in particular the teachings on *love* and *forgiveness*!<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Plato's Socrates does reject and to some extent inverts some of the traditional views of praiseworthy military endurance and courage in battle, as described in the preceding chapter. Standing firm against an overwhelming opposition force is evaluated as an "unwise" form of endurance. To that extent Plato's Socrates foreshadows Aristotle's notion of authentic endurance. Interestingly, however, the image of the much-enduring warrior overwhelmed by opposition in battle, will diachronically continue to be employed by Hellenistic and Greco-Roman thinkers as a positive metaphor of moral

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<sup>26</sup> For a discussion on the impact of the teaching of love in the mission and spread of early Christianity, vide, A. von Harnack, L.J. Swift, *The Early Fathers on War and Military Service* (Wilmington, Michael Glazier, 1983), R.H. Bainton, 'The Early Church and War' in *HTR* 39 (1946) 189-212, C.J. Cadoux, *The Early Christian Attitude to War* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 19193, H. von Campenhausen, 'Christians and Military Service in the Early Church,' in *Tradition and Life in the Church*, ET A.V. Littlesale (Philadelphia, 1968), S. Gero, 'Miles Gloriosus. The Christian and Military Service According to Tertullian' in *CH* 39 (1970) 285-98.

heroism, as is evident in the writings of the Roman Stoic Seneca and the early Christian apostle, Paul.

In the second place, the above passage of dialogue ends in unresolved *aporia*. Yet despite its inconclusive or aporic state, it would be incorrect to assume as Lane has pointed out, that Plato has dismissed the connection between courage and endurance.<sup>27</sup> In that sense, at least within the *Laches*, Plato's Socrates never fully "demilitarizes" the notion of the warrior's endurance, and Laches' initial conceptual alliance between courage and endurance, drawn fully from the military world, is never fully ruptured by Socrates, though it is now applied in a wider context, particularly through the introduction of "wisdom" in the discussion. But this new cognitive dimension applied to courage and hence endurance, is still germinal in Greek philosophy. As Lane observes elsewhere, the dimension which remains problematic or aporic in his attempt at defining "essential" or philosophic endurance, is not so much in terms of the continued alliance between courage and endurance but rather the precise nature of the cognitive aspect associated with endurance.<sup>28</sup> Courage understood as endurance is nowhere explicitly rejected within the *Laches* for Socrates continues to treat it as a possible basis for further discussion' (194A).<sup>29</sup> In later dialogues, is the possibility of introducing other virtues in association with endurance realized? Is the aporic connection between wisdom, courage and endurance resolved?

**v. Moral Endurance and the Later Plato - *The Republic*:** The *Republic* which was composed in ten books, concerns a discussion on the nature of justice (δικαιοσύνη), and the just one (ὁ δίκαιος),<sup>30</sup> nevertheless the notion of endurance is clearly present. Indeed we find this concept in all its various dimensions - besides the distinction between wise and unwise endurance

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<sup>27</sup> I.R. Lane, *Laches: Translated and Introduced*, in Saunders *op. cit.* 73-74.

<sup>28</sup> Lane explains: 'The discussion...has shown that there is a problem for any account of bravery which has a cognitive element; it has not shown that such an account cannot contain any reference to endurance . . . . Laches insight is never explicitly rejected in the dialogue itself . . . . ' *idem* 73-74.

<sup>29</sup> *idem* 74.

<sup>30</sup> For general discussions on *Resp.* vide D. Lee, *Plato: The Republic*, 2nd ed. (Hammondsworth, Penguin, 1988), R.C. Cross & A.D. Woozley, *Plato's Republic* (Macmillan, 1964), J. Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1981). Concerning Plato's ethics, vide A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1960), J. Gold, *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955).

Plato does not distinguish between different categories of endurance. Sage and warrior may demonstrate a wise endurance. To begin with, the impact of the warrior's endurance is still very visible, especially in Plato's admiration of the Spartan form of military training and testing of endurance - motifs which will find further philosophication in subsequent generations of sages. Accordingly in his discussion of the education of Plato's πολιτεία's future "guardians," or sage-kings, (Book III), Socrates has no problem in setting forth as a paradigmatic form of endurance and courage, the Spartan warrior, Spartan training and the inculcation of militaristic ideals of manhood.<sup>31</sup> Thus he insists that in the choice of music education, the Lydian and Phrygian mode of music ought to be avoided since they promote a certain laxity of soul and hence are judged as unfit for a warrior. Socrates argues to retain the (Dorian) musical mode which promotes and encourages steadfast endurance. It is significant here that while his vision of the guardian's endurance is inspired by the heroic (Spartan) warrior, nevertheless he does envisage this endurance being applied to other instances of hardship, conflict and danger, besides the concrete battlefield, namely the figurative battlefield, by "repelling" the "strokes of Tyche" - a military image which will be taken up by subsequent philosophers, especially Seneca,<sup>32</sup> and developed as a military metaphor to signify the sage's "external" "battles:"

' . . . . leave us the mode that would fittingly imitate the utterances and accents of a brave man (ἀνδρείου), who is engaged in warfare or in any aggressive occupation, and who when he has failed, either by meeting wounds, or death, or by having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune (τύχη) with steadfast endurance (καρτεροῦντες) and repels her strokes.' [*Resp.* 399AB].

While the capacity of a warrior's endurance and courage are to be vital attributes to which the future "guardian" (philosopher-king) aspired in his education, the opposite or negative qualities are to be avoided. These are "softness" (as the opposite of endurance) and "savagery" (as misdirected courage). As such the education of endurance for Plato appears to be as a precaution against softness (μαλακία), deemed as an effeminate attribute, unworthy for a future guardian (*Resp.* 410De). Likewise, as in the case of the training of the Spartan youths, the future guardian's

<sup>31</sup> For scholarly discussions concerning Plato's ideas on education, vide, R.L. Nettleship, *The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1935), W. Barclay, *Educational Ideals in the Ancient World*, (Collins, 1959), H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, (Mentor, 1964), E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 1 (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wicksell, 1965), esp. 241-276.

<sup>32</sup> I treat this in the sub-section entitled 'Stoic Endurance and Moral Warfare,' subsequently in this chapter.

masculinity is to be constantly tested. Socrates proposes that in order to determine who is and who is not fit to become a guardian, potential candidates are to be severely tested to the point of torture, for memory, principles and suitable traits throughout various stages of their life. For Socrates it is only the few who will successfully pass, in other words, display endurance in such painful or severe testing (βασανίζοντες). It is precisely these much-enduring youths (whether in physical or moral testing) that shall be fit to become the guardians. They must be tested much more carefully than gold in the fire.<sup>33</sup> Those who are unable to endure such tests are to be rejected as unsuitable characters for guardianship. While the explicit vocabulary of endurance is not employed here, the notion is clearly implied by the image of proven authenticity through testing in fire. In this sense, like a Spartan warrior's endurance, the future guardian's endurance is the capacity to successfully undergo and withstand the pressure of toils, pain, and hardship. This endurance, which is manifested by successfully resisting fear and pain, in turn becomes the proof of one's authenticity in courage and endurance and hence of the capacity to assume the highest office of public administration:

Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose for them tasks (ἔργα), in which one would be most likely to forget this principle (i.e. doing what is best for the state at all times) or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure . . . . we must accept, while the others we must cross off our list . . . . and again we must subject them to toils (πόνους), and pains, and competitions / struggles (ἀγῶνας), in which we have to watch for the same traits . . . . Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see whether the man remains immune . . . . and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and his culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful . . . . And he who as a boy, lad and man endures the suffering (βασανιζόμενον) and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardians . . . . ' [Resp. 413DE-414A].

On the other hand, having already undergone a process of philosophical transformation, the concept of endurance is also evident as a moral or philosophical notion. The impact of the warrior's endurance however is still evident in Plato's discussions. For example in Book X, in his argument concerning the good and rational man as consistent and stable in character (in contrast to the irrational, fearful and inconsistent man), Plato makes use of the concept of endurance within

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<sup>33</sup> This metallurgic imagery of testing is also repeated in the Hellenistic-Jewish *Wisd. Sol.*, *1 Pet.* as well as the apostle Paul's *Rom.* 5.1-5.



the framework of the military motif of "warfare" or "combat." In order to explain why art, poetry and drama appeal to the lower nature, Plato draws a distinction between a higher and lower principle in man. While the higher principle is the most worthy, the poet or dramatist, if he is to win popular appeal, will depict his characters as unstable, changeable and cowardly rather than stable or constant, since this is better understood by the populace, and better imitated by the actor (presumably the artist being irrational cannot imitate a rational character). As such he seeks to appeal to the lower irrational part of the soul (*Resp.* 604D-605A). As an example of the uniqueness and inimitable character of the rational soul, Plato discusses the desirability, ethics, and rationality of endurance:

'When a good and reasonable man . . . . experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear . . . . he will endure it most easily (ῥᾶστα οἴσει) than the other type of people (i.e. irrational people).' [*Resp.* 603E].

For Plato, the good man's easier capacity for endurance in the face of hardship, is precisely a sign of his rationality and goodness. Plato proceeds to elaborate on the nature of this rational endurance. His capacity for endurance does not arise out of an anaesthetized apathy, but rather out of a capacity to moderate his pain: ' "Will he feel no pain or, since that is impossible, will we say that in some sort he will moderate (μετριάζει) his grief?" "That . . . . is rather the truth." [*Resp.* 603E].

He posits such rational moral endurance, nevertheless within a military framework of the "internal" battle of the good man. Endurance here is understood as the idea of (military-like) resistance and fighting against opposition. As such it constitutes an active and aggressive virtue (it also, simultaneously takes up the question of private and of public endurance):

' "Do you think he will be more likely to resist (ἀντιτείνειν) and combat (μαχεῖσθαι) against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone?" "He will be much more restrained. . . . when he is on view." "But when he is alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which if heard by another would put him to shame . . . . " ' [*Resp.* 604A].

For Plato, endurance is not the capacity to totally block out the effects of hardship or pain.<sup>34</sup> The good man of endurance will feel pain. The difference however is that he has the capacity to (i)

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<sup>34</sup> Subsequent philosophers will take up this topic again. Seneca, for instance, is ambivalent on this. On the one hand he believes that the sage's endurance is of such a nature that he will be immune from injury or insult. Seneca like Plato also discusses this form of moral and rational endurance in military imagery; vide 'Stoic Endurance in Moral Warfare,' in this chapter.

moderate it, (ii) "resist" it, (iii) "combat" it, and (iv) restrain it. The capacity for moral endurance in this "battle" is in terms of the restraint of emotion and irrational responses demanded by reason and principle. The "battle" against grief is the struggle between rational endurance and the impulse to "surrender" or "give way:" 'Is it not reason (λόγος) and law (νόμος) that exhorts him to resist (ἀντιτείνειν), while that which urges him to give way to grief is the bare feeling itself.' [*Resp.* 604A].

The concept of "militarized" moral endurance therefore becomes a key instance of one of Plato's central bipartite anthropological schema, where he tries to demonstrate that there exist two impulses in man which are in conflict. This schema here is explained in the vocabulary of military endurance or its absence - (i) a rational impulse, manifested by the "resistance" to grief, and (ii) an irrational impulse, manifested by "surrender" to grief. Such is the impact of the warrior's endurance upon Plato's philosophy.

However, it is interesting that for Plato, his "militarized" moral endurance has a public and private face. In private the good man is allowed to give way to some emotion / irrationality. That is he is permitted to depart slightly from the standard of "rational endurance." Unlike the *Laches*, it is now no longer necessarily bound to courage, but may be employed as a positive moral attribute, either on its own right or in connection with other virtues. Its context has clearly moved away from its primary military framework. Accordingly the notion (φέρειν) is employed in connection with the hardships of old age and poverty (*Resp.* I.329DE, 330A). It also finds expression in the sense of *perseverance* (μένειν) in connection the dialogue's central theme of justice. The just man perseveres in justice and strongly refrains from cheating or stealing from others (*Resp.* II.359B). Indeed (in contrast to the unjust who seem to be just), precisely because of his commitment and perseverance in justice, the just man will have to endure (πάθειν) much suffering, mistreatment, torture and even death at the hands of the unjust (361E-362A). In order to remain just, the just person must steadfastly persevere in justice and endure in suffering. The idea of endurance here is

clearly martyrological, as is signaled by the nature of the list of hardships, yet it remains demilitarized in its language:<sup>35</sup>

For Plato, endurance also becomes a necessary moral attribute associated with knowledge, truth and the good. Accordingly in the ascent of the mind towards ultimate reality - contemplation of the essence of the good - the endurance of all suffering, is a pre-requisite. The alternative (i.e. absence of moral endurance) would lead to a continued life of ignorance or irrationality. Thus in the celebrated metaphor of the Cave, Plato explains that the movement of the prisoner from the dark cave towards the light requires endurance.<sup>36</sup> When the eyes of the cave-dweller first encounter the light, he must endure the shock of the pain of the naked light, and by habitude he would eventually feel comfortable. Likewise the ascent of the mind towards the "real" requires such endurance against the initial disorientation (515E-516A). Eventually through such endurance the mind is able to contemplate the very essence of the good:

'But our present argument indicates . . . . that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of the eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul . . . . until the soul is able to endure (ἀνάσχεσθαι) the contemplation of essence and the brightest reason of being. And this we say is the good . . . . ' [Resp. VII.518C-D].

Through an initial act and period of necessary endurance, through habitation, the released cave-prisoner would be able to look and contemplate the "real light" and realize his former state of illusion in the cave.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly he would not wish to live in such manner again and would refuse their rewards, honours and values. Indeed he would endure any pain rather than live in such state of darkness and illusion:

' " . . . . do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer and greatly prefer while living on earth to be a serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything (ὄτι οὐκ ἂν πεπενηθῆναι) rather than opine with them and live that life?" "Yes" he (i.e. Glaucon) said, "I think that he would choose to endure anything (παν μάλλον πεπενηθέναι) rather than such a life." [Resp. 516D-E].

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<sup>35</sup> I discuss the notion of martyrological endurance in the Platonic dialogues (*Ap.*, *Phd.* and *Cri.*), both in its "militarized" and "demilitarized" form in greater detail in ch. 4 of the present study.

<sup>36</sup> For discussions concerning the metaphor of the Cave, vide, J.E. Raven, 'Sun, Divided Line and Cave,' in *CQ*, 1953, J. Ferguson, 'Sun, Line and Cave again,' *CQ* 1963, Part 1, 188-91.

<sup>37</sup> For Plato virtue can be taught by habitation, (*Resp.* VII.518D-E).

In sum, what is of import in our discussion of Plato, is that in an early text such as *Laches* or a later dialogue such as the *Republic*, the impact of the warrior's endurance is clearly inescapable, and indeed for Plato's Socrates wise endurance may as readily be demonstrated by the warrior in battle as by the good man in another situation of hardship or danger. Expressed as a philosophic value describing one of the vital attributes of the consistent, rational, just and good man (which includes the warrior) as well as the sage-king, it is found both in a "militarized" and "demilitarized" mode. While its employment as a "militarized" moral trait, namely as an associate value of courage, or as part of a military metaphor occurs in both the early and later dialogues, this tends to be more prominent in the earlier dialogues (in particular expressed as an attribute of courage). Nevertheless with the introduction of a cognitive dimension to the idea of endurance within the *Laches*, namely the attempt to qualify endurance as wise and unwise, Plato permits the possibility of linking this concept with other virtues. Within the later dialogues, the demilitarization process of moral endurance undergoes this further stage of development. While a "militarized" expression of moral endurance is clearly still present (particularly within "warfare" metaphors rather than an association with courage),<sup>38</sup> now Plato begins to employ the notion of moral endurance without connecting it to courage, as an independent character of the soul, or, in conjunction with such other major Greek moral virtues and values as "justice," "knowledge," or the "good." Aristotle, the intellectual linear successor of Plato, becomes the next major Greek thinker to take up and develop the theme of moral or philosophic endurance.

*D. The Place of (Militarized and Demilitarized) Moral Endurance  
in Aristotelian Ethics: Aristotle and the Further Philosophication of Endurance.*

**i. Introduction:** Within the extant literary corpus of Plato's most celebrated student - Aristotle (B.C. 384-322), two works, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια)<sup>39</sup> and the

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<sup>38</sup> The idea of the "strokes of Tyche," is also present here.

<sup>39</sup> Most likely entitled after its editor, Aristotle's son Nicomachus. Porphyry, an early commentator, has suggested that this work was actually dedicated to Nicomachus. A few ancient writers, such as Cicero (*De Fimibus* 5.12) among the Latins, and Diogenes Laertius among the Greeks, did not dismiss the possibility that the *NE* may have been composed by Nicomachus. However most ancients and certainly almost universally in modern Aristotelian scholarship, the original authorship is attributed to Aristotle himself.

*Eudemian Ethics* (Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια)<sup>40</sup> are clearly the most significant of his ethical system.<sup>41</sup> A third and much shorter volume dealing with ethics, the so-called *Magna Moralia* (Ἠθικὰ μεγάλα) appears more likely to have been compiled by a Peripatetic of a subsequent generation, though relying heavily upon original material from Aristotle.<sup>42</sup> Concerning the chronological order of the first two major moral treatises, considerable debate has occurred in scholarly circles.<sup>43</sup> Following Jaeger, the general modern consensus accords priority to *Eth. Eud.* where its text differs from *Eth. Nic.*<sup>44</sup> In accordance with this view, the unique text of *Eth. Eud.* (i.e. where it differs from *Eth. Nic.*) affords us a view into an earlier phase in the development of Aristotle's own ethical system.

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<sup>40</sup> Entitled, after Aristotle's student Eudemus and the work's probable editor. Porphyry considers the nomenclature as a dedication. Most scholars regard this treatise as a genuine work of Aristotle. I also follow this view in this dissertation. Nevertheless some consider this ethical treatise as "probably genuine," vide G.E.L. Owen 'Aristotle,'  *OCD* 115.

<sup>41</sup> Scholars divide Aristotle's writings into two basic groups - the exoteric (ἐξωτερικοί, ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι) and the esoteric (ἀκροαματικοὶ λόγοι). It is thought by some that his exoteric or more popular dialogues, now lost, represented his Platonic phase and were composed during his stay at the Academy, whereas the extant literary corpus tends to reflect his post-Platonic intellectual phase. It is here that we must logically include his ethical "writings." These were by and large originally lecture notes intended for his students at the Lyceum. Vide, W. Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, 2nd ed. trans. by R. Robinson (New York, London, OUP, 1948); also, R. Bambrough, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (New York, Mentor, 1963), 18-20. It needs to be said however, following Jaeger's pioneering work, that even within the independent (esoteric) works of Aristotle, the intellectual links with Plato are not totally severed. Indeed in his earlier phase of his "esoteric" ethical system, such as survives in the *Eth. Eud.* the links with Plato are obvious. In accordance with Jaeger's analysis, to some extent, the same may also be said, with Aristotle's later ethical systematization, as disclosed in the *Eth. Nic.* Besides the *Eth. Eud.* and the *Eth. Nic.* ethical discussions also exist in sections of his *Art of Rhetoric* (Τέχνη ῥητορικῆ), the *Topics* (Τοπικά), and the *On Movement of Animals* (περὶ ζώων κινήσεως).

<sup>42</sup> It is however included within editions of the collections of Aristotle's works. Only a small fraction of this work now survives. Those scholars who do accept it as genuinely Aristotelian, treat it as the earliest expression of his ethical literary corpus.

<sup>43</sup> Chronologically, the works of Aristotle are usually placed in one of three periods of his intellectual life: (1) the period of the Academy, (2) his post-Athenian period (at Assos and Mitylene, and (3) the Lyceum period at Athens. It would appear that while *Eth. Eud.* belongs to the second phase, *Eth. Nic.* was composed during his activity in the Lyceum i.e. during his final return to Athens; e.g. vide F. Copleston S.J., *A History of Philosophy. Volume I, Greece and Rome, Part II* (Garden City, New York, Image Books, 1962 edition) 15.

<sup>44</sup> Jaeger, *op. cit.* The essence of Jaeger's argument relies upon the development in the usage of the concept of φρόνησις. For other expressions or variations of the Jaegerian thesis, vide H. Racham, *Aristotle: In Twenty Three Volumes. XX, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices*, (LCL), (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1981 reprint), 191; also, C.J. Rowe, *The Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought* (Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1971). In this monograph, Rowe understands the *Eth. Nic.* as a re-working of the earlier Platonic-influenced *Eth. Eud.* In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* J. Barnes, has confirmed that, 'It is now all but universally agreed that the *Eudemian Ethics* preceded the *Nicomachean Ethics* . . . ' vide, J. Barnes, 'Introduction,' in *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics* Penguin Classics, trans. J.A.K. Thompson (Penguin, London, 1988 reprint - 1976 edition) 14. For an opposing view concerning the dating and priority of the Aristotelian ethical treatises, vide A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978).

But what of the overlapping texts within the *Eth. Eud.* and the *Eth. Nic.*?<sup>45</sup> Here it is not so clear in which tome these identical books were originally incorporated, and indeed this controversial issue has caused considerable scholarly debate. In the present analysis, I follow the general contemporary scholarly tendency of incorporating the common books as more properly belonging to the *Eth. Nic.* than the earlier *Eth. Eud.*<sup>46</sup> This decision leads to significant methodological and thematic ramifications:

(1) Since the most significant discussions on endurance within Aristotle's ethical works are basically restricted to Book 3 of the *Eth. Eud.* as well as Book 6 (= Book 7 in *Eth. Nic.*), I am presented with two methodological options here. Either I treat the two chapters as part of the same volume (*Eth. Eud.* 3 & 6) or regard the two chapters as belonging to two separate volumes (*Eth. Eud.* 3 & *Eth. Nic.* 7). Because I regard the common books as belonging more naturally to the later *Eth. Nic.*, and hence *Eth. Nic.* 7 as subsequent to the literary composition and compilation of *Eth. Eud.*, I will deal with the identical material as part of *Eth. Nic.*'s text.<sup>47</sup>

(2) The links between Aristotle and Plato in their respective ethical systems are not as fragile as were once thought.<sup>48</sup> This is particularly true of the early Aristotle's discussions on endurance as

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<sup>45</sup> More than a third of the *Eth. Eud.* overlaps with the slightly longer *Eth. Nic.* Thus *Eth. Eud.*'s Books 4,5,6 represent the text of *Eth. Nic.*'s Books 5,6,7.

<sup>46</sup> In modern editions of the *Eth. Eud.* and the *Eth. Nic.*, the common books tend to be treated as part of the latter. For instance H. Racham in his LCL editions of these two ethical treatises, omits the common books from the *Eth. Eud.* in preference to viewing them as an aspect of the *Eth. Nic.*, vide, H. Racham, *op. cit.* & by the same translator, *Aristotle: In Twenty Three Volumes, XIX. The Nichomachean Ethics* (Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1982 reprint). Likewise in the Penguin Classics edition of the *Eth. Nic.*, the common books are incorporated as part of this later Aristotelian treatise; vide, J.A. Thompson, H. Tredennick & J. Barnes, *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics*, (London, Penguin Books, 1988 reprint). Others however have argued that the overlapping books fit best within the framework of the arguments found within the unique books of *Eth. Eud.*, and that these books are an early attempt to cover the long-lost 3 books of *Eth. Nic.*. Another argument in support of including the 3 common books within *Eth. Eud.*, is thematic. The beginning of *Eth. Nic.* 10 appears to be a more precise treatment of the topic of "pleasure" than *Eth. Eud.* 6 (= *Eth. Nic.* 7). It would then not be untenable to assume that the original place of the identical books to have been in the earlier work. However as my present analysis of Aristotelian endurance will show, the treatment of endurance in the common books shows a distinct and further development to the earlier apparently Plato-influenced understanding of courage and endurance. Within the common books we find esp. in (*Eth. Nic.*) Book 7 (= *Eth. Eud.* 6), that the notion of endurance is no longer exclusively viewed as allied to courage, undertaking a further evolutionary step in its demilitarization process.

<sup>47</sup> This decision also suits the basic flow of my conclusions in the present analysis.

<sup>48</sup> One of the important contributions of Jaeger's definitive work on Aristotle, is to no longer view Plato and Aristotle as representing two mutually exclusive philosophical (esp. ethical) systems. Bambrough explains this succinctly: ' . . . his (i.e. Jaeger's) work disposes of the second traditional assumption - namely, that Plato and Aristotle are natural opponents in philosophy, that their approaches to philosophy represent two irreconcilable polar opposites. The truth is that Aristotle's departure from Platonism was very gradual, and that even in his latest works

found in *Eth. Eud.* where the shadow of Plato is clearly cast. On the other hand it is also clear that certain discontinuities or developments have occurred in the further philosophication and understanding of the notion of endurance as a moral attribute of the rational soul - both in the younger and older Aristotle.

**ii. "Militarized" Moral Endurance - A Rational Aspect of Courage *Eth, Eud* .:** In his discussion of the desired state of ἀνδρεία (*Eth. Eud.* Book 3), the younger Aristotle will bring into inquiry, in some detail, the ethical concept of endurance, for the most part designated as ὑπομονή. Here (as in the case of Plato's *Laches*), Aristotle will formulate the idea of rational and irrational endurance. For Aristotle, there exist many types of courage. Only one however qualifies to be properly addressed as such. This is the courage which is in accordance to reason, knowledge and the principle of goodness. Such a type of courage arouses "rational endurance." Alternatively the type of courage which endures great pain and great fears, but is motivated by passion, ignorance, habit or experience is not authentic. Such irrational bravery is not real bravery. Consequently, endurance of the latter type is for Aristotle irrational and not motivated by "the good" (τὸ καλόν):

'And it seems that the brave man (ἀνδρεῖος) is in general fearless (ἄφοβος), and the coward (δειλός) liable to fear; and that the latter fears things when they are few in number and small in size as well as when numerous and great, and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly. Whereas the former, on the contrary either never feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude; and he endures (ὑπομένει) the most fearsome things (τὰ φοβερὰ σφόδρα), whereas the other does not endure even the least threatening (i.e. tame) things.' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.5].

What then, according to this schema, would the courageous man (ἀνδρεῖος) *qua* courageous, need to endure? Aristotle addresses this directly. He does so by distinguishing between the brave man's human and courageous nature as well as things which are fearsome in particular or absolutely. Accordingly the brave man demonstrates endurance in those matters which are fearsome in the absolute sense and hence most formidable to his human nature:

'What sort of things then does the brave man endure (ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος)? First it is the things which are formidable / fearsome (φοβερά) . . . . the brave man is fearless in regard to them (i.e. things which are fearsome in the absolute sense) and endures fearsome things of this sort, which are fearsome to him in one way but in another way are not - they are fearsome to him *qua* human being, but *qua* brave man

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we can still see the clear influence of his master. What once was thought of as a sudden reaction can now be understood as an organic growth.' Bambrough *op. cit.* 20.

(ἀνδρείος) they are not fearsome except slightly or not at all. Yet these things are really formidable for they are fearsome to most men.' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1,6,9].

As such for Aristotle, as in the first cycle of argumentation in the *Laches*, the difference between the brave man and the coward rests primarily on the ability to endure fearsome or formidable things. Thus for Aristotle, whereas the majority of people are cowards, because they are quickly affected or overcome by fear, in other words, they are unable to endure or resist fearsome things (i.e. situations of danger), the ἀνδρείος is precisely the one who displays such endurance (i.e. is not affected by fearsome things). Aristotle continues his analysis by the use of medical imagery in his description of the man who endures fear - he is in a state of health (ὕγιεινός) and strength (ἰσχυρός). On the contrary the one who does not have the ability to endure fear is bracketed with those who cannot endure affliction, that is the sickly (νοσώδεις) and the weak (ἀσθενεῖς). For Aristotle the ἀσθενεῖς lack endurance in affliction, hardship, fearsome or dangerous situations and represent the most common type of person in society:

'...the brave man's state of character is praised because it resembles that of the strong and the healthy . . . . they are not affected at all, or only affected slightly by the things that affect the many or the majority. Therefore whereas the sickly and weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and brave, although affected by the very great afflictions, are affected by them more slowly and less than the mass of men and moreover they are entirely unaffected or only slightly affected by the things that affect the mass.' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.10-11].

What distinguishes the brave man from the coward is precisely his ability to endure those things and afflictions which the mass considers fearsome and unendurable. Like Plato, so too in Aristotle, courage and endurance as ethical concepts are inextricably intertwined, reflecting the abiding legacy of the military origins of these notions. Like Plato, so too Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of endurance rational and irrational endurance. In the former case, what is involved is the endurance of fearsome things on account of reason (λόγος), while in the latter, endurance is demonstrated for reasons which are not in accordance with λόγος:

For courage is following reason (τῷ λόγῳ) and reason (ὁ λόγος) bids us choose what is good (τὸ καλόν). Hence he who endures (ὑπομένων) fearsome things not on account of reason is either out of his mind or daring (θρασύς). But only he who does so (i.e. endure fearsome things) for the sake of the good is fearless and brave (ἀνδρείος) . . . . but reason does not bid him endure things which are extremely painful /



distressful (τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ) and destructive (φθαρτικά), unless they are good. The daring man faces such things . . . . even if reason does not bid him face them.' [*Eth.Eud.* 3.1.12-14].<sup>49</sup>

Aristotle proceeds to outline five categories of courage which involve endurance. However he classifies such courage / endurance, though at times "useful" as nevertheless irrational, that is, motivated by the wrong reasons. This is in contrast to the genuinely brave who endure fearsome things for the sake of the good (τὸ καλόν). Among this list Aristotle classifies military courage / endurance as a distinct and separate category of courage and endurance. Whether consciously or otherwise, this is an important Aristotelian statement in the diachronic history and evolution and philosophication of endurance. By designating military endurance as a distinct form of irrational endurance, and as an inferior expression of endurance, Aristotle makes possible a philosophic idea of endurance quite separate and independent of its primarily military context. It can now become an ethical value or virtue in its own right, even independent from its links with courage.

One type of courage / endurance is civic (πολιτικὴ) motivated by a sense of shame. Another, as I have already mentioned is military (στρατιωτικὴ), arising out of battle experience and not from a knowledge of things which are fearsome (as Socrates had stated). Thirdly, Aristotle mentions the type of courage / endurance which is totally ignorant (e.g. the courage of a "madman" who grasps snakes). Another is that courage or endurance that is caused by hope (ἐλπίς). In this instance the hopeful endures dangers which an intoxicated man might, for wine arouses hope.<sup>50</sup> Another form of courage / endurance arises out of irrational passions such as erotic desire or anger:

'There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy because brave men of these kinds endure (ὑπομένουσιν) the same things as the really courageous but not for the same reasons. One is civic

<sup>49</sup> No doubt following the death of Alexander, Aristotle considered his stay in Athens, as extremely painful or destructive for him. Unlike Socrates, he decided that the prospect of enduring martyrdom by the Athenians was an irrational endurance.

<sup>50</sup> This is in sharp contrast to Paul's notion of endurance in affliction and in danger, which in no small part is inspired and motivated by an eschatological hope. Thus for example, in *Romans* the apostle Paul informs his Roman readers that: 'Let us rejoice in the hope (ἐπ' ἐλπίδι) of the divine splendour that is to be ours . . . . let even rejoice in our present afflictions (θλίψεσιν), because we know that affliction produces endurance (ὑπομονήν), and endurance (ὑπομονή) brings proof that we have stood the test, and this proof is the ground of hope . . . . ' [5.3]. It is interesting that while the term ἐλπίς / ἐλπίζω plays no great significance within the Gospels occurring only minimally, within the Pauline corpus it is found some 55 times (19 verbal occurrences and 36 nominal); vide E. Hoffman, 'Hope, Expectation,' in *DNTT*, Vol. 2, 241. Within the Aristotelian ethical system, Pauline endurance with its affiliation and emphasis on ἐλπίς, by and large, would be classified as "irrational" in its nature. For Paul on the other hand such a hope produces the incentive for the energizing of real and immovable endurance in affliction and danger.

(πολιτική) courage, that is courage due to a sense of shame. Second is military (στρατιωτική) courage; this is due to experience (ἐμπειρίαν) and to knowledge, not of what is fearsome, as Socrates said, but of ways of encountering what is fearsome. Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance that makes children or madmen endure (ὑπομένουσι) things rushing on them or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope (κατ' ἐλπίδα), which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers (ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους), and those who are intoxicated - for wine makes men sanguine. Another is due to some irrational emotion (πάθος ἀλόγιστον) for example eros or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers (ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους) . . . . and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself . . . . ' [Eth. Eud. 3.1.15-18].

For Aristotle, none of these forms of courage - and hence of its accompanying expression of endurance of danger, may be considered as real courage, for in the final analysis such endurance arises from irrational factors (i.e. irrational endurance): 'But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful in encouragement in dangers.' [Eth. Eud. 3.1.19]. Thus Aristotle explains that in the case of civic courage, shame is the motivating factor which leads to the endurance of hardship. This form of impulse to endurance, according to Aristotle, is perhaps the closest in appearance to real courage, though in fact it is not:

'But among all such causes (of endurance) it is when shame makes men endure (διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες) what is alarming that they would appear to be the bravest, as Homer says Hector endured the danger (ὑπομῆνοι τὸν κίνδυνον) of encountering Achilles . . . . Civic courage is of this kind (i.e. driven by shame) . . . . ' [Eth. Eud. 3.1.30-31].

Likewise in the case of military courage, endurance arises out of experience in battle rather than knowledge. Here Aristotle acknowledges Socrates as his source for his determination. However (unlike Aristotle), Socrates does not necessarily deny authentic courage and endurance based on reason and knowledge being constantly manifested in a military situation. For Socrates, war activity is honourable and good (359E).<sup>51</sup> Aristotle pronounces military endurance *per se* as representative of an inferior form of endurance in contrast to ethical or "philosophic" endurance:

'And in like manner to all those who endure dangers because of experience are not brave; that is how perhaps most of the military class endure dangers. For the fact is the exact opposite of Socrates who thought that bravery was knowledge' [Eth. Eud. 3.1.28].

As evidence that a warrior's ἐμπειρία (or motivation though shame) in the face of danger in battle does not constitute real bravery (and hence endurance) Aristotle cites the ensuing instances:

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<sup>51</sup> It appears that Aristotle is drawing from the *Protagoras* (490CD), where Socrates argues that cowardice (and hence lack of endurance) in battle comes through a lack of knowledge of what is dreadful, while courage (and hence endurance) comes through a wisdom or knowledge of that which is and is not dreadful.

' . . . . some men do endure (ὑπομένουσι) danger in spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and they do so because they do not think that there is any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. A proof of this is that when they think that they have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now close at hand, they cannot endure (οὐχ ὑπομένουσι). But among all such causes it is when shame makes men endure what is dreadful that they would appear to be bravest as Homer says, Hector endured the danger (ὑπομείναι τὸν κίνδυνον) of encountering Achilles' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.29].

While true courage is distinguishable from counterfeit courage, Aristotle admits that the latter form, which in turn leads to counterfeit endurance, does resemble authentic courage and endurance:

'But true courage is neither this (i.e. motivated by shame) nor any of the others (i.e. of the rest of the five types described above), though it resembles them, as does the courage of wild animals which are led by passions to rush to endure (φέρεται) the blow.' [*Eth. Eud.*].

Accordingly, Aristotle speaks of one who rationally endures. This is a proof of authentic ἀνδρεία. Thus whereas the coward and the daring man may at times show courage at fearsome things, in fact their allied endurance is triggered by a false mental perception and for erroneous motives or reasons. This is irrational courage and endurance.<sup>52</sup> The truly ἀνδρεῖος is he who correctly perceives what is fearful and then endures the danger(s) out of knowledge and reason.

Here real courage and endurance are ethical concepts:

'Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring are mistaken owing to their characters, since the coward thinks things not fearsome as formidable and things slightly fearsome as extremely fearsome, and the daring man on the contrary thinks fearsome things as only slightly fearsome, to the brave man, on the other hand, the truth appears exactly so. Hence a man is not brave if he endures (ὑπομένει) fearsome things through ignorance (for instance if owing to madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), nor if he does so out of anger (διὰ θυμὸν) when knowing the greatness of the danger . . . . ' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.24-25].

Accordingly for Aristotle, this notion of rational and hence authentic courage and endurance to face fearsome and dangerous situations represents the mean between the two character extremes of daring and cowardice, both of which produce an irrational and counterfeit form of endurance.

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<sup>52</sup> A case in point is suicide - facing death for the wrong reasons or motivations, reflects an irrational courage and endurance. Thus, if for an individual death might be pleasurable or a means of avoiding further pain or distress then such death cannot be considered as an act of courage or endurance. As such Aristotle categorically rules out any so-called "courage" or "endurance" in an act of suicide as real. In fact it is an irrational and counterfeit form of courage / endurance: 'And some men endure terrors for the sake of other pleasures (ὑδονας ὑπομένουσιν) . . . . But nevertheless neither if someone endures death (ὑπομένει τις τὸν Θάνατον) for the sake of this or another pleasure, nor for the sake of fleeing greater sorrows (ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν) would any of these persons justly be classified as brave (ἀνδρεῖος) . . . . Nor are any of those brave who, as many a man do, commit suicide to escape from pain / hardships. [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.26,27]. Here Aristotle equates a suicidal "endurance of death" with "fleeing" from pain. This paradoxical equation of "endurance" with "flight" renders such (suicidal) endurance as ethically irrational and counterfeit.

To some extent, parallel to the views of the Greek warrior's courage and endurance, mentioned in the preceding chapter, the philosophication of endurance into moral categories, is accompanied within the Aristotelian system with an ethnocentric focus in his construction of the ethnic other. For Aristotle, the Greeks were the inventors and practitioners of philosophy and hence of the exercise of true wisdom or rationality. Non-Greeks therefore, according to this principle, are lacking in the exercise of true reason. It seems more than plausible that such views influenced Aristotle to conclude that rational courage and hence wise endurance appear to be more likely traits of the Greeks rather than "barbarians," while irrational courage and hence unwise endurance, are suggested as characteristic attributes of the non-Greeks:<sup>53</sup> ' . . . . in general the courage of barbarians has an element of passion / anger.' (*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.25). Aristotle offers a useful conclusion to this part of his discussion of rational courage and endurance. True courage is now an ethical virtue, which in Aristotle's definition (as in Plato's) involves the proper exercise of endurance. This involves a rational understanding or knowledge of what is to be endured and what avoided. This exercise is made possible in accordance to the ultimate ethical principle of goodness. This in turn leads to rational endurance in terrors, hardship and pain, which is characteristic of true ἀνδρεία:

'But since indeed all virtue / goodness (ἀρετή) involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this - goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is good [καλόν]), it is clear that courage being a form of virtue (ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὔσα) will make a man endure fearsome things (τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένει) for some object so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure but because it is good (καλόν), since in a case where it is not good but insane he will not endure them (οὐχ ὑπομένει), for then it would be base to do so.' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.32].

iii. "Demilitarized" Moral Endurance Within *Nichomachian Ethics*: While in his earlier *Eth. Eud.*, Aristotle's discussion of endurance was in association with ἀνδρεία, within his subsequent ethical treatise (*Eth. Nic.*), the notion is now exclusively allied with the moral notion of ἐγκράτεια (self-control / self-mastery). Although a definitional distinction is drawn between these

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<sup>53</sup> One of the causes of tension between Aristotle and his celebrated pupil Alexander, was precisely a difference over views of "barbarians" - Aristotle was not comfortable with Alexander's inclination to ' . . . . regard Greeks and "barbarians" on an equal footing.' F. Copleston S.J., *op.cit.*, 11. Aristotle quotes from an unknown verse the example of the Celtic warriors who march against the waves: ' . . . . the Celts "take arms and march against the waves." ' [*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.25]. It is interesting that Shakespeare uses this motif as a metaphor - 'to take arms against a sea of trouble.'

two positive moral qualities, nevertheless with regard to classification, they are related. In Book 7 of *Eth. Nic.*, Aristotle's argument concerns moral character and behaviour. He explains that there exist three types of ethos which are to be avoided - vice (κακία), lack of self-mastery or unrestraint (ἀκρασία) and bestiality (θηριότης) (7.1). On the other hand he lists three opposite dispositions which are morally praiseworthy virtue (ἀρετή, the opposite of vice), self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) and superhuman virtue (τὴν ὑπερ ἀρετὴν, which represents the opposite of bestiality) (7.1). Superhuman virtue, for Aristotle consists of a divine element (7.2). The bulk of his discussion however here, touches upon the dimension of self-mastery in opposition to unrestraint. Within this discussion, Aristotle provides us with an interesting analysis of his understanding of endurance, particularly within an ethical classificational and definitional framework. Here, as in *Eth. Eud.* the key term employed to designate the praiseworthy moral quality of endurance is καρτερία. Furthermore he makes reference to a conception of endurance held by the common Greek person of his time. As such he provides us with a most valuable insight into the level of the popular understanding of the transformed ethical form of this concept. We discover that by the latter part of the 4th century (B.C.) the ordinary Athenian regarded it as a positive and admirable moral quality. It would appear that the philosophical process of the demilitarization of endurance, already evident in Democritus, has by now also reached the popular level. Here, interestingly endurance is not linked with courage but with self-mastery:

Now the following opinions are held - that self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and endurance (καρτερία) are wonderful (σπουδαίων) and praiseworthy (ἐπαινετῶν) dispositions. But unrestraint (ἀκρασία) and softness are blameworthy. [*Eth. Nic.* 7.1.6].

Here endurance no longer stands necessarily in relationship to courage, but in its own right as an ethical value, devoid of military overtones.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand when seeking to explain the function of moral endurance, Aristotle does not hesitate to draw upon an established Greek philosophic tradition, already attested in Democritus, namely the metaphor of the soul's "internal

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<sup>54</sup> An argument may be made that the notion of self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια), may also have its original primary context within the military world. I have not observed this to the same degree that courage and endurance feature in Greek chronicles of war. More research on this however is required. In the absence of such a study, I do not treat self-mastery as necessarily and originally a military concept.

warfare" against the passions employing military terms to distinguish between the comparative efficacy of self-mastery and endurance in this "combat."<sup>55</sup>

**iv. Military Language, Metaphor, Moral Endurance and Self-Mastery - The External and Internal Warfare:** Besides the juxtaposition of courage as a virtue with endurance, are there any other hints of the military origins of moral endurance (and courage), in the ethical treatises of Aristotle, as we find in the dialogues of his eminent predecessor? It is true to say that compared to Plato, and particularly to the Stoics of a subsequent age (e.g. Seneca ) military imagery and language in Aristotle occurs less frequently. Indeed it may even be true to say that the process of the de-militarization and philosophication of the concept of endurance, evident in Plato's *Laches*, with Aristotle reaches its apex. Nevertheless he does make some use of the military world and its values, as illustration for his logical or ethical arguments (e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 1.1.4; 1.2.3; 1.6.4; 1.7.1), and in particular his metaphors of (i) the "external battle:" The happy man by his virtuous life and endurance of the vicissitudes of fortune is able to assure a stable and consistent manner of life not permitting himself to be overwhelmed by the circumstances at play. In this aggressive grasp of life, he is like a general in battle who does not permit circumstances to defeat him. (ii) The "internal battle:" In his reference to the ethical functions of self-mastery and endurance expressed in military language and metaphor of the soul's "internal war." The latter two become the focus of my present investigation of the later Aristotle.

In his discussion of the happy man and the vicissitudes of "fortune" (τύχη), in *Eth. Nic.*'s Book 1, which deals with the object of life and the meaning of happiness (εὐδαιμονία), Aristotle explains the unreliability of calling a person's life "happy" based simply upon the external action of "fortune" (τύχη). Rather he explains, this depends upon the exercise of virtue in action (καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαν) as well as endurance. In this discussion Aristotle makes an allusion to life in the face of fortune as a battle.

Aristotle argues that since actions in conformity to virtue have a permanent quality (βεβαιότης),<sup>56</sup> the virtuous man will be stable and consistent (cf. a chameleon-like inconsistent

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<sup>55</sup> Vide 'The Presocratics and the Philosophication of Endurance and Courage, "Militarized" Courage and Endurance,' earlier in the present chapter.

<sup>56</sup> In contrast to the changes which fortune brings.

existence or character described by Aristotle as - ποικίλος or εὐμετάβολος<sup>57</sup> and permanently happy:

' . . . . it is clear that if we are to be guided by fortune (ταῖς τύχαις), we shall often have to call the same man first happy (εὐδαίμονα and then miserable (ἄθλιον); we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of chameleon . . . . But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune's favours . . . . but it is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue (κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαν) that causes happiness . . . . since none of man's functions possess the quality of permanence (βεβαιότης) so fully as the activities in conformity with virtue . . . . the happy man therefore will possess the element of stability . . . . and will remain happy all his life.' [*Eth. Nic.* 1.10.9].

This virtuous, happy and stable man is best able to demonstrate endurance before the vicissitudes of fortune most nobly. His endurance becomes a sign of his wisdom, goodness as well as an guarantor of his stability or consistency:

'Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man easily endures (φέρη τις εὐκόλως) repeated and severe misfortune (ἀτυχίας), not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul . . . . no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hateful or base actions since we hold that the truly good and wise man (ἀλυθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφορον) will endure (φέρειν) all kinds of fortune in a seemly way and will always act in the noblest way in the circumstances.' [*Eth. Nic.* 1.10.12-13].

In order to illustrate this wise endurance and stability of action in all circumstances of adversity, hardship or danger, and how one is to act accordingly in a seemly manner, not allowing oneself to fall victim to circumstances, Aristotle draws upon the world of the military. He compares the wise man who endures against fortune and through virtuous action does not permit adverse circumstances to defeat him, to a good general who in all circumstances of war, seeks to make the most effective employment of his available soldiers, rather than allow the battle to run its own course: ' . . . . even as a good general (στρατηγὸν ἀγαθόν) makes the most effective use (πολεμικώτατα) of the forces at his disposal (τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ) in war . . . . ' [*Eth. Nic.* 1.10.13]. Again, Aristotle makes use of the military metaphor of the internal "war" in his discussion of the good man's endurance and self-mastery. He poses a significant question. While endurance and self-mastery are related, are they to be considered as identical or different? ' . . . .

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<sup>57</sup> *Eth. Nic.* 1.10.14. This Aristotelian understanding of "inconsistency" of character, that is the absence of βεβαιότης as a sign of a flawed personality, leading a life not in accordance with virtue or reason, and described as "chameleon"-like will be re-echoed into Greco-Roman philosophy as well as popular conventions. It will describe the cowardly, untrustworthy and opportunistic "flatterer," as Plutarch points out (*How to tell a Friend From a Flatterer*), and will in fact be one of the accusations leveled against the "polytropic" apostle Paul in his dealings with the Corinthians. Vide P. Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1987) esp. chs. 2 & 8.

is self-mastery (ἐκκρατῆ) the same as endurance (καρτερικόν) or distinct from it?' (*Eth. Nic.* 7.3.1). For Aristotle the essential difference between these two positive ethical qualities deals with their "objects." Thus while the object of continence concerns pleasure (ἡδονάς), the object of endurance and its ethical opposites, that is μαλακία (weakness or softness), is pain or hardship (λύπας). Aristotle's distinction is couched in association with the moral disposition of σωφροσύνη (temperance and its opposite ἀκολασία):

'As for the pleasures and pains, desires and avoidances . . . . we have already determined as the sphere of temperance (σωφροσύνη) and licentiousness (ἀκολασία). . . . Of these two dispositions when manifested in relation to pleasures constitute the continent and the incontinent respectively, when concerned with pain the soft (μαλακός) and the enduring man (καρτερικός).' [*Eth. Nic.* 7.7.1].

From the above and in a subsequent argument, Aristotle provides two important points in his systematic propositions concerning the nature of endurance as an ethical concept:

(1) The opposite to this notion of moral endurance (καρτερία) is expressed in the idea of μαλακία which may be translated as softness or weakness.

(2) Endurance as a moral quantity is of lesser value than continence or self-mastery. This is because, Aristotle argues, whereas endurance involves resistance towards the effects of pain or hardship, self-mastery involves the activity of exercising control over pleasure. In this argument of moral superiority as well as the specific functions of these two ethical values, Aristotle makes illustrative use of military language, specifically with reference to the "internal battle" against the desires and passions:

'The opposite of the incontinent type (ἀκρατεῖ) is the continent (ὁ ἐγκρατής), and of the soft type (μαλακῷ) the enduring (ὁ καρτερικός); for endurance (τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερῖν) consists in resisting (τὸ ἀντέχειν) one's desires, but continence in conquering (κρατεῖν) them - two quite different matters are resisting (τὸ ἀντέχειν) and conquering (κρατεῖν), just as avoiding defeat is different from victory. Accordingly continence (ἐγκράτεια) is more valuable than endurance (καρτερίας).' [*Eth. Eud.* 7.7.4].

Thus in this evaluation of endurance in its relation to continence, as well as its role in the "internal warfare" something more about Aristotelian endurance is formulated and revealed. Endurance involves the successful resistance (ἀντοχή) of desires, rather than their complete "conquest" (κρατεῖν). Endurance does not annihilate desire or passion, self-mastery does. As Aristotle explains in his military language, the difference is that endurance against the passions spells the "avoidance of defeat," while self-mastery represents the "conquest" or total "victory"



over pleasure. In other words, within this philosophical system, endurance is that moral disposition which enables the individual to undertake the "inner battle" successfully, though not necessarily in absolute victory.

**v. Aristotle, Moral Endurance, Social and Gender Implications:** Aristotle discloses more information concerning the nature of moral endurance, through his description of its opposite disposition, namely "softness" or inability to "resist" pains or desires, and who characteristically constitutes this category of non-enduring people: 'One who is deficient in withstanding pains which most men are able to resist successfully is soft (μαλακός) and men with feminine dispositions (τρυφῶν) for effeminacy is a form of softness.' [Eth. Nic. 7.7.5]. This principle leads to certain clear social implications in the ethics of endurance. Indeed one can speak of a social hierarchy of endurance. What type of person is deficient in moral endurance? What type of human is unable to resist the attacks of desire and pain? In other words what category of human is unable to wage the "internal war?" For Aristotle while most men are able to show some sort of endurance in relation to pain, nevertheless certain categories are incapable. These include (i) the sick or infirm, (ii) males with feminine dispositions, (iii) those who are innately weak or irrational in their nature, namely women as well as "barbarians" and (iv) those who inherit their weakness in hereditary form, such as the royal house of Scythia.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, rational endurance is a masculine attribute which most Greek males can potentially display:

' . . . . failure to resist (ἀντέχειν) is due to some innate tendency (φύσιν) or to disease (νόσον): instances of the former being the hereditary weakness (μαλακία) of the royal family of Scythia and the inferior endurance of the female gender as compared to the male.' [Eth. Nic. 7.7.6].

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<sup>58</sup> Concerning this Aristotelian principle Stowers writes: 'Enkrateia is more noble than endurance because endurance means only successful resistance to passions whereas enkrateia involves their mastery. Then Aristotle notes that softness and lack of mastery are sometimes innate, as for example, in the royal house of Scythia or in the female . . . barbarians often lack self-control because of their innate weaknesses or inferior laws and constitutions.' Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans* 45.

## II. A Synchronic Analysis: "Militarized" and "Demilitarized" Moral Endurance: Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Philosophy and the Transformation of the Warrior's Endurance

### A. *The Place of Moral Endurance in Cynic Ethics* *"Demilitarized" Endurance*

i. **The Cynics - Methodological Issues:** A serious analysis of any aspect of early Cynicism is presented with certain problems.<sup>59</sup> To begin with, due to the Cynic sage's rejection of some fields of study traditionally associated with philosophical endeavour in classic times (as well as in certain Hellenistic philosophical traditions), and their exclusive concentration on ethics or moral development, it has been debated both in antiquity and in modernity, whether within the history of ancient ideas it is proper to regard Cynicism as a philosophy or a way of life (ἔνστασιν βίου). The Cynics, unlike their Stoic and Epicurean contemporaries, beginning with Antisthenes, tended to dismiss the role of logic, dialectics, physics, astronomy or mathematics. In short, it was presented as a σύντομος ὁδός - a "short cut" in the practical pursuit of happiness through a life lived in accordance with nature (κᾶτα φύσιν),<sup>60</sup> freedom, wisdom and moral virtue, in avoidance of the labyrinth of doctrine and intellectual theorizing.<sup>61</sup> In this study, following the example of

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<sup>59</sup> R. Höistad warns, in a somewhat pessimistic tone that any investigation of the Cynics is inevitably faced with the problem of historical uncertainties and ' . . . which preclude results which *really* can be proved.' R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King. Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund, Boktrycker, 1948), 221.

<sup>60</sup> For the Cynic living according to nature is opposed to living in accordance with popular opinion (κᾶτα δόξαν) or the standards or mores set by society. Thus for the Cynic absolute freedom is essential for the pursuit of happiness and virtue.

<sup>61</sup> In one of the pseudepigraphical Cynic epistolographical collection of the early imperial period, *Pseudo-Crates* 6 the author exhorts: 'Do philosophy . . . not as the others do philosophy, but as Antisthenes began to do philosophy and as Diogenes perfected it. But if doing philosophy in this way (i.e. the Cynic way) is difficult (δύσκολον) at least it is shorter (σύντομώτερον).' Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophical schools, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism tended to divide their philosophical systems into physics, logic and ethics, though their emphasis tended to rest upon right moral conduct; vide AA. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. Calif. Press, 1986), Second Edition; E. Brehier, *The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age*, ET W. Baskin (Chicago, London, Univ. Chicago Press, 1965). The Cynics, on the other hand, as Diogenes Laertius indicates, tended by and large, to discard the other divisions altogether (i.e. logic and physics), concentrating exclusively upon ethics, referring to their system as a "short cut" towards virtue and happiness: 'They (i.e. the Cynics), like Aristion of Chios, to do away with the subjects of Logic and Physics and to devote their whole attention to Ethics. . . . they get rid of geometry and music and all such studies. (6.103,104); vide, A. Malherbe, 'Self-Definition Among Epicureans and Cynics,' in B.E. Meyer & E.P. Sanders, *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume 3. Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1983) 45-59. Malherbe points out that Cynics ' . . . have generally been perceived as having an aversion to encyclopaedic learning and placing no premium on education in the pursuit of virtue.' *Idem* 49.

Diogenes Laertius, as well as other ancient authorities, I too will consider Cynicism in its various phases as a school of philosophy.<sup>62</sup>

Another ongoing debate with ancient origins revolves around who ought to be acknowledged as the founding figure of Cynicism Antisthenes<sup>63</sup> or Diogenes of Sinope? Again in accordance with Diogenes Laertius I will treat Antisthenes as the initial Cynic thinker.<sup>64</sup> A further problem, and certainly most serious for the historical and critical literary analyst, concerns the nature of the extant sources. Most of the original works or teachings of the early Cynics, such as Antisthenes,<sup>65</sup> Diogenes,<sup>66</sup> Bion<sup>67</sup> and Crates have been lost.<sup>68</sup> Some literary fragments however do remain. Nevertheless the bulk of these literary attestations are to a significant extent secondary, legendary

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<sup>62</sup> The absence of any systematic body of doctrine, as well as their rejection of logic, physics etc., has led modern scholars such as Tarn to reject the classification of "philosophy" as appropriate for Cynicism; vide W.W. Tarn, 'Alexander, Cynics and Stoics,' in *Am. Jour. Phil.*, 60 (1939) 42. Likewise in antiquity Diogenes Laertius raised similar concerns: '. . . . if, that is, we decide that Cynicism is really a philosophy, and not as some maintain, just a way of life (ἔνστασιν βίου).' [6.103]. Diogenes Laertius however will proceed to treat Cynicism as a philosophy, and I also follow his example. The debate however is not urgent to the immediate scope of the present dissertation. For a brief discussion however, vide, M.D. McGehee, *Divine Appointment to Specific Social Functions in Four Greco-Roman Traditions*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Dept. Religious Studies, Brown Univ.) 19-21.

<sup>63</sup> Even though chronologically Antisthenes belongs to the classical period of Greek philosophy, in this study I treat him as a Hellenistic sage. This can be justified on the grounds that Antisthenes anticipates in his proto-Cynic system some of the major tendencies of Hellenistic philosophy, especially his emphasis on ethics.

<sup>64</sup> For instance, while Diogenes Laertius and Pseudo-Crates (*Ep.* 6) considered Antisthenes as the founder of Cynicism other ancient authorities favoured Diogenes. In modernity such scholars as U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and D. Dudley have argued against the Antisthenian origins of Cynicism in favour of Diogenes, while others such as Höistad and A. Malherbe tend to treat Antisthenes as the first Cynic. Vide, Höistad, *op. cit.* 5-21; A. Malherbe, 'Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War,' in *HTR* 76 (1983) 143-73; also reprinted in a collection of essays by the same author, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1989), 91-119. F. Sayre has proposed that Crates ought to be considered as the authentic founder of Cynicism. On the other hand, he postulates that Antisthenes whom he claims was esteemed by Plato and Aristotle, had nothing to do with the establishment of the Cynic movement; vide, F. Sayre, *Diogenes of Sinope. A Study of Greek Cynicism*, Inaugural Dissertation, (Baltimore, 1938). In this view Sayre has won no adherents.

<sup>65</sup> For a list of Antisthenes' literary works, vide Diog. L. *Vita Antis.* 6.15-18. This is conveniently set out by F.D. Caizi, *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, (Milan, 1966) 17-20.

<sup>66</sup> Diog. L. *Vita Diog.* 6.80.

<sup>67</sup> Unlike the other early Cynics, Diog. L. *Vita Bionis* 4.46-58, does not supply us with a catalogue of Bion's philosophical works. All that Diog. L. explains is that Bion ' . . . . left very many memoirs (ὑπομνήματα) and also sayings (ἀποφθέγματα) . . . . ' (4.47). Indeed among our ancient sources regarding Bion, there is a remarkable paucity of information concerning his numerous literary works. Only tiny fragments of his work exists. For a discussion and collection of the fragments attributed to Bion, vide, J.F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes. A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell Int. 1976) esp. 21-55.

<sup>68</sup> Kester's attempt, in the 1930's, to identify Themistius' *Or. XXVI* as an Antisthenian composition has not received support; vide H. Kester, *Antisthène de la dialectique. Etude critique et exégétique sur le XXVI:e discours de Themistius*. Thèse Recueil de travaux publiés par les membres des Conférences Histoire et de Philologie, 2 :3 (Louvain, 1935). According to Kester the treatise was originally composed by Antisthenes as a response to Plato's *Phaedrus*. For a brief discussion, vide, R. Höistad *op. cit.*, 6.

and anecdotal rather than historiographical in nature.<sup>69</sup> Consequently caution is necessary in any systematic investigation of the ideas of the early Cynics. Here I follow Höistad in attaching value to the doxographies of Diogenes Laertius, and will use this source in my analysis of some of the early Cynics.<sup>70</sup> For our sources of Antisthenes' teachings, in addition to Xenophon, Aristotle and the doxographical section in Diogenes Laertius' biographical collection, we also possess the only surviving complete text of one of his treatises, namely the Ajax and Odysseus speeches. If we accept that Antisthenes was in fact a Cynic then this text becomes the earliest surviving complete Cynic treatise in our possession, thus far.<sup>71</sup> Ironically, the most extensively preserved collection of original early Cynic writings are those of the least known, and perhaps the least creative, namely Teles.<sup>72</sup> Preserved by Stobaeus, the diatribes of Teles provide us with an interesting and first-hand view into the window of the thought-world of the early Cynics by also incorporating invaluable literary fragments from Diogenes, Bion and Crates.<sup>73</sup>

These thinkers signal the beginnings of the Hellenistic moralist tradition, where certain breaks with the classical Greek philosophical tradition are discernible.<sup>74</sup> Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy (inc. Epicureanism and Stoicism) turned its focus increasingly upon ethics,

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<sup>69</sup> For a discussion on some of the historical problems associated with our ancient sources on the early Cynics, vide Höistad, *op. cit.* 7-15; also D.R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (Chicago, Ares, 1980 reprint) esp. ch. 2.

<sup>70</sup> In the case of Diogenes of Sinope it is important to distinguish between the doxographical writings and the anecdote tradition.

<sup>71</sup> Following K.V. Fritz, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope* Philologus, Supplementband 18:2 (Leipzig, 1926), and Höistad, *op. cit.* 17, it is also possible to ascribe reliability in Dio Chrysostom as a source for Antisthenes.

<sup>72</sup> Dudley expressed the matter somewhat more harshly: 'It is a curious turn of literary fortune that Teles, apparently a fourth-rate writer of little originality . . . should be represented by larger fragments than Crates, Bion and Mennipus . . .' *op. cit.* 84-85.

<sup>73</sup> Internal evidence suggests that the original text, notwithstanding the first-century epitomist Theodorus' additions preserves fragments of a text dating back to the mid-third century (B.C.). It is this Theodorian text that was preserved by Stobaeus. For a discussion of the text's dating, vide E. O'Neil (ed. & translator), *Teles the Cynic Teacher, SBL Texts and Translations No. 11, Greco-Roman Religion Series No. 3* (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1977) xi-xii. The text is liberally sprinkled with quotes from Teles' heroes - Diogenes, Crates and especially Bion. It has been debated whether these quotes derive first-hand from the original Cynic texts or whether as Hense postulated, from books containing collections of wise sayings (*χρηταί*).

<sup>74</sup> In contrast to the post-Kantian understanding of philosophy more as a professional academic discipline rather than a practical guide towards a self-realized life, Greek philosophy from Socratic times was perceived as a pedagogue towards the attainment of happiness through the virtuous life by the pursuit of wisdom. Indeed philosophy rather than Greek religion was perceived as the custodian and instructor of moral excellence. For a brief but useful discussion of the practical nature and role of philosophy in Greek and Hellenistic times, vide Stowers, *Letter Writing*, ch. 4.

and this is of course, as I have already noted, nowhere more correct than with the Cynics, where (unlike the Stoics and the Epicureans) it became the only authentic pre-occupation of the sage. At variance with Plato and Aristotle, the philosophical endeavour, particularly for the Cynics (though to a lesser degree for Stoics and Epicureans) was not as monolithically absorbed in the systematic definitions of concepts as in the practical application of ethics and character formation.<sup>75</sup> This would be taught by the sage's personal example and persuasive rhetoric. For the early Cynics (especially Antisthenes), interest with conceptual definitions was regarded as unprofitable since it is not possible to logically grasp a concept's essence but simply to either list its primary elements or attempt relevant conceptual comparisons.<sup>76</sup> Unlike Plato, the early Cynics emphasized the writings of Homer, especially the *Odyssey*, read within a framework of allegorical interpretation, as a rich source of moral teaching.<sup>77</sup>

The basic texts for Cynic expressions of endurance in the Greco-Roman period, will be the extant pseudepigraphical collection of Cynic letters,<sup>78</sup> as well as the moral essays of Dio Chrysostom.<sup>79</sup> It would, nevertheless, be erroneous to consider those who defined themselves as Cynics in this period as representing a monolithic school of thought. On the contrary, significant doctrinal and other differences existed.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, a comparison between some of the Cynic letters and the essays of Dio Chrysostom would reveal intra-Cynic polemics, as Malherbe has pointed out.<sup>81</sup> Not least in the differences between the so-called "rigorous" and "milder" Cynics were the respective views held of Odysseus, either as a heroic Cynic model of wisdom and endurance or

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<sup>75</sup> Stowers, *op. cit.* ch. 4.

<sup>76</sup> Brehier in discussing Antisthenes in comparison to Plato and Aristotle writes: '....definition is impossible since essence is either compound, in which case one can enumerate its primary elements but cannot go beyond these undefinable terms, or simple, in which case one can only tell what it resembles.' *op. cit.* 9.

<sup>77</sup> In Book 2 of the *Republic* Plato objected to the use of Homer, whether allegorically or literally, in education on several grounds: (i) the unsuitable depiction of divinity, (ii) the morally weak representation of the gods and the heroes, and (iii) the unnecessary imaginative identification presented to the reader by the text's direct speech.

<sup>78</sup> Vide discussion below on the Cynic letters.

<sup>79</sup> Vide below.

<sup>80</sup> On the diversity of the Cynics Malherbe writes: 'Considerable diversity characterized Cynics in the Roman empire. Serious Cynics differed from the many charlatans who also took the name. But even genuine Cynics differed among themselves . . . . ' A. Malherbe, 'Cynicism,' *IDB Supplementary Vol.* (1976) 202-203.

<sup>81</sup> Vide Malherbe, 'Self-Definition,' and 'Antisthenes and Odysseus.'

else rejected as "servile," "weak," "inconsistent," "duplicitous" and lacking in endurance.<sup>82</sup> In this new philosophical climate, endurance will feature as a very significant moral concept and practical disposition towards the attainment of happiness.

**ii. Cynic Ethics and Endurance Expressed in its Demilitarized Format:** Despite these differences, it is nevertheless possible to detect certain common elements held by all who defined themselves and who might be considered as genuine (as opposed to charlatan) Cynics. One of their common starting points, was their rejection of the "illusions of human life." As I have explained, practitioners of the κυνική φιλοσοφία or of the κυνικοῦ βίου<sup>83</sup> held to a "short cut" or "briefer" direction (σύντομος) to virtue (ἀρετή) which was sufficient for happiness (εὐδαιμονία).<sup>84</sup> In one of the Cynic letters of the Roman period, ascribed pseudepigraphically to the "Crates" tradition, and with leanings to an austere form of Cynicism positing Diogenes of Sinope as the paradigmatic Cynic sage (cf. Antisthenes), we find a summary statement of this goal and a Cynic self-definition:<sup>85</sup>

'Cynic philosophy (κυνική φιλοσοφία) is Diogenean, the Cynic is he who toils according to this philosophy (ὁ κατὰ ταύτην πονῶν), and to be a Cynic is to take a short cut in doing philosophy (τὸ συντόμως φιλοσοφεῖν).' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 16].

This "short cut" to virtue and happiness, as explained earlier, consisted of the rejection of physics, logic or any other branch of theoretical knowledge, a philosophic ideal with origins in the presocratic sages. This was in keeping with their quest for freedom and happiness "in accordance with nature" (e.g. Ps. Diog. *Ep.* 25) and their radical rejection of social conventions and public opinion as well as a contempt for traditional ideals. Thus Antisthenes maintained that 'virtue is an

<sup>82</sup> Similar charges could be leveled by Paul's opposition in Corinth. Vide ch. 5 of the present study.

<sup>83</sup> Cynics debated whether "Cynicism" ought to be considered a "philosophy" or a "way of life."

<sup>84</sup> Antisthenes, regarded by some Cynics as their founder, taught "virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness (αὐτάρκη δε ἦν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν) [Diog. L., *Antisthenes* 6.11]. Polemon, whose view were very similar to Crates re-echoed this ethical view: τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι . . . . τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονία εἶναι.' (Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 2.22.13). In the Roman period Pseudo-Crates, re-echoed this: 'For happiness is not pleasure

(εὐδαιμονία γὰρ οὐκ ἡδονή), on account of which we need externals, while virtue (ἀρετή) is complete without any externals.' (Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 3.151-17).

<sup>85</sup> In Pseudo-Crates' "letter" to Eumolpus, Diogenes of Sinope is affirmed as the founder of this method: ' . . . . it is . . . . Diogenes, who discovered the short cut to happiness (Διογένην τὸν εὐρόμενον τὴν σύντομου ὁδὸν ἐπ' εὐδαιμονίαν)' [*Ep.* 13.10-11].

affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning' (ἀρετήν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων).<sup>86</sup> Accordingly, ethics became the singular absorption of the Cynic pre-occupation.<sup>87</sup> This is consistent with their emphasis on a praxis-centered philosophy, which was only concerned to teach about human conduct and life "according to nature" (Κατε φαύισμ βίου). Where does the ethical notion of endurance fit within these first Cynic principles? Did it retain its military ethos?

To the Cynics the means to achieve virtue was through ἄσκησις.<sup>88</sup> Pseudo-Crates can therefore advise Orion that a country residence will not educate his sons in virtue, rather it is philosophic ἄσκησις:

' . . . . if you want your sons to become good men . . . . send them not to the country but to a philosopher's school . . . . For virtue is something acquired by practice (ἀσκητὸν γὰρ ἀρετή) and does not spontaneously enter the soul . . . . ' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 12.21-24].

Through undergoing training or practice in hardship (ἀνάγκη), difficult toils (πόνους) and the avoidance of pleasure the Cynic arrives at virtue and happiness. In this struggle moral and physical endurance, are understood among the best Cynic moral "goods" (ἀγαθῶν), together with self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια), plays an important role.<sup>89</sup> To begin with, it is through toil (πόνος) that endurance is produced: 'And pursue not only the best of goods (τὰ τέλη τῶν ἀγαθῶν), self-mastery and endurance (καρτερίαν), but also their causes, toils (τούς πόνους) . . . . ' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 15.21-233].

This endurance which comes through toil may best be taught to initiates to the Cynic way of life, not by a systematic doctrine or speech but by exemplary action. This was considered, by Pseudo-Crates, to be an original ethical contribution of the Diogenean form of Cynicism: ' . . . .

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<sup>86</sup> Diog. L. 6.11.

<sup>87</sup> As M.D. McGehee has pointed out: 'Cynics started with ethics and ended with ethics.' in *Divine Appointment to Specific Social Functions in Four Greco-Roman Traditions*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Religious Studies, Brown University (1985) 30.

<sup>88</sup> Pseudo-Crates (*Ep.* 11.14) exhorts his students to "practice being in need of only a few things" (ἀσκεῖτε ὀλίγων δεηθῆναι). Likewise he advises Hermaiscus to persevere in "toil:" "Whether toil (πόνος) is something to be chosen or to be avoided continue to toil (πόνει) . . . . ' (*Ep.* 4.1).

<sup>89</sup> In one of Pseudo-Crates' letters, endurance and self-control are described as the "most honoured" Cynic goods (τὰ τιμώτητα ἀγαθὰ) [43.3].

action teaches endurance more quickly than words (ἐπεὶ διδάσκει καρτερίαν τάχιον τὸ ἔργον), a tenet found only in the philosophy of Diogenes.' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 20.17-19].

Perhaps Diogenes the Cynic's most celebrated disciple was Crates (fl. B.C. 328-324). In the Greco-Roman period he would be regarded together with Hercules, Odysseus, Antisthenes and Diogenes as the prototypical Cynic,<sup>90</sup> and indeed it was through Crates that Zeno the founder of Stoicism was initiated into philosophy. Among the extant sources for the teachings of Crates perhaps Diogenes Laertius' account represents the most significant attestation.<sup>91</sup> According to Diog. L. the original impulse which led to Crates' adoption of Cynic philosophy was his admiration of life in poverty. As such he is described as a "philosopher of endurance." Indeed according to Diogenes Laertius, his endurance became so proverbial that the comic poet Philemon describing the motif of endurance (of harsh weather) does so in terms of the imitation of the paradigmatic much-enduring Crates:

'According to Antisthenes in his *Successions*, the first impulse to the Cynic philosophy was given to him when he saw Telephus in a certain tragedy carrying a little basket and altogether in a wretched state. So he turned his property into money . . . . and having thus collected about 200 talents distributed that sum among his fellow-citizens. And it is added such a philosopher with endurance / did he become (καρτερῶς οὕτω φιλοσοφεῖν) that he is mentioned by the comic poet Philemon.'

"In summer time a thick cloak he would wear. To be like Crates, and in winter rags." [Diog. L. *Crates*].

Again, Diogenes Laertius depicts Crates as a model of the much-enduring sage in a subsequent passage. In this instance reference is made to Crates's disposition to withstand pain without being visibly affected. Here, while the concept of endurance is present and employed in a martyrological context, nevertheless the language of endurance is implicit rather than explicit: 'At Thebes he was flogged by the master of the gymnasium another version being that it was by Euthykrates and at Corinth; and being dragged by the heels he spoke out as if it did not affect him.' [Diog. L. *Crates*

<sup>90</sup> For a detailed scholarly discussion concerning Cynic paradigmatic heroes, vide Höistad, *op. cit. passim*. he identifies such ancient figures as Hercules and Odysseus as well as historical figures such as Cyrus the "ideal king."

<sup>91</sup> Diog. L.'s brief account acknowledges Zeno, Philemon, Menander, Erasthenes, Diocles, Demetrius, Aristhenes of Rhodes, Hippobotus and Favorinus as sources. Besides Diog. L. the extant sources for Crates include Teles' fragments, Menander's comedies and Julian's 6th Oration. Allusions also survive in Seneca, Epictetus, Athenaeus, Marcus Aurelius, Demetrius, Greg. Naz. and Origen. The totality of his surviving fragments are sufficient to assess his philosophical system (vide Diels, *Frag. Poet. Phil. Graece* Vol. 1, 1901). While a number of Cynic letters have survived bearing the name of Crates, these are pseudepigraphical and will be treated with our investigation of the later Cynics.



6.90]. What is important, at least from Diog. L's description of Crates, is that while endurance does not necessarily figure in his teachings as an ethical concept, nevertheless it is present in his paradigmatic life. He becomes the model of endurance of poverty, weather and pain, and must be considered as among the first Greek philosophers to be regarded as a paradigm of endurance, worthy of imitation. Furthermore the notion here is not associated with military images, though it does carry clear martyrological connotations at least in one instance - the much-enduring sage who remains calm under physical torture!

Endurance also is understood as an indispensable good in the sage's continued successful encounter with life's adverse circumstances and labours (πόνους). Indeed, one of the Cynic letters ascribed to the "Crates" tradition (*Ep.* 29), renders the attainment of endurance in hardships and labours as the central element by which outsiders evaluate the authentic Cynic, while another, intended for an "insider" novice designates the Cynic life as the "life of endurance:"

'It is not because we are indifferent to everything that others have called our philosophy Cynic, but because we demonstrate much endurance (ἀπό τοῦ σφόδρως ὑπομένειν) to those things which are unbearable to them . . . .' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 29].

'I am returning the tunic which you wove and sent to me because those of us who live a life of endurance (τοῖς καρτερίῳ) are forbidden to wear such things.' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 29].

The affiliation of the practice of endurance with the Cynic way of life thus became one of the central identifying marks by outsiders in recognizing and accepting the sage as Cynic as well as a central topic of discussion for those interested in the pursuit of the "short cut to happiness:"

'And those following me often listened to me discussing endurance (διαλεγόμενου μου περὶ καρτερίας), and they often happened to be present as I actually exercised endurance (καρτεριοῦντος) or pursued that pattern of life. Because of this, some gave me money, others things worth money and many invited me to dinner.' [Ps. Diog. *Ep.* 38.3].

The sage's practice of endurance therefore played an important aspect of the Cynic self-definition and also served a social function, namely public recognition and acceptance of one's credentials of authenticity as a sage, a recognition which should guarantee public financial support. In the above passage the display of public endurance by the sage was economically rewarded through money and food offerings.

In antiquity many claimed to be Cynics, simply by adopting the cloak and staff. Nevertheless more sophisticated thinkers such as the satirist Lucian and the Cynic sage Dio Chrysostom, were

very careful to distinguish between genuine Cynics and those who were charlatans.<sup>92</sup> One of the authenticating marks of a genuine Cynic sage, according to Dio Chrysostom as well as the Stoic Epictetus, was the capacity of the sage to demonstrate endurance in the face of persecution or ὕβρις, from a hostile crowd. This endurance becomes a sign which proves and authenticates his divine commission and appointment and hence his genuineness.<sup>93</sup> Thus Dio in his Diogenes or Isthmian oration addressed to a predominantly Corinthian crowd praised Diogenes' and Odysseus' endurance in situations of hostile ὕβρις:

'At these meetings, he (i.e. Diogenes) held to the same line of conduct, not changing his ways nor caring whether anyone of his audience commended or criticized him . . . . Some admitted him therefore as the wisest man in the world, to others he seemed insane, many scorned him as beggar and a poor good-for-nothing, some jeered at him, others tried to greatly insult him by throwing bones at his feet as they would to dogs, yet others would approach him and pluck at his cloak. It was just like the way in which Homer says the suitors made sport of Odysseus; he too endured their riotous conduct and insolence for a few days, and Diogenes was like him in every respect. For he really resembled a king and lord who in the guise of a beggar moved among the slaves and menials while they caroused in ignorance of his identity. And yet he demonstrated endurance to them (ῥαίως φέροντι) drunken as they were . . . . ' [Or. 9.9].

So far, I have discussed the place and function of moral endurance, within Cynic ethics, exclusively in its "demilitarized" format. I now ask - given the austere nature of the life adopted by many of the Cynics, did the image of the warrior's endurance impact upon their description of the Cynic sage's "toil" in order to illustrate the magnitude of the Cynic's "combat" against the hardships and the passions, that is, do we find a "militarized" mode on the Cynic description and understanding of moral endurance? Or, was the concept of moral endurance, presented simply in a thoroughly demilitarized form? I now turn my attention to this issue.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> It is interesting that while Lucian presents a satirical stereotype of Cynics, he does distinguish between two types of Cynics. Thus while Demonax and other Cynics are presented in a positive light (vide *Zeus Catechized*, *Demonax*) in other texts they are depicted in a most pejorative and satirical manner (vide *Peregrinus*, *Philosophers for Sale* and the *Runaways*). Also vide A. Malherbe, 'Gentle as a Nurse: The Cynic Background to 1 Thess. ii,' in *NovT*. 12.12 (1970) esp. 206-209; McGehee, *op. cit.* 19-21.

<sup>93</sup> Vide McGehee, *op. cit.* 39, also Malherbe, 'Gentle as a Nurse,' 215-216.

<sup>94</sup> Certainly one of the interesting elements which arises in dealing with this concept among the Cynics is the gender issue. What is surprising, given the normative pessimistic evaluation of woman in the majority of the Greek philosophical circles, is the somewhat optimistic perspective the some Cynics adopted (particularly Crates and those subsequently associated with the name of Crates) when dealing with endurance (and courage) as it relates to women. Can a woman be a philosopher? Does she possess the capacity towards endurance, particularly in the face of danger or violence? Is a woman's endurance comparable to a "warrior's" endurance? I deal with this issue in chapter 4 of the present study, in conjunction with an early Jewish martyrological text which features the endurance of a woman described in metaphoric military terms, in a martyrological context. Vide 'A Woman's Martyrological Endurance: Warrior of God' ch. 4 of the present study.

*B. Cynic "Militarized" Moral Endurance  
The Cynic Sage as Much-Enduring Warrior*

**i. Antisthenes and the Much-Enduring Odysseus as "Sage-Warrior:"** Antisthenes is something of an enigmatic character who has prompted considerable debate in modern scholarship as much in terms of his rightful place in the establishment of the ancient Cynic movement as for his status as an '...independent and dominating figure in the conflict of ideas which broke out after the death of Socrates.'<sup>95</sup> Though we have lost most of the Antisthenian texts, within our most reliable sources preserving fragments from the teachings of Antisthenes, it is possible to discern two traditions concerning the philosophication of endurance.

Judging from the titles and the extant fragments, it seems highly likely that the wandering and much-enduring Odysseus, became a hero for Antisthenes.<sup>96</sup> It is fortuitous that of the only two surviving, complete original texts of Antisthenes, the Ajax and Odysseus declamations, his hero Odysseus figures prominently. Although from a rhetorical perspective these two forensic speeches are closely allied to Antisthenes' mentor, Gorgias, the content and intention as Höistad correctly points out already incorporates certain Cynic issues. Odysseus' speech, which has metaphoric or parabolic tendencies<sup>97</sup> and set within a fictitious martial setting, posits Odysseus the warrior (rather than Odysseus the traveller) as a prototypical Cynic sage expounding in opposition to Ajax, certain fundamental Cynic virtues - especially bravery, self-sufficiency and individualism, self-abasement, and a capacity for much endurance (πολύτλας). As opposed to Ajax's form of brute and rash courage based on heavy weaponry and shield protection, Odysseus' courage is defined in

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<sup>95</sup> Höistad *op. cit.* 6. For a brief summary of the history of academic discussion concerning the intellectual inter-relationship between Plato and Antisthenes as well as Antisthenes and Diogenes, vide *idem* 5-21.

<sup>96</sup> Timon was apparently a prolific writer. According to Diogenes Laertius for this very reason he was criticized by Timon. Diogenes Laertius lists ten volumes of Antisthenian writings (6.15-18). Of these volumes at least two, judging from the titles contain themes on Odysseus. On Odysseus as an Antisthenian and Cynic hero, vide Höistad *op. cit.* 94-1021 also Malherbe *op. cit.*

<sup>97</sup> I agree with Höistad (rather than Tate) that while in Antisthenes' Ajax and Odysseus speeches we are not dealing with fully developed allegorical narrative nevertheless he intended them as parabolic; vide R. Höistad, 'Was Antisthenes an Allegorist?' in *Eranos* 49 (1951) 16-30, esp. 23-24: 'Thus his Ajax and Odysseus speeches served the same function as the parable. It is obvious that the allegorical presentation is not far from this.' *Ibid.* 24. In this parable, as I shall elaborate subsequently in this section, Odysseus is the prototypical Cynic and his unarmed "weaponry" are the Cynic virtues: 'An analysis of these fictitious forensic speeches seems to show that they are to be regarded as something more than purely rhetorical exercises. Antisthenes had a definite purpose with them that is propaganda of Odysseus as representing some Cynic virtues.' *Ibid.* 23. For an opposing perspective, vide J. Tate, 'Antisthenes Was Not an Allegorist,' in *Eranos* 51 (1953) 14-22.

terms of his unarmed (ἄοπλος) exploits against the enemy at night (*Odysseus* 8). Unlike Ajax, the implication here is that while physically unarmed his real "weapons" are his character traits including self-sufficiency by means of his resourcefulness, ingenuity, craftiness and adaptability, his capacity to endure voluntary self-abasement or humiliation (*Odysseus* 10)<sup>98</sup> and this not for his own glory but for the sake of all the Greek army (*Odysseus* 8). Ajax, on the other hand, representing conventional Greek heroic values, places a low value on voluntary self-abasement, condemning Odysseus for his unthinkable willingness to suffer self-humiliation (clothes himself in rags and allows his servants to treat him disrespectfully) and hence explicitly confesses his incapacity to endure voluntary humiliation (κάγω μὲν οὐκ ἄν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων). Most significant for our theme is the description of Odysseus' ability for great endurance in danger and adversity. While in the Homeric *Odyssey*, the epithet πολύτλας referred primarily to Odysseus' endurance throughout his many travels, in the *Iliad* the idea of endurance was pre-eminently martial. The present Antisthenian context is clearly Iliadic and it seems therefore better to understand the description of Odysseus as πολύτλας in a metaphoric martial sense namely as one of Odysseus' the proto-Cynic sage's "weapons." Thus he awaits the day when a poet will praise his worth as one who is "...much enduring πολύτλας).<sup>99</sup> These values, some new, represented and embodied in the Antisthenian Odysseus, are meant to show the superiority of Odysseus in comparison to the more conventional Ajax, and hence a parabolic celebration of the new Antisthenian Cynic man and hero. In this, the capacity to endure, indeed the ability towards much endurance is deemed as a key virtue or "weapon" for Antisthenes' "sage-warrior." Therefore in this Antisthenian essay, where Odysseus is depicted as the paradigm of the Cynic sage, we have

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<sup>98</sup> This Odyssean or proto-Cynic "virtue" of adaptability, namely the capacity to adapt to circumstances, as well as the associated notion of voluntary self-abasement, will become a controversial issue among Cynics in a subsequent era. The Cynics who adopted a milder psychagogic style, tended to identify with the Antisthenian Odysseus in his adaptability or "polytropy" (esp. in speech) and voluntary self-abasement. The more rigoristic Cynics however rejected the Antisthenian Odysseus as a philosophical paradigm accusing the milder Cynics along with their hero of inconsistent, cowardly and self-abasing behaviour. As Malherbe has demonstrated, Odyssean "adaptability" and "servility" also becomes a key issue in the charges leveled against the apostle Paul's "polytropic" missionary and psychagogic style in his dealings with the Corinthian and Achaean churches; Malherbe, *op. cit.*. I will argue that not only will polytropy, servility and cowardice become major themes, but so will the concept of endurance (and courage), in the Pauline apologia in 2 *Corinthians*, vide ch. 5 of present dissertation.

<sup>99</sup> *Odysseus* 14.

access (as best as I can determine) to one of the earliest Greek philosophical usages of the notion of the Greek sage's moral endurance depicted within a metaphoric military setting or context, as one of his powerful and aggressive moral attributes in facing the "Trojan enemy," danger and hardships.<sup>100</sup>

**ii. The Later Cynics and the Sage as Much-Enduring Warrior - The Exhortation to "Stand Firm" in Moral Warfare:** Given the Cynic ethic on toil, hardship, training, endurance and the avoidance of pleasure, it would not be unreasonable to expect military metaphors in their teachings, a practice which was already initiated, by Democritus, Plato and Aristotle. However it would be Antisthenes, who would first depict the Cynic sage as a type of the "much-enduring warrior" (namely Odysseus) at war against the "Trojans." This trend towards the use of moral endurance within military metaphors is also the case with the later Cynics. What is an interesting new development, however, is that the juxtaposition of moral endurance and courage, evident in both the younger Plato and Aristotle, is no longer apparent within the later Cynics. Indeed moral endurance rather than courage becomes the more significant virtue or disposition of the soul. "Militarized" moral endurance is now almost exclusively presented within military metaphors, rather than in association with courage.

Within the Cynic metaphor of moral "warfare" it is possible to classify two types of "foes" and hence "combat" faced by the Cynic sage: (i) the "external" attacks, hardships or toils upon the soul by external "enemies" (e.g. public mockery or slander, adversity, etc.) and (ii) the internal attacks upon the soul by the sage's or his disciples' internal foes (e.g. the passions, desires, vainglory etc.), this constitutes the "battle within the soul." A few examples will suffice to illustrate this. Pseudo-Crates for instance, exhorts Ganymedes to put on "the weapons of Diogenes" which are in

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<sup>100</sup> In the absence of the majority of Antisthenes' works, Diogenes' Laertius' doxographical account of Antisthenes forms a most significant attestation in any reconstruction of this early Cynic's personality and teachings. Do we find hints of Antisthenes' use of military metaphors and language? It would appear that Antisthenes' predisposition to employ metaphoric military language is supported by the doxographic evidence. Thus in an Antisthenian fragment recorded by Diocles preserved by Diog. L., Antisthenes exhorted the need to make a "military alliance" with men who are brave and just. He then explains that virtue was a "weapon that cannot be taken away." Finally he explains by a military illustration the need to be on the side of virtuous men: 'Make allies (συμμάχους) of men who are at once brave and just. Virtue is a weapon (ὄπλον ἢ ἀρετὴ) that cannot be taken away. It is better to be with a handful of good men fighting against (μάχεσθαι) all the bad than with hosts of bad men against a handful of good men.' Diog. L.. 6.12].

effect the Cynic cloak, long hair, wallet and staff as exemplified by Diogenes, and which are described as very "effective" in "combating" foes:<sup>101</sup>

' . . . . . fear (not) the cloak and wallet and staff and long hair . . . . . put on the weapons of Diogenes (ἐνδύσαι δὲ τὰ Διογένεια ὄπλα), with which he did drive away those who had evil designs for him . . . . . For these weapons are terribly effective in combating / overcoming (καταγωνίσασθαι) such enemies . . . . . ' [Pseudo-Crates *Ep.* 23.6-7,14-18].

Likewise the notion of the struggle against vainglory and the passions, depicted as a "battle" is also present in the later Cynics. Thus Pseudo-Diogenes addressing Perdicas, advises him to summon him to his side in order to help him in his "fight" against some very formidable "enemies" who were more powerful and menacing than the most ferocious human warriors such as the Thracians and Paeonians, namely vainglory and the passions. Following a "moral warfare" tradition established by Aristotle, in this "war" Pseudo-Diogenes claims to be an expert "general:"

'If you are now waging war against vainglory (ταῖς δόξαις ἤδη πολυμείς), enemies (ἐχθροῖς) which in my view, are more powerful (ἰσχυροτέροις) and inflict more damage (πλείονα καταβάπτουσι) on you than the Thracians and Paeonians, and if you are trying to subdue the human passions (πάθη), summon me, for I can wage war against these just like a general (πόλεμον καὶ στρατηγεῖν).' [Ps.Diog. *Ep.* 5.1-6].

Associated with the Cynic sage's internal "warfare" against vainglory is his external "battle" against irrational public opinion. His garb is only one weapon in his campaign against popular opinion, but as a "warrior" of the truth he is to "wage war" consistently and aggressively against this "foe," namely the common values of the multitude, even if the "foe" is not attacking: '...you are not battling against (τὴν μάχην) truth but against popular opinion. Fight (μάχου) against this everywhere even if nothing is pressing upon you . . . . ' [Ps. Diog. *Ep.* 10]. it is precisely in these "battle" settings - whether internal or external - that the idea of the sage's moral endurance is most naturally figuratively depicted in terms of military or battlefield endurance. The sage is now a "much-enduring warrior" engaged in "battle," or in his capacity as sage and hence as "much-enduring general" exhorts his subordinates (i.e. those to whom he is offering moral advice) to

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<sup>101</sup> The Cynic "uniform" of the cloak, staff and wallet being more effective than a warrior's weapons is found in another letter of the Pseudo-Crates collection, ~p 33. Here "Crates" exhorts "Hipparchia" his wife, to dress their infant son, when he is able to walk, with the Cynic habit which offers "better guards" than swords: 'When he is able to speak and walk, dress him not with a sword, as Aethra did with Theseus, but with a staff and cloak and wallet, which can guard men better than swords.' 33.26-29. In one of the letters of the Pseudo-Diogenes collection, the Cynic sage's cloak, wallet and staff are rendered celestial in origin, since Odysseus, the τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτατον was likewise dressed by Athena (7.12-15). Malherbe has argued that the idea of "divine weapons" may have been echoed by Paul in 2 *Cor.* 10.3-6.

"stand firm" or "resist" the external or internal "enemy" in their "combat." The following illustrations from the Cynic letters suffice to make the point.

Within the Pseudo-Diogenes collection two letters are of special interest. In the first one addressed to "Crates" (*Ps. Diog.* 12), the author is concerned to draw a distinction between the moral circumstances of the masses and that of the sage. The masses, because of their weakness, are reluctant to pursue the hardships associated with the life of (Cynic) philosophy. They prefer to pursue a life of pleasure and hence become slaves to every circumstance. But the sage is different. By the use of military language and imagery the author exhorts "Crates" to "resist" (ἀντιτάττεσθαι), that is demonstrate a "warrior's" endurance in his "war" (πολεμεῖν) against the (internal) tendency towards pleasure and the (external) circumstances of hardships. Through this resistance / endurance he will be victorious and "take prisoner" / "detain" both pleasure and hardships:

'But as for you, continue in your training just as you begun, and earnestly pursue a balanced resistance (ἀντιτάττεσθαι) to both pleasure and hardship. For it is natural for us to war (πολεμεῖν) equally against both and first and foremost, to detain them (ἐμποδίζειν), the one because it leads to shameful deeds, the other because it leads away from noble acts through fear.' [*Ps. Diog.* 12.11-16].

In another letter from the same collection (*Ps. Diog.* 27) ostensibly addressed to the Scythian sage "Anacharsis," the Aristotelian theme of the superiority of the sage's moral (rational) endurance in comparison to that of the warrior is revisited. The epistolographical author draws an antithesis between Diogenes' supreme (philosophic) endurance (ὑπομονή) in his struggle against the passions in comparison to the most renowned and brave warriors of Greece, the Spartans. They cannot boast of his endurance. While they possess and demonstrate manly courage in war both by the fact of allowing Sparta to remain unwalled as well as by their fearful prowess in battle, nevertheless in the field of moral warfare the much-enduring and courageous Spartan warriors have, in comparison to Diogenes no endurance. In the internal war against the passions they have "surrendered" (through a lack of moral endurance) their souls to the "attacks" of the passions and are defenceless, without walls to that enemy. They cannot even send any "auxiliary forces" against them in defence and hence are overwhelmed and captured by these internal "diseases." In short

they cannot show any moral resistance (i.e. endurance) because they lack moral virtues.<sup>102</sup> In effect the Cynic sage-hero Diogenes is a greater "warrior" of endurance in the internal war against the passions since he is able to resist them. Indeed the possession of such moral endurance becomes the object of "boasting." In this "boasting" of endurance in "frightful circumstances" only Diogenes can lay a legitimate claim:

'Who would boast of endurance (ὑπομονή) under frightful circumstances with Diogenes present? It follows that, although they seem to live in unwall'd Sparta by relying on the manly courage (ἀνδρείαν) for their defense, they have actually surrendered their unprotected souls to the passions (τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκδεδώκασι), setting up no auxiliary forces against them. While they appear fearful to their neighbours, they suffer attack (πολεμοῦνται) from diseases from within themselves. So let them drive away virtue, by which alone the soul could be strengthened and set free from its diseases.' [*Ps. Diog.* 27.117-25].

As I have already pointed out in my preceding chapter, the act of fleeing in battle, that is the absence of endurance, was considered as shameful for a warrior. It represented the very opposite of "standing firm," the latter being the mark of the heroic warrior. Indeed a consistent pre-battle cry was the exhortation "stand firm" / "do not flee!" In the wake of the philosophication of the various aspects of the warrior's endurance, these motifs were taken up by the sages in their description of the moral "warfare," as is attested by *Ep.* 10, in the Pseudo-Diogenes epistolary corpus with reference to the exhortation to "fight" (μάχου) the "battle" against vainglory at all costs - even if not attacked - and two letters in the Pseudo-Crates collection. In the latter collection *Ep.* 29, allegedly addressed to the female philosopher Hipparchia, the recipient is exhorted to be a warrior of endurance and "stand firm" in the life of the Cynic life:<sup>103</sup>

'It is not because we are indifferent to everything that others have called our philosophy Cynic, but because we demonstrate great endurance (σφοδρῶς ὑπομένειν) to those things which are unbearable to them because they are soft or subject to false opinion . . . . Stand firm (μένε) therefore, and live the Cynic life . . . . ' [*Ps. Crates Ep.* 29.10-14].

In *Ps. Crates* 35, the idea of the shameful or sorrowful consequences of a warrior's retreat (φεύγειν, φυγή) is taken up evoking the image of the deserter or "the "one who flees" (τόν φεύγοντα). Here the author in re-echoing the oracles of the ancients, exhorts "Aper" not to "flee"

<sup>102</sup> This Cynic tradition represents one of the few instances in Greek philosophy where Sparta and her warriors are not employed in a positive illustrative sense, albeit figuratively. For an overall treatment of the place of Sparta in Greek thought, vide E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta*, passim. For a broader historical treatment, vide E. Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition*, passim.

<sup>103</sup> This is an important text from the Greco-Roman world, concerning ancient perspectives on women, which I shall discuss more fully in ch. 4.



from the presence of hardship, since this would result in sorrow: 'Do not flee (μὴ φεύγειν) from what is necessary. For the one who flees (τόν γάρ φεύγοντα) from what is inevitable must be sorrowful.' [Ps. Crates *Ep.* 35.4-6].

**iv. Models of Moral Endurance in "Warfare:"** In *Ep.* 5 within the Pseudo-Socrates collection of Cynic letters,<sup>104</sup> "Socrates" advises "Xenophon" concerning the possibility, given a worsening political situation in Athens, of acute slander being directed against him ("they will set upon you"). In the coming "war" he reminds him of the value of the virtue of courageous endurance (as well as for contempt of money) which he ought to exercise. In this passage we discover one of the important functions of endurance in "battle" it was to render the "warrior" formidable and hence intimidating, in the eyes of the enemy. The author then reminds "Xenophon" of the models of such endurance within his own family, which he is to imitate:

I would not be surprised, if the political situation worsens, if some will attempt for their own reasons to slander you . . . . they will set upon you . . . . And know that both of these virtues are especially necessary for war (πόλεμος): both endurance (καρτερίας) and contempt for money . . . . through endurance we become formidable to our enemies. You have examples of both of these among your own kin.' [Ps. Soc. *Ep.* 5.1,2].

Certain interesting elements, many of them new, are now evident within the Cynic use and treatment of moral endurance. The protagonist of the "moral warfare" is now not designated as the "rational / virtuous man" (cf. Plato and Aristotle) but more specifically identified primarily with the Cynic heroes and sage (though of course the idea of the sage as "virtuous man" is still present). Likewise the concept of endurance, now becomes more important and more central than that of courage. Indeed it is now very rarely juxtaposed with courage, even in military metaphors. Furthermore the "military" exhortation issued by the sage to his disciples to "stand firm" and "resist" their internal and external "foes," now becomes prominent. Are these trends in the on-

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<sup>104</sup> This collection of 35 pseudepigraphical letters, ostensibly written by Socrates and a Socratic circle (Xenophon, Plato, Phaedrus, Antisthenes) which is preserved in Codex Vaticanus graecus 64, clearly appear not to have derived from the same original author. Scholarly research has demonstrated that while one of the letters may be genuine (*Ep.* 28) the rest of the collection falls into two groups: (i) *Epp.* 1-7 which are ascribed to Socrates, and make use of Xenophon's (cf. Plato's) Socrates. (ii) *Epp.* 8-27, 29-34 (*Ep.* 35 more properly belongs to a Pythagorean literary corpus) which bear the names of various Socratics. The present epistle belongs to the first Xenophonic-Socratic group. According to Malherbe these letters may be dated to the first century (A.D.), vide A. Malherbe, *Cynic EpistJes* 27.

going process of the philosophication of the warrior's endurance continued or re-echoed in Stoic philosophy?

*C. The Place of Moral Endurance in Stoic Ethics  
Moral Endurance as a Subordinate Virtue to the Cardinal Virtue of Courage  
Or as a Fused Cardinal Virtue - Brave Endurance*

**i. Stoic Ethics - The Good, Reason and Virtue:**<sup>105</sup> Like most classical and Hellenistic philosophical systems the aim of the pursuit of Stoic doctrines was a practical one - the attainment of happiness (εὐδαιμονία). This Stoic "happiness" however, is not to be confused with pleasure, which was considered as transient and undesirable - in fact contrary to nature. In all its historical stages Stoic ethics taught that εὐδαιμονία (beatus) came as a direct consequence of life in accordance to nature both as a universal principle, which in Stoicism was divinized and identified with "God" or "Zeus", or in its particular or momentary manifestation in every human. For the Stoics φύσις (naturae) as a universal or cosmic principle is constituted as ὀρθὸς λόγος (correct reason / ratio perfecta). Hence living according to nature involved living in accordance to the principles of reason.<sup>106</sup> The human alone (cf. animals) is endowed with the capacity to live in accordance to nature in a rational manner.<sup>107</sup> This capacity renders him potentially able to comprehend universal or cosmic events, laws or patterns, to participate in the well-being of this cosmic order through his own efforts and volition as well as providing him with "weapons" with which to potentially resist and overcome the various internal or external "foes" who "wage war" against his soul (*Ira* 1.17.2). In a very real sense, the infiltration of vice within the soul is nothing

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<sup>105</sup> For a fuller treatment of the topic vide, A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 2nd edition (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Univ. California Press, 1986) 147-209; G. Reale, *op. cit.* 259-288; L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1980) 3rd printing, passim; F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (Bristol, Bristol Press, 1989) 2nd edition, 28-68. Fitzgerald also provides a very useful treatment of Stoic (and other) ethics in his chapter dealing with the hardships of the sage, *op. cit.* 47-116.

<sup>106</sup> For Stoics such as Seneca the harmony which exists between Nature and Reason is such that any separation between them becomes untenable: ' . . . . we must use Nature as our guide, she is that reason heeds, it is of her that it takes counsel. Therefore to live happily is the same thing as to live according to Nature.' (*VB* 8.1.2). 'Reason is in accordance with Nature. "What then," you ask, "is reason?" It is copying Nature.' (*Ep.* 66.39). As Stowers explains, very often the Stoics employed the terms "Nature" and "Reason" as well as "Law" and "Zeus" interchangeably: 'For the Stoics, the goal of life was to live by a set of perfectly consistent principles variously called the Law of Nature, the Common Law, Right Reason, or the will of Zeus.' S.K. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans, Justice, Jews and Gentiles* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1994) 109.

<sup>107</sup> For Stoics, animals live in accordance to the will of nature but not in a manner which demonstrates reason.

more than the result of incorrect reasoning, while the "campaigns" of Fortuna, must be met with right reason and its accompanying virtues.<sup>108</sup> While nature endows the human with certain impulses toward virtue or "seeds of knowledge", the role of nature as an instructor does not exceed this limit.<sup>109</sup> Happiness as a goal, hence, is only attainable by the conscious and laborious struggle of the rational development of these endowments towards virtue. Accordingly it is possible to develop human nature from a state of non-rationality (in youth) and automatic animal-like impulses, into an organism that is completely governed by right reason. Translated into action, this leads to a virtuous or morally perfected life in avoidance of the passions and in pursuit of the "ἀγαθόν" or ἀγαθὰ (good or goods), namely those moral attributes which lend to the growth, benefit or preservation of life in accordance to reason.<sup>110</sup> The primary "goods" are composed of the primary virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance, as well as admitting other moral virtues or attributes which in turn contribute to the primary goods or participate within them.

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<sup>108</sup> Concerning the military imagery and language employed by the Stoics to designate the sage's struggle vide part D, 'Militarized Stoic Endurance in Moral Warfare,' below.

<sup>109</sup> The role of "nature" as a universal principle of instruction (for the Gentiles) appears to be also re-echoed in the writings of Paul. Thus he can ask the Corinthians concerning the didactic role of φύσις: 'Does not Nature itself teach you (ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ διδάσκει) that is it shameful for a man to wear long hair, but if a woman has long hair it is her glory? For long hair is given to her as a covering.' (2 Cor. 11.14-15). Within his dialogue with an imaginary gentile, in his letter to the church at Rome (2.1-16), Paul suggests an identical function between the Mosaic Law (for the Jewish people) and Nature (for the Gentiles). Indeed he goes so far as to assert that the commandments of the Law are to be found within Nature: ' . . . . it is not those who hear the Law who are righteous in God's sight, but it is those who obey the Law who will be declared righteous. Indeed when gentiles who do not have the Law, do by Nature (φύσει) things required by the Law, they are a law unto themselves, even though they do not have the Law, since they show that the requirements are written on their hearts . . . . ' (Rom. 2.13-15). Nevertheless in the final analysis for Paul, both Law and Nature eventually belong to the realm of "flesh" understood in a pejorative sense with the universal principle of "sin." Law and Nature might reveal correct action, but do not empower the individual to attain it. Unlike the Stoic greater anthropocentric moral stress where the attainment of virtue in accordance with a life of reason involves the active involvement of individual merit, attainment and training, this enablement is completely a result of a divine intervention in the life of the individual believer through the indwelling, liberating, life-giving and guiding power of the Spirit of God, the possibility of life according to the law of the Spirit and the soteriological work of Jesus Christ (e.g. Rom. 8.1-17). Concerning the relationship between the Stoic and Pauline φύσις, vide J.N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (Leiden. E.J.Brill. 1961) 138-140.

<sup>110</sup> Those items which popular speech labeled as "good" were not necessarily accepted by the Stoic as "good". The Stoic "good" (or "goods") has reference both to the *animal* φύσεις or the *rational* φύσεις. That which contributes to the well-being, growth or conservation of animal or biological life, refers to the good of the animal φύσεις, while those goods which are beneficial, increase or conserve one's moral being, relate to the rational φύσεις. The two types of goods are different and distinct and represent a hierarchy of values. Strictly speaking, however, for the Stoics it is only those goods, which contribute to the rational φύσεις which can be considered as authentic goods, namely the moral goods. Accordingly, moral goods are only those which contribute or preserve life according to reason (or Nature), hence allowing one the possibility of becoming ontologically good, virtuous and happy. The opposite constitutes the Stoic *evil*. (κακόν), namely that which is harmful. Another ethical category within the Stoic system refers to the so-called moral indifferents. These in fact were held as morally neither good nor bad but simply as indifferent. These include wealth, health, beauty, fame etc.

Alternatively the primary "evils" correspond to the chief vices, folly, injustice, cowardice, intemperance and whatever contributes to them. Diogenes Laertius, in his discussion on Zeno, explains the difference between the Stoic "good" and "bad" in the following manner:

'Of things that are, some they say are good some are evil . . . . Goods comprise the virtues of prudence (φρόνησιν), justice (δικαιοσύνη) courage / manliness (ἀνδρείαν), temperance (σωφροσύνην) and all that which is virtue or participates in virtue, while the opposites of these are evil, namely folly, injustice, and all that which is a vice or participates in vice.' [Diog. L *LEP* 7.102].

While Nature points the soul towards moral perfection, and provides the basic ingredients towards its attainment, yet, it is important to note, in the light of the anthropocentric tone of Stoic ethics, that this work of moral perfection in the virtues, is not granted *gratis* by Nature. Rather, as Seneca explains to Lucilius, the acquisition of virtue and the development of the soul towards the good comes out of a conscious effort and art by the individual, through training, toil and struggle: 'For Nature does not bestow virtue, it is an art to become good.' (*Ep.* 90.45). The sage, then, because of his right-reasoned consistency, in action, in judgement, in knowledge, in behaviour and hence in harmony with universal nature / reason, becomes the paradigmatic standard of such a morally perfected or rational life of virtue, hence he alone is happy - *sola ratio beatum facit*:

'Virtue alone affords everlasting and peace-granting joy.' [Seneca *Ep.* 27.3].

'What then is peculiar to man? Reason. When this is right and has reached perfection, man's felicity is complete . . . . Reason alone brings man to perfection, Reason alone when perfected makes man happy . . . . This perfect reason is called virtue.' [Seneca *Ep.* 76.10].

' . . . . the happy life is not that which conforms to pleasure, but that which conforms to Nature . . . . ' [Seneca *Ep.* 94.8]

Conversely, being among all creatures a moral agent, the human can also act contrary to the will of nature and in conscious discord with right reason. Accordingly the human, uniquely, is endowed by nature to chose between the "ἀγαθόν" (good) or the "κακόν" (bad). In Stoic ethics the latter is not to be confused with ideas of innate wickedness but rather involves the choice of an imperfect moral life, which specifically means a rejection or erroneous use of reason, and hence of virtue,<sup>111</sup> in preference to following those irrational impulses, which are hostile and initially alien to the soul but which infiltrate it, weaken it, depress it, delude it and promote the growth of vice:

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<sup>111</sup> The sage's possession of reason and hence of a life according to virtue, necessarily endows him with knowledge of that which is "good" and that which is "bad" and that which is "indifferent."

'For all other things which arouse our desires, depress the soul and weaken it, and when we think they are uplifting the soul, they are merely puffing it up and cheating it with much emptiness.' [Seneca *Ep.* 76. 17].

Besides the moral categories of "good" and "bad" Stoic ethics also postulated a morally indifferent class of circumstances (ἀδιάφορα / indifferentia). These were generally external to the soul and were morally neutral *per se*, neither good nor bad and included such choices where possible between wealth and poverty, health and sickness, strength and weakness, life and death. In themselves the ἀδιάφορα do not contribute or detract from moral happiness which is only affected by the choice between virtue or vice.<sup>112</sup> concerning this Diogenes Laertius writes:

'Neutral (οὐδέτερα) (neither good nor evil that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a person: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like . . . . ' [Diog. L. *LEP* 7.102].

While the "indifferents" do not in themselves affect the life according to reason, yet one's attitude towards them, was paramount in contributing to the life according to reason, especially those which were considered as "rejected" (ἀποπροηγμένα)<sup>113</sup> - disease, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth and so forth. Here moral endurance played a key role.<sup>114</sup>

It should be obvious by now, that for the Stoics, the "goods" were identified with the "virtues" while the "bad" was likewise correspondent to the vices. This is summarized by the following Stoic maxim: 'only virtue is good and only vice is evil.'<sup>115</sup> Diogenes Laertius writes:

'Good (ἀγαθόν) in general is that from which some advantage comes and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue (ἀρετήν) itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good . . . . ' [Diog. L. *LEP* 7.101].

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<sup>112</sup> Beginning with Zeno, they were careful to distinguish however that the κακόν did not necessarily reflect those external hardships which were popularly conceived as "ills" such as death, poverty, ill-repute or sickness. These are *per se* morally indifferent. Likewise those things or events popularly conceived as "good" may in fact be morally indifferent. Stoic ethics postulated that while virtue was beneficial (ωφέλιμον), useful (χρήσιμον) and desirable, vice was bad (κακόν), harmful (βλαβερόν) and undesirable. On the other hand the morally indifferent or neutral items did not affect one's moral perfection, for they were in themselves neither good nor bad. Nevertheless where choice was possible they could be categorized into two categories - the preferred (προηγμένα) and those which might be rejected or relegated (ἀποπροηγμένα). Hence Zeno argued that as in a royal court only the king was *sui generis* in a class of his own, while the various courtiers had their own ranks of precedence, so too the good was unique but among those morally indifferent items some ought to be preferred. For example where choice existed wealth, health and beauty ought to be preferred over poverty, sickness and ugliness.

<sup>113</sup> Vide note above.

<sup>114</sup> Vide 'Stoic Ethics and Endurance,' below.

<sup>115</sup> Quoted from G. Reale, *The Systems of the Hellenistic Age*, ET J.R. Catan, (Albany, State Univ. New York Press, 1985) 265.

For the Stoics, the virtues are either primary (πρώτας) or subordinate (ὑποτεταγμένα) to the cardinal ones. Within this list endurance (καρτερία) is also listed as a subordinate virtue to courage (ἀνδρεία):<sup>116</sup>

'Among the virtues some are primary (πρώτας), some are subordinate) ὑποτεταγμένας) to these. The following are primary: wisdom / prudence (φρόνησιν), courage (ἀνδρείαν), justice (δικαιοσύνην) temperance (σωφροσύνην). Particular virtues are magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχίαν), self-control (ἐγκράτιαν), endurance (καρτερίαν), presence of mind (ἀγχίνοιαν), good counsel (εὐβουλίαν).' [Diog. L. *LEP* 7.92].

In keeping with their ethical doctrines, the Stoics developed corresponding anthropological systems. Accordingly while the early Stoa created an absolute two-fold anthropological structure - the "wise" (σοφός, sapiens) and the "foolish" (ἄμαθεῖς, stultus),<sup>117</sup> later expressions of Stoicism held a more dynamic view of the state of moral progress.<sup>118</sup> Thus they incorporated an intermediate class, within their anthropological system, namely those who are progressing towards virtue and happiness - the "progressing" (προκόπτοντες, *proficientes*), who hence could possess various degrees of moral happiness, in accordance within their moral progress.<sup>119</sup>

**ii. Stoic Ethics and Endurance as a Desirable Good and Virtue:** How then does the notion of moral endurance fit within the overall picture of Stoic ethics? Within Stoic systems of ethics in all epochs of the Stoa (Old, Middle and Late), moral endurance was considered as a key

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<sup>116</sup> Vide Stoic Ethics and Endurance,' below.

<sup>117</sup> Certainly within the early Stoa (no doubt inherited from early Cynicism) there appears to be no clear intermediate class between these two Stoic human categories. Fitzgerald explains: 'By insisting that the distinction between virtue and vice was absolute, members of the early Stoa placed a great gulf between the sage and everyone else. Allowing no room for an intermediate class . . . . ' *op. cit.* 56. Cicero re-echoes this Stoic sentiment when he writes: ' . . . . a man that has made some progress toward the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.' *Fin.* 3.14.48.

<sup>118</sup> Non-Stoics such as Plutarch found this early Stoic socio-ethical absolutism between the wise and the foolish and hence between virtue and vice (a position which continued in certain more conservative expressions of later Stoicism) as unrealistic, and wrote an entire treatise defending the possibility of gradual progress in virtue, *Progress in Virtue*. On the other hand, some modern scholars consider the early Stoa as representing a more optimistic anthropological view. For instance the early Stoics believed in the actual possibility for an ideal state where all would be wise (e.g. Zeno's *Republic*).

<sup>119</sup> Seneca thus writes the following diatribe to Lucilius: 'You reply: "What? Are there no degrees of happiness below your "happy" man? Is there a sheer descent immediately below wisdom?" I think not. For though he who makes progress (qui proficit) is still numbered with the fools yet he is separated from them by a long interval (stultorum).' *Ep. Mor.* 75.8. Seneca goes even further to distinguish between three categories of the proficiens (cf. Chryssipus and Epictetus, who only acknowledged the first two categories of the "progressors"): 'Among the very persons who are making progress there are also great spaces intervening. They fall into three classes, as certain philosophers believe.' (*Ep. Mor.* 75.8).

and characteristic concept.<sup>120</sup> While, for the most part, it was not included as one of the four Stoic "cardinal virtues" that is one of the four primary "goods" - wisdom, courage, justice and self-mastery nevertheless it was considered as the main subordinate virtue in the constitution of the cardinal virtue of courage (ἀνδρεία)! Its definition and applicability however tended to vary. The epistemological view of virtue, which characterized the earlier Stoa, was associated with the idea of knowledge. The sage's possession of reason, reflected by a life according to virtue, necessarily endows him with knowledge of that which is "good" and that which is "bad" and that which is to be rejected. Accordingly courage (ἀνδρεία) becomes a knowledge or a science (ἐπιστήμην) of determining what is fearful, what is not and what is neither fearful nor non-fearful (i.e. indifferent). Stobaeus explains: 'Courage (ἀνδρεία) is the science of what is fearful and what is not, as well as what belongs to neither category.' [Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.59.4; frag. 262 von Arnim *SVF* 3].

In this perspective, endurance *per se*, as a moral attribute, most usually expressed in Stoic virtue lists as καρτερία, and which is considered as a subordinate virtue of courage, is also understood in an epistemological perspective. It is understood as a knowledge of what one ought to hold fast to (to endure) and what not to put up with. Diogenes Laertius,<sup>121</sup> in his essay on Zeno, writes: ' . . . . endurance as a knowledge science or habit that suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent.' [Diog. L. *LEP* 7.93].

While not rejecting the epistemological dimensions of courage, another approach to this primary virtue, within the Old Stoa involved the notion of endurance. In that sense endurance

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<sup>120</sup> The Old Stoa refers to the foundational or earliest period of Stoicism. This phase of Stoicism is best represented by such sages as its founder, Zeno of Citium (B.C. 333-264), his successor Cleanthes (B.C. ca. 331-232) and Chryssipus of Tarsus / Soli (B.C. -202) the systematize of the Old Stoic philosophical system. The Middle Stoic period can be said to commence with Panaetius of Rhodes (B.C. ca. 180-110). This phase of Stoicism is characterized by a greater dependence on Plato and Aristotle than the earlier period. Perhaps the best known representative of this Middle Stoa is Posidonius (B.C.). Stoicism during the Roman imperial period is best represented by the Rome-based sages Seneca (B.C. 4-65) and Musonius Rufus the "Roman Socrates" (ca. A.D. 30-100) as well as the slave Epictetus (ca. A.D. 55-135) who founded a school in Nicopolis after being expelled from Rome by Domitian.

<sup>121</sup> Diogenes Laertius who lived in the first half of the third century (A.D.) wrote a biography of the most celebrated ancient philosophers in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.

becomes an integral aspect of wise courage hence fusing the two former military values into one cardinal virtue - brave endurance.

'For if a man be possessed of virtue, he is at once able to discover and to put into practice what he ought to do. Now such rules of conduct comprise of rules of choosing, enduring (ὕπομνητέα) persevering (ἐμμενητέα); so that if a man does some things by intelligent choice, some things with endurance (ὕπομνητικῶς), some with just distribution, some things with perseverance (ἐμμενητικῶς), he is at once wise, courageous, just and temperate . . . . courage is concerned with things that must be endured (ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰ ὑπομνητέα) . . . . ' [Diog. L. *LEP* 7.126].

In comparison to the cognitive and systematic presentation of courage and endurance in the Old Stoa, Greco-Roman Stoicism, while still associating courage and endurance, treated them, in their definitions and descriptions, in a considerably less theoretical and systematic manner and in a far livelier and dialogic style.<sup>122</sup> Stoic ethics are now far more practical and protreptic in character. While we find the same lists of primary and subordinate virtues they are now directed to a situational or psychagogic intent, and hence become more dramatic in their description. Seneca for instance addresses his list of virtues in a consistent didactic or psychagogic intent, namely the image of the much-enduring sage as a model of imitation for the *proficiens*. What is interesting in the ensuing list of virtues is the unique linkage between the vocabulary of endurance (*toleratio*) and love. In this instance however endurance is represented in its gentler form of patience:

'If we had the privilege of looking into a good man's soul, O what a fair, holy, magnificent, gracious, and shining face should we behold - radiant on the one side with justice and temperance, on another with bravery (*fortitudine*) and wisdom! And besides these, thriftiness, moderation, endurance (*tolerantia*), refinement, affability and . . . . love of one's fellow-men . . . . ' [Seneca *Ep.* 113.3].<sup>123</sup>

Likewise, the systematic and epistemological definitions of endurance in terms of wise and foolish endurance, are widened, in a pastoral manner, to emphasize the correct attitude to vice (the internal struggle) and the less preferred indifferents (the external struggle prompted by Fortune)<sup>124</sup> such as poverty, exile, ill-repute, toil, hardships, travel, sickness, old age and the like. Not infrequently, the idea of courage now tends to directly incorporate the notion of endurance. This is

<sup>122</sup> Certainly this would appear to be the trend in the presentation and discussion of Stoic ethics, at least from the extant attestations of the Old and Middle Stoa. It must be borne in mind that the vast majority of these writings are however lost.

<sup>123</sup> It is interesting that this Senecan list of virtues incorporates the notion of love., albeit as a subordinate virtue. This is one of the most rare instances where this gentle virtue is incorporated in Stoic virtue lists. This list coincides with two significant items of Paul's list of "virtues" or rather "fruits of the Spirit" in Gal. 5.22-23 - love and patience / long-suffering.

<sup>124</sup> Vide next section, 'Militarized Stoic Endurance in Moral Warfare.'



often the case in Seneca's *fortitudo* or brave endurance, and perhaps the most important essay, in this respect, is one of his letters to Lucilius, in which the notion of endurance is a central theme, namely *On Ill-Health and Endurance of Suffering* (*Ep.* 117), where Seneca underlines this consistent association between the two ancient Greek military virtues - courage and endurance - in his definition and understanding of ἀνδρεία / *fortitudo*. Here, as in one tradition of the ancient Stoa (as well as Plato), courage is defined precisely in terms of endurance. He also reveals several other elements of Stoic endurance. Seneca responds to a question posed by Lucilius concerning the desirability of every good (117.3). Perhaps in response to Seneca's, or like-minded Stoic's exhortation to pray for extreme hardships, Lucilius objects:

'If it is a good to be brave under torture, to go to the stake with a stout heart (*magno animo*), to endure illness with resignation (*patienter aegrotare*) it follows that these things are desirable. But I do not see that any of them is worth praying for. At any rate I have as yet known of no man who has paid a vow by reason of having been cut to pieces by the rod or . . . . made taller by the rack.' [*Ep.* 117.3].

Seneca, in response, explains that Lucilius is confusing two issues and failing to draw a distinction between courage and endurance as desirable virtues which enable one to face hardships, rather than the desirability of adverse circumstances *per se*. Indeed, Seneca would prefer not to undergo torture, war, wounds, starvation, illness. He does not desire such painful situations. Yet if they do occur they become opportunities to demonstrate a manly and noble endurance, for this is the desirable. Its absence would lead to effeminate conduct (*effeminate*, 1 17.4):

'My dear Lucilius you must distinguish between these cases., you will then comprehend that there is something in them that is desirable. I should prefer to be free from torture; but if the time comes that it must be endured (*sustinenda*) I shall desire to conduct myself with bravery (*fortiter*), honour, and courage (*animose geram*). Of course I prefer that war should not occur; but if war does occur, I should desire that I may nobly endure (*generose feram*) the wounds, the starvation, and all that the exigency of war brings. . . .'

'The conclusion is, not that hardships are desirable, but that virtue (*virtus*) is desirable, which enables us patiently to endure hardships (*qua perferuntur incommoda*).' [*Ep.* 117.3-4].

Lucilius' position appears to have represented a version of a standing intra-Stoic debate, concerning the desirability of "strong endurance" (*fortem tolerantiam*, *Ep.* 117.5), probably because of a similar lack of precision between circumstance and virtue itself. These other Lucilius-like (Roman?) Stoics considered such endurance as a non-desirable attribute because they did not

regard adverse circumstances as desirable, preferring and praying for less aggressive situations, and hence the absence of the necessity of the more robust virtues (though they accepted and admired courage, most likely in a strict epistemological sense). For them the need for endurance suggested that the sage is still entangled in circumstances of conflict and struggle rather than peace or serenity. Accordingly they prayed only for the good which was 'unalloyed, peaceful and beyond the reach of trouble' (117.5). For the Senecan brand of Stoicism, however (including Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius), the idea of the sage's tranquillity or serenity which does not necessarily preclude a continued state of conflict<sup>125</sup> - a situation which lent itself naturally to military and athletic metaphors<sup>126</sup> - meant that endurance occupied a central and desirable place. He argues that it is a "good" and hence an indispensable and most desirable moral virtue, which enables the sage to face hardships correctly (in accordance to nature / reason), that is in a manly fashion. Furthermore, he explains, since endurance is an integral aspect of courage (a desirable virtue which also suggests conflict and hardship), which enables one to stand firm and not shrink back from pain as well as enabling one to march into the possibility of wounds or the spear (unmistakable military illustrations of courageous endurance), it must be viewed as a desirable Stoic good or virtue. In this instance Seneca achieves this by merging both virtues into a synthetic one - **brave endurance**:

'Certain of our School think that, of all such qualities, a stout endurance (*fortem tolerantiam*) is not desirable, - though not to be deprecated either, - because we ought to seek by prayer only the good which is unalloyed, peaceful, and beyond the reach of trouble.

Personally I do not agree with them. And why? First because it is impossible for anything to be good without being also desirable. Because, again, if virtue is desirable and if nothing that is good lacks virtue, then everything good is desirable. And lastly because a brave endurance even under torture is desirable. At this point I ask you: Is not bravery desirable? And yet bravery despises and challenges danger. The most . . . . admirable part of bravery is that it does not shrink back from the stake, advances to meet wounds, and sometimes does not even avoid the spear, but meets it with opposing vigour .

If bravery is desirable so is patient endurance of torture, *for this is part of bravery* . . . . it is not mere endurance of torture, but brave endurance that is desirable. I therefore desire this "brave" endurance, (*pati fortiter*) and this is virtue. [Seneca *Ep.* 117.5-6].

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<sup>125</sup> Seneca however will argue that such a state of conflict need not mean that the sage could be injured, harmed or insulted, for he resides safe and secure in his lofty much-enduring "citadel" of reason. Vide *Constant.*, also 'Stoic Endurance and Moral Warfare,' in the ensuing chapter section.

<sup>126</sup> Vide 'Militaryized Stoic Endurance and Moral Warfare,' below.

The desirability of endurance as a moral virtue is also explained by the understanding of hardships as "indifferents" and as an aspect of the cosmic order. From a narrow individualistic perspective pain and suffering may be seen as undesirable and perhaps even as "unnatural". However viewed from the perspective of universal λόγος, or φύσις, hardship or suffering, brought about by adverse circumstances, need not be perceived as a negative experience detracting from moral "happiness". From this viewpoint, hardship is ethically indifferent and *per se* does not contribute nor detract from virtue, though for the Stoic they may provide an opportunity for moral growth. As Seneca explains *calamitas virtutis occasio est* ("disaster is virtue's opportunity") (On *Prov.* 4.6). From a cosmic vantage point suffering is not an accidental event or phenomenon and has its functional part in the cosmic scheme of things since it eventually accords with universal Nature and its well-being - it is only the non-rational and evil which is contrary to Nature.<sup>127</sup> Accordingly a Stoic *proficiens* such as Lucilius, must learn to view his hardship from a cosmic and non-egocentric perspective. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the Stoic emperor,<sup>128</sup> explains the matter in the following manner:

'Welcome everything that happens even if it seems harsh, because it contributes to the health of the universe and the well-faring and well-being of Zeus. For he would not have brought this on a man unless it had been advantageous to the whole.' [Marcus Aur. 5.8].

<sup>127</sup> The problem of the existence of "evil", as an irrational phenomenon, within the Stoic ethical system has been variously resolved. Does "evil" also accord, from a cosmic dimension, with the will of Nature? For Cleanthus evil does not originate from God, yet even this disharmony and discord can eventually be harmonized by God: 'Nothing occurs on earth apart from you O God, nor in the heavenly regions nor on the sea, except what bad men do in their folly; but you know how to make the odd even, and to harmonize what is dissonant . . . . And so you have brought together into one all things that are good and bad, so that there arises one eternal Reason (λόγος) of all things, which all bad mortals shun and ignore . . . . ' *Hymn to Zeus* lines 11-18. As Long observes (*op. cit.* 181), Epictetus some four centuries after Cleanthus makes a similar point though now rephrased. 'Zeus has ordained that there be summer, and winter, plenty and poverty, virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the sake of the harmony of the whole.' [Disc. 1.12.16].

<sup>128</sup> Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121 - 180) was Roman emperor (A.D. 161-180) and a Stoic philosopher. His tutors in rhetoric and poetry included Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius Fronto. He embraced Stoicism as a result of Diognetus and continued to practice it till his death. His memorable *Meditations*, which were composed in Greek and dominated by his Stoic *weltanschauung*, were intended as "private devotional memoranda" or what he describes as ὑπομνημάτια (3.14). Vide C.R. Haines (ed. & trans.), *The Communings With Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Emperor of Rome, Together With His Speeches and Sayings*, LCL (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1987), xi. While he was benevolent to philosophers, and by all accounts a gentle man, his attitude to Christians was nevertheless hostile. He does share some points of affinity in his brand of Stoicism, with Seneca. Like Seneca's epistolary corpus, his writings are not intended as systematic treatises on Stoic ethics; both Stoics share an admiration for Epicurus. Nevertheless as Haines points out, the Stoic emperor was not writing out of protreptic or pastoral motivations, rather on a purely subjective level, he was "reasoning with his own soul....against the persecutions and impulses of the flesh;" his view of the soul did not share in Seneca's understanding of its immortality (*Ep.* 54.102); furthermore we find none of the contradictions that one finds in Seneca, *ibid.* xiii, xxvi.

A further dimension in Seneca's treatment of endurance, concerns its transparency. For Seneca, moral endurance is the one virtue, which is the most manifest or visible: 'When one endures torture bravely, one is using all the virtues. Endurance may perhaps be the only virtue that is on view and most manifest . . . . ' [Ep. 67.9]. As a consequence of its key position within the Stoic ethical system, Stoic endurance would become proverbial, even being incorporated into what might well have been popular Stoic slogans, as for instance preserved by Aulus Gellius,<sup>129</sup> intended for all to follow - sage, proficiens and the masses - which seem to be alluding to the need for endurance in both inner and outer struggles: 'Endure within and endure without (ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου)' [Notes Atticae 17.19].

#### *D. Militarized Stoic Endurance in Moral Warfare*

**i. The Stoic Sage's Life as Warfare:** The later Stoics, and in particular Seneca, employed illustrations and metaphors from various spheres of Greco-Roman civilization - agricultural,<sup>130</sup> architectural,<sup>131</sup> athletic,<sup>132</sup> medical,<sup>133</sup> travel,<sup>134</sup> zoological.<sup>135</sup> Yet it is clear that military language, concepts and metaphors are more frequently and more systematically employed in the service of Stoic ethics. To begin with, Seneca describes himself as a "soldier" and the Stoic school as a "military camp" (*Helv.* 5.2-3).<sup>136</sup> Alternatively he can describe the Stoic sage as a "general" in enemy territory (*Constant.* 4.3). Likewise the *proficiens* on the road to virtue is like a soldier who has enlisted under a "military oath" (*sacramento, Ep.*, 37.1). His is a manly and

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<sup>129</sup> Aulus Gellius (ca.) A.D. 130-180, the author of the multi-tomed *Notes Atticae*. His education was in Rome and he was a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, indeed both shared the friendship of Fronto. In Athens he attended the lectures of Calvenus Taurus, a period of his life which he subsequently recorded in literature. His major work, *Notes Atticae* consisted of multifarious topics including philosophy, law, history, literary criticism. For an introductory discussion vide, *OCD* 459-450.

<sup>130</sup> E.g. Seneca *Ep.* 39.4, *Ep.* 41.7.

<sup>131</sup> E.g. Seneca, *Ep.* 52.5.

<sup>132</sup> I discuss athletic metaphors of endurance within philosophic and martyrological texts respectively in the ensuing two chapters (i.e. 3 & 4).

<sup>133</sup> I discuss athletic metaphors of endurance within philosophic and martyrological texts respectively in the ensuing two chapters (i.e. 3 & 4).

<sup>134</sup> E.g. Seneca *Ep.* 44.7, *Ep.* 45.1, *Ep.* 49.12. Vide discussion in Introduction of present study, 3-6.

<sup>135</sup> E.g. Seneca *Ep.* 41.6, *Ep.* 42.4.

<sup>136</sup> In this section I mainly draw upon the writings of the Stoic sage Seneca, a contemporary of the apostle Paul.

not an easy sort of "soldiering" (*Ep.* 37.1).<sup>137</sup> The sage's virtues and exercise of reason become his "weapons" and his "impregnable fortress" (*Ep.* 113.27, 28). Indeed in another of his letters of advice to Lucilius (*Ep.* 96.6), Seneca formulates a classical Stoic maxim, in which he depicts and interprets the entire life of the sage through the metaphoric prism of warfare, when he declares that "life is warfare" (*vivere militare est*). In *Ep.* 101,<sup>138</sup> Seneca provides a longer version of this maxim, by explaining to Lucilius that the sage's life is like an unceasing warfare: 'We too have a war to wage (*nobis quoque militandum*), a type of warfare in which there is allowed no rest or furlough.' [*Ep.* 101.].

In other instances Seneca describes the sage's life in terms of a permanent military "siege" (*Ep.* 113), or even as a series of "campaigns" (*Ep.* 93.4). He faces all kinds of "weapons" (*Ep.* 36.8), though "arrows" (*Constant.* 3.5) and "missiles" hurled from "catapults" (*Constant.* 4.7) are specifically mentioned. His death is designated as his "honourable discharge" (*Ep.* 32.5), while in life no "discharge" is possible (*Ep.* 37.2).

Given this predilection towards military metaphors, what then is the impact of military endurance and the accompanying "combat" motif upon the Stoic understanding of moral endurance? Seneca's description of the sage's endurance in the face of hardships is quite frequently depicted as a "combat" in which the Stoic as "warrior" must demonstrate endurance (and bravery) in the course of the various "assaults" and "spearthrusts" (*Ep.* 18.11) of circumstances, Fortuna or the passions. As in the case of the Cynic "warfare," two types of moral "combat" situations constitute the image of the Stoic sage as "warrior" in whom endurance is a pre-requisite moral attribute: (i) the external combat against Fortuna or circumstances of hardships, and (ii) the sage's internal "warfare" against the various "assaults" of the diverse hostile vices which infiltrate and destroy the soul (passions, desires, greed, ambition, fear of death),<sup>139</sup> which by the exercise of

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<sup>137</sup> Seneca in one instance employs an image of wisdom presented as an "archer" (*sagittarius*, *Ep.* 29.3).

<sup>138</sup> *On Baiae and Morals*.

<sup>139</sup> Strictly speaking, according to Stoicism, vices are not originally inherent aspects of the created soul, but alien invaders which eventually infiltrated and occupied it, and dominate it. At the point of birth the individual soul is innocent, without desire and fear (e.g. *Ep.* 22.15). By straying from the order ordained by "nature" vice infiltrates the soul and corrupts it, stifling the seeds of virtue (*Ep.* 108.8).

reason (i.e. a life in accordance to the principles of nature) as a mighty fortress remains "lofty" and "unconquerable" (VB 7.3).

**ii. The Stoic Sage as Much-Enduring Warrior in his "External" Combat Against the Assaults of Fortuna:** As I have mentioned above, the Stoic idea (already evident in Aristotle), of the sage's struggle with Fortune (Τύχη), found a natural literary and conceptual vehicle of expression in the metaphoric use of the military notion of "warfare." Fortune thus is rendered and personified as the sage's (i.e. the "happy man's") militant "enemy" who embarks on various "assaults" and employing all types of "weapons." In this *contra fortunam militaturis* however, the authentic sage remains unscathed, invincible and unshaken when Fortune hurls "the deadliest missile in her armoury." Such missiles may graze the sage but never wound him. While Fortune missiles conquer mankind in general, they are ineffective against the sage. Furthermore for Seneca this battle against Fortune, cannot be avoided. It is the inevitable destiny of the sage. Thus in describing the uselessness of subtle dialectics or logic for the major issues facing the sage, namely the battle with Fortune, he explains that such measures provide no effective "weapons:" 'I am ashamed to say what weapons they supply to men who are destined to go to war with Fortune (*contra fortunam militaturis*), and how poorly they equip them.' [Ep. 48.10].

It is not surprising therefore, given the prominence of military metaphors in the later Stoic description of the sage's demeanor and attitude to external circumstances of hardship, to find the concept of endurance also incorporated. It made sense. Not only did it recall its original social matrix, and hence its ideological continuity with a philosophic tradition which is first clearly noticed within Democritus and in Plato's *Laches*,<sup>140</sup> and developed metaphorically with Antisthenes and the Cynics, but it also served to emphasize and plainly illustrate various aspects of the character of the sage's struggle. For this reason the literary presentation of a substantial portion of the expression of moral endurance,<sup>141</sup> in situations of external hardships, brought about by the diverse adverse circumstances of Fortuna, appears within the Stoic tradition preserved by

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<sup>140</sup> Vide diachronic sections of this chapter.

<sup>141</sup> As I have already explained, within Stoic ethics (following Plato) the idea of moral endurance was considered a sub-category of the virtue of courage. Its association of with courage further revealed its original military matrix.

Seneca,<sup>142</sup> in military language and metaphors.<sup>143</sup> Like the Cynic sage so, too, the Stoic is rendered figuratively as a much-enduring warrior!<sup>144</sup> In his *Helv.* he describes the Stoic school as a "military camp," the Stoic sage as a "soldier" and himself as an obedient "guard." In this camp the other "soldiers" (i.e. the Stoic sages) have demonstrated sure endurance against Fortuna's attacks. Seneca, the new "warrior" is now ordered to imitate them by vigilantly "standing guard" and anticipating the various imminent "assaults" of Fortuna (which in the metaphor incorporate the idea of the enemy's covertness and stealth), before she strikes:

I have taken refuge in the camp [i.e. the Stoic movement] of others - of those, clearly, who can easily defend themselves and their followers. They have ordered me to stand ever watching, like a soldier placed on guard and to anticipate all the attempts and all the assaults of Fortune long before she strikes.' [*Helv.* 5.2.3].

The theme of the much-enduring vigilant guard continues in *Ep.* 36, which deals with the value of retirement or withdrawal from worldly affairs and honours in the pursuit of wisdom and tranquillity.<sup>145</sup> Seneca exhorts Lucilius to advise his friend who has undertaken such a decisive and bold step to prove to his detractors the value of such action (36.1). Prosperity simply puffs up

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<sup>142</sup> Seneca's usage of military metaphors, incorporating notions of endurance in the "war" against Fortune, were drawn eclectically from Hellenistic philosophy, including Stoic and Cynic. Seneca claimed to be in continuity with the teachings of such early Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes or Chryssipus, as well as later Stoics such as Panaetius and his pupil Posidonius, among whose names he also includes and identifies himself as "we Stoics" (*Ep.* 33.4). Nevertheless, from the available textual evidence, it would seem to me that Seneca's predilection with military metaphors to describe the sage's warfare with Fortuna, and in particular the need to use one's own virtues as "weapons" in this warfare, appears to have been, in part at least, influenced by Posidonius, who arrived in Rome from Rhodes ca. B.C. 87 and whose ethical system influenced several generations of Roman thinkers including Lucretius, Cicero, Pliny the Elder (as well as Seneca). Thus in one of his letter-essays (*Ep.* 113.28, Seneca quotes directly from a Posidonian text wherein the sage is exhorted to "fight" Fortuna not with the "weapons" that she supplies but rather with his own "weapons." Having defined bravery as an "impregnable fortress" which surrounds the sage, and which with his endurance can "hold out" any "siege" since he is using his own 'weapons," Seneca at this point lends support to his argument by quoting from Posidonius: ' . . . . I would quote you from Posidonius: "There are never any occasions when you need think yourself safe because you wield the weapons of Fortune; fight with your own! Fortune does not furnish arms against herself; hence men equipped against their foes are unarmed against Fortune herself.'" Another source of inspiration in Seneca's military metaphors (which also include notions of endurance) appears also to have been influenced by Stilbo whom he is fond of quoting. From the extant Senecan fragments it would seem that Stilbo, the Megarian philosopher, (B.C. 4th cent.), taught about calm endurance in hardship (*Constant.* 6.3) and the incomparable endurance of the firmly-fixed soul, which unlike a fortress wall which can be shaken by the besieging forces' "battering ram," no "war-engine" can make shake. Such is its strength and endurance (*Constant.* 6.4).

<sup>143</sup> Seneca also uses other martial imagery to express this struggle between the sage and Fortune. I deal with Stoic athletic imagery and endurance in ch. 3 & 4. When Seneca is not using military or martial imagery to denote the sage's struggle with Fortune, he may refer to the need to "rise above" Fortune etc.

<sup>144</sup> There are however differences between the Stoic and Cynic depiction of military metaphors. For one thing endurance figures more prominently than courage.

<sup>145</sup> *On the Value of Retirement.*

(36.1). What this young man must do is to continue to aspire and cherish moral virtue (36.4). He is to bring the spirit within him to a state of constancy of attitude which remains unaffected by hardship or can rise superior to wealth (36.6). Accordingly in his pursuit of philosophy he must learn contempt of death which arms him against all "weapons" and "foes" (36.8). By learning such a contempt for death, the *proficiens* and indeed the sage, is like a much-enduring and vigilant "soldier" on "guard" in the "trenches" on alert, even if "wounded," against the "foe:"

To what then, shall this friend of yours devote his attention? I say, let him learn that which is helpful against all weapons, against every kind of foe - contempt of death . . . . No one learns a thing, in order that, if necessity arises, he may lie down with composure upon a bed of roses; rather he steels his courage to this end - that he may not surrender his plighted faith to torture, and that if need be, he may some day stay out his watch in the trenches, even though wounded, without even leaning on his spear; because sleep is likely to creep over men who support themselves by any prop . . . . ' [Ep. 36.8-9].

For Seneca, the flight of time is swift and hence must be used properly (Ep. 49.5). Accordingly he advises Lucilius not to waste time in superfluous pursuits such as lyric poetry and dialectics (49.5-6). To illustrate his advice he draws from the world of the military (49.6-9). A soldier when war erupts around him has no time to pick up trifles (49.6), no time for matters non-military. Likewise, Seneca has no time to waste on disputed inflections of words (49.7). As a "warrior" he needs to concentrate on the battle, to hear the "din of battle" and to respond with endurance (without flinching):

When a soldier is undisturbed and traveling at his ease, he can hunt for trifles along his way; but when the enemy is closing in on the rear, and a command is given to quicken the pace, necessity makes him throw away everything which he picked up in moments of peace and leisure. I have no time to investigate disputed inflections of words or to try my cunning upon them . . . . I need a stout heart to hear without flinching the din of battle . . . . ' [Ep. 49.6-7].

For Stoics like Seneca, the journey towards wisdom, or in other words the life of (Stoic) philosophy, did not wait for those who procrastinated, putting off the decision until after they have attained to a certain level of material comfort first, as he elaborates in his letter dealing with philosophy and the dangers of riches (Ep 17.8). A *proficiens* like Lucilius is to cast all obstacles out of his way, especially those pertaining to material possessions (Ep. 17.1). Unlike riches, for Seneca poverty possesses a distinct advantage, for the one aspiring to wisdom (Ep. 17.3). The life of poverty seeks very little and is affected by little (Ep. 17.4). Peace of mind and study which are the pre-suppositions of philosophy cannot be attained without voluntary poverty (Ep. 17.5).



Lucilius' concerns for further material acquisition are therefore a waste of time in his decision to follow philosophy (*Ep.* 17.5-6, 8). Poverty teaches endurance of hunger which is a pre-requisite of the life of the sage (*Ep.* 17.6). Seneca then draws an illustration of endurance in want from the world of the warrior (*Ep.* 17.7). The much-enduring warrior suffers all kinds of deprivation for the sake of attaining territory for another. The sage like the much-enduring warrior must also learn to live in deprivation, and hence must also be much-enduring. His prize however is greater, for he does not fight for another but rather for his own freedom from confusion and a troubled mind:

There is no reason why poverty should call us away from philosophy, no, not even actual want. For when hastening after wisdom, we must endure (*tolerando*) even hunger. Men have endured hunger when their towns were besieged, and what other reward for their endurance did they obtain than that they did not fall under the conqueror's power? How much greater is the prize of everlasting liberty . . . . Armies have endured all manner of want, have lived on roots, and have resisted hunger by means of food too revolting to mention. All this they have endured to gain a kingdom, and . . . . a kingdom that will be another's. Will any man hesitate to endure poverty, in order that he may free his mind from madness?' [*Ep.* 17.6-7].

Another associated aspect of the image of the warrior's endurance employed by the Stoics is that of military training (*exerceas*, ἄσκησις). This is especially evident in one of his psychagogic letters which deals with the theme of festivals and fasting.<sup>146</sup> Seneca explains to Lucilius that he as a *proficiens* ought to take advantage of the times of "external peace," that is in periods when Fortune has eased her violent assaults upon him. This period of voluntary fasting provides him with necessary time and opportunity for on-going training or exercise in endurance. In this, Seneca draws a parallel with military life. The *proficiens* is like a soldier, who in times of peace when no enemy is attacking, strengthens his fortitude through military training so that in an actual battle setting he will stand his ground and not flinch:

I am so determined, however, to test the constancy of your mind . . . . It is precisely in times of immunity from care that the soul should toughen itself beforehand for occasions of greater stress, and it is while Fortune is kind that it should fortify itself against her violence. In days of peace the soldier performs manoeuvres, throws up earthworks with no enemy in sight, and wearies himself by gratuitous toil, in order that he may be equal to unavoidable toil. If you would not have a man flinch when the crisis comes, train him (*exerceseas*) before it comes.' [*Ep.* 18.6].

An important essay relevant to the present discussion is his *Constant.*<sup>147</sup> In this essay, in which Seneca addresses Serenus, he deals at length with the notion of the firmly-fixed soul which

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<sup>146</sup> *On Festivals and Fasting*, that is, *Ep.* 18.

<sup>147</sup> The full Latin title is *De Constantia Sapientis* (Concerning the Constancy of the Sage). Inconsistency of action and thought was considered to be the sign of moral weakness, a soul in turmoil belonging to a flatterer, a coward, rather than that of the serene, brave and much-enduring sage. For a discussion of this notion vide Marshall, *op. cit.*

is characteristic of the Stoic sage and which can suffer no injury or insult by the attacks of Fortune:<sup>148</sup> 'The wise man is safe and no injury or insult can touch him.' (*Constant.* 2.3). In this essay Seneca makes extensive use of military metaphors. Such a soul displays bravery and unyielding endurance, and therefore is enabled to bear the diverse circumstances of attacks which Fortuna brings, calmly, without injury or insult. Seneca offers the example of the Megarian Stilbo, who while losing all his material possessions at the hands Fortune, namely through an invading foreign army, considered himself unconquered, unharmed, without loss (5.6), having "wrested victory from the conqueror" (5.7). Stilbo demonstrates more courage and endurance than a heroic warrior:

'When Demetrius . . . . had captured Megara, he questioned Stilbo, a philosopher to find out whether he had lost anything . . . . "Nothing; I have all that is mine with me." Yet his estate had been given up to plunder, his daughters had been outraged by the enemy, his native city had passed under foreign sway, and the man himself was being questioned by a king on his throne ensconced amid the arms of his victorious army. But he wrested the victory from the conqueror' [*Constant.* 5.6-7].

The wise man is beyond the attacks of Fortune whether through war, the economy, politics or other circumstances (6.7) Among the attributes which such a sage displays is brave endurance. Quoting from Stilbo (6.3-9) Seneca wants to show that amid the assaults of Fortune the sage displays calm endurance (6.3) because he knows he cannot lose anything:

"There is no reason why you should doubt that a mortal man raise himself above his human lot, that he can view with unconcern pains and losses, sores and wounds....can endure hardship calmly and prosperity soberly, neither yielding to the one nor trusting the other., that he can remain unchanged amid the diversities of Fortune . . . . ' [*Constant.* 6.3]

Fortune can only claim that which belongs to her. The virtues cannot be lost (6.3). His defence system, that is his endurance in all attacks and weapons against his soul is unshakable: 'fortifications shaken by battering-rams may totter . . . . and earthwork rise to match the loftiest citadel, yet no war engine can be devised that will shake the firm-fixed soul.' (*Constant.* 6.4). The sage's inner endurance and strength, because of his virtues, are therefore greater than any human

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78-90. It is interesting that in the face of various accusations associated with his inconsistency, the apostle Paul, responds in 2 Cor. in terms of his "great endurance" (6.3-10 & 11.1-12.12). Vide ch. 5.

<sup>148</sup> Seneca uses Serenus' indignation at the outrages suffered by Cato (1.3), for the Romans, as his launching point. He structurally divides his essay into two parts: (i) 3.1 - 9.5 which deals with the issue of the invincibility and protection of the sage from injury, and (ii) 10.1 foll. which deals, in similar fashion, with the idea of insult.

military fortifications - Babylon's walls (6.8), Carthage's or Numantia's ramparts (6.8) or even Rome's Capitol (6.8):

'Know therefore Serenus, that this perfect man, full of virtues, human and divine, can lose nothing. His goods are girt about by strong and insurmountable defences. No Babylon's walls, which an Alexander entered, are to be compared with these, not the ramparts of Carthage or Numantia both captured by one man's hand not the Capitol or citadel of Rome - upon them the enemy has left his mark. The walls which guard the wise man are safe from both flame and ass . . . . . lofty, impregnable . . . . . ' [*Constant.* 6.8].

The sage relying on reason and hence his virtues, is like a warrior who "marches" through mortal vicissitudes. Fortune is inevitably "outmatched" by virtue. The virtuous sage can withstand even the ultimate force of Fortune's assault - death. Accordingly any catalogue of attempts by Fortune to "overwhelm" or "encompass" him, in comparison, can be easily endured:

'The man who relying on reason, marches through mortal vicissitudes has no vulnerable spot where can receive an injury. . . . . Not even from Fortune, who, whenever she has encountered virtue, has always left the field outmatched. If that supreme event, beyond which outraged laws and the most cruel masters have nothing with which to threaten us and in which Fortune uses up all her power, is met with calm and unruffled mind . . . . . we shall much more easily endure (*tolerabimus*) all other things - losses and pain, disgrace, changes of abode, bereavements and separations. These things cannot overwhelm the wise man, even though they all encompass him at once, still less does he grieve when they assault him singly. And if he endures (*fert*) composedly the injuries of Fortune, how much the more will he endure those of powerful men whom he knows to be merely the instruments of Fortune.' [*Constant.* 8.3].

While reason is attributed as the cause for his impregnable endurance in *Constant.*, Seneca clearly explains in *Ep.* 113.27 that one virtue in particular enables the wise man to show such endurance; it is *fortitudo*. Here again the sage's attributes in his war with Fortune reflect the heroic warrior's: 'And what is Fortitude (*fortitudo*)? It is the impregnable fortress for our mortal weaknesses. When a man has surrounded himself therewith, he can endure / hold out . . . . . life's siege, for he is using his own strength and his own weapons.' [*Ep.* 113.27].

In short, therefore, for Stoics such as Seneca, one of the manifestations of the firmly-fixed soul, that is of the sage's *constantia*, is his life according to reason or Nature. Such a life permits the development of a noble soul, that is a soul which is imbued with the various moral virtues, hence raising it above the mortal to a lofty height, equal to the gods. Any attacks by Fortune, any weapons hurled by her, including her most potent ones, which in effect are more impressive than any of Alexander's charges, come to nothing since they either fall short of their target or else if they should strike, meet with massive, indeed impregnable resistance or defence, since among the virtues at the sage's disposal are moral courage and endurance. These become the unshakable

fortifications of the sage, more powerful and more resistant than Babylon's walls or Carthage's ramparts. As a result he can experience neither injury nor insult nor grief. Any breaches or destruction in the sage's fortifications or ramparts, clearly suggest a flawed soul, a soul which is not firmly-fixed, a soul which is not fully living in accordance to reason or Nature, a soul which is not imbued with virtues, lacking especially in courage and endurance. Such a person is not relying upon his own inner strength, but rather is relying in part upon Fortune's weapons. Accordingly his fortifications are brittle. Expressed in a warrior motif, Seneca would explain that his armour is unable to resist external attacks. In short he is not a much-enduring sage. Here we find all the elements which constitute one of the primary Stoic virtues, *fortitudo* - the power of endurance, courage and firmness (constancy).

**iii. The Exhortation to Stand Firm in Battle:** In his *Ep.* 29, after volunteering to endure Marcellinus' taunts in order to convert him to philosophy,<sup>149</sup> Seneca now turns his psychagogic attention to Lucilius, offering him advice as one who has already progressed substantially in virtue, but who nevertheless suffers from certain fears - whether real or imaginary. He exhorts him in military language, reminiscent of a commander's pre-battle or mid-battle *cri de guerre*.<sup>150</sup> Lucilius appears to be in a situation of danger, where his life is apparently under some threat. Seneca exhorts the classical "military" virtues - courage and endurance! Lucilius is as a warrior in battle in a "Thermopylae"-like situation, that is in a narrow pass, and as the Spartan warriors, he too is to "be courageous" and "stand firm" in the face of his present danger and fear which he is experiencing:

' . . . . do you in the meantime, who are able, and who understand from where and to where you have made your way, and who for that reason, have an inkling of the distance you have to go, regulate your character, rouse your courage and stand firm in the face of things which have terrified you. Do not count the number of those who impose fear in you. Would you not regard as foolish he who was afraid of a multitude in a place where only one at a time could pass? Just so there are not many who have access to you to slay you, though there are many who threaten you with death.' [*Ep.* 29.9]

**iv. Inner Warfare Within the Person:** As with the Cynics, so too the Stoics recognize a second front in the sage's "warfare." Here too military metaphors and language abounds. In this

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<sup>149</sup> Vide discussion in previous section.

<sup>150</sup> As I have previously pointed out, this genre of moral exhortation was also employed by Cynic sages to their disciples. Vide 'The Cynic Sage as Much-Enduring Warrior,' above.

battle the vices or passions are depicted as an inner opponent (cf. Fortuna), "waging war" or "hostility" against the virtuous life, that is life according to Nature, and hence threaten the soul: 'Virtue is according to Nature, vice is opposed to it and hostile.' (*Ep. 50.9*). Accordingly various aspects of war are found in Seneca's description of the inner enemy.<sup>151</sup> In the military world, peace is only possible when the enemy is checked, so too is the condition of the soul which guided by reason can check the various inner enemies, especially leisure. Living in a quiet abode need not result in inner peace for the soul which may still be tormented by the passions or emotions. However, similar to the tactics of great generals, who when faced with imminent mutiny among their soldiers keep them in check by toil and forays, the sage too, guided by his general - reason - does not yield to mutinous desires, such as leisure, but keeps himself busy:

' . . . . . no real rest can be found when reason has not done the lulling . . . . . Real tranquillity is the state reached by an unperverted mind when it is relaxed . . . . . the unfortunate man . . . . . complains that he has heard sounds when he has not heard them . . . . . His soul is in an uproar. It must be soothed and its rebellious murmurings checked. You need not suppose that the soul is at peace when the body is still. Sometimes quiet means disquiet . . . . . Great generals, when they see that their men are mutinous, check them by some sort of labour or keep them busy with small forays . . . . . the evils of leisure can be shaken off by hard work.' [*Ep. 56.6-9*].

Like a military enemy, the vices may "creep" into the heart under disguise or camouflage of virtue, for according to the Stoics the vices are alien to the soul. Among the various inner enemies threatening and facing the *proficiens*, the Stoics list material wealth, the fear of death,<sup>152</sup> pleasure, comfort, anger, grief. Indeed material prosperity is described as insolent enemy: 'This is the case with the soul . . . . . for it is ruined by uncontrolled prosperity . . . . . What enemy was ever so insolent to any opponent as are their pleasures . . . . . ?' (*Ep 39.4-5*). The inner war is far more perilous than physical warfare and demands a far greater form of courage, endurance and wisdom. Seneca accordingly explains that while the much-enduring and courageous Alexander was one of the greatest military conquerors of the Orient, who subdued kings and nations, nevertheless he was

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<sup>151</sup> Seneca also uses medical imagery to depict the cancerous action of vice on the soul (e.g. *Ep. 50.4*). Medical imagery in the employment of philosophy was quite widespread in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times. Vide, J. Xenakis, *Epictetus, Philosopher-Therapist* (The Hague, 1969), M. Nussbaum, 'Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle,' in *The Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics*, M. Schofield & G. Striker (eds.), (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986) 31-74. Concerning the employment of medical imagery in the New Testament vide, A. Malherbe, 'Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles,' in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* A. Malherbe (Minneapolis, Fortress press, 1989) 121 -136.

<sup>152</sup> I treat fear of death in the section on the martyr's "military" endurance.

hopelessly defeated and conquered by his own emotions - anger and grief (*Ep.* 113.29). In the inner war Alexander lacked endurance, courage and self-control and hence was no match for the more powerful inner enemy - his emotions:

'Alexander to be sure, harried and put to flight the Persians, the Hyrcanians, the Indians, and all the other races that the Orient spreads even to the Ocean. But he himself as he slew one friend or lost another, would lie in the darkness lamenting sometimes his crime, and sometimes his loss, he the conqueror of so many kings and nations was laid low by anger and grief! For he had made it his aim to win control over everything except his emotions.' [113.29].

In order that victory be attained over these vices it is necessary that the *proficiens* wage war upon them and "fight." This "battle," Seneca advises Lucilius, needs assistance, namely the advice of the ancient sages: 'You may be sure that this refractory nature, which demands much toil, has been implanted in us . . . . So let us fight, and call to our assistance some helpers . . . . the ancients . . . .' (*Ep.* 52.7). In his *Ep.* 51, Seneca advises Lucilius that in this inner battle against the vices, there can be no rest or furlough. The combat must be incessant. Indeed various necessary attributes are exhorted. Among them is endurance, that is the power not to surrender or yield to the passions, especially pleasure, for if one does then one effectively surrenders to pain, toil and poverty. Seneca explains that the great Carthaginian commander, Hannibal, was defeated in battle precisely because of his momentary pampering in winter at Campania, which took away his vigour. He conquered with his weapons but was in turn conquered by his own passions. It is necessary to fight pleasure and the other vices. There can therefore be no surrender (i.e. absence of endurance) to vices and pleasure, no "giving up the war." Such surrender or slackening in the "war effort" would be considered as shameful effeminate conduct:

'A single winter relaxed Hannibal's fibre. His pampering in Campania took the vigour out of that hero who had triumphed over Alpine snows. He conquered with his weapons, but was conquered by his vices. We too have a war to wage, a type of warfare in which there is allowed no rest or furlough. To be conquered, in the first place, are pleasures, which as you see have carried off even the sternest characters . . . . there must be no dainty or effeminate conduct.'

'Suppose we do what Hannibal did - check the course of events, give up the war . . . . And we have even less right to do this than those followers of the Carthaginian flag. For our danger is greater than theirs if we slacken, and our toil is greater . . . . The soul is not to be pampered, surrendering to pleasure means also surrendering to pain, surrendering to toil, surrendering to poverty. Both ambition and anger will wish to have the same rights over me as pleasure, and I shall be torn asunder, or rather pulled to pieces, amid all these conflicting passions. I have set freedom before my eyes.' [*Ep.* 51.5-9].

The brave and much-enduring soldier is brought up in rough regions rather than the cities, where he receives no pampering or pleasures. Likewise the one on the road to wisdom ought to

live in a plain abode, avoiding luxuries and pamperings which weaken the soul and its resistance in the course of the war against pleasure:

'Therefore, a man occupied with such reflections should choose an austere and pure dwelling-place. The spirit is weakened by surroundings that are too pleasant, and without doubt one's place of residence can contribute towards impairing its vigour . . . . The bravest soldier comes from rock-ribbed regions, but the town-bred and home-bred are sluggish in action.' [*Ep.* 51.10].

It is interesting that the exhortation to flee (φεύκτον) the internal enemy which threatens the soul, namely the vices, is also an aspect of the Stoic warfare, both in the Old and Roman Stoa.<sup>153</sup> Whereas normally the sage or the *proficiens* is to stand firm against the vices, in some circumstances, for strategic purposes the exhortation for honourable or tactical retreat may also be given by the Stoic "commander." The specific circumstances are those of "provocation." This suggests two possibilities: (i) The *proficiens* is not to provoke any unnecessary "attack" by the vices or passions. Such attacks must be initiated by the passions themselves and he is not to act in a suggestive or provocative manner that would incite or arouse them towards action against him. Accordingly he is to keep a safe distance from such a situation, even if it means "fleeing." (ii) He is not to surrender his freedom to the vices, prior to their infiltration within the soul, that is prior to any actual attack. In that context it is better to flee, rather than linger around an alluring though lethal and devastating enemy, for surrender or familiarity with such an attractive though brutal enemy is not a wise option. The wisest option is to distance oneself as far as possible from the enemy. Here perhaps the Homeric motif of the irresistible Sirens' song, may be at play:<sup>154</sup> 'We ought to see to it that we flee to the greatest possible distance from provocations to vice. We should toughen our minds and remove them far from the allurements of pleasure.' [*Seneca Ep.* 51.5].

In conclusion, it may be apt to provide a definition of Stoic endurance, in its "militarized" form. In his treatise on *On Various Aspects of Virtue*, Seneca reveals to Lucilius the qualities of a brave endurance, which he equates with joy. For Seneca, brave unyielding endurance is a

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<sup>153</sup> F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* 2nd edition (Bristol, Bristol Univ. Press, 1989) 30.

<sup>154</sup> The Stoic Epictetus adds a further circumstance for fleeing an enemy. He explains that a novice in philosophy (ἀρχόμενον φιλοσοφείν) is in no position to engage in combat (μάχη) against an enemy clearly more powerful than his moral resistance can withstand. Thus he cites the case of the allures of a "pretty young woman." In this case the novice philosopher is exhorted to "flee" (φεύγε): 'But first of all flee far away (φεύγε μακράν) from the things / those that are too strong for you (ἀπο τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων). It is not a fair combat (μάχη), that between a pretty young woman and a young beginner in philosophy.' (*Disc.* 3.12.123).

magnanimous, masculine, vigorous, active and combative "good" (virtue) which is able to face pain (or hardship) to supra-natural or heroic degree and which manifests a consistent manly character. Furthermore, for Seneca, combative endurance is both offensive and defensive in mode:

Therefore it follows that joy and a brave unyielding endurance (*fortis atque obstinata tormentorum*), are equal goods; for in both there is the same greatness of soul, relaxed and cheerful in the one case, in the other combative and braced for action. What? Do you not think that the virtue of him who bravely storms the enemy's stronghold is equal to that of him who endures a siege with the utmost patience (*obsidionem patientissime sustinet*)? [*Ep.* 61.12-13].

### **III. Diachronic and Synchronic Analysis: Concluding Remarks**

It needs to be recognized that ancient Greek culture, despite all its sophistication, was nevertheless primarily a military culture. Unlike the post-Vietnam social demotion of the prestige and positive image of the warrior in Western industrial societies, and the accompanying suspicion of the military and the values which it comes to represent particularly in intellectual circles - ancient Greek society however hailed the warrior as a heroic and patriotic figure of the first rank.<sup>155</sup> Pacifism is not a Greek invention and its possibility as a legitimate historical idea, at least in European thought, is only made fully possible through the early Christian teaching on love and forgiveness, and the spread of early Christianity throughout the Roman empire.<sup>156</sup> As I pointed out in my preceding chapter, the notion of the warrior's endurance (and courage) was hailed as a significant and praiseworthy value, not only by the military world, but by the broad diversity of ancient Greek society - historiographers, artists, dramatists, poets and the mass of the Greek people. Indeed with the invention of the philosophic endeavour, and since many of the sages were former warriors, most notably Socrates himself who regarded war as "honourable," it is not surprising that many of the ideals and values in Greek philosophical discussion were drawn

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<sup>155</sup> It is true however that at the time of the completion of this study (1995), there appears to be a popular resurgence of militaristic values and the warrior-cult in American society, as is evidenced, for example, by the growth of various extremist para-militaristic movements. Indeed in this popular neo-American phenomenon (which stands as a reaction to the negative treatment afforded to Vietnam veterans), the soldier is glorified as the archetypal American, and much-enduring soldiers in the battlefield are regarded as heroes (e.g. Gulf War). This sentiment would be understood by an ancient Greek. However the philosophers claimed the sage in his moral warfare as the true "warrior," the "true hero." Such a claim is not being heard today.

<sup>156</sup> Vide n. above.



directly or indirectly from the world of the military. Among such values we may include freedom and courage or manliness as well as the theme of the present investigation, endurance.

Given this background, it is not difficult to understand the notion of the warrior's endurance being appropriated and philosophized as an aggressive and masculine moral concept in situations of hardship, conflict and danger. The purpose of the present chapter was to diachronically and synchronically analyze the nature and consequence of this philosophication process, as well as the place which moral endurance held, whether in its "militarized" or "demilitarized" form, within the various philosophical systems. Despite the diversification of the understanding, function and nature of the idea of moral endurance within the various philosophical schools, certain very significant principles or trends remain thoroughly constant:

( 1 ) All philosophic treatments of this notion, understood as a positive moral attribute, from Plato's Socrates up to Seneca, treat it as an aggressive, masculine, rational attribute of the soul, most necessary in situations of external or internal, conflict, hardship or danger. In its positive philosophic sense it draws upon many of the characteristics and functions of military endurance such as its frequent association with courage, its heroic and masculine qualities, its context of struggle, pain, danger or death, its victorious battle ethos, as well as its hierarchical (commander exhorting troops) and sociological (gender and ethnographic) dimensions. Alternatively undesirable endurance is considered as an irrational disposition characteristic of a cowardly, inconsistent and weak character, most usually identified in Greek philosophy with non-Greeks ("barbarians"), effeminate and women (cf. Crates' Cynics). Here too many of the military ideals of endurance are reflected, such as the shameful and sorrowful aspect of the weak person's incapacity towards endurance.

(2) While courage as a moral virtue tends to be the most usual associative moral attribute connected with endurance, usually as its parent virtue (e.g. the young Plato, Aristotle and Stoics), endurance as a philosophic value is also linked with other virtues such as self-mastery (e.g. Aristotle), again in a "subordinate" status. On the other hand, moral endurance can also be

understood as an independent and central moral virtue, more significant than courage. This is most evident among the Cynics.

(3) From a parallel diachronic perspective, the notion of moral endurance is discussed within a consistent twofold rhetorical schema. It is expressed either as (a) a "demilitarized" mode, that is without any manifest allusions to military language (e.g. in association with courage) or imagery. Furthermore it may be linked with the cognitive and gentler virtues. Or, (b) expressed within a "militarized" framework. This most usually occurs either by linking moral endurance with courage or by setting the notion within the framework of a military metaphor. In Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times, typically the sage (rational man) was depicted as a much-enduring and courageous warrior waging war against internal enemies (e.g. passions, desires or vainglory) and external attacks (usually embodied in the mythological persona of Tyche / Fortuna) - the latter predominantly by the Roman Stoic Seneca.

The significant points that arose in this chapter's analysis of the philosophication process of the notion of endurance from a primarily military context into a moral value, as it occurred within four of the major philosophical tendencies of Greek and Roman antiquity, may be summarized in the following manner:

**i. Democritus:** The presocratics had been active in philosophic endeavour a century prior to Socrates. While ethics was not a primary concern nevertheless within the extant fragments, especially in some attributed to Democritus, it is evident that the idea of endurance (and courage) has already been moralized, and indeed figures as a positive moral attribute. Democritus is the earliest extant philosopher to describe man's life according to reason as a "military battle" against the inner impulses of the passions and the tendency to pleasure. He becomes the earliest Greek philosopher on record to designate the rational man as a much-enduring and courageous "warrior" engaged in the "inner battle" against the soul's inner "foes." Thus already in the writings of Democritus we are in contact with a "militarized" form of moral endurance (and courage), a tradition which will be taken up and developed more explicitly by Plato.

ii. **Plato:** Within the early Plato, namely the *Laches*, one views for the first time in literary history, an attempt to *systematically* broaden the meaning of endurance far beyond its primarily military context and hence a deliberate attempt at its philosophication. In this process of the development of this moral concept within the writings of the early Plato, namely the *Laches*, despite the aporic conclusion, it remains possible to draw certain important insights into how Plato (and Socrates) deals with and understands the notion of moral endurance:

[1] Within the history of western ideas, it would be the *Laches* which represents the earliest *systematic* treatise to deal with endurance on a philosophical or ethical level, albeit as a category of ἀνδρεία, beyond the realm of the traveller or warrior. Being an early Platonic dialogue, the *Laches* preserves a view of courage and endurance, as ethical values, closer to that held by the historical Socrates than would discussions about other moral values found in the middle and later dialogues. By the method of elenchus, Socrates rejects any single illustration of courage simply and exclusively in terms of military endurance and seeks a broader definition (yet Socrates does not in any sense mean to preclude the warrior's endurance from his discussion, indeed it is possible to demonstrate "wise endurance" on the battlefield). For Socrates it is necessary to the to discover the essential meaning of courage and endurance, one which would be as applicable on the battlefield as in other realms of human endeavour where danger, conflict or adversity arises. This broadening step, within the *Laches* represents the initial philosophication process of the notion of endurance within Greek (and Western) thought. Despite the fact that the entire exercise of explicating courage in terms of endurance falls into aporia, there is nevertheless, nothing in the arguments set forth in the *Laches*, which precludes the postulation that at least one of the necessary elements which constitutes courage is endurance, understood in a cognitive sense, namely wise endurance. Accordingly, the *Laches* also represents the earliest extant systematic attempt in Greek literature to philosophize the notion in favour of a broader ethical idea which is applicable to various contexts of human moral endeavour.

[2] *Laches*, the Greek general in the dialogue, who is made to represent traditional Greek military values, re-echoes and confirms the popular view of endurance in the ancient Greek world.

It is in the first place a military value, associated with courage and signifies the warrior's ability to stand firm in battle no matter what the odds - a definition which Socrates seeks to broaden and qualify.

[3] This philosophication of the warrior's endurance, however, is never fully "demilitarized." To begin with, the notion of endurance is never disassociated with that of courage. The traditional military links, as espoused by Laches, are preserved, albeit in an ethical direction. This Platonic text also offers one of the earliest literary attempt to portray the inner "combat" against the passions, desires and pleasures as a metaphor involving military imagery. In this "war" the "warrior" employs courage and endurance.

[4] Plato's vocabulary of endurance within the *Laches* is exclusively comprised of three terms - μένειν (4 occasions), καρτερεῖν (10 occasions) and ὑπομένειν (once). Within the *Laches* καρτερεῖν is the term which designates endurance in its broadest ethical dimensions, while μένειν and ὑπομένειν tend to preserve military connotations. Μένειν represents for the most part a form of endurance which involves the notion of standing firm to one's assigned position in the face of attack, without deserting or fleeing. Here there is no necessary concern for the overwhelming strength of the opposition as implied by ὑπομονή. Interestingly in the *Laches* both ὑπομένειν and μένειν preserve their original military overtones. There is however no single term to designate "wise endurance." Endurance in its ethical form of καρτερεῖν is associated with two moral virtues - courage (ἀνδρεία) and wisdom (φρόνησις). Its association with wisdom is a sign of its new philosophical or ethical identity. The terms which express the opposite to the concept of endurance include φεύγειν, ἀναστρεφομένειν, μὴ μένειν and τρύφων.

[5] In juxtaposition with wisdom, Plato (like Aristotle subsequently)<sup>157</sup> distinguishes between two forms of endurance - wise or rational endurance (φρόνιμος καρτερία) and endurance which is

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<sup>157</sup> There appears to be a linear relationship between Plato's and Aristotle's formulation of endurance, which suggests some form of dependency. Both formulate ethical endurance primarily in terms of καρτερεῖν. Both associate the concept with ἀνδρεία, although Aristotle also associates it with self-mastery. Both categorize endurance in positive (rational) and negative (irrational) distinctions. In both cases ὑπομένειν may describe the negative or irrational form of endurance. However while Plato employs φρόνησις, Aristotle associates it with λόγος (the same juxtaposition is also made in the first-century Stoic-influenced Jewish martyrological tractate *4 Maccabees*. Aristotle furthermore tends to view endurance within a tripartite schema, with perfect endurance being the middle state between the excesses of daring and comfort-seeking. While alluding to the these extremes, Plato does not

not in accordance with φρόνησις and which in the *Laches* begins to be identified with what the military world described as heroic. While wise endurance is described as good (καλή), noble and constituting real courage, unwise endurance is described as hurtful. As such according to this logic a warrior who makes a stand against an overwhelming force is not acting out of authentic (rational) courage.

The later Plato, specifically as attested in the *Resp.* still understands the concept of endurance in all its various dimensions. It refers to the warrior's endurance in actual battle as well as in the (Spartan-like) training of the much-enduring character of the sage-king. Such an endurance must be tested in constant hardships and dangers and struggles or competition (ἀγών) in order to demonstrate its authenticity and become a standard for evaluating the suitability of character (or otherwise) of the potential occupant of society's highest leadership office (the philosopher-ruler). It is in a very real sense an elite virtue, one reserved for the very finest product of the πολιτεία, the attribute and moral badge of the very few. It is now also employed in a full philosophic sense, both as a "militarized" and "demilitarized" moral attribute of the good and just man (which may also include the warrior). In its "militarized" form, wise or rational endurance is formulated within the language and imagery of the military metaphor of warfare. The good and wise man will "endure" the "strokes of Tyche," "resist" and "fight" rather than "surrender" against his grief. On the other hand irrationality would lead one to "surrender" to grief. As such the notion of "militarized" moral endurance becomes a central aspect of Plato's dichotomous anthropological schema and its resultant "battle" between the rational and irrational impulses of the soul. The idea of the sage's "internal" and "external" warfare, a theme which will find popular coinage in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophy, is already evident in Plato's dialogues.

On the other hand, the association of endurance with a value other than courage within the *Laches* makes the possibility of a further subsequent "demilitarization" possible. Accordingly in the *Resp.*, Plato's Socrates discusses the idea of moral endurance in conjunction with such Greek

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classify them to a norm or μέσον. This provides him with serious difficulties in the *Laches* with arriving at a firm conclusion on both the nature of endurance and courage.

philosophic values as justice, knowledge and the good. Moral endurance becomes a Platonic moral value situated well within the interior of his ethical system, and from Plato it will subsequently continue as one of the important values of Greek, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophy, both in its "militarized" and "demilitarized" form. It is interesting that concerning Plato's use of the vocabulary of endurance, specifically ὑπομονή (with reference to the *Gorgias*), and its subsequent impact, the celebrated French scholar A.M. Festugière would write, 'le texte est, car Il onus situe l'hypomone a l'interieur du systeme il est l'une des pièces et, par le fait des circomstances, non pas la moindre.'<sup>158</sup> However, concerning the aporic connection between courage and endurance, that is what precisely constitutes courage, and hence endurance, Plato would answer "wise endurance." Yet what this meant would be elaborated by Aristotle who would formulate the ethical notion of the mean, as well as the demarcation between various levels of endurance and courage.

**iii. Aristotle:** Certain similarities are apparent between Plato's and Aristotle's understanding of endurance. To begin, Aristotle (like Plato) treats the notion of endurance within the categories of 'rational' and "irrational." Here Aristotelian endurance particularly expressed by ὑπομένειν or its variants, is still discussed and subsumed within the overall agenda or framework of courage (ἀνδρεία) as an inextricable aspect of the latter. The type of courage which is motivated by reason, knowledge and goodness necessarily produces a "rational endurance" This is authentic bravery and endurance. In other words, the truly brave man truly endures. Such a courage arouses a capacity to endure the most fearsome (φοβερὰ) situations (for Aristotle dangerous or threatening contexts in an absolute sense require courage and endurance). For Aristotle, like Plato, very few people in society have this capacity for such an endurance and courage. Such a brave and much-enduring man is "healthy" (ὕγιεινός) and strong (ἰσχυρός) Conversely courage motivated by passions and other emotions arouses an "irrational endurance." This represents an inauthentic expression of endurance - one not motivated by the "good" - one characteristic of the coward. This characterizes the masses who are rapidly overcome by fear and an inability to endure fearsome things as well as afflictions. They are "sickly" (νοσώδεις) and "unhealthy" (ἀσθενεῖς). On the other hand,

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<sup>158</sup> A.M. Festugière, *Hypomone dans la Traditon Grecque,* in *Recherches et Science Religieuse* 30 (1931) 477-86.

irrational courage may be demonstrated by an irrational endurance which is not cowardly but daring. This too is an unacceptable extreme not motivated by reason (λόγος). Accordingly Aristotle is able to resolve the aporia left by Plato's Socrates concerning the relationship between courage, endurance and wisdom by postulating the idea of the mean between two extremes of irrational courage and endurance (daring and cowardice). Aristotle makes a further categorical refinement by distinguishing between five categories of irrational courage and hence endurance, which though motivated by erroneous reasoning yet at times may be "useful." This includes civic (πολιτική) courage and endurance motivated by shame; the daring courage and endurance of a madman, that of one intoxicated by hope rather than reason, that aroused by anger and other passions (including eros), and military courage and endurance, arising from battle experience rather than reason and knowledge.<sup>159</sup> Yet to the extent that within the ethics of the younger Aristotle a link is manifestly maintained between the idea of endurance and that of courage, no matter how philosophized, he still preserves and reflects a "militarized" understanding of moral endurance (and courage). As in Plato's ethics in the *Laches*, so here it is still "courage," the old military virtue which is the "parent" or dominant virtue *par excellence*. Endurance only makes sense with reference to ἀνδρεία. Thus in the history of the philosophical evolution of this primarily military ideal, at least within the early Aristotle, its military background is still discernible. To that extent the notion of moral endurance, at least within the ethics of the younger Aristotle, remains "militarized." Yet, there is also discontinuity between Plato and the younger Aristotle's notion of moral endurance. It is now more deliberately and more intently treated than ever before within Greek philosophy.<sup>160</sup> More importantly, Aristotle's understanding of wise endurance (as an aspect of rational courage) is now no longer considered as possible on the battlefield. Unlike the *Laches*, military endurance can

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<sup>159</sup> The daring warrior who faces fearsome opposition and endures overwhelming odds, Aristotle would say, is not motivated either by reason nor knowledge, but by prior experience in battle. He is "daring," not necessarily brave. Yet he would not deny that such heroic endurance on the battlefield might be "useful" even if he would not regard it as rational. In the final analysis however, the warrior's courage and endurance are intrinsically inferior to that form of moral courage and endurance based on knowledge or reason.

<sup>160</sup> While the concept of moral endurance would continue to be a significant ethical disposition or quality of the rational soul, nevertheless, the categorical and systematic treatment of this notion within treatises on ethical issues, in the post-Aristotelian period, would not be repeated, until the 3rd century (A.D.). Interestingly, following Plato or Aristotle, the next most exhaustive or systematic treatment of this concept would be undertaken by the Latin Church Father, Tertullian in his treatise *De Patientia*.

no longer be even accepted as a particular instance of endurance, in fact it is an inferior, even a counterfeit representation of endurance. It arises out of a warrior's experience and not out of knowledge, and hence is not a meritorious value as ethical or moral endurance, which is expressed with knowledge and rationality. It is a mature philosophical concept superior to military expressions or instances of endurance. To that extent Aristotle undertakes the further step in the full emancipation of moral endurance from its military origins.

Again, building upon a trend already evident in the older Plato, and in continuity with his *Resp.*, the notion undergoes a further philosophication process. Now, within *Eth. Nic.*, endurance as an ethical concept, is no longer necessarily associated with the virtue of courage, rather it is exclusively discussed, in connection with self-mastery.<sup>161</sup> Aristotle at first presents a popular and "demilitarized" understanding of more endurance (καρτερία). It (as well as self-mastery) is considered as a praiseworthy and significant disposition, representing the opposite of the blameworthy disposition, softness (μαλακία), while unrestraint (ἀκρασία) signals the converse of self-mastery. On the other hand, while the older Aristotle no longer treats endurance under the umbrella of courage, nevertheless a "militarized" expression of moral endurance is still evident. This occurs within the context of the military metaphors of the external and internal "warfare." (i) The happy and wise man by his endurance, virtuous life and stability of action in the face of fortune is like a wise general in battle. When confronted with the vicissitudes of fortune (τύχη) the wise man through his endurance and virtuous life, guarantees stability and consistency of action, rather than a passivity to the whims of circumstance. In this he is like a wise general in battle who does not allow the circumstances of combat to take their own course. Such then is the role of endurance in the happy man's "battle" against fortune. (ii) In his description of the respective functions of endurance and self-mastery, Aristotle employs the metaphor of the internal moral "war." The distinction between these two dispositions concerns their object. The object of self-mastery is to concern itself with pleasure or desire, that of endurance with pain and the emotions.

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<sup>161</sup> It is fair to say however, following Jaeger, that even in the later Aristotle the links with Plato are not totally severed. Yet the Aristotelian treatment of endurance, in his last Athenian phase, does suggest an independence in thought.



The difference in their function lies in their respective potency in this "battle." While endurance generates "resistance" against the desires, self-mastery achieves their complete "conquest." In this analysis, moral endurance is that disposition of the rational man which allows him to successfully wage war against the soul's "inner foes" - though not necessarily to achieve their annihilation. The latter remains the function of self-mastery. Accordingly, the "weak" or the "soft," namely those incapable of endurance, are unable to undertake such a "war." They are consistently conquered and under the control of desire and pleasure. According to Aristotle, these non-enduring people (i.e. the soft) include those who are innately weak or irrational - women, barbarians and effeminate. Consequently, being a rational masculine disposition, it is only the (Greek) male who can potentially demonstrate wise endurance and combat the inner foe. What Aristotle makes possible in future ethical discussions or usages of the notion of moral endurance is the continuation of the choice between the use of a "militarized" or "demilitarized" expression, or the use of both, as well as the significance of the role of endurance in the inner "war" against the passions, or the external "war" against fortune, choices which are still available to rhetors and writers of moral subjects up to the time of the apostle Paul's letter-writing activity and beyond into the Byzantine world.<sup>162</sup>

iv. **The Cynics:** In my analysis of the place, function and character of moral endurance within Cynic writings, I explained that I considered Antisthenes as the founder of this philosophical tendency while acknowledging that it is difficult to regard Cynics as a homogeneous movement. They constituted a diversified ideology and often were at odds with each other. Nevertheless they all agreed that by eliminating concerns for logic or physics, and by focusing solely on ethics and a life according to "nature," their method of philosophy represented a "short cut" to virtue and happiness. Within this exclusively-ethical and praxis-oriented *weltanschauung*, in conjunction with their radical rejection of traditional social conventions, ideals and values, certain common elements concerning their attitude to the ethical value may be discerned.

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<sup>162</sup> For Paul endurance is of more import than courage - indeed courage on the two occasions that it does occur, is a subordinate value to endurance. For Paul the notion of endurance is linked, among other "virtues," with love. However, as I will explain and elaborate, Paul does make use of "militarized" endurance within "warfare" metaphors. In that tendency Paul is in continuity with a philosophical tradition that can be traced back to Plato's Socrates.

**Demilitarized moral endurance:** Since they believed that virtue was not spontaneously generated in the soul, but was only acquired through constant "toil" (πόνοϋ) and "training" in hardship and affliction (ἀσκησιϋ), endurance (καρτερία) ranked either as the central moral "good" (ἀγαθόν), with the Cynic life in its striving towards the development of virtue being described as the "life of endurance."

Endurance in toil and hardship thus became a key authenticating mark by which an outsider should identify the Cynic sage, as well as a central self-definitional moral attribute. On other occasions, it was taught that endurance was one of the two major "goods." Following Aristotle, the "Crates" tradition at times posited self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) as the other "good." Cynic endurance also held an economic dimension. Through the public display of endurance in poverty, hardship and pain, monetary reward often flowed. The receipt of financial assistance and food was therefore considered as a public acknowledgment of the sage's exemplary and authenticating endurance. On the other hand, some Cynics held that the true Cynic sage was identified through his endurance in the face of popular rejection and the persecution or insults (ὕβριϋ) of hostile crowds. Within these Cynic philosophical systems of "short cuts," it was also widely believed that endurance could best be taught not by words but exemplary models. Various Cynics posited various paradigmatic figures as much-enduring and much-toiling psychagogic exemplars worthy of imitation. The list of these much-enduring Cynic heroes included Hercules, Odysseus, Diogenes or Crates who was dubbed "the philosopher of endurance" (καρτερῶϋ οὕτω φιλοσοφεῖν). Unlike the young Plato and Aristotle, one of the characteristic features of the Cynic understanding of moral endurance, especially among the later Cynics (cf. Antisthenes), was its relatively more frequent disassociation with courage whether in simple ethical juxtaposition or as a subordinate character of courage. Endurance now becomes the key or central moral attribute independent of courage, within an ethical system. In fact, for the first time in Greek philosophical traditions, it becomes a more prominent and more significant disposition than courage. To that extent its "demilitarization" is more complete than in either Plato or Aristotle.

"Militarized" moral endurance: This understanding of endurance is now predominantly set within the metaphor of "moral warfare," a metaphor which was clearly facilitated by the very "agonistic" nature and structure of Cynic ethics. Here again several important features were found to be noteworthy:

(1) In the Cynic's moral combat, against external and internal "foes," the protagonist is no longer a generalized "rational" man living according to virtue, but is pin-pointed to precisely signify the Cynic sage or his heroes (Odysseus, Herakles, etc.), living according to reason, virtue or nature. To that extent the possibility for moral endurance is sectarianized or dogmatized. The moral "warrior" is now the Cynic sage.

(2) The first Cynic to employ moral endurance in a military metaphor was Antisthenes, in his Odysseus and Ajax declamations. Odysseus, representing the prototypical Cynic as "warrior" embodies certain virtues including bravery, self-sufficiency, self-abasement and the capacity for much endurance (πολύτλας) in circumstances of danger and adversity in "warfare."

(3) Another important development evident in the Cynic understanding of "militarized" moral endurance, is the exhortation to "stand firm" in "combat." The sage (following Aristotle) assumes the role of an experienced "military commander." As part of his psychagogic function of advising his disciples towards full development as a Cynic sage, he exhorts them to "fight" against external enemy or the internal "foes" by "standing firm" or "resisting" them.

(4) The "enemy" which the Cynic is to "stand firm" against or "resist" include (i) (internal foes) the passions, the soul's diseases, vainglory, pleasure, fear; (ii) (external foes) frightful circumstances, hardship, public opinion. The notion of a belligerent Tyche / Fortuna as an external foe is not prominent (cf. Stoics).

(5) They are not to "flee" against such foes for this would result in sorrow.

(6) Re-echoing an Aristotelian understanding of rational endurance, Cynic "militarized" moral endurance is only possible to a few (i.e. the Cynic sage). The masses because of their adherence to false opinion and softness / weakness of character are unable to "stand firm" and "combat." On the other hand, in this moral warfare, some women are not precluded from becoming "much-enduring

warriors." This is specifically the case in that Cynic tradition associated with the name of Crates, a tradition which is in total antithesis to Aristotle's understanding of endurance.

**v. The Stoics:** The purpose of Stoic ethics is a practical one, the attainment of happiness. This can only be achieved by the pursuit of life in accordance to reason, nature or virtue. This life involves the individual in a laborious struggle for virtue, since this is not granted by an act of grace (cf. Paul). The struggle consists in the pursuit of moral "goods" and the avoidance of "evils" or vice. The primary "goods" consist of prudence, courage, justice and temperance. The primary vices are folly, cowardice, injustice and intemperance. Besides these two moral categories a third one, consisting of the "indifferents," also exists, which is morally neutral though some are preferred and some rejected. According to the Stoics, the sage because of his possession of virtue alone can possess happiness, while the *proficiens* aspires towards progress in virtue and hence happiness. Moral endurance within Stoic ethics functions basically as one of the indispensable moral attributes in the pursuit of virtue against the "attacks" of the evils, at times itemized in a catalogue of vices, as well as defining the proper or rational demeanour towards the rejected indifferents (e.g. poverty, exile, travel, low birth, disease, pain, obscurity, old age, death, etc.), often given a mythic framework as the attacks of Tyche or Fortuna. At times these hardships to be endured would appear in a formal rhetorical convention, in a list, dubbed by modern scholarship as a *peristasis catalogue*. Its place within this system is, by and large, either as a subordinate virtue to courage (Old Stoa) or as a synthetic virtue in fusion with courage (Seneca). These understandings of endurance spell a return back to versions of the early Plato's or Aristotle's views of endurance. To that extent endurance within Stoic ethics remains "militarized." There are two discernible tendencies in this Stoic understanding of moral endurance: (i) endurance is a subordinate virtue to one of the four primary goods, courage. This view, particularly advanced by the early Stoa, incorporates a cognitive dimension and is defined as the knowledge of what to hold fast to and what to abandon or flee from. (ii) a second tendency within the Old Stoa was to fuse endurance and courage into one synthetic virtue - brave endurance. This too was defined from a cognitive dimension.

In later expressions of Stoicism, particularly that Roman form expressed by Seneca, the understanding, discussion, place, function and definition of endurance becomes part of a more pastoral or psychagogic Stoicism. Stoic philosophy (as Cynicism) is now more practical, more protreptic and less theoretical. Its intent is to facilitate growth in virtue. It would appear that the moral value or desirability of endurance in Roman Stoicism was under dispute. Some were arguing that a Stoic's display of endurance would indicate his continued state of conflict and adversity as opposed to serenity or happiness. Seneca in response insists that while he does not prefer or desire hardships nevertheless if such unpreferred indifferent circumstances do arise, then he will employ this situation(s) of hardship(s) as an opportunity to demonstrate his manly courageous endurance. For Seneca, in continuity with some of the Old Stoic sages, endurance is f used with courage into one virtue - brave endurance (*pati fortiter*). Any such absence of noble endurance leads to effeminacy and softness of character. Accordingly for the Stoic sage, situations of conflict, hardship and danger still continue and represent an opportunity for training, testing and defending their virtue. Indeed the sage's suffering becomes part of the cosmic scheme, part of universal Nature. Accordingly endurance (and courage) is a desirable good, in accordance to reason and Nature.

Another aspect of the Stoic "militarized" understanding of philosophical or moral endurance, concerns the use of military metaphors, particularly among the later Stoics. The idea of the sage's life as one of continued hardship, danger and conflict or "combat" (*vivere militare est*) certainly facilitated the use of such "warfare" metaphors and imagery. Indeed the predilection among the later Stoics (esp. Seneca) towards the use of the military metaphor was the most prolific in Greco-Roman antiquity. Not surprisingly, the old military value of endurance, now in its philosophic guise, fitted most naturally in this literary or rhetorical context. Like the Cynics, the Stoic sage was also pronounced a "warrior." As in the case of the Cynic sage, so too the Stoic sage was depicted as facing "assaults" on two fronts: (i) The internal "war" against the passions and other vices which are opposed to reason. They infiltrate and occupy the soul which is not ruled by reason, and hence is defenseless, by creeping within the soul and camouflaging themselves as "virtues." Thus

the irrational *soul* confuses rashness for bravery and cowardice for prudence (re-echoing Aristotle's doctrine of the mean). The most common Stoic list of vices which threaten the soul includes fear of death, pleasure, comfort, vainglory, anger and grief. This inner war is understood as more perilous than physical war, for it is constantly fought and the stakes are higher, and demands the sage's courage, endurance and wisdom. As Seneca explains, effectively it would be Alexander's lack of inner endurance or resistance to anger, grief and self-mastery, that rendered him captive to his passions, even though he held military control over the Orient. In this battle the *proficiens* needs assistance from the sage in his capacity as "warrior," there is no time for "furlough" or rest for it is an incessant struggle. Surrender to the vices (pleasure, comfort, pampering, ambition, passions, pain, hardship etc.) that is an absence of endurance, is unthinkable. This would lead to a lessening of the warrior's effectiveness and masculine aggression, rendering him effeminate. In certain battles, however, for strategic purposes it may be more reasonable to flee the attacking enemy, that is vice, rather than stand firm and fight. (ii) The external "battle" against adverse circumstances generally ascribed to Fortuna. In this battle brave endurance figures prominently, as the sage is depicted as a much-enduring warrior, a vigilant guard who does not desert his appointed post. Fortuna unleashes her mightiest weapons against the warrior-sage in a warfare which is the inevitable destiny of the sage (*contra fortunam militaturis*). As a warrior he needs to be vigilant, hear the "din of battle," with unconcern for matters non-military and respond with endurance, without flinching. Like a warrior on campaign lives on bare necessities and strict deprivation, so the sage or the seeker of wisdom, the *proficiens* is to live in poverty and material deprivation. This trains or tests his endurance, rendering him more effective in his moral warfare, as well as assuring his freedom. Even in times of "peace" when Fortuna ceases her assaults, the sage must continue to exercise and toughen his virtues including his courage and endurance. This helps him in time of "battle" to "stand firm." Throughout these violent attacks from Fortuna, by his calm endurance, consistency and virtue, the sage's defence system remains unscathed, without injury or insult. The strength and endurance of his inner fortifications are much more powerful and impregnable than Babylon's walls or

Carthage's ramparts. The virtuous sage living in accordance to reason, can even withstand Fortuna's most lethal weapon, death! None of Fortuna's weapons can overcome the sage, can penetrate his much-enduring defences, shatter his endurance in life's siege. Conversely the irrational man, devoid of brave endurance, would not be able to withstand such a lethal attack, and would quickly succumb and surrender as a prisoner of Fortuna. On occasions, the sage as "military commander," may exhort his charges to "stand firm" in the face of the present danger, fear, conflict or hardship.

In conclusion, I would suggest that the Stoics' notion of moral endurance retains a clear military flavour in a more pervasive manner, than in any other philosophical school. This is especially the case with Roman Stoicism contemporaneous with the time of the apostle Paul's letter-writing activity. It is considered in association with courage as a synthetic virtue - brave endurance, and consistently appears in military metaphors to designate the sage as a much-enduring "warrior." Indeed the very definition and understanding of Stoic endurance echoes its military origins - it is a magnanimous, masculine, vigorous, combative offensive and defensive virtue. On the other hand the notion of Stoic moral endurance, devoid of military imagery or connotations, would of course also continue to designate the wise man's fortitude in circumstances of hardship, adversity, conflict, danger or crisis. The difference between "militarized" and "demilitarized" moral endurance appears to be one of emphasis and illustration.

The impact of military endurance upon Greek philosophy would also be felt by another route, namely by way of the athletic world, a world that had been thoroughly affected by military values and ideals (including that of endurance). To this process, I now direct the present investigation.

**CHAPTER 3:  
AGONISTIC MORAL ENDURANCE:  
THE IMPACT OF THE WARRIOR'S ENDURANCE  
ON GREEK ATHLETICS AND PAIDEIA**

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**I. The Warrior's Endurance, Greek Athletics and Education**

*A. The Abiding Martial Character of Greek Athletics*

**i. The Military Matrix of Greek Athletics - The Warrior as Athlete:** Whatever the origins of Greek athletics may have been,<sup>1</sup> there can be little question that from its earliest recorded times, that is the Homeric and Spartan periods, it would be difficult to separate it from the world of the military. Greek athletics in these early periods was an instrument of the warrior and was dominated by military thinking. From the evidence of the earliest most elaborate European literary description of sporting activity, namely the funeral games for Patroclus (*Il.* 23.256-897),<sup>2</sup> it is unambiguously clear that at this germinal stage the world of the warrior and that of the athlete (ἀθλητήρ) coincide almost entirely. In fact warrior and athlete are one and the same. Indeed they are not simply any warrior but the finest the ἄριστοι, the most heroic and aristocratic members of the Greek military. The competitive ideals of the warrior to excel and be the best in his manly and military skills, courage and endurance, are the same as those of the Homeric athlete. In the *Iliad*,

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<sup>1</sup> Scholars such as to M. Glotz, R. Hall and E.N. Gardiner have argued in favour of tracing the origins of Greek athletics back to Crete, vide M. Glotz, *Aegean Civilization* pp. 289, 293, also M. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World* (Chicago, Ares, 1987) reprint of 1930 edition, 11-14.

<sup>2</sup> The *Odyssey*, also mentions athletic events. However, the after-dinner games in Phaeacia (*Od.* 8.97-384) are associated with Odysseus the warrior-traveler but who is not addressed here as a warrior but rather as a long-suffering and much-enduring traveller (8.137-139). Indeed even the names of the Phaeacian champions have a nautical flavour. Furthermore, the setting and the atmosphere of the games are no longer on the battlefield but as an integral aspect of a peaceful after-dinner leisure activity. While the events do suggest a military background (e.g. discus or weight [stone] throwing) nevertheless the sporting tradition here appears to be considerably demilitarized. Phaeacian society is depicted as an idyllic, peaceful, demilitarized utopian society where warfare is absent and hence where sport and athletic events are the vestiges of either a previous Phaeacian military era, or are simply an import. The competitors are described as "youths" (νέοι, 8.110) rather than "warriors". But Homeric Phaeacia is not typically Greek for it transcends the μοῖρα of the Greeks and warfare, and hence neither can its athletic setting be described as typical of Homeric society. It may very well be that Homeric Phaeacia ought be judged as the earliest quasi-pacifist utopian society recorded in European literature.



the sporting situation is one of competition among elite warriors for a display of ἀρετή and for the winning of the "prize". Furthermore the vocabulary of warfare is employed wholesale in the descriptions of athletic events - a tendency which remained throughout the history of Greek sport. Thus Homer refers to wrestling with the same term employed to describe a battle - ἀλεγεινός (grievous). Likewise this inextricable inter-connection between the military and the athletic is also diachronically evident in Spartan society, which, as I have already noted, aimed above all at the development of a courageous and much-enduring warrior. Indeed the inter-twining between athletics and the military became even more universal in this instance since athletics was no longer simply the reserve of only the elite warrior. Towards this ideal, athletics served as an important preparation, training and education in the formation of the celebrated Spartan warrior. Accordingly to a Greek of the archaic era, it would have largely appeared artificial to draw demarcation lines between these two spheres of human activity. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in a subsequent era, with the flowering of Greek athletics, a steady separation did begin to occur between the world of the warrior and that of the professional and specialist athlete, on several significant levels.<sup>3</sup> Homeric athletics were unorganized and spontaneous, though for the most part tied to the warrior's world. Post-Homeric athletics increasingly tended to become more organized, reaching its zenith in the classical and Hellenistic periods. The setting for the Homeric games was the battlefield. In post-Homeric times the gymnasium, the palæstra and the stadium progressively became the locale for athletic competition and training.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore religion became more significant to Greek athletics. The Homeric prizes for the victorious warrior-athlete were spontaneous, basically what was available in the donor's tent. With the rise of the pan-Hellenic festivals prizes were constant - a laurel (or wild celery) crown, popular adulation and special civic

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<sup>3</sup> By Classical times the decay of the original athletic ideal had led to severe critiques of Greek athletics by the tragedians (e.g. Euripides), while in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period, this polemic was led by philosophers (esp. in traditions concerning Diogenes of Sinoppe), who nevertheless had already appropriated an idealized form of athletics in metaphoric imagery and language to describe the ἀγών of the sage. Vide below. On the critique, vide R. Heinze, 'Anacharsis,' in *Philologus* 50 (1891) 458 ff. V.C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1967) 23.

<sup>4</sup> In classical Athens organized athletics centered almost exclusively around the gymnasium and the palæstra. For a discussion of the role of these institutions vide, 'Palæstra and Gymnasium' in E.N. Gardiner *op. cit.* 72-82.

privileges - a practice which reached its peak in the Hellenistic period.<sup>5</sup> Whereas the deities may assist their favourite Homeric warrior-athlete (e.g. Athena's assistance to Odysseus through the tripping of Ajax), and while there are hints that the Homeric athletic competitions have a sacred character, particularly the funeral games in honour of Patroclus<sup>6</sup> - though the Phaecian after-dinner games give the semblance of a purely secular affair with no trace of any ritual dedication - nevertheless the subsequent organized Panhellenic athletic festivals, namely the Olympic, Isthmian, Nemean and Pythian games, assume a far more developed religious or cultic character, being designated as "sacred" (ἱερά), while the idea of the patron deity's protection and assistance takes on a ritualistic framework suggesting that victory is not only due to the athlete's own effort, strength, endurance and skills.<sup>7</sup> While the rules of competition in the Homeric games appear somewhat spontaneous, those of the Panhellenic festivals became elaborate, religious and ritualistic. In this regard Pfitzner writes: "Before the image of the deity the contestants vowed to comply with the rules of the games, and to him they brought their offerings and prayers for victory

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<sup>5</sup> B. Kyrkos writes: 'From the 5th century B.C. onwards, despite the fact that the prize in the great Panhellenic games was simply a crown, a number of cities began to honour the victors by offering them goods or money or exemptions that could be measured in terms of money . . . . It was during the Hellenistic period, however, that the phenomenon of athletes competing solely for money gradually took on serious dimensions - a development that proved impossible to arrest . . . . treating sport as a profession, they [i.e. athletes] travelled from contest to contest through the whole of the Hellenistic world, collecting crowns and financial rewards' 'The Development of Sport in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods,' in N. Yalouris *op. cit.* 281, 282.

<sup>6</sup> Vide V.C. Pfitzner, *op. cit.* 19. Concerning the Patroclus games Pfitzner writes, 'The situation, including the proceedings themselves, clearly indicates, that the contests here have a cultic character: they appear within the framework of the hero cult.' 19.

<sup>7</sup> Vide V.C. Pfitzner, *op. cit.* 18-20; S.G. Miller, *Arete. Ancient Writers, Papyri, and Inscriptions on the History and Ideals of Greek Athletics and Games* (Chicago, Ares, 1979); R.S. Robinson, *Sources for the History of Greek Athletics* (Chicago, Ares, 1984 reprint); E.N. Gardner, *Athletics of the Ancient World* (Chicago, Ares, 1987 reprint). The festivals were performed under the patronage and protection of one of the major Olympus deities - the Olympic games were dedicated to Olympian Zeus, the Pythian Games to the Delphic Apollo, the Isthmian Games to Poseidon while the Nemean Games, the last of the Panhellenic festivals, were dedicated to Nemean Zeus. Does the notion of direct divine assistance exist? The earliest accounts of Greek athletics (the *Iliad*) is illuminating. The gods help the Homeric warrior in battle, yet this is an infrequent occurrence in the Homeric athletic events. For instance, Athena assists Odysseus in his race against Ajax, but it is certainly not a well developed idea. The descriptions of the Greek athletic training and competition given by some of our post-Homeric (non-philosophic) literary sources, however, do suggest a more developed link between athlete and patron deity. The athlete's endurance may not necessarily be simply a direct product of hard and disciplined training in the gymnasium and the palæstra. Divine assistance may be a factor, as is suggested by the ritualistic symbolism of returning the victor's wreath back to the festival's patron deity, as well as the athlete's act of formal prayer for victory before the image of the deity, prior to the contest. However this motif of divine assistance is not emphasized in the ethical treatises of the sages, from Plato to Epictetus. Here, for the most part, the athlete's prize is seen as a direct consequence and reward for his own labours, toils, discipline, training and endurance, vide the ensuing part of this chapter, 'The Warrior's Endurance and the Athlete's Endurance.'

and later if successful, their statuettes and crowns. Whenever possible the games were held in the vicinity of the sanctuary, and it became a firm practice to cut the victor's crown, wreath or palm branch from a tree in the sacred grove."<sup>8</sup> The Homeric warrior-athlete competed for his own glory, and before an audience largely composed of his fellow warriors, whereas with the rise of the Panhellenic games the athlete competed for the glory of his *polis* before stadiums filled with spectators. Indeed at the time of the defeat of the Persians, when Greek athletics had reached the apex of its popularity, the victory was viewed as the triumph of the free *polis* over oriental despotism, the triumph of a few manly athletically-trained warriors over a horde of "effeminate barbarians," and led to the inauguration of a new athletic festival, the "Ἐλευθερία" or "Freedom Games."<sup>9</sup> The Homeric athlete was a warrior, a trend which continued up till classical times, but already beginning in classical Athens and culminating in the Hellenistic period, the athlete became increasingly a specialist in one event and a professional, which was to become a source of serious criticism by philosophers and military commanders alike. Plato especially sought to re-orient sport to its original purpose, namely preparation for war (*Resp.* 3, 403), while Alexander saw no value in them as preparation for his warrior's, though following a tradition established by his father, he still encouraged and sponsored athletic festivals as popular spectacles and as a useful symbol of Hellenism and promotion of his military plans.<sup>10</sup>

Despite these changes, however, the abiding impact of the military upon Greek athletics had already been cast and remained evident in several significant dimensions well into the various post-Homeric periods (up to the early Macedonian period), as a vital means in the preparation and training for war as well as by the very nature of the athletic events themselves. Indeed with the spread of Hellenism and the establishment of new cities based along the model and ethos of the

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<sup>8</sup> Pfitzner, *op. cit.* 19-20. As Pfitzner also points out (*ibid.* 20) it was precisely this developed "sacred" nature of the Greek athletic festivals which caused much later Christian polemics against them (e.g. Tertullian), though a tradition of employing athletic metaphors, as a literary vehicle in communicating the Christian message, was established by the apostle Paul and the Pauline School, in continuity with Greek and Roman moral philosophy. Vide ch. 6 of the present study.

<sup>9</sup> Gardiner, *op. cit.* 42-43.

<sup>10</sup> Not only did Philip II sponsor the Panhellenic games but he was also a participant in the Olympiad, and in fact winning the horse race event. Alexander considered Olympia as the capital of the Hellenic world which he was spreading in the Orient. Indeed it was before the multitudes gathered at Olympia in B.C. 324 that Alexander's royal rescript was read declaring his divinity; vide Gardiner, *op. cit.* 45.

classical Greek *polis*, an ethos where athletics and athletic festivals were an integral dimension of life, the Hellenic athletic ideal became internationalized. New athletic festivals were added, gymnasia were built throughout the Hellenistic world and athletic training and education both in the schools and the gymnasia became a normal aspect of life and *paideia* in such regions as Syria,<sup>11</sup> Egypt<sup>12</sup> and to some extent even in Palestine, where in Jerusalem itself Herod I erected an amphitheater, and inaugurated a new athletic festival in honour of Caesar Augustus, much to the chagrin of the more conservative anti-Hellenic elements in Palestine.<sup>13</sup> Winners in the Olympic competition were now more likely to hail from Ephesus, Alexandria, Troas or Seleucia rather than Sparta or Athens. Furthermore despite an initial decline in athletics following the Roman conquests, within the imperial period it experienced a significant revitalization, particularly by Augustus himself.<sup>14</sup> The Panhellenic games were regaining their former glory, including the Olympic Festival, and the crowds once again were flocking to these and other sporting festivals, while the gymnasium and its athletic training remained a lasting symbol of Hellenism. Here athletes trained in accordance to the methods and organization of the Athenian gymnasia and palæstra, which in part were originally aimed for the preparation of the warrior (Epebe training), and competed in events set by the Olympic, Pythian or Isthmian sporting agenda, which in turn were also originally military in character. The military cast of Greek athletics had now spread from the beginning of Hellenistic times into the Orient and North Africa, with such large metropolitan centers as Antioch and Alexandria achieving prominence in the athletic world.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously,

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<sup>11</sup> Vide comments below on the games of Daphne.

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of athletics in the Hellenistic era, vide, B. Kyrkos, *op. cit.* 275-285.

<sup>13</sup> For a discussion of Jewish attitudes to Greek athletes as well as the presence and impact of the latter in Palestine vide, D.A. Harris, *Greek Athletics and the Jews* (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1976), M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism*, 2 vols. trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1974, also R.R. Chambers, *op. cit.* passim.

<sup>14</sup> This Augustan athletic revitalization was basically an eastern phenomenon. Attempts to popularize these festivals in the west were met with superficial acceptance, at least up till the second century (A.D.). To the blood-thirsty Roman spectators used to gladiatorial combats in their agenda of sport, Greek athletics seemed somewhat a tame affair, with the exception of boxing and wrestling. It is interesting that when Roman sages, such as Seneca, employ athletic imagery it is most usually in reference to boxing, wrestling or gladiatorial combat.

<sup>15</sup> During the early part of the second century (B.C.), in Daphne, neighbouring Antioch, an athletic festival was inaugurated by the zealously-Hellenizing monarch Antiochus Epiphanes. In (A.D.) 44, these games received from Elis the honour of being designated as "Olympic," and meticulously followed the rules and administration of Olympia. These games lasted till their abolition in the sixth century. The celebrated Byzantine biblical exegete and preacher, St. John Chrysostom, makes reference to these games in his sermons.

as noted above, during the Greco-Roman period, the major old Panhellenic athletic festivals in Hellas herself were also experiencing a new lease of life. This was particularly evident at Isthmia, under the auspices and sponsorship of a prosperous and cosmopolitan Corinth. When the apostle Paul, during his first Corinthian stay, in the early 50's, witnessed the Isthmian Games, he was observing a revitalized period of Greek athletics, amid events which originally had a military character, and yet whose martial mould could still be felt.<sup>16</sup> It is interesting therefore, that when sages employed military metaphors, they often incorporated athletic imagery,<sup>17</sup> a tradition which would also be followed by the apostle Paul and epistolographical documents of the *Corpus Paulinum*, namely in *Eph.* 6.10-20 and in *2 Tim.* 2.3-5.<sup>18</sup>

**ii. The Abiding Military Character of Greek Athletics:** While it is clear, as I have already explained, that radical changes in the nature of Greek athletics did occur over the post-Homeric periods, nevertheless its original military mould remained unmistakable. To begin with, for the Homeric warrior, athletics served in part to sharpen his military skills. Herodotus several centuries later can constantly refer to the "warlike prowess of athletes."<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, athletics was employed as a means of military training both by Spartans and by Athenians.<sup>20</sup> The Homeric warrior's competitive character in the furious quest for ἀρετή, the desire to excel all others, also became a characteristic feature of athletics with the acquisition of a *sporting* crown becoming one of the most prestigious achievements in any human's life. Furthermore, the use of military language and concepts to describe athletic training and competition also continued. Thus, for instance, in a catalogue of athletic virtues listed by Lucian's Solon in the *Anacharsis*,<sup>21</sup> we find an

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<sup>16</sup> Vide P. Broneer.

<sup>17</sup> For example, Roman Stoics such as Seneca, as well Jews of the Greco-Roman period such as Philo and the author of *4 Macc.*

<sup>18</sup> A discussion of the philosophication of athletic language and imagery is included in this chapter.

<sup>19</sup> T.S. Brown, 'Alexander and Greek Athletics, in Fact and in Fiction,' in K.H. Kinzl (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory* (Berlin, New York, de Gruyter, 1977), 82 n.35.

<sup>20</sup> Vide the relevant discussion on Spartan and Athenian military training below.

<sup>21</sup> The satirist Lucian (ca. A.D. 125-190) lived several centuries after Solon. It is therefore not clear to what extent he preserves actual Solonic tradition. Nevertheless the account found here does most likely correctly depict the world of Athenian athletics and especially that of the gymnasium of the sixth century (B.C.), albeit somewhat idealized. Vide, R.S. Robinson, *Sources for the History of Greek Athletics. In English Translation: With Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, and Indices* (Chicago, Ares, 1984), 62-78.

almost exact re-echoing of the warrior's virtues, including skill, bravery, strength and endurance:<sup>22</sup>

'If it were the time, Anacharsis, for the Olympic or the Isthmian or the Panathenaic games . . . . you yourself sitting in the midst of the spectators, were to see manly perfection . . . . mighty skill, irresistible strength, daring, rivalry, indomitable perseverance / endurance, inexhaustible ardour for victory.' [*Anach.* 12].

Originally, athletics also served as a means of non-fatal competitive combat an ἀγών with recreational aspects for the spectator-warriors on the battlefield. Hence their staging was also connected with military situations. When an army assembled for battle, or when warriors desired to honour a worthy fallen comrade, games were staged. This habit continued in Greek society at least up till the fifth century (B.C.).<sup>23</sup> At times the occasion may be no more than simply a constructive method of passing time for warriors, during a campaign. Thus when Achilles, in his capricious mood remains enclosed within his tent, his men amuse themselves by discus throwing, archery and the throwing of spears (*Il.* 2.774). Hundreds of years later, Xenophon in his record of the march of the Greek mercenary warriors, in enemy territory, towards Hellas, relates that frequently they amused themselves by holding athletic competitions among themselves (*Anab.* 4.8.27). Despite his personal dislike for athletics as a means of military training, Alexander and his warriors, in between battles, also took time to hold athletic competitions, such as the celebrated armed combat contest between Dioxippos of Athens and Koragos the Macedonian officer (*Diod. Sic.* 17.100-101).<sup>24</sup> However nowhere else is the military character of Greek athletics more evident than in its function of preparing the warrior for war - at least up to the dawning of the Hellenistic period. From the very beginning the role of athletics was to serve this function and this continued well into the classical period. The physical strains of war and the sheer weight of the

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<sup>22</sup> Galen the second-century physician (ca. A.D. 130 - 200), in his treatise on the maintenance of health, describes certain physical exercises (some of which were very ancient) in martial language, postulating the need for "strength" and "violence" in some ἀσκήσις: 'Now it is time to turn our consideration to the individual features of the several exercises, making clear from the first that also in these there are several differences . . . . There are some exercises (ἀσκήσεις) which exercises one vigorously, violently . . . . Now by "vigorous" exercise, I mean one performed with strength but without speed; and by "violent" one combining strength with speed.' [*De Sanitate Tuenda* 2.9.10-11].

<sup>23</sup> Harris writes: 'Athletic sports were held at funerals at least as late as the fifth century B.C. especially at the funerals of those killed in war.' *op cit.* 36.

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion concerning Alexander's connection with the world of Greek athletics, vide T.S. Brown, *op. cit.* passim.

armour, shield and weapons (usually sword and spear),<sup>25</sup> demanded a fit and strong warrior who could endure the stress of battle. With reference to this, F.A. Wright observed that individual athletic events served a specific role in the development of physical fitness and strength and ' . . . . taken together they formed a complete and adequate training for what was to an ancient citizen the chief business of life - war . . . . athletics made a soldier nimble and supple . . . . ' <sup>26</sup> Furthermore he continues to explain that at the moment of battle 'All the tricks of the wrestling school and the boxing match were designed for use in this hour . . . . ' <sup>27</sup> In variant degrees, athletic *ἀσκησις* from Homeric times up till the classical era, served continuously as one of the basic means of military training. This is evident from the list of athletic events listed by Homer, most of which are manifestly military in nature - chariot racing,<sup>28</sup> contest in armour, wrestling, boxing, discus throwing,<sup>29</sup> archery, spear casting and racing (in armour). With the rise of the independent Greek *polis*, this list, with its clear military flavour, albeit with certain minor adjustments, remained as fixtures of the warrior's training as well as the sporting agenda of subsequent eras of athletics, namely the era of the organized Panhellenic sporting festivals. Indeed the list of events would even survive into the Roman period, even at the very heart of the empire at Rome, where chariot racing, boxing and wrestling would now be featured alongside the more Romanesque gladiatorial contests and fighting with beats. This was a constant reminder that the original function and setting of athletics was preparation for war - such was the abiding impact of the warrior's world upon Greek athletics!<sup>30</sup> More than any other *polis* it would be Sparta, however, which employed athletics as training and education for warfare, and this reflected in its

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<sup>25</sup> The spears used by Alexander's armies were on the average some twelve feet in length and their effective use required great strength of the arms.

<sup>26</sup> F.A. Wright, *op. cit.* 41-42.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 57.

<sup>28</sup> This was in all probability a reference to war chariots. In actual combat the warrior was the passenger, so as to be free to combat. In the races the warrior became the driver.

<sup>29</sup> In the Homeric poems this was probably no more than a reference to stone throwing. Stones were obviously also used in actual combat as a natural weapon, though this of course is the weapon of the ordinary rather than that of the nobility. In the Patroclus funeral games however the "discus" thrown is described as a "mass of metal" (*Il.* 23.826).

<sup>30</sup> In this connection, though specifically with reference to the hoplite race, H.A. Harris has written (though somewhat wide-sweepingly): 'The hoplite race, or race in armour over 400 yards was reminder that all athletics was in origin preparation for war.' H.A. Harris, *Sport in Greece and Rome: Aspects of Greek and Roman Life* (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1972) 33.

dominance within the early periods of Olympic competition.<sup>31</sup> For Plato, in his blueprint for the ideal society, physical education became an integral aspect of the training of the young between the ages of eighteen and twenty, that is the period of their military training (*Resp.* 3, 403C-4 1 2A), a practice which was already institutionalized in Athens as part of the Ephebe training. Plato thus refers to his subjects of physical training as "athletes of war" or "warrior-athletes" (πολεμικοῖς ἄθλητοῖς),<sup>32</sup> and the purpose of this athletic training is to prepare them for the actual conditions and hardships of military campaigns (στρατεία).<sup>33</sup> Even in the Philipian Macedonian period, the use of athletics as military training was adapted as a means of keeping the warrior fit for battle.<sup>34</sup>

Overall, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the very function of athletics, from Homeric society at least to late classical times, was intrinsically involved in one way or another and in variant degrees, with that of the warrior and warfare. Despite the growth of athletics as an independent realm of endeavour, it never quite managed to completely shake off its primary military mould. In various degrees, it continued to serve the warrior and his warfare, as well as remind the general populace of the merit of martial values such as discipline, training, competition as well as publicly attesting to such originally military attributes as courage and endurance.

### *B. The Warrior's Endurance and the Athlete's Endurance*

**i. Preliminary Remarks - The Military Origins of Athletic Endurance:** Given this military matrix of Greek (and European) athletics, as well as the inter-connection between these two important fields of Greek activity, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable to also discover the impact of the notion of the warrior's endurance upon the world of Greek athletics. While it is true that the vocabulary of endurance is not employed within the Homeric descriptions of athletics, the idea is implicitly present. Thus in the description of the events in which the heroes participated in the funeral games held in honour of the fallen Patroclus - chariot race, boxing, wrestling, contest in

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<sup>31</sup> Vide below.

<sup>32</sup> *Resp.* 404A.

<sup>33</sup> *Resp.* 404A.

<sup>34</sup> T.S. Brown, *op. cit.* 83.



armour, spear throwing, archery and the foot race - the notion of endurance while not explicitly mentioned, is implicitly present, particularly in the sense of perseverance,<sup>35</sup> it is only in a subsequent (post-Homeric) era of Hellenic literary history that the vocabulary of endurance begins to be explicitly invoked, appropriated and incorporated within the semantics of Greek athletic activity, and with reference to Spartan and Athenian athletic training for war. Both descriptions are attested in Plato's writings. Accordingly, a Spartan tradition preserved in the *Laws* refers to the preparation of a warrior's endurance as being causally related to athletic training.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore within Plato's blueprint of an ideal society, as attested in the *Republic*, the athlete and the warrior are identified as one person, who in his capacity both as warrior and athlete is trained from childhood in fortitude or endurance. Thus it would appear that by Spartan times, though most certainly by the sixth century onwards, the vocabulary of endurance, especially as designated by *καρτερία*, is now being explicitly employed in athletic terminology. This suggests an important diachronic point. In the history of Greek and hence western thought, whereas *καρτερία* and the semantics of endurance, in the Homeric literary tradition refer to a military (and epic travel) virtue and context,<sup>37</sup> within the Spartan and Platonic traditions they are also found in an athletic context. It is not unreasonable to surmise from this an appropriation and transfer of this military concept from the world of the warrior to that of athletics. Whereas at first this notion of athletic endurance was essentially tied with that of military training<sup>38</sup> progressively as the world of athletics separates from that of the military so will endurance begin to be referred to as a purely athletic concept or virtue without reference to military activity, of one sort or another. By the time of Aristotle it is clear, from the available literary evidence, that the vocabulary of athletic endurance has now reached an autonomous stage. Athletic endurance no longer needs to be necessarily spoken of as an

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<sup>35</sup>*Il.* 23.256-24.6. Refer also to 'Methodology' in this investigation's 'Introduction.'

<sup>36</sup>*Leg.* 633BC. Vide below.

<sup>37</sup> The vocabulary of endurance is employed by Homer in a predominantly twofold manner; (i) it refers to the warrior and the battlefield (*Iliad*), and (ii) in the context of epic travel, especially as an epithet for Odysseus (*Od.*). However, as I have argued, athletics in Homer is inter-connected more naturally with the warrior than the traveller. For a discussion of the Phaeacian after-dinner games in which Odysseus the traveller participates (*Od.* 8.97-384), vide n.2 of the present chapter. Suffice it to say here that these games are not typically Greek.

<sup>38</sup> Vide below.

aspect of military endurance. Yet despite this semantic autonomy, as I shall explain below, its military background, on various occasions and in various ways, becomes manifestly clear.

**ii. Greek Military Training, Greek Education and Athletic Endurance:**

Athletic exercise formed an important and integral aspect of Greek παιδεία and of the training of the Greek warrior.<sup>39</sup> Thus in Plutarch's account of the sayings of the Theban general Epameinondas (d. B.C. 362) we hear about the inter-connection between athletic training and military drill: 'He used to declare that the hoplites (ὅπλιτων) ought to have their bodies trained (γεγυμνασμένον) not only by athletic exercises (ἀθλητικῶς) but by military drill (στρατικῶς) as well.' (Plutarch *Mor.* 192C).

As I have already explained in my first chapter, the warrior's capacity to demonstrate endurance (and courage) in the battlefield was one of his crucial duties and virtues, and one praised by historiographers, poets, artists and tragedians. Upon this military virtue hinged his own glory and the survival of his *polis*. Towards its development the Greeks employed athletic training and discipline. This is nowhere more evident than in the military training methods of the Spartans and the Athenians.

Towards the socialization of the young in this ideal - endurance (and courage) in battle - as I have already briefly mentioned, the Spartan *polis* developed a communal program of extremely rigorous military training or *agoge* (ἀγωγή).<sup>40</sup> At the very center of this Spartan warrior training was the inculcation of endurance. Thus Mergillos, the Spartan spokesman, describes in Plato's *Laws* some details concerning Spartan youth training. Here, it is also important to notice the close inter-connection between military and athletic endurance. The emerging Spartan warrior's

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<sup>39</sup> Education was also vitally affected by the notion of warfare and the image of the warrior. Thus from Homeric to Greco-Roman times one of the key aims of education was to nurture one who would eventually become a much-enduring warrior and hence a citizen. For a discussion of the impact of the military upon Greek education from the aristocratic-warrior culture and education in Homeric times, to Spartan military education etc. vide H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* ET by G. Lamb (New York, Sheed & Ward, 1956) esp. Part I, *passim*.

<sup>40</sup> In an effort to nurture these basic military values within the consciousness of its young, Spartan educators sought to instill these twin qualities from young age, training their students towards endurance in the face of pain and hardship. This was accomplished by a process of severe social engineering, namely through the removal of the male child from "comfortable" family life and the adaptation of a harsh, disciplined and rigorous barrack community lifestyle. For a useful discussion on the topic of Spartan youth training, vide Jean-Pierre Vernant 'Between Shame and Glory: The Identity of the Young Spartan Warrior' in his *Mortals and Immortals. Collected Essays* (ed.) F.I. Zeitlin (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1991) 219-243; also vide ch. I of the present study.

endurance is, in part, inculcated and maintained through the use of rigorous athletic training and contests:

' . . . . . the training, widely prevalent among us, in endurance of pain (καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδόνων), by means both of manual combat (ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις) and of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound drubbing; moreover, the "Crypteia" (κρυπτεία) [i.e. secret service] as it is called, affords a wonderfully severe training in endurance (πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις), as they go barefoot in winter and sleep without covers and have no attendants but wait on themselves and rove through the whole countryside both by night and day. Moreover in our [athletic] games / contests, we have severe tests of endurance (δειναὶ καρτερήσεις) . . . . . ' [Leg. 633BC].

In Lucian's *Anacharsis* which presumably preserves certain sixth-century (B.C.) athletic traditions, where the major focus is on Athenian athletics, nevertheless a brief description is given of Spartan athletic training, as part of the overall Spartan program of the preparation of the warrior. Again the idea of promoting endurance among the young is emphasized. Indeed in this training and discipline of endurance, the father and mother themselves play an active role in encouraging and exhorting the young athlete-warrior son towards greater endurance in pain and hardship, even threatening him to greater punishments if he does not demonstrate a brave endurance under the torture. From a Greek perspective the picture of the Spartan mother here is certainly one who goes "beyond her gender" by not showing "distress:"

'Above all, do not laugh if you see them (young athlete-warriors) getting flogged at the altar and dripping blood while their fathers and mothers stand by and are so far from being distressed by what is going on that they actually threaten to punish them if they should not endure under the stripes, and exhort them to endure the pain as long as possible and be staunch under the torture.' [Anach. 38].

Plato also saw the profit of athletic exercise in the development of the warrior's endurance. In describing the training of the warrior he explains the need to exercise endurance through athletic discipline. It is interesting that the kind of endurance described here is that of the capacity to face the harsh natural elements (besides the human opposition) such as heat and cold, which a warrior meets in any military campaign:

' . . . . . a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; among the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break . . . . . ' [Resp. 3.411].

While admitting the benefit of athletic training in the education of the young, which constituted an integral aspect of his blueprint for the ideal state, nevertheless for Plato athletic exercises and training can never be fully separated from their original military purpose and context, namely the

preparation of the warrior (*Resp.* 403, 410B). Indeed Plato became a social critic of his time in connection with what he perceived become a social evil, namely the exaggerated importance given to athletic competition.

Aristotle emphasized the necessity of young children's physical firmness by means of exposure to the elements as a pre-requisite for developing fortitude in future military training and service: 'Young children should be kept healthy by exposure: to accustom children to the cold is an excellent practice which greatly conduces to health and hardens them for military service.' [*Eth. Eud.*]

**iii. The Notion of Athletic Endurance as Autonomous Sports Concept.** With the separation of the battlefield and the gymnasium, however, the concept of endurance would also become an athletic value in its own right, despite its original matrix as an aspect of the warrior's endurance. Thus in Lucian's *Anacharsis*, an account of Athenian athletic training in the days of Solon,<sup>41</sup> presented in the form of a dialogue between the enquiring Scythian sage Anacharsis and Solon, the notion of athletic endurance is presented as an ongoing aspect of sixth-century education and athletics, not necessarily tied to military goals. In discussing the nature of the sporting prizes awarded at the Panhellenic festivals, the Scythian is amazed at the hardships and pain that athletes endure in their preparation and labours towards their attainment:

' . . . . they will endure all these preliminary hardships and risks, getting choked and broken in two by one another, for apples and parsley, as if it were not possible for anyone who wants them to get plenty of apples without any trouble . . . . ' [*Anach.* 9.].

This causes Lucian's Solon to provide the Athenian ideal concerning the athlete's endurance of hardship in the light of such apparently paltry prizes - the prizes are tokens. The fame of the victor is in recognition of the exertion and display of endurance in the hardships of the gymnasium's athletic training (ἄσκησις). Only by the endurance of such unpleasantness and pain can the athlete expect to attain the fame which accompanies the "prize":

'But my dear fellow, it is not the simple gifts that we have in view! They are merely tokens of the victory and marks to identify the winners. But the reputation that goes with them is worth everything to the victors and to attain it, even to be kicked is nothing to men who seek to capture fame through hardships. Without hardships [in training] it cannot be acquired; the man who covets it must endure many

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<sup>41</sup> Vide n. 21 in present chapter.

unpleasantness in the beginning before at last he can expect the profitable and delightful outcome of his exertions.' [*Anach.* 10].

The cost of victory for the ultimate athletic prize - an Olympic crown (in wrestling), the price one must pay, the level of endurance in the hardships of training and discipline necessary to develop and sharpen skills, is re-echoed by Epictetus who provides us with a glimpse into the austere life of an athlete, reminiscent of the Spartan warrior-athlete:

'Do you wish to win an Olympic victory'? So do I, by the gods, for it is a fine thing. But consider the matters that come before that, and those which follow after, and only when you have done that, put your hand to the task. You have to submit to discipline, follow a strict diet, give up sweet cakes, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour in heat or in cold; you must not drink cold water, nor wine whenever you just feel like it, you must submit yourself to your trainer as you would do to a physician. Then when the contest comes on, you have to "dig in" beside your opponent, sometimes dislocate your wrist, sprain your ankle, swallow quantities of sand, take a scourging, yes and then sometimes get beaten along with all that. After you have counted up these points, go on into the games, if you still wish to . . . . ' [Epictetus *Disc.* 3.15.2-5].

Athletic endurance in its exclusively sporting understanding, as Epictetus implies, not only applies to the athlete's *ἀσκησις*, but also to his performance in the actual event itself. For example, Aristotle in the fourth-century employs the notion with reference to an athlete's capability in an actual race, presumably the long-distance competition, the *dolichos*:<sup>42</sup> 'In a young man it [i.e. beauty] consists in possessing a body capable of enduring all pains / labours (τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον), either of the race track or of bodily strength . . . . ' [*Rhet.* 1.5.11].

Nevertheless, in the final analysis Spartan and Athenian athletics were aimed towards its ultimate end - the preparation and constant training of the warrior. This is clearly borne out in the Lucianic Solon's account of the overall context and aim of athletic training in endurance, as well as the other athletic *ἀρεταὶ*. When Solon is questioned by Anacharsis concerning the waste of time, effort and endurance exerted by the athletes, since they are not facing any foreign threat, Solon

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<sup>42</sup> Of all types of Greek running events, this was the one which tested the athlete's endurance to its limit. At Olympia this was a 24 stades race.

reveals the true nature of Athenian athlete, his endurance and the role of the gymnasium's *paideia* - preparation for war and the defence of individual and collective (*polis*) freedom:

**Anach.** ' . . . . Solon . . . . these things which you have enumerated - the physical perfection . . . . the daring - are being wasted . . . . without any great object in view, since your country is not in peril, nor your farmlands ravaged. So the competitors . . . . endure so much for nothing, making themselves miserable . . . . '

**Sol.** ' . . . . I shall now tell you what we think about our young men, and how we deal with them from the time they begin to know good from bad, to be physically mature, and to endure hardships, in order that you may learn why we prescribe these exercises and compel them to train their bodies. It is not simply on account of the contests, in order that they may be able to take the prizes . . . . we seek a certain greater good from it for the entire state . . . . freedom for each individual singly and for the state in general . . . . ' [*Anach.* 13-15].

For Solon this freedom is in part achieved through the successful exercise of war. Athletics serve precisely this purpose by developing the warrior's endurance (and other skills) in battle through training in athletic endurance and other forms of *ἀσκησις*. For Lucian's Solon, those athletic items which are regarded as best training in promoting the athlete's and hence the warrior's endurance, are wrestling, boxing and long-distance running: 'Furthermore we train them to be good runners, habituating them to endure / hold out for a long distance.' [*Anach.* 27].

Nevertheless, boxing and wrestling are identified as most conducive to inculcating the basic element of the warrior's endurance, namely not recoiling from the attacks of the opponent out of fear, but rather standing firm and hence securing Athenian freedom:

**Sol.** ' . . . . having invented many forms of athletics and appointed teachers for each, we teach one for instance, boxing, and another the pancratium, in order that they may become accustomed to endure hardships and to meet blows and not recoil for fear of injuries . . . . Those of them who put their bent heads together and wrestle learn to fall safely and get up easily, to push grip and twist in various ways, to endure being choked and to lift their opponents high in the air. They too are not engaging in useless exercises . . . . they become expert as a result of it, in case they should ever come to need what they have learned in battle . . . . For we make all these preparations, Anacharsis, with a view to that contest, the contest under arms, and we expect to find men thus disciplined far superior . . . . for their opponents . . . . That Anacharsis is the training we give our young men, expecting them to become stout guardians of our city, and that we shall live in freedom through them conquering foes if they attack us . . . . ' [*Anachar.* 24-30].

However, Solon does give other rationales for the institution of athletics and the developing of athletic skills, including endurance, in times of peace. Here the aim of athletics is presented in socio-political terms - as a means to occupy the energies and time of the people. Yet even here this is never totally distanced from a military context.

**iv. Athletic Endurance: Uniquely Greek Notion:** It is important to note, in closing this section that the notion of athletics and hence that of athletic endurance must be viewed diachronically and synchronically (with the apostle Paul's times) as uniquely Greek. This is clearly borne out not only in Lucian's dialogue between the Athenian Solon and the Scythian interlocutor Anacharsis who finds the entire endeavour as alien and incomprehensible,<sup>43</sup> but also by the hostile attitudes held towards them by certain ethnic groups in the Mediterranean such as certain pockets of ultra-conservative Palestinian Jews<sup>44</sup> and even the Italian Romans in the pre-Augustan period and to some extent in the Augustan and post-Augustan age, despite the Actiads.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, so

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<sup>43</sup> Other cultures which trained their children for warfare did not incorporate athletics in the development of such military attributes as courage and endurance. For instance, concerning Parthian, German or ancient Roman military παιδεία, Seneca explains to Lucilius that: 'If your friend had been born in Parthia, he would have begun, when a child, to bend the bow; if in Germany, he would forthwith have been brandishing his slender spear; if he had been born in the days of our forefathers, he would have learned to ride a horse and smite his enemy...' [*Ep.* 36.7].

<sup>44</sup> For a discussion, vide R.R. Chambers, *Greek Athletics and the Jews, 165 B.C. - A.D. 70* Ph.D. Dissertation, Miami, Ohio: Miami Univ. 1980; also, H.A. Harris, *Greek Athletics and the Jews* Trivium Special Publ. 3 (Cardiff, Univ. of Wales Press, 1976). It must be remembered however that not all Jews were hostile to the Greek athletic ideals. To begin with, archaeological excavations have pointed to an apparent association between the synagogues at Sardis and Delos and the gymnasium or stadium. Indeed we find among the lists of Ephebes (who also trained in athletics) names of young Jews, no doubt encouraged by their parents. Furthermore, as Chambers points out, accommodation to or participation in Greek athletic ideals, was a means of entering the mainstream of Greco-Roman society, especially for upwardly mobile Jews who sought to enter the ranks of the socially elite aristocracy. Their participation in athletics and the gymnasium, in a very real sense, designated their full integration and acceptance into the cultural values of Greco-Roman society, very reminiscent of today's largest multi-cultural nations such as the U.S.A. or Australia, where a child of an immigrant or minority group would zealously embrace and seek to excel in baseball or cricket, respectively - as unique cultural symbols of their society - as an instrument and badge of social integration. By surrendering in part to this "other dominant culture" social mobility is assured. Indeed Jewish scholars such as Philo and Josephus would also use metaphors drawn from Greek athletics in their writings, a rhetorical device which would also be followed in more explicitly religious writings as found in the Talmudic tradition as well as by those of a former Pharisee, namely Paul of Tarsus, as a means of illustrating, among other themes, Christian discipline and heroism. Vide Pfitzner, *op. cit.*

<sup>45</sup> N.K. Petrochilos, *Roman Attitudes to the Greeks*, Πανεπιστ. Ἀθην. Θιλ. Σχολ. Βιβλ. S.N. Saripolou 25 (Athens, 1975). Gardiner *op. cit.* explains that the Italian Romans both in the pre-Augustan period as well as in the first-century (A.D.) looked with some suspicion and contempt upon Greek athletics. The emperors and the Italian aristocracy, nevertheless tolerated them because of their potential value: ' . . . . the Romans, though they looked on athletics with contempt, realized the value of the festivals . . . . when Augustus restored peace to the troubled world a new era of prosperity began. The old festivals were restored to their former splendour, new festivals multiplied on every hand and a wave of athleticism began culminating in the second century under Hadrian.' 45. This popularity was of course reserved for the eastern portion of the empire - the former Hellenistic world. For the Roman crowd, as I have already noted, it would be boxing, wrestling and chariot racing which held the most attraction among all Greek athletic events. But even these needed the addition of gladiatorial shows to make them popular attractions. It does appear however that Augustus did have an attraction for Greek athletics: 'Augustus seems to have had a genuine liking for athletics, unusual in a Roman.' *ibid.* 47. Despite the inauguration of athletic festivals in Italy, such as the Actiads (at Rome) and the Augustalia (at Neapolis / Naples) the western Roman public never quite took a natural sympathy to the less violent aspects of Greek athletics. Gardiner explains: 'The athletic movement initiated by Augustus was, at least as far as Italy was concerned, purely artificial. The athletic festival was nothing more than a show. In the first century of our era they still regarded the Greeks with a certain contempt, and despised Greek athletics.' *ibid.* 49.

thoroughly Hellenic was the world of athletics, that when the Greeks of the eastern provinces of the Roman empire sought to designate their unique identity as "Greeks," they settled for an interesting though sufficiently distinctive if not revealing self-definitional appellation, drawn precisely from what was conceived as the unique badge and symbolisms of "Greekness" - the world of the athlete! Accordingly they ethnically described themselves as "those from the gymnasium." The uniqueness of Greek athletics is emphasized by Lucian:

'It is only natural Anacharsis that what they [i.e. the Athenian athletes] are doing should have that [i.e. negative] appearance to you, since it is unfamiliar and very much in contrast with Scythian customs. In like manner you yourselves have much in your education and training which would appear strange to us Greeks . . . . But have no fear . . . . it is not insanity, and it is not out of brutality that they strike one another . . . . It has a certain usefulness . . . . and it gives much strenght to their bodies . . . . '

[*Anach.* 6].

Unlike the idea of the warrior's endurance which is also found, in Hebraic and Roman cultures,<sup>46</sup> the idea of the athlete's endurance is distinctively Greek in origins and remained so right up to the first century (A.D.), the century of the apostle Paul's missionary and writing activities, being popularly appreciated essentially in the eastern regions of the empire. In conclusion, it seems safe to say that any appropriation of this notion whether in a military context (i.e. mixed military and athletic language) or as an autonomous virtue (i.e. athletic endurance without reference to a military context), must be considered as eventually Greek in origins.

## II. The Philosophication of the Athlete's Endurance

### A. *The Greek Sage, Athletic Language, Imagery and Endurance*

**i. Prologue:** As with the philosophical appropriation of military imagery, language and concepts, including that of endurance, so too we find a parallel process of the philosophication of athletic imagery and ideas (including that of endurance) for illustrative, psychagogic and instructive purposes in moral exhortation. This is not surprising given the close inter-connection and

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<sup>46</sup> Vide Appendix 1. However the idea of the warrior's endurance as a metaphoric illustration of moral endurance is also uniquely Greek. It is hardly found in the Hebrew Scripture. Its incorporation into early Jewish literature can clearly be traced to the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period as a direct result of the intellectual impact of Hellas upon Jewish life and thinking. Likewise the notion of the warrior's endurance as a moral metaphor is also found in Roman philosophy (esp. Stoic), as I have demonstrated in the preceding chapter. It is in direct continuity and influence with older Greek philosophical traditions. On the other hand, while Greek athletics and gymnasia were introduced into Jewish life during the Seleucid period, the notion of the athlete's endurance as a moral metaphor will occur late in early Jewish literature (e.g. *4 Macc.*, *T. Job*, as well as in some of Philo's essays), that is, about a century following the Maccabean and Hasidic reaction to the Seleucid Hellenization programs. Vide R. Chambers, *op. cit.* passim.



similarities, as I have already explained, between the military and athletic worlds: (i) as in matters military, so *too* the athletics was a widespread and commonplace phenomenon within the Greek-speaking world. (ii) Its values, symbols and concepts (which for the most part derive from the military world) were readily understood by the popular culture. (iii) The deeds of the much-enduring victorious athlete were just as readily lauded by the populace as those of heroic much-enduring warriors. (iv) Both athlete and warrior shared similar concerns, situations of adversity, pain, hardship and suffering and the need to demonstrate endurance and skill, as well as notions of training, discipline, self-denial and the overarching Greek ideal of "struggle" (ἀγών), a notion which it shared with the military world,<sup>47</sup> while also providing certain new dimensions to the "agonistic" motif, such as the notion of "competition" and the symbol of the "prize." Accordingly the athletic metaphor (like the military metaphor) lent itself perfectly with the philosophic idea of the sage's agonistic ideals of "training" (ἄσκησις), "pain" / "hardship" (πόνους) as well as his virtue of endurance (ὑπομονή). Furthermore it added the nuance of the sage's ἀγών in the sense of "contest" or "competition" and victorious "crowning" or "prize" (στέφανος). Consequently, as in the case of military attributes and images, it would not be long before the philosopher showed some interest in the athletic endeavour which, as I have already noted, also incorporated within its language and conceptualizations the idea of aggressive masculine endurance under hardship, pain and adversity.<sup>48</sup> The sage now became the "real athlete" in competition or in conflict with inner or outer opponents to his soul - desires, vainglory, cowardice and other vices, and in pursuit of the "prize" of preserving his virtues. A distinction between the military and athletic metaphor, however, at times lay in the notion of conflict. While military metaphors in moral essays, almost universally carried the idea of conflict, athletic metaphors on the other hand were more naturally oriented, for the most part, to that of competition. To be sure, however, combative athletic events

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<sup>47</sup> The mere presence of the term "ἀγών" does not necessarily denote an athletic context, whether metaphoric or actual. This term is associated in ancient Greece with the idea of the athletic "struggle" and "contest" as well as the designation of the various Panhellenic "games," nevertheless was employed in military situations. The context of its usage determines the field of endeavour it designates.

<sup>48</sup> Concerning the impact of athletics upon philosophy Pfitzner has observed: "It is significant that the more important gymnasia, for example the Lyceum and the Academy, also became centers of intellectual training and philosophy, in which . . . . Plato and Aristotle taught." V.C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif* (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1967), 23.

such as wrestling, boxing and armed combat, that is those events most clearly preserving the battlefield context of Greek athletics, when used in metaphors, could substitute for military metaphors, for they too also suggested the theme of conflict.

Despite the similarities between the military and athletic use of the philosophical and military metaphor (or language), it would nevertheless appear that in the sage's discussion and presentation of the idea of moral endurance, the military metaphors were more abundant and more popular than athletic ones, particularly among the classical philosophers. This may perhaps be linked with the initial negative or reserved perspective by which athletics was held by the sages.<sup>49</sup> Greek thinkers such as Tyrtaeus, followed by presocratics like Democritus, the Sophists and the tragedians, viewed athletics as an inferior activity, pre-occupied with the physical. While this pejorative idea prevailed in subsequent expressions of Greek philosophy, especially inflamed by the increased professionalism in sport, nevertheless athletic imagery did begin to be employed in an idealized and favourable sense when directed towards a metaphor vividly illustrating various aspects of the sage's struggles. A few examples from the time of the apostle Paul will suffice to illustrate this point. Thus in his essay concerning the value of advice (*Ep.* 94), Seneca, building upon the teachings of Aristo the Stoic, concerning the value of philosophy and the Supreme Good as the ultimate adviser of humanity, rather than "old wives' precepts," draws an illustrative parallel between the training of the javelin thrower and the sage. The sage, instructed by philosophy, knows how to deal with any particular problem of life, not with random solutions but with precise and deliberate aim is like the javelin thrower who has been instructed and trained with a fixed rather than random targets and his gradual acquisition of expertise and ability in his precise aiming at other targets (*Ep.* 94.3). Again he illustrates the sage's joy at meeting death under torture or pain like the joy of a charioteer in his final or home stretch, who knows that the "prize" is at hand (*Ep.* 30.12-13). In another letter-essay (*Ep.* 34), concerning the psychagogue's joy derived from

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<sup>49</sup> It is interesting to note that while Plato appears to have been influenced by the warrior's endurance as a philosophical ideal, the Cynics appear to have emphasized the image of athletic endurance. Vide M.O. Goulet-Caze, *L'ascèse Cynique: Un Commentaire de Diogene Laërce VI 70-71* (Paris, J. Vrin, 1986) passim. Nevertheless, the philosophical tradition of the presocratics, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, viewing the sage as the superior in his moral "athletics" over the physical athlete, continued. The Cynic sage was portrayed as the "true athlete" in his moral "struggle" (e.g. Diog. Laertius' portrayal of Diogenes of Sinoppe).

watching the moral and character progress of a promising pupil, Seneca explains to Lucilius that his role is now one of a "spectator" in a stadium watching a "race" in which Lucilius is competing, whose role is to cheer and encourage him on to victory. In turn he feels that Lucilius is cheering him on in his own "race" (*Ep.* 34.2).

Unlike the appropriation of military metaphors and language within Greek philosophy, the philosophication process of athletics has attracted weighty scholarly attention.<sup>50</sup> Another discussion here is therefore not necessary. What I intend therefore, in the present discussion, is simply to provide in abbreviated form the most relevant and significant points of this process,<sup>51</sup> with particular interest in the notion of endurance.

**ii. A Diachronic Synopsis of the Greek Philosophication of Athletic Endurance:** There appears to have been some reaction among Greek thinkers, at first, concerning the benefit of athletics. Already in the seventh century (B.C.) the pro-military elegiac Spartan poet Tyrtaeus,<sup>52</sup> emphasizes the superiority of the warrior's virtues (which as I have already pointed out, for him were *par excellence* courage and endurance), over those of the athlete.<sup>53</sup> For Tyrtaeus it was the military virtues in battle (esp. courage and endurance) rather than athletic achievements in running or wrestling or physical built, which were of more benefit to the polis, and which, as I have already noted constituted the Spartan citizen's primary obligation.<sup>54</sup> In the sixth century (B.C.) Xenophantes re-echoed Tyrtaeus' polis-consciousness, asserting that "wisdom" (σοφία) rather than athletic endeavours which was of utmost value to the polis.<sup>55</sup> The presocratic Democritus, in what appears to have been a polemical statement against pre-occupation with physical training (military or athletic), emphasized the superiority of activities of reason and the soul over the physical:

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<sup>50</sup> V.C. Pfitzner, *op. cit.* ch. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Much of the discussion in this part of the chapter, relies on the work of V.C. Pfitzner, *op. cit.* ch. 2.

<sup>52</sup> According to Plato, Tyrtaeus was an Athenian by birth, who later became a citizen (πολίτην) of Sparta (*Leg.* 629A). However scholars have questioned this on the grounds that as a general of the Spartans leading the Spartan army in the Second Messenian War he would not have been tolerated by his soldiers; vide C.M. Bowra 'Tyrtaeus,' in *OCD* 1102. Tyrtaeus is thus a warrior-poet.

<sup>53</sup> Vide Tyrtaeus 12.11 ff., here cited from Pfitzner *op. cit.* 24 n.3.

<sup>54</sup> Tyrtaeus 12.1ff in T. Bergk (ed.) *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* II pp. 17f, cited from Pfitzner *op. cit.* 24 n.3.

<sup>55</sup> Pfitzner, *op. cit.* 24-25. Xenophantes Frag. 2B.

'For humans it is more fitting to pay more attention to the soul than the body (ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος). Because the excellence of the soul directs correctly the weakness of the body. But the strength of the body without reason (ἀνευ λογισμοῦ), does not make it better . . . . '56

In the classical period, not only the Sophists but also the tragedians, on occasions, undertook caustic polemics against athletics.<sup>57</sup> As I have already pointed out, Plato did see a positive role for physical training when directed to the agenda of preparing the warrior and sage-Guardian (φίλακος). Nevertheless he could not envisage a role for the contemporary methods of athletic training, perceiving them as unhealthy and unsuitable in the training of the alert much-enduring warrior (*Resp.* 404A). Indeed Plato distinguishes between his "athlete-warrior" and the "ordinary athlete" (ἄλλοι ἄθληται).<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, despite this prevailing attitude to professional athletics, the Greek sages would begin to borrow from the language of an "idealized" athletics, subjecting it into the service of moral philosophy for metaphoric or illustrative purposes. Thus Plato can describe the future "guardians" (φίλακοι) in their training as "athletes in the greatest of contests" (ἄθληται . . . . τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος).<sup>59</sup> Within Aristotle's intricate ethical system there is no hesitation to employ athletic imagery and language to illustrate certain principles. Two such examples from within his discussion on the meaning of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) in Book I of his *Nic. Ethics*, are noteworthy. The first one functions in a non-ethical context primarily to make his argument clear. Thus in seeking to explain his methodological principle, that learners ought to start from the known, from beliefs with which they accept or at least are familiar, Aristotle illustrates his point by drawing from the world of athletics:

'We must not overlook the difference that it makes whether we argue *from* or *to* first principles. Plato too used very properly to raise this question enquiring whether the procedure was from or just as in a stadium (ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ) the contestants run either from the judges' stand (τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν) to the far end or in the reverse direction.' [*Nic. Ethics* I.45].

<sup>56</sup> Diels *op. cit.* p. 192, lines 17ff., cited from Pfitzner *op. cit.* 25.

<sup>57</sup> For example Euripides (Frag. 282N), Sophocles *Ajax* (1250); vide Pfitzner *op. cit.* 24 n.2.

<sup>58</sup> *Resp.* 410B.

<sup>59</sup> *Resp.* 403E. As in the case of the philosophication of military values such as courage and endurance, so here too, Plato played a role. It would seem that one of the earliest depictions of the philosophical life in terms of an (athletic) ἀγών, occurs in the *Georgias*. Here Plato's Socrates summarizes his philosophic aim enquiry into truth and a βέλτιστος life - in terms of an "ἀγῶνα" (contest), higher than any other ἀγών, and exhorts others to follow suit (526DE). Plato saw a role for athletics, under proper conditions, in the education of the young (*Resp.* 410C ff.).

Subsequently in the context of an ethical argument concerning the meaning of happiness as activity in accordance to virtue, Aristotle offers a distinction between supposing the supreme good (τὸ ἄριστον) 'as consisting in the possession or in the displaying it: in a state of mind or in an activity (ἐνεργεία).'<sup>60</sup> Aristotle argues in support of the activity of virtue, of the manifestation of a virtuous disposition over mere possession. Here again Aristotle draws upon an athletic illustration to demonstrate his ethical point. What is of interest in this athletic illustration is that the virtuous life of action is represented metaphorically with one who "competes" or "contests" in the "Olympic Games" and is bestowed with a winner's "wreath" or athletic "prize" because of his endeavour:

'Just as at the Olympic Games (ὡς περ δ' Ὀλυμπιάσιν) it is not the handsomest and strongest persons present who are bestowed with the victory wreath (στεφανοῦνται), but men who enter for the competitions (οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι) - since it is among these that the winners (νικῶσιν) are found - so it is those who act rightly (οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς) who carry off the prizes and good things of life.' [*Nic. Ethics* I.8.9].

Already with Aristotle, as Pfitzner points out, one finds within Greek philosophy the full range of imagery and concepts which would become a standard topos within Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Cynic and Stoic moral exhortation, including the idea of endurance. Thus Aristotle in his discussion on courage in relation to pleasure and pain explains that courage is more praiseworthy and nobler in the endurance of pain or grief than in the easier task, namely abstinence from pleasure.<sup>61</sup> To the objection that the end of such an exercise of much-enduring courage is pleasant, Aristotle qualifies the objection through an illustration from the world of Greek athletics, specifically boxing. The end may in fact be painful and appear to contain no pleasure at all, just as in the case of the victorious boxer, so too the courageous sage, the end may not feel pleasurable but will endure the pain, even unwillingly, for it is the noble thing to do:

' . . . . . people are called courageous for enduring pain / grief (τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν). Here courage implies the presence of pain, and it is rightly praised because it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. It may of course be thought that the end (τέλος) of an act that involves courage is pleasant, but that this fact is obscured by the antecedent circumstances just as happens in athletic contests.

The end or purpose of the boxers, that is the wreath and the honours of victory, is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them . . . . . and also all the pain or labour (πόνοσ) they undergo is painful. Incidents are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears to contain no pleasure at all.

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<sup>60</sup> *Nic. Ethics*

<sup>61</sup> Here again, we observe the Aristotelian link between courage and endurance; vide ch. 2 of the present work.

If then the same is true of courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them, because it is noble to do so (ὕπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλόν).' [Nic. Ethics 3.9.1-4].

*B. A Synchronic Analysis:  
The Stoic Sage or Proficiens as Athlete of Moral Endurance*

To begin with, it is important to note that for the later moral philosophers, the already established presocratic, Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical tradition stressing the superiority of philosophical or rational activity over matters physical, is clearly affirmed. Seneca for instance, in one his letter-essays to Lucilius, Seneca tackles this theme in a direct and explicit manner. He exhorts Lucilius not to waste too much time with physical exercises or matters concerning the well-being of the body, rather he ought to focus more of his attention upon "exercising" the mind, through philosophical study:

Now there are short and simple exercises which exhaust the body rapidly, and so save our time . . . . .  
These exercises are running, brandishing weights, and jumping - high jumping or broad jumping - . . . . .  
But whatever you do come back soon from body to mind. The mind must be exercised (exerce) both day and night . . . . . ' [Ep. 15.4-5].

On the other hand, as in the case of the older philosophers, the world of the athlete is presented in a positive and idealized format when metaphors are drawn to illustrate aspects of the agonistic sage or to show the sage as the "real athlete." This is done in one of two ways: (i) It is the sage rather than the Panhellenic professional athlete who now represents and embodies all the finest ideals, values and virtues of the athletic world. (ii) An idealized athletic stage is propped up as a comparative backdrop to the sage's struggles for illustrative purposes. Again, re-echoing the military metaphor of endurance, where the sage was depicted as a much-enduring warrior, so too now the sage is portrayed as the authentic athlete of endurance. A few illustrations shed light on this trend, which accelerated in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman moral exhortation.

For the Stoic Seneca, as I have discussed previously, the sage's engagement with hostile external circumstances was depicted with the assistance of the military metaphor, in terms of the sage or *proficiens*, as a much-enduring warrior engaged in combat with the adversarial Fortuna. Seneca, however does not restrict this motif to military imagery, but also employs the more combative athletic events, to make the same point. Accordingly in *Ep.* 13, he compares the earnest

*proficiens* seeking to build up his endurance and preserve his freedom from the yoke of slavery of externals, as a prize-winning fighter in opposition to the blows initiated by Fortuna. Victory can only be achieved through a spirit of persevering endurance - through standing one's ground as many times as one is knocked down, and never surrendering. As in the case of endurance in battle, so too the much-enduring prize fighter is presented as a figure of the sage's or *proficiens* manliness. Endurance as a moral virtue illustrated by athletic metaphors need not necessarily signal a de-emphasizing of its aggressive, or manly qualities. It is interesting that in this example, Seneca explicitly describes this illustration drawn from the athletic world by its technical rhetorical nomenclature, *similitudinem* (similitude or metaphor):

'It is only in this way that the true spirit can be tested - the spirit that will never consent to come under the jurisdiction of things external to ourselves. This is the touchstone of such a spirit; no prize fighter can go with high spirits into the strife if he has never been beaten black and blue; the only contestant who can confidently enter the lists is the man who has seen his own blood, who has felt his teeth rattle beneath his opponent's fist . . . . who has been downed in body but not in spirit, one who as often as he falls, rises again with greater defiance than ever. So then, to keep up my metaphor (*similitudinem*), Fortune has often in the past, got the upper hand of you, and yet you have not surrendered, but have leapt up, and stood your ground, still more eagerly. For manliness gains much strength by being challenged . . . . ' [Ep. 13.1-3].

The theme of victorious endurance described in athletic metaphor is repeated by Seneca in *Ep.* 78. Seneca advises Lucilius that the recollection of past suffering and the fear of future suffering needs to be fought. In this attack, as well as present suffering, he must stand his ground and endure the blows as an athlete who through his desire for fame and victory endures all manner of suffering and torture. Yet in contrast to the athlete the much-enduring *proficiens'* prize is permanent and more significant than a simple garland:

'Let such a man fight against them with all his might. If he once gives way, he will be vanquished. But if he strives against his sufferings, he will conquer . . . . if you hold your ground and make up your mind to push against it, it will be forced back. What blows do athletes receive on their faces and all over their bodies! Nevertheless through their desire for fame they endure every torture (*ferant tamen omne tormentum*), and they undergo these things not only because they are fighting but in order to be able to fight. Their very training means torture. So let us also win the way to victory in all our struggles - for the reward is not a garland or a palm or a trumpeter who calls for silence at the proclamation of our names - but rather virtue, steadfastness of soul and a peace that is won for all time, if Fortune has been vanquished in any combat.' [Ep. 78.16].

In the struggles against the unpreferred indifferents, Seneca also employs illustrative images of endurance, or its absence, within athletic competition. Thus in describing the elderly Aufidius Bassus and his suffering from ill-health as well as the physical effects of his advanced years,

Seneca borrows from the world of athletics to make his point to Lucilius. He compares Aufidius to a wrestler lacking in endurance, unable to bear the sheer weight of his opponent, being overwhelmed and hence gradually losing the contest, by his inability to stand his ground:

I have beheld Aufidius Bassus, that noble man, shattered in health and wrestling with his years. But they already bear upon him so heavily that he cannot be raised up. Old age has settled down upon him with great, yes with its entire weight.' [Ep.30.1].

In his essay on the firmness of the soul of the sage (*Constant.*), Seneca supplements his metaphors of the much-enduring sage drawn from the military world, with several comparisons from the athletic world. As the sage is like a warrior who trains in endurance, so too he is like an athlete who exercises his endurance (and courage). Accordingly he explains that through his endurance the sage protects his soul from all injuries. In this the sage is like a combatant athlete (boxer or wrestler) who wins against his opposition through sheer endurance, which exhausts his opponent. Such a victorious endurance whether in the case of the athlete or the sage - has in fact been developed through long and disciplined training (*exercitatione*). As Fitzgerald observes, "The trained sage is thus totally prepared and as such he is like the trained athlete, eager and ready for the agon."<sup>62</sup>

'....the wise man may cast all injuries far from him and by his endurance and his greatness of soul protect himself from them. Just as in the sacred games men have won the victory by wearing out the hands of their assailants through stubborn endurance. Do you then reckon the wise man in this class of men - the men who by long and faithful training have attained the strength to endure and tire out any assault of the enemy.' [Constant. 9.5].

Within Roman Stoicism, not surprisingly one finds athletic metaphors of endurance, drawn from Roman sporting events or shows, such as the gladiatorial contests. Accordingly Seneca uses an illustration from an old Roman proverb concerning gladiatorial contest to demonstrate a psychagogic problem the sage faces in advising by letter. While he can lay out general rules he needs to be present to an actual situation before he can give more specific counsel. In this he is like

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<sup>62</sup> Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 93. Epictetus the Stoic, likewise emphasizes the notion of ἀσκήσις in moral development and in endurance. Thus in his essay concerning training of the wise man (Περὶ ἀσκήσεως), he exhorts that through "training" one can endure being reviled (λοιδορούμενος ἀνέχεσθαι) (*Disc.* 3.12.10). For an important discussion on the ἀσκήσις of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman sage, including the idea of endurance, vide 'The Sage's Andreia, Action and Askesis,' Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 87-100; B.L. Hijmans, ἌΣΚΗΣΙΣ; *Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (Assen, Van Gorcum, 1959), also, P. Hadot, *Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie Antique*, second edition, Paris, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1987). Concerning the history of the notion of ἀσκήσις, vide H. Dressler, *The Usage of Ἀσκέω and its Cognates in Greek Documents up to 100 A.D.* (Washington D.C., Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1947)



a gladiator who in the course of the actual combat watches intently his adversary's glance or movements in order to plan his strategy in the deadly contest (*Ep.* 22.1).<sup>63</sup> In *Ep.* 37, Seneca makes further usage of the gladiatorial world to illustrate the life of the sage or the *proficiens*. Lucilius as an aspirant to wisdom has undertaken a solemn oath of endurance and courage, as does a gladiator, promising to endure through burning, imprisonment, or death by the sword (37.2).<sup>64</sup> The *proficiens*, however, unlike the gladiator who unwillingly endures his trial of blood, he is to demonstrate endurance willingly and cheerfully in his moral trials. Likewise while the gladiator in combat in the arena, may lower his weapons (expecting the crowds mercy) - in a difficult moment against his opponent - the *proficiens* is to be a much-enduring gladiator, who never lowers his weapons, preferring to die standing firm, with dignity:

From the men who hire out their strength for the arena, who eat and drink what they must pay for with their blood, security is taken that they will endure (*patientur*) such trials, even though they be unwilling. From you that you will endure (*patiaris*) them willingly and with alacrity. The gladiator may lower his weapon and test the pity of the people, but you will neither lower your weapons nor beg for life. You must die erect and unyielding.' [*Ep.* 37.2].

### *C. The Cynic Sage as Athlete of Moral Endurance*

**i. The Cynic (male) Sage as Authentic Athlete of Moral Endurance in his 'Αγών.** The notion of athletic endurance as a metaphor for the sage's moral endurance also occurs in Cynic writings. For instance, Dio Chrysostom in his *Isthmian Discourse* (*Disc.* 9) ascribes the idea of athletic endurance as a metaphor for Diogenes' moral endurance. Dio compares the treatment received by Diogenes from the public to that of Odysseus in his disguised beggarly presence in his palace at Ithaca, by Penelope's suitors. Like Odysseus he is a disguised ruler. Like

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<sup>63</sup> Seneca explains: 'There is an old adage about gladiators - that they plan their fight in the ring; as they intently watch, something in the adversary's glance, some movement of his hand, even some slight bending of his body, gives a warning. We can formulate general rules and commit them to writing, as to what is usually done or ought to be done; such advice may be given, not only to our absent friends, but also to succeeding generations. In regard however to the second question (i.e. how he can accomplish his withdrawal from the world) - when or how your plan is to be carried out - no one will advise at long range; we must take counsel in the presence of the actual situation.' (*Ep.* 22.1-2). In most instances however of martial metaphors it is usually the military which is most prominent in Seneca's psychagogic counseling. For instance in exhorting Lucilius to be original and creative in his philosophic formation, compares the sage who constantly employs other philosopher's *chreia* or maxims, to a "soldier" who marches under another's command (*Ep.* 33.7).

<sup>64</sup> Gummere explains that this represents an abbreviated form of the path taken by gladiators, when they hired themselves to their fighting masters. R.M. Gummere (ed.), *Seneca, IV, Ad Lucilium Epistolae Morales* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1979) n.a 254.

Odysseus he is ridiculed by his own subjects and slaves. Like Odysseus, he too is a prototypical hero of moral endurance (9.9). Dio then proceeds to depict Diogenes in rags revealing his true identity. he declares to the crowds and officials during the Isthmian Games, that he is the unique and authentic victorious moral "athlete" of endurance, far superior to the "servile" physical athletes. All others, Greek and barbarian, succumb in the moral contest against mighty "external" antagonists such as poverty, exile, disrepute, as well as "internal" antagonists such as anger, desire, fear and the most powerful of all pleasure. He alone has the moral strength and endurance in this "battle" (μάχη) and "contest" (ἀγών) to resist and vanquish such antagonists, and in particular pleasure:<sup>65</sup>

'But when he (i.e. Diogenes) went so far as to put the crown of pine upon his head, the Corinthians sent some of their servants to bid him lay aside the crown and do nothing unlawful. He however asked them why it was unlawful for him to wear the crown of pine and not do so others. Whereupon one of them said, "Because you have won no victory, Diogenes." To which he replied, "Many and mighty antagonists (πολλούς . . . . ἀνταγωνιστάς καὶ μεγάλους) have I vanquished, not like these slaves who are now wrestling (παλαίοντα) here, hurling their discus (δισκεύοντα) and running (τρέχοντα) but more difficult in every way (χαλεπωτέρους) - I mean poverty, exile, and disrepute; yes, and anger (ὀργήν), grief (λύπην), desire (ἐπιθυμίαν), fear (φόβον) and the most redoubtable boast of all, treacherous and cowardly, I mean pleasure (ὑδονήν), which no Greek or barbarian can claim he fights (μάχεσθαι) and conquers (περιεῖναι) by the strength of his soul, but all alike have succumbed to her and have failed in the conquest (ἀλλὰ πάντες ἤττηντι καὶ ἀπειρήκασι πρὸς τὸν ἀγὼν τοῦτον) Persians, Medes, Syrians, Macedonians, Athenians, Lacedaemonians - all that is, save myself.' [Or. 9.10-13].

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<sup>65</sup> It is interesting that Dio is perhaps employing here mixed military and athletic language in his metaphor. Hints of mixed military and athletic language or metaphors of endurance are also found among the Roman Stoics. This is another reminder that the athletic ideals never quite completely lost their original martial ethos, even long after Hellas had been demilitarized by the Romans. This is further attested by the usage of mixed military and athletic metaphors of endurance among the Greco-Roman moralists in their essays - the sage is described as a much-enduring "warrior" and "athlete" in adversarial action, whether in "combat" or in "contest" against his external opponent Tyche (e.g. *On Prov.* 2.1-4) (or against internal opposition to his soul, as in the case of Dio's Diogenes). Seneca begins his argument by employing metaphoric military vocabulary ("assault," "overcoming," and "rising to meet") to characterize the severe and violent nature of the external assault and hence, in response, the "aggressive" or "militant" character of the endurance required to resist the attack. Consequently Seneca explains to Lucilius in his essay *On Providence*: 'You ask, "Why do many adversities come to good men?" No evil can befall a good man; opposites do not mingle . . . . the assaults of adversity do not weaken the spirit of a brave man. It always maintains its poise . . . it is mightier than all external things . . . he overcomes them and being in all else unmoved and calm rises to meet whatever assails him. All his adversities he counts mere training' [*Prov.* 2.1-2]. He continues, however, to also appropriate from the world of Greek athletics, the image of the much-enduring wrestler who eagerly submits to trials of strength by facing the most powerful opposition possible. Among other issues, this powerful "wrestling" contest, demonstrates the sage-wrestler's authenticity as a man of virtue, through the powerful resistance or endurance he displays: 'Who, moreover if he is a man and intent upon the right, is not eager for reasonable toil and ready for duties accompanied by danger? . . . . Wrestlers who make strength of body their chief concern, we see pitting themselves against none but the strongest and they require of those who are preparing them for the arena that they use against them all their strength; they submit to blows and hurts . . . . Without an adversary prowess shrivels. We see how great and how efficient it really is, only when it shows by endurance what it is capable of. Be assured that you ought to act likewise [i.e. like the much-enduring wrestler]; they should not shrink from hardships and difficulties nor complain against fate; they should take in good part whatever happens . . . . Not what you endure but how you endure, is important.' [*Prov.* 2.2-4].

In his address to the Alexandrians (*Or.* 32), Dio compares the type of philosopher who in his absence of endurance to hostile crowds and his concern to preserve his dignity, does not make any public appearances before people nor even converse with them, to "degenerate" athletes. These sages are like athletes who while they spend time in the gymnasia and the wrestling schools, shy away from competing in the stadium. Consequently they are "make-believe" and not authentic sages:

'In my opening remarks I laid the blame for this upon the philosophers who will not appear before the people or even deign to converse with you, but while wishing to maintain their dignity are seen to be of no utility, and like those degenerate athletes who are a nuisance to palaestrae and gymnasia, with their make-believe sparring and wrestling, but refuse to enter the stadium, viewing with suspicion the sun's heat and the blows' [*Or.* 32.20].

**ii. The Cynic Female Sages as Much-Enduring Moral Athletes:** As I have already mentioned, of all the ancient Greek and Roman philosophical movements, it is the Cynics, and specifically that associated with the Crates tradition that is the most sympathetic to the philosophic potential of women. Unlike other philosophic traditions which viewed women as innately unable think rationally, this particular expression of Cynicism, allowed the possibility for women to participate in philosophical endeavour and the display of endurance in toil. Indeed "Hipparchia" is compared, quite uniquely in the ancient world, to a "warrior" and exhorted by Pseudo-Crates to "stand firm."<sup>66</sup> Equally unique for the ancient world, within the same tradition "Hipparchia" the female sage is compared to a much-enduring athlete. "Crates' her husband, in his letter of congratulation concerning the birth of their son, affirms that she is one who is used to enduring toil (πόνους). Accordingly, unlike other women who are enfeebled, she continued to toil during her pregnancy, in this she is like the much-enduring athletes (ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγωνισταὶ), and hence her delivery was easy:

'You believe, it seems, that toiling is the cause of your not having to toil (τὸ πονεῖν αἴτιον ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ πονεῖν). For you would not have given birth so easily unless, while pregnant, you had continued to toil as the athletes do (ἐπόνεις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγωνισταὶ). Most women however, whenever they are pregnant, are enfeebled . . . . . ' [*Ps. Crates* 33].

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<sup>66</sup> Vide ch. 4 in the present study, 'A Woman's Martyrological Endurance: Warrior of God.'

### III. Concluding Remarks

[1] Greek athletics grew out of the world of the military. Accordingly athletic endurance is at first an aspect of warrior's endurance. The close connection between Greek warrior and athlete continues throughout antiquity. This is evidenced by the military nature of the athletic events; by the use of athletics in military training (ἀσκησις) (especially in Sparta and Athens); by the use of common language, including the application of the notion of endurance (as well as courage, strength, skill) to the athlete, and by the fact that athletics served the warrior in recreational shows of strength and endurance. As it was a military virtue it also becomes an athletic virtue.

[2] An important point in Spartan training of the warrior-athlete's endurance related to the encouraging role played by parents. They would exhort their afflicted son to endure his torture.

[3] Even with the growing autonomy of athletics from the world of the soldier through the increasing professionalism and the rise of the Panhellenic games, nevertheless the military impact and mark upon it had been indelibly branded - not least being the notion of athletic endurance, courage and competing according to the rules.<sup>67</sup>

[4] With the spread of Hellenism in the Orient, the values and ideals of this uniquely Greek phenomenon, were universalized. Gymnasia and wrestling schools became part of the landscape even in Palestine, and the idea of the much-enduring athlete was as much a part of the popular image as it was enshrined and celebrated in vases and statues. The time of the apostle Paul's arrival in Corinth and the Isthmia, marked a period of revival and popularity in Greek athletics, in the eastern provinces of the empire, since their restoration by Augustus. The games were not as popular in the Italian west.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Greek and Roman warfare insisted on certain rules of honourable and fair conduct in combat, the so-called *Jus in bello*. For instance, included in the code of "just war" was the immunity from harm of women, children and the elderly during warfare. An army can only engage in conflict with an opposing armed male force. The breaking of these rules was considered as outrageous and utterly shameful to the soldier, signifying his complete lack of manliness and endurance. Vide J. Helgeland, R.J. Daly and J.P. Burns, *Christians and the Military: The Early Experience* (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1985) ch. 1. Likewise the rules of athletic competition whether in combative or non-combative events prevented the athlete from taking an unfair advantage over an opponent. This too suggested a shameful absence of endurance and courage.

<sup>68</sup> It is interesting that whereas the apostle Paul's letter to the Romans is his lengthiest, his usage of athletic imagery is limited (cf. *1 Cor.*, *Gal.*, *Phlp.*).

[5] Not surprisingly philosophy had already begun to appropriate the ideas and values of the athletic world for its own intellectual and moral agenda. While they criticized the actual reality of athletics,<sup>69</sup> in their appropriation of it they tended to present an idealized version of the athletic world and its values. Athletic endurance became one of the interests of the sages. In his blueprint for his utopia, Plato's Spartan-like interpretation of athletics formed an integral dimension of the training of the young warriors in endurance. Aristotle also endorsed athletic training in education for the development of endurance and hardihood. On the other hand, both from a diachronic and synchronic perspective, philosophers uniformly affirmed the superiority of the intellectual or rational endeavor over the physical. Philosophical exercises were of more significance than physical exercises. However, the most important aspect of the sage's encounter with the Greek world of athletic dealt with the resultant appropriation, philosophication and transformation of its symbols, concepts, language and ideals - including the notion of endurance - to a moral or ethical direction. This was essentially achieved through the use of the athletic metaphor. As in the case of the military simile, athletic imagery is now applied to the world of the sage. The sage and his moral struggle is figuratively compared to the agonistic Olympic athlete in all his various phases of endeavour - from training to competition to victory - a tendency which is already evident with Aristotle. This propensity is further developed in various Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophical enterprise, especially among Cynics and Stoics. In connection with the notion of endurance the following points arise:

i. The spirit of persevering endurance is an essential ingredient in a prize fighter's attainment of victory, against his opponent. No matter how hard his opponent hits the protagonist must rebound to his feet and stand firm. In this way he wears out his opponent. Likewise the Stoic *proficiens* must consistently endure the blows of Fortune. In this manner he will attain victory and not be subordinated to the yoke of externals. Endurance against an opponent spells victorious freedom.

ii. The athlete's endurance displayed in his ἀσκησις in the gymnasium did not necessarily involve a life and death situation, though it could result in some physical injury of disablement - though not necessarily the shedding of blood. Likewise neither did his performance in the track events signify the shedding of blood. The winner gained glory, the loser shame but not death or sever disablement. On the other hand, in the combative athletic contests (boxing and wrestling) and even more, the Roman gladiatorial events, there is a greater

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<sup>69</sup> Modern scholars such as E.N. Gardiner, J. Jüthner, and H.A. Harris, speak of a "rise and fall" pattern, to Greek athletics, with the fall setting in by the sixth century B.C. For a qualifying view vide DG. Kyle, *Athletics in Ancient Athens* (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1987) 124-154. Kyle explains that some of the attacks did not necessarily reflect popular opinion but in fact were aimed against popular opinion which underestimated the value of intellectuals to the *polis*.

potential for a life and death struggle, and certainly for severe physical disablement or the shedding of blood. Accordingly in the moral transformation of endurance, in these sports - now employed in a metaphoric manner - loses none of its aggressive tendencies found in equivalent military metaphors of conflict, where the issue of serious injury, shedding of blood or death was at play. His absence of endurance (or courage) can result in death, serious disablement or slavery.

iii. The much-enduring sage achieves a more permanent victory and prize to the athlete. The much-enduring athlete gains a garland. The much-enduring sage obtains virtue, steadfastness of soul and a permanent peace.

iv. Like a combative athlete (wrestler or boxer), a victorious endurance, is only obtained through long, severe and disciplined training (ἀσκησις). Severe training in philosophical endurance will also serve the sage well in actual combative contest against the blows of adversity. He simply wears out the opposition, while at the same time he continues to sharpen his endurance.

v. The harder and the stronger the sage's adversities and hardships are, the more opportunity he has to demonstrate his authenticating endurance as well as providing him with an opportunity for training it. In this he is like a wrestler who seeks to compete with none but the strongest opponent.

vi. In Roman Stoicism, images from the Roman "sports" are also employed. Thus Seneca as sage, assuming the role of a gladiatorial instructor, advises and exhorts the *proficiens* as a gladiator prior to combat, to be much enduring. He is not to be like those weak-hearted gladiators who beg for mercy, rather he is exhorted to be willing to demonstrate an unyielding endurance unto death, if necessary. There is to be no begging for life. This guarantees the sage's freedom from the slavery of defeat.

vii. For the Cynic sage Dio Chrysostom, the charlatan sage is like an athlete who spends time in the gymnasium but none in the stadium, being afraid of the crowd or losing his dignity. The authentic sage is like an athlete who enters the stadium and can endure the heat, the contest and the crowd.

viii. Within the Cynic "Crates" tradition women are compared to much-enduring athletes.

ix. On occasions, mixed metaphors of endurance employing both athletic and military images are employed to depict the much-enduring sage or novice. Usually, the athletic events in such mixed metaphors of endurance, recall combative events (wrestling or boxing), to parallel the military notion of conflict.

x. In the case of sporting events, the much-enduring athlete while representing his *polis*, nevertheless represents the sole victor. On the other hand the much-enduring victorious warrior is one among many victors. The transformation of athletic endurance into a philosophic value, did not ignore this distinction, in the choice between military and athletic metaphors.

xi. Wrestling, boxing and long-distance running, of all Greek sporting events, were isolated as activities particularly connected with athletic endurance. In their use of athletic metaphors, the sages were aware of this characteristic.

Within the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions, from Socrates to Seneca and beyond, the sage in his capacity of innocent martyr, is willing to suffer tortures and even death with a calm endurance, at the hands of a tyrant or through unjust trails. His willingness to endure such pain, torture and death is for the sake of his uncompromising philosophic principles. Quite interestingly, the sage-martyr is often portrayed as a much-enduring (and courageous) "warrior" or "athlete" of heroic endurance. I now turn my attention to this further impact of military and / or athletic moral endurance, upon the world of Greek philosophy.

**CHAPTER 4:**  
**MARTYROLOGICAL ENDURANCE AND HEROIC DEATH:**  
**THE IMPACT OF THE WARRIOR'S AND ATHLETE'S**  
**ENDURANCE ON THE SAGE-MARTYR**

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**1. Martyrological Endurance in Ancient Greece:**  
**Diachronic Analysis**

*A. Noble Death, Courage and Endurance Among the Greeks:*  
*Warriors and Proto-Martyrs:*

**i. The Noble Death of the Much-Enduring and Courageous Greek Warrior:**<sup>1</sup> In the Greek world, beginning with Homer, the notion of a brave and noble death was almost exclusively linked with the warrior. Conversely, as I have already explained, the warrior on the battlefield who placed the safety of his life above his honour, acting out of fear, was universally considered, within all branches of Greek culture, as "shameful" - lacking in courage and endurance. Between the choice of heroic death and shameful life the Greek was to choose the "noble death" as befits a warrior. Accordingly the much-enduring and courageous warrior who falls in battle is regarded, in the words of Epaminondas as having received the "finest death" (ἐν πολέμῳ θάνατον εἶναι κάλλιστον).<sup>2</sup> Likewise Pericles describes the heroic warrior's death in combat as the most "glorious death" (Thuc. *Pelop. War* 2.44.1). Such a death was a guarantee of a long-lasting heroic reputation and honour, and was considered, at times, to possess a sacrificial or redemptive quality. The warrior-citizen exchanged his life for the safety of the *polis* (ὑπέρ τῆς πόλις)<sup>3</sup> or in defence of the Hellenic ideal (ὑπέρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος).<sup>4</sup> In return the *polis* bestowed "immortal glory" upon him, beyond death. Their endurance and courage in battle would be recognized and rewarded after death, and indeed would serve as a paradigm for others to imitate.

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the chapter draws substantially from the work of C.K Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event. The Background and Origin of a Concept*, HTRHDR No. 2 (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1975) esp. ch. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Mor.* 192C, quoted from Williams, *op. cit.* 144.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Men.* 246A.

<sup>4</sup> (Isocrates, *Panegy.* 75).

In the wake of the appropriation of military imagery and language to describe the philosophic life it was not a long step, in the history and evolution of the Greek idea of endurance, to compare the sage-martyr willingly and courageously enduring the pains of torture and death to the brave, much-enduring warrior voluntarily facing wounds and even death. Such comparisons would most usually either take the form of militarized language or metaphoric military images where the martyr would be described as a much-enduring "warrior" facing noble death. Indeed subsequently and not surprisingly, again drawing from the Greek martial world, the image of the much-enduring athlete in his "struggle" (ἀγών) for the champion's "prize," would also serve as a metaphoric illustration of the sage-martyr. An intriguing attempt was also made by Plato to displace the figure of the Greek warrior as the prototypical image of the "aggressive" or "virile man" with that of the Greek sage as "virile sage" (ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος).<sup>5</sup> Just as the epic warrior or the warrior-citizen were proclaimed by the Athenian funeral orators as ἀνὴρ because they knew how to die heroically, that is with courage and endurance, so too Plato in the *Phaedo* proclaims the heroic sage especially in his role as "martyr" as ἀνὴρ. The sage becomes the new model of he who understands and accepts a noble death with courage, endurance and wisdom or knowledge.

ii. **Proto-Martyrdom and Endurance in Ancient Greek Myth:** In addition to the warrior's "noble death," the idea of the willingness to endure great hardships, torture and even death for a cause is also clearly present in Hellas before the age of the philosopher-martyr and is particularly associated with the willing sufferings of certain mythological figures. These may be described as the "proto-martyrs" of Greek literature. For instance, in the legend of Prometheus, as preserved by Hesiod but re-worked by the dramatist Aeschylus (B.C. 525/4-456), whereby the protagonist in *Prometheus Bound* is recast from a trickster to a new status of moral dignity becoming the willing risk-taker ready to endure torture and punishment for the sake of providing fire to mortals in defiance of the tyrant Zeus.<sup>6</sup> An interesting motif that arises from the Aeschylean

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<sup>5</sup> For a discussion vide N. Loraux, 'Therefore Socrates is Immortal,' *Le temps de la réflexion*, Vol. 3 (Paris, Gallimard, 1982) ET by J. Lloyd, 13-45.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. *Prometheus Bound* 259-69. Vide H.J. Rose & C.M. Robertson, 'Prometheus,' in *OCD* 883-884; also Williams *op. cit.*



Prometheus concerns Zeus' sympathetic reaction to his steadfastness or endurance in suffering, hence inaugurating a new stage in Greek theology. As S.K. Williams, building on the work of G. Murray points out:

'Unfortunately, the *Prometheus Unbound* and *Prometheus the Firebearer* do not survive. However, references to these works in ancient literature plus the picture of Zeus in extant plays such as the *Agamemnon* allow the suggestion that, within the framework of Aeschylean theology, the unrepentant suffering and steadfastness of Prometheus was a factor in the transformation of Zeus into a more understanding, moral and gracious deity.'<sup>7</sup>

With Aeschylus' Prometheus we are in touch for the first time, at least in Greek literature, with the theme of "martyrological" endurance as a redemptive victorious quality - a theme which eventually will be re-echoed in the Greco-Roman period within Jewish martyrological literature (e.g. *4 Maccabees*).<sup>8</sup> In the post-Aeschylean phase of the idea of endurance under torture or even death for a cause we find elements of both the warrior's and the Greek proto-martyr's endurance, in synthesis.

*B. The Greek Sage-Martyr, Noble Death, the Immortality of the Soul  
and the Much-Enduring Warrior  
(Plato's Apology and Phaedo)*

"Martyrdom" (and persecution) as a concept in the history of Greek ideas, identified with historical personages, was popularized by the philosophers. While the term "martyr" (μάρτυς) and "martyrdom" (μαρτυρία) were not employed in their technical sense until the early Christians incorporated them in their vocabulary of suffering and persecution, nevertheless the idea of the "martyr," "martyrdom" and persecution (διωγμός), namely the notion of a person's willingness to willingly suffer, endure tortures or even sacrifice his / her life to the point of death, in the hands of "tyrannical" or "uninformed" authority figure(s), for the sake of an idea, conscience or principle, would eventually become firmly identified with philosophy and specifically with the sage. Here, the "pervasive and influential" impact of the teachings, trial and "martyrdom" of Greece's first

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<sup>7</sup> Williams, *op. cit.* 150. Vide also, G. Murray, *Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1940) 99-110.

<sup>8</sup> Vide next chapter of the present study.

major historical "martyr" - Socrates - is pivotal. As a consequence of his death, Socrates was transformed into the Greeks' original and most-celebrated sage-martyr.<sup>9</sup>

The impact of Socrates' martyrological death was monumental in Greek thought. To begin with, especially in the *Phaedo*, as Loraux has pointed out, the sage now re-appropriates and re-defines, from the world of the warrior or the warrior-citizen, the idea of the soul.<sup>10</sup> Hitherto the warrior after his courageous death in battle, enters into an everlasting fame. For the Homeric or epic warrior this glory is bestowed upon him by a bard, for the warrior-citizen by the words of the state's funerary orator, his cremated body (σῶμα) becoming the property of the state.<sup>11</sup> The situation of the warrior's soul (ψυχή) however is somewhat more nebulous. The epic warrior's soul enters, weeping, into the dim world of Hades, ingloriously becoming a shade among other departed shades. For the departed citizen-warrior, his soul may find its place in Hades, if as Loraux remarks, ' . . . something remains of him to make the journey, apart from his name, which now belongs to the collective memory of the living. . . . '<sup>12</sup> However, in the case of the sage-martyr, it is the *polis* which sentences and inflicts death upon him. The sage, unlike the warrior, takes responsibility for the journey of the soul after death, and does not rely upon either the goodwill or the funerary rites of the *polis* or a bard for this transition.<sup>13</sup> The sage-martyr's soul is in control of the extra-terrestrial journey to Hades, needing no external authorization. Furthermore he does not rely on the *polis'* appointed orator for his immortal fame, rather his own

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<sup>9</sup> Williams, *op. cit.* 142. Concerning the impact of Socrates' death upon the Greeks, W. Jaeger writes: 'Socrates is one of the imperishable figures who have become symbolic. The real man . . . shed most of his personality as he entered history and became for all eternity a "representative man." It was not really his life or his doctrine . . . which raised him to such eminence, so much as the death he suffered for the conviction on which his life was founded.' W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. 2 (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1943) 13, quoted from Williams, *op. cit.* 142.

<sup>10</sup> N. Loraux, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> In this respect Loraux writes: 'Nor did his [i.e. the citizen-warrior's] body matter: already cremated on the field of battle, it has been reduced to bones, an abstract basis on which to construct the political ceremony of the public funeral rites. The official orator steps forward to celebrate the city through its dead; all that matters now are his words.' *ibid.* 15.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Concerning the significance of the polis' funerary rituals, for the soul of the dead, Loraux writes: ' . . . no one had the right to be called dead unless the funerary rites had been performed in his honor, authorizing his *psyche* to enter the misty kingdom of the underworld.' *ibid.* 18. Vide also, J.-P. Vernant, 'Mort grecque, mort a deux faces,' *Le debat* 12 (May 1981) 52; S. Humphreys, 'Death and Time,' in *Mortality and Immortality. The Anthropology and Archaeology of Death* S.C. Humphreys and H. King (London, 1981) 263.

words proclaim his soul's immortality. The blissful immortality of his soul is guaranteed since, unlike the dying warrior, he has already learned to detach himself from his body in a battle which has been life long, for "to philosophize is to learn to die." Through the rejection of the passions, the desires and vainglory the sage is in essence already in a state of bodily death, having prepared his soul in advance of death through the rejection and denial of his body.<sup>14</sup> The death of Socrates, the first celebrated Greek sage-martyr, marks a distinctive stage in the Greek idea of noble death. It represents a jump from emphasis upon the body to that of the blissful and blessed immortality of the soul, once separated from the body. It signals the possibility of a shift from an immortality of glory which is bestowed by the collective psyche of the *polis*, to one which is endemic to the soul itself, though in either case - warrior or sage the body is of no importance.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, for Plato's Socrates, the destination of the sage's departed soul is not the dim and misty Hades, rather, it is the "land of the blessed" (*Phaedo* 115D), Pindar's location of the gods' favourites.

Consequently, Plato's Socrates' fearlessness towards death and his willingness to endure the mockery, persecution and charges which led to his trial were related to his beliefs on the nature of the soul, death and after-life. For Plato's Socrates, as attested in the *Phaedo*, death is a release from the realm of the body (66DE), a realm of constant "warfare" between reason and bodily desire (66C), into that of pure reason, intellect and wisdom. Armed with this knowledge and assurance, the authentic sage ought therefore be empowered with courage and endurance in the face of even tortures. The sage transforms his attitude towards death from an "evil," which is precisely what the "lovers of the body" do (68B), into a noble death (58E), like a heroic warrior. Yet the sage possesses the greater courage when it comes to death since more than any warrior he understands the true nature of the separation of the soul from the body, and is quite eager for it.

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<sup>14</sup> Loraux writes: 'Socrates is about to die, and as he awaits death, he speaks of immortality - the death of his body and the immortality of the soul . . . . In other words, according to Socrates, body and soul are already irrevocably separated just as are the visible and the invisible, that which is destined to lose its identity and that which keeps it forever, the dissoluble and the indissoluble, the mortal and the divine . . . . Sentenced by the city-state the model philosopher awaits his death . . . . He has trained himself to reject all the pleasures of the body so that, even in the here and now, his life resembles as closely as possible the existence of one who is dead.' *op. cit.* 15.

<sup>15</sup> Vide, *Ibid.* 17.

Furthermore no other person (inc. the warrior) has the right attitude in death, for all are motivated by fear, except the sage:

'In fact . . . . . (for) the true philosophers . . . . . death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life - and they longed for wisdom . . . . . ' [*Phaedo* 67E-68A].

And do not brave men face death . . . . . through fear of greater evils? That is true. Then all except philosophers are brave through fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice.' [*Phaedo* 68D].

Beginning with Plato's Socrates, the sage-martyr, now displaces the warrior (and the athlete), at least in philosophical circles, as the prototypical icon of authentic bravery and endurance, and it is his death above the warrior's which epitomizes the most "noble death." Accordingly in describing Socrates' martyrological death, *Phaedo* stresses his courage, his serenity / calmness and his capacity to endure any pressure - external or internal (58E). Nevertheless an important philosophical and conceptual paradox remains here in the history of ideas. Despite the lines of demarcation drawn by Greek philosophers, beginning with Socrates, between themselves and the world of the military, nevertheless they still found the image of the much-enduring and courageous warrior in battle so compelling, that they had no hesitation in still employing it, albeit metaphorically, for their own various didactic, psychagogic, self-definitional as well as martyrological purposes. Simultaneously, given the abiding and popular impact of the courageously enduring warrior upon all aspects of Greek culture, this metaphoric image was also intended and addressed to the layperson, who still considered the warrior as the epitome of courage and endurance. In this custom, of describing the sage-martyr in military terms, a significant difference, arises in the conceptualization and description of the Greek "martyr's" endurance and that of the mythological "proto-martyr" Prometheus. In the latter case, no military comparisons or allusions were drawn.

Yet again, the impact of the Greek warrior's endurance is here still clearly evident, despite Socrates distinction of categories. Fitzgerald has argued in his definitive study of the ancient

*peristasis catalogue*, that in Seneca's *De Constantia Sapientis* <sup>16</sup> we find the re-echoing of "an old Roman military virtue."<sup>17</sup> While I agree with his observation concerning the military character of the sage's or martyr's endurance, and that furthermore while it is evident that Seneca's paradigms of the much-enduring and courageous warrior, in *Constant.* are for the most part Roman military heroes (e.g. Cato), I would add a supplementary note, namely that eventually the Roman Seneca's understanding of the "steadfast" or much-enduring martyr-sage, is actually in direct continuity with a traditional philosophic conceptual appropriation that had already been initiated in Plato's treatises. This is precisely how Plato's Socrates in the *Apology* prefers to describe and understand his own endurance in his impending "martyrdom" by the use of the military understanding of endurance - "standing firm" in one's appointed post, whether in battle or on guard duty.

In the *Apology*, while responding to the charges leveled against him, within a diatribal context where an imaginary interlocutor raises an objection concerning whether he ought not to have feared that thorough pursuing "shameful" philosophy he placed himself in "danger of being put to death," Socrates addresses his rhetorical interlocutor by drawing his attention to certain military comparisons with his situation as a philosopher facing death (i.e. "martyrdom). In the first place he compares himself with the hero-warriors at Troy. Here the comparison draws upon the notion of courage and disdain of death:

' "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit that you are now in danger (κινδυνεύεις) of being put to death (ἀποθανεῖν)?" But I should make to him a just reply: "You do not speak well, sir, if you think that a man ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy including the son of Thetis who so despised danger . . . made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward . . . ." [Ap. 28BC].

Socrates then draws a second military comparison with his mission as a philosopher willing to face danger and death. He does this in terms of the language of military endurance. He explains that as he stood firm in his post in obedience to his commanding officers, in the Athenian campaigns at Potidae, at Amphipolis and at Delium, so now he must stand firm to his divine call as

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<sup>16</sup> Vide ch. 2 of the present study.

<sup>17</sup> Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 59.

a philosopher no matter what the costs to his personal safety. What is of interest in this pericope is Socrates' comparison between his willingness to stand firm in his appointed post as a soldier, even to the point of facing death, rather than flee (absence of endurance), and his disposition as a sage willing to stand firm in the face of death (martyrdom) rather than flee. Here Socrates is alluding in the language of military endurance - *μενεῖν* - "standing firm in his post" his attitude to his imminent martyrdom. He is as a much-enduring warrior standing firm in his appointed station and not fleeing at the approach of possible death:

For thus it is men of Athens, in truth, wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander (ἄρχοντος), there he must remain facing danger (μένοντα κινδυνεύειν) considering neither death (ὕπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον) nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if when the commanders (ἄρχοντος), whom you chose to command me, stationed me both at Potdaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained (ἔμενον) where they stationed me, like anybody else, and faced the danger of death (ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν) but when God gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to abandon my post (λίπομι τὴν τάξιν) through fear of death or anything else whatsoever . . . . For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not . . . . ' [Ap. 28D-29A].

Through his courage, endurance, self-control and wisdom, the sage-martyr can face tortures and death without losing his serenity calmness and happiness, like Socrates who was laughing prior to his "martyrdom.". Thus Epicurus could declare that the sage would still remain happy (εὐδαιμόν) under the tortures of the rack (Diog. Laert. *Epic.* 10.118).

This motif of the much-enduring sage-martyr in terms of a heroic warrior will be further developed, by the Cynics and especially the Stoics.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless the impact of Socrates remained monumental. Right up to the Greco-Roman period he is *par excellence* the paradigm of the much-enduring sage-martyr - the "warrior" of endurance in wisdom's "noble death."

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<sup>18</sup> The comparison between God and as military commander (ἄρχων, στρατηγός), at least in Greek thought, was also first explored by Socrates but more fully developed by the Stoics. The notion of God as a "divine warrior" is already existent in ancient Israel within the writings of the so-called *Deuteronomistic Historian*.

## II. Synchronic Analysis: The Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Sage-Martyr: Martyrological Endurance Expressed in Martial Imagery and Terms

### A. *The Greek and Roman Much-Enduring Sage-Martyr and Military Endurance*

i. **The Much-Enduring Warrior Under Torture:** The use of military metaphors or language to describe the sage-martyr's tortures and painful death continues in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman epoch. It would appear that in popular Greek thought that warrior was still conceived as a prototypical icon of the much-enduring and courageous man facing noble death at times even under torture. For example, within the brief diatribal essays of Teles (fl. ca. B.C. 240),<sup>19</sup> who preserves some of the ideas and rhetorical style of the early Cynics, in an unpretentious layman's fashion, the concepts of courage (ἀνδρεία) and endurance (καρτερία) are not only applied to the heroic warrior in battle but also to him as a prisoner of war under torture. Thus in his treatise *On Seeming and Being* [33], the interlocutor defends the idea of seeming to be courageous as more advantageous than being actually so. Such a pretense of courage would actually bring honour without any actual suffering. This of course reveals an important point - courage (and endurance) were not only considered as indispensable military values but they also evoked admiration among the Greek people and bestowed honour to the warrior.<sup>20</sup> Teles refutes this position by citing examples of hardship from the life of a warrior. In this illustration courage and endurance are clearly recognized as classical heroic military virtues. Such a warrior will be placed at a most prominent and vital front line position in battle, "first man on the right side of the battle line" (cf. Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 5.71.1). What is interesting here is the association of endurance as the primary virtue of the warrior-prisoner under torture and the idea which will be popularized by the Stoics, namely the possessor of courage and endurance will in fact provoke harsher treatment than the coward and the weak of character:<sup>21</sup>

'And if you become a prisoner, since you seem to be courageous, you'll wear huge shackles and handcuffs . . . . Why you'll even be locked up and if they torture you you will receive many blows. And even

<sup>19</sup> For a discussion of Teles and his writings vide E. O'Neil (ed.), *Teles the Cynic Teacher* SBLTT 11 GRRS 3 (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1977) ix-xix.

<sup>20</sup> In Greek culture, as I have already argued, the warrior's display of courage and endurance was considered as the opposite of "weakness" and "shame." Vide ch. 1.

<sup>21</sup> For the Stoics, Tyche will hardly wage war upon a weak person, considering that person already captured. It is rather the sage as much enduring and courageous in character that will receive the harshest circumstances from Tyche.

when you tell the truth (i.e. about the pretended courage) you will not be believed. Instead you will seem to be mocking them on account of seeming to have endurance (ἀνδρείος εἶναι καὶ καρτερικός), and they will order you to be beaten and stretched on the rack and burned. See how many things you will suffer by seeming to be courageous and capable of endurance (καρτερικός)? [Teles *On Seeming and Being* 37-46].

As I have already explained, the step from the brave warrior of endurance to the much-enduring sage under torture facing martyrdom, is not a long one. The Hellenistic and Greco-Roman sages, motivated by Socrates' himself, will of course, continue to employ military language and metaphors to illustrate the sage-martyr, in particular his endurance and courage, considering it a most appropriate and readily recognized comparison, despite the sage's devaluation of the soldier's endurance (non-reasoned endurance) in comparison his own (rational or reason-motivated endurance). Nevertheless military imagery served as a useful didactic tool for the lay person or the student of the philosophical life, to highlight the heroic dimensions of the sage-martyr's endurance of suffering and death. This is nowhere more evident than in the writings of Seneca to his disciple Lucilius.

**ii. Endurance, Persecution, the Stoic Martyr and Military Values:** The idea of the warrior's "noble death" in battle or under torture continued to influence military codes of valour up to Roman times. Seneca for instance in his essay on endurance and suffering, cites the case of the second Decius who 'rivalled his father's bravery' and 'dashed into the thickest of the combat . . . . regarding a noble death (*memorabilem mori*) a thing to be desired' (*Ep.* 67.9).<sup>22</sup> The values of heroic death remain the same. Accordingly Seneca is confident that Lucilius will concur with his sentiment when he asks "Do you doubt, then, whether it is best to die glorious and performing some deed of valour?" (*Ep.* 67.10). Furthermore, since the paradigmatic martyr's death of Socrates, by Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times philosophy had continued to speak of the sage-martyr's "noble death" in military language and metaphors. The impact of Socrates' martyrological endurance and its association with military language continues in subsequent descriptions of

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<sup>22</sup> In his *Ep.* 24, which deals with the theme of despising death, Seneca provides Lucilius with paradigms of endurance and bravery in death. For the most part they were warriors, martyrs (esp. Socrates) or righteous exiles or prisoners.



him.<sup>23</sup> Most typically it would employ the twin military virtues of endurance and courage to describe the desirable demeanour of the sage under persecution or torture. Thus in response to Lucilius' question pertaining to "martyrdom," Seneca incorporates an illustration from the battlefield. What is interesting in his statements, is that the necessary and heroic qualities of the martyr, are the same as the heroic warrior's - courage and endurance:

. . . . . if the time comes when it (i.e. tortures) must be endured, I shall desire that I may conduct myself therein with bravery, honour and courage . . . . . if war does occur I shall desire that I may nobly endure the wounds, the starvation and all that the exigency of war brings.' [Ep. 67.4].

Further in this essay, makes a distinction (which he does not often make) between mere "endurance" and "brave endurance." For Seneca both warrior and martyr possess this quality which he regards as a desirable virtue:

' . . . . . a brave endurance even under torture is desirable . . . . . The most beautiful and most admirable part of bravery is that it does not shrink back from the stake, advances to meet wounds, and sometimes does not even avoid the spear . . . . . If bravery (fortitudo) is desirable so is patient endurance (patienter ferre) of torture, for this is part of bravery (fortitudinis) . . . . . For it is not just endurance of torture (pati tormenta), but brave endurance (pati fortiter), that is desirable. I therefore desire that brave endurance; and this is virtue . . . . . ' [Ep. 67.6].

Again, Seneca reflects military values when describing the attitude of the martyr. By displaying endurance with bravery, the martyr possesses all the finest virtues. Seneca then lists them in terms of the vocabulary of endurance - endurance, long-suffering, steadfastness For Seneca these types of endurance coupled with courage encompass all the heroic virtues. Seneca is simply describing the martyr's necessary qualities in terms of the warrior's necessary attributes, including the various types of endurance: 'When one endures torture bravely, one is using all the virtues. Endurance and resignation and long-suffering and its branches . . . . . There is also steadfastness.' [Ep. 67.10].

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<sup>23</sup>Thus Seneca, re-echoing a version of Socrates' immortality of the virtuous soul (Ep. 71.16), and likewise asserting the notion of the idea of the virtuous man's brave endurance in the face of "noble death," proceeds to make a Stoic doctrinal point - all "goods" (i.e. various circumstances in which the good or virtue can be manifested) are equal. He illustrates this by the juxtaposed examples of the courage of a warrior at death (Cato) and a sage-martyr's brave endurance in prison (Socrates): 'You need not, therefore, wonder that goods are equal, both those that are to be deliberately chosen and those which circumstances impose. For if you once adopt the view that they are unequal, deeming for instance a brave endurance of tortures as among the lesser goods you will be including it among the evils *also*; you will pronounce Socrates unhappy in his prison, Cato unhappy when he re-opens his wounds . . . . . ' (Ep. 71.17).

Finally, in his essay on *Conquering the Conqueror*,<sup>24</sup> Seneca draws a vital Stoic distinction concerning attitudes to death. For Seneca even the "weak" person, at the actual moment of his death will be endowed with courage. To illustrate the point he offers a martial example of the fainthearted gladiator who nevertheless at the moment of his execution accepts it (30.8). Yet knowledge of approaching death is what demands actual courage and endurance. This is one of the reasons, that for a Stoic like Seneca, the martyr's death is "noble." The martyr is aware of his imminent death and has to undergo slow tortures. This calls for the manly virtues of courage and endurance. On the other hand, the weak or fainthearted will only accept death at the very last moment. They lack courage and endurance. It is for this reason, that philosophy, from the time of Socrates found the heroic warrior's courage and endurance an apt illustration for the sage, since like the martyr the warrior constantly faces pain and death. Yet for Greek and Roman philosophy eventually there is a difference between the two - one is guided by reason and wisdom, the other by duty, and hence it is the sage who possesses the authentic and superior brave endurance.

#### *B. The Persecuted Sage and Sage-Martyr as Real Athlete of Endurance*

In accordance to my previous discussion, martyrological endurance, strictly speaking refers to that fortitude and calm demeanour demonstrated during tortures or prior to death, imposed by a tyrant or consequent to an unjust judgement in trial, for the sake of a principle or conscience. However, it is possible to extend its meaning to cover the endurance of hardships patiently and bravely suffered for any form of legal punishment or persecution imposed upon the sage as a result of his teachings or *παρρησία* (boldness of speech to a tyrant). Besides capital punishment, the Roman state also imposed exile as a severe penalty.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, this was the fate of many

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<sup>24</sup> The "conqueror" referred to by Seneca is a metaphor for death. Conquering the conqueror refers to the defeat of death by the sage through his wisdom, endurance and courage.

<sup>25</sup> Besides the various institutions of capital punishment in Greco-Roman antiquity (e.g. the arena, crucifixion, burning, stoning, other forms of non-capital punishment also existed. These were for the most part exile, imprisonment and corporal punishment. Vide, J.S. Pobe, *Persecution and Martyrdom in the Theology of Paul*, JSNTSS 6 (Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1985) 1-12. In a relevant passage concerning penalties that can be legally inflicted upon a Roman, Seneca asks Lucilius, who is anxious concerning a lawsuit he is involved in: ' . . . . can anything more severe happen to you than being sent into exile or led to prison? Is there a worse fate than any man may fear than being burned or being killed? (24.3). To Seneca there do exist some men who have not feared these penalties and have bravely endured them. His list includes Socrates, Rutilius and Metellus: 'Exile was endured by

philosophers during the reign of Domitian, including the Cynic Dio Chrysostom. In his eighth oration on the "real athlete," while referring to Diogenes' endurance of hardships in Corinth, while in exile from Sinope (*Or.* 8.1), it is clear to the audience and the reader that Dio is also alluding to his own endurance in banishment because of Domitian's persecutions.<sup>26</sup> At the Isthmian games, Diogenes declares himself not as a spectator but an ἀγωνιζόμενος, an athletic contestant in them (8.11), competing against the toughest possible "opponents" (ἀνταγωνιστάς) (8.11), namely hardships or labours (ἰσχυρούς πόνους) (8.13). Whereas the passion-filled person yields or surrenders to his desires the noble man realizes that his hardships are his "athletic" antagonists (8.15). With them he is to "battle" (μάχεσθαι) day and night,<sup>27</sup> His prize of victory however is not a sprig of parsley,<sup>28</sup> or a bit of wild olive,<sup>29</sup> The sage under hardship must constantly face strong opponents, nor does he desire to draw an easier opponent (8.16). Furthermore he has no fear of them. As a "real athlete" he must endure all these "antagonists." Dio then proceeds to list Diogenes' catalogue of hardships, that is his "antagonists" faced by the sage as athlete. In this *peristasis catalogue* martyrological items form a large part of the opposition he faces and must endure. Accordingly Dio mentions exile as well as the lash, burning and torture. Here we are in touch with a Cynic perspective on the persecuted sage or sage-martyr as an "athlete of endurance" and courage, in contrast to the athletes in the Isthmian games whose endurance is demonstrated against much feebler antagonistic forces:

'But the noble man (ὁ γενναῖος) holds his hardships (πόνους) to be his greatest antagonists (ἀνταγωνιστάς μεγίτους), and with them he is ever wont to battle (μάχεσθαι) day and night, not to win a sprig of parsley . . . . nor for a bit of wild olive, or of pine, but to win happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν) and virtue (ἀρετῆς) . . . . he is afraid of none of these opponents (φοβούμενον μηδὲ), nor does he pray to

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Mettelus with courage, by Rutilius even with gladness . . . . Socrates in prison discoursed and declined to flee; he remained there (i.e. stood firm), in order to free mankind from the fear of two grievous things, death and imprisonment.' interesting that in Socrates' case, for Seneca, his martyrological endurance has certain redemptive or cathartic qualities - the liberation of mankind from fear of death and imprisonment. This redemptive quality of martyrological endurance, as has already been mentioned, was already evident within Greek thought, already with the Aeschylean Prometheus. Seneca's reference to Socrates' "not fleeing" and "remained" may very well carry military overtones.

<sup>26</sup> Dio's bitterness with lawyers is perhaps understandable in the light of the injustice leveled against him. His anti-lawyer sentiment is evident in *Or.* 8.9.

<sup>27</sup> The reference to "battle" here may be simply a reference to combative athletic opponents or else he is using mixed athletic-military language of conflict.

<sup>28</sup> The victors in the Isthmian and Nemean Games received a chaplet of parsley which was placed upon their heads.

<sup>29</sup> That is, the crown of an Olympic victor.

draw another antagonist, but challenges them one after another, grappling with hunger and cold, enduring thirst (ὕπομένοντα) . . . . he must endure (καρτερεῖν) the lash (μαστιγούμενον) or give his body to be cut or burned (καόμενον). Hunger, exile (φυγὴν), loss of reputation and the like have no terrors for him.' [Or. 8.15-16].

### III. The Widespread Affect of the Philosophical Notion of Martial Moral Endurance Upon the Greco-Roman World: Greco-Jewish Martyria Literature

#### A. The Eclectic Intellectual Nature of the Greco-Roman World

As is well known, in the wake of Alexander's conquest of the orient, and the subsequent Hellenization of the Mediterranean world, Greek martial ideas, education, rhetoric as well as philosophic notions became widespread throughout the new and expanded Greek-speaking world<sup>30</sup> - including the permeation of early Jewish thought and literature, both in the diaspora (esp. Alexandria) and within Palestine itself.<sup>31</sup> Among these philosophic notions one may also include the transformed heroic concept of "martial" moral endurance, both in its linguistic and metaphoric form. Thus by the middle of the first century, that is the time of the composition of the

<sup>30</sup> Cultural inter-action between Hellas and the Near East did not begin with Alexander, to be sure. Inter-actions were already occurring centuries earlier. Nevertheless with Alexander's conquest of the Near East, a systematic agenda was inaugurate for the Hellenization of the orient; vide M. Avi-Yonah, *Hellenism and the East*, (Ann Arbor, Michigan Univ. Microfilms International, 1978).

<sup>31</sup> With a brief period of independence, the so-called Hasmonean period (B.C. 142-63), Palestine came under the direct control of the Greco-Macedonian dynasties left by Alexander, first with the Ptolemies (B.C. 323-198) then with the Seleucids (B.C. 198-142) and its accelerated program of the Hellenization of Judah. This was followed by (Hellenized) Roman rule, which further re-enforced Hellenic culture, continued by Byzantines until the Arab conquest of Palestine. In essence Judah came under the direct spell of Hellenized culture and rule for nearly a millennium. Judah in the Second Temple period was no stranger to the Greek (or Roman) warrior. The intensity of the Hellenization and inter-action between Hellenic and Jewish culture during the Second Temple period, not only in the diaspora but also in Palestine, is now an accepted, well-established and well-documented scholarly consensus, with personalities such as Philo Judaeus and Josephus as embodiments of this intellectual synthesis. For details vide, M. Hengel, *op. cit.*. Not only do we find gymnasia and hence athletic nudity in the environs of Judah's central and most venerable cultic locale, during Herod's reign - the ultimate sign of Hellenism - but even the sacred writings of ancient Israel and Judah were translated into Greek (LXX), presumably for a new generation of diaspora Jewish people who no longer conversed in Hebrew or Aramaic. Furthermore, many of the Jewish religious writings composed during that period, within the land of Israel, were also produced in Greek (most first-century Jews in Palestine spoke Greek as a "second language" or "third language" as part of a diglot or triglot situation Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek, vide R.H. Gundry, 'The Language Milieu of First Century Palestine,' in *JBL* 83, 1964, 406, also Chambers, *op. cit.* 88. Latin was purely an administrative language in Palestine). It is interesting that among the Qumran ultra-conservative and nationalistic sectarian documents and fragments found in the caves of the Judean desert, Cave 7, preserved several Greek manuscripts, including 7Q2 (i.e. the text of the Epistle of Jeremy, ca. B.C. 100). Indeed, in addition to the appropriation of Greek moral ideas, much of the Jewish writings of this period, consciously sought to adapt Greek rhetorical styles and conventions (e.g. Josephus' historiographical style in *BJ* and his *Ant. Jud.* Vide Aune 'Hellenistic Jewish Historiography,' in *op. cit.* 104-109 M. McNamara (M.S.C.), *Intertestamental Literature*, OTM 23 (Wilmington, Michael Glazier, 1983) 21 1-240, also M. Stone (ed.), *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period*, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum, Section Two, The Literature of the Jewish people in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud (Assen, Van Gorcum, Fortress Press, 1984), *passim*.

apostle Paul's letters to a predominantly Greco-Roman readership, metaphoric images of the sage, or even the novice sage, as authentic "warrior" and "athlete" of heroic and superior moral endurance in the face of his external battles / struggle (hostility, hardships, danger, pain, persecution and even martyrdom), and / or internal warfare / struggle (desires, passions, fear, pleasure or vainglory), became, as I have already noted, an intellectual or moral aspect of the eclectic ideological climate of the Greco-Roman world, as a powerful didactic and illustrative tool, in the service of Stoics in Rome or Cynics in exile at the frontiers of the empire. Despite the *pax Romana*, nevertheless, the imperial realm possessed no less a martial ethos than did ancient Greek society.<sup>32</sup> The symbol of the warrior still remained an archetype of heroic endurance and courage, and among lists of the most popular heroes of Roman society, celebrated warriors were always included. Furthermore, athletic ideals, as I have explained, had by now also become universal in the Mediterranean, especially in the eastern provinces<sup>33</sup> - including Herodian Jerusalem.<sup>34</sup> In the west, it would be the chariot races in the circus maximus or more so the gruesome gladiator combats in the amphitheaters, which would arouse the popular passions and interest.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly the figure of celebrated combative athletes (wrestler or boxer), the charioteer or gladiator of endurance (and courage), held perhaps even more popular appeal and admiration than

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<sup>32</sup> For a study of the Roman army, its functions and its influence during the imperial period, vide, G.R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier*, (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), passim; also, G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army*, third edition (Totowa, Barnes & Noble, 1985).

<sup>33</sup> This is not to suggest that athletic games were unknown in the west, but rather that they were more popular. Vide ch. 3 of the present study.

<sup>34</sup> Attempts to introduce gymnasia into the life of Jerusalem had already begun during the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, under the auspices of the Hellenizing High Priest, Jason, much to the lament of the author of *2 Macc.*: 'When the king granted his request and he had seized power, he at once converted his countrymen to the Greek way of life . . . . He gladly built a gymnasium under the very acropolis, enrolled the most influential young men . . . . The result was . . . . an enthusiasm for Hellenism...' [*2 Macc.* 4.7]. However, while the rapid and concerted Hellenization of Antiochus was short lived, in Herodian times gymnasia and athletic contests were revived in Jerusalem. According to Josephus, Herod inaugurated, in honour of Caesar, the so-called quinquennial games and initiated a building program for athletic complexes (gymnasia, hippodromes and stadia), this also offended certain conservative pockets of Jerusalem society: ' . . . . in the first place he appointed solemn games to be celebrated every fifth year, in honour of Caesar, and built a theatre in Jerusalem, also a very great amphitheater in the plain . . . . ' (*Ant. Jud.* 15.268), for a discussion of Herod's athletic program in Jerusalem, vide 'Herod and Gymnasia in Jerusalem,' in Chambers, *op. cit.* 90-99; V. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization*.

<sup>35</sup> J. Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome*, ET by E.O. Lorimer (New Haven, London, Yale Univ. Press, 1940) 231-244. Indeed as Carcopino observes, aspirants to the highest public offices sought to exploit the perverse popularity for such shows, for their own political ends. Pompey actually staged public combats; vide Carcopino *op. cit.* 232.

the heroic general entering the city in triumphant procession, after a victorious battle. The philosophic appropriation and moral transformation of these popular and readily-identifiable figures of endurance into metaphoric archetypes of heroic moral endurance, courage and sagacity, now belonged to the common eclectic moral and intellectual tapestry of the Greco-Roman philosophic and religious world, and is also found within first-century Jewish martyrological literature. Indeed two important documents may be described as panegyrics to the virtue of endurance: (i) The Greco-Jewish first-century *martyria*, *4 Macc.* Here the pious Jewish martyrs' heroic endurance under torture and death, as a result of their obedience to reason taught within the "school" of Torah, and their self-mastery and victory over the passions, is figuratively compared to a warrior's and athlete's endurance. (ii) Likewise in another first-century Greco-Jewish *martyria*, which also incorporates apocalyptic and testamentary elements - *Testament of Job* - where the suffering and persecuted protagonist, Job, is consistently described in his struggle (ἀγών) against idolatry and Satan, in terms of an athlete of heroic endurance.

The evidence suggests that this "martial" linguistic and metaphoric description of these Jewish protagonists and champions of endurance, are not in intellectual continuity or succession with the writings of ancient Israel and / or Judah. Rather they are best understood under the direct light of the discussion concerning Greek and Roman transformed "militarized" and "agonistic" conceptualization of moral endurance.<sup>36</sup> It is important to note that the idea of heroic military endurance is certainly attested in some of the earlier ancient Israelite recorded memories of warfare in the religious history and experiences concerning the conquest and settlement of the land of Israel, particularly as it is recorded within the literary corpus of the *Deuteronomic Historian (DH)*.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, given the military nature of ancient Israelite and Judahite society, it is no

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<sup>36</sup> This appropriation, nevertheless, will be filtered and redirected towards a Jewish theological lense, a lense which is already evident in the religious writings of ancient Israel and Judah, particularly with biblical notions as election and divine favour.

<sup>37</sup> That is the canonical book of the Hebrew Bible known as the "former Prophets" (*Joshua - 2 Kings*). This collection is understood by many modern scholars to be a product of the "Deuteronomic school," a "school" which originated about B.C. 650, though its literary output continued into the exilic period. For various scholarly opinions concerning DH vide O. Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction*, Oxford and New York, 1965), M. Noth, *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien I*, (Halle, 1943). D.E. Aune, 'Israelite Historiography,' in *The New Testament in its Literary Environment*, (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1987) 98-99, P.N. Tarazi, 'The Deuteronomistic History' in his *The Old Testament: An Introduction*, (New York, St. Vladimir's Press, 1991) 89-93; F.M. Cross,

surprise to find the notion of endurance in a literal military context, as a battlefield quality of the heroic warrior.<sup>38</sup> Yet it is interesting and even intriguing that, within the history of ideas, when we turn to the prophets or other writings of ancient Israel and Judah, in contrast to early and classical Greek philosophical literature, where one finds a transformation process of the notion of the warrior's heroic endurance occurring, there appears to be no equivalent attestation for an independent demilitarization, appropriation or moral transformation of this notion from the world of the military into the language and imagery of ancient Israelite ethics or religion. Yet paradoxically, military metaphors featuring other concepts and themes are ample.<sup>39</sup> Therefore in the history of Jewish religious thought, the question of the origins and evolution of this notion

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The Structure of Deuteronomistic History,' in his *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic*, (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1973), 274-89; B.S. Childs, *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture*, (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1980) second printing, 230-232. L. Hoppe, *Joshua, Judges, with Excursus on Charismatic Leadership in Israel*, OTM 5 (Wilmington, Michael Glazier, 1982), 20-21. It would seem that in DH's final text, while we have access to some of the earliest extant Hebrew literary memories and descriptions of ancient Israelite warfare, we are basically in touch with a sixth-century (B.C.) multi-tomed Hebraic historiographical document. Unlike Homer and Thucydides, DH's descriptions of battle, however, tends to focus on abbreviated descriptions and generally of collective battle. Descriptions of individual deeds of heroism are much rarer. Furthermore DH's view of war (as well as other aspects of history), is exclusively understood and interpreted from a specific (Deuteronomistic) theological perspective. DH's theological pre-supposition for viewing the ancient wars of Israel is filtered through the lenses of a two-fold principle found in the "Book of the Law," i.e. *Deuteronomy* (Tarazi *op. cit.* 89). Throughout the text of the "former Prophets" which represents DH's comprehensive history of ancient Israel and Judah, selected battles or skirmishes spanning from the initial military push into Canaan (*Joshua*) and its consolidation (*Judges*), to the period of the united monarchy (*1 Sam. - 1 Kings*) till the time of the divided monarchy (*1 Kings - 2 Kings*) leading to the fall of the northern kingdom (*2 Kings*) and the capture of Jerusalem by the Babylonians (*2 Kings*) are interpreted by the double notion of (i) Yahweh as Israel's Divine Warrior *par excellence*, as well as (ii) the imperative of obedience - disobedience to Yahweh's Law and commandments. For Homer, war is the inevitable μοῖρα (fate) of the Greeks; vide ch. 1 of the present study.

<sup>38</sup> Vide Appendix 1, 'The Deuteronomistic Historian in Praise of Military Endurance,' in this study.

<sup>39</sup> Metaphors, of course, are very instructive concerning the cultural symbols and the psyche of any particular society. The fact that military metaphors abound in the prophetic literary tradition, is of course a cultural comment concerning the military nature of ancient Israelite society. This is clearly evident within the prophetic traditions. For instance, one finds military metaphors throughout *Jer.* The Judeans as Yahweh's people are accused of "shooting" lies like a "bow" (9.3) and as deceitful a tongue as a "deadly arrow" (9.8). On the other hand Yahweh is Jeremiah's strong "fortress" in time of distress (16.19). Yet, for the backsliding Judeans Yahweh is like a "warrior powerless to save" (14.9). Within all the literary and chronological layers of the Isaianic text one also finds military metaphors. Thus the suffering servant's mouth is made as a "sharpened sword" and his being as "a polished arrow" by Yahweh (*Is.* 49.2). Nevertheless the military metaphors, in *Isaiah*, are almost exclusively descriptions of Yahweh - Yahweh is a "fortress" of protection for the righteous (17.10); Yahweh's protective action as Divine Warrior is described as the "shield" of Jerusalem (31.5); the Assyrians are Yahweh's "club of wrath" and "rod" (10.5). The most elaborate military metaphor, occurs in *Trito-Isaiah*, a work written from a post-exilic perspective. Here Yahweh is presented as the only force capable of protecting Judah, for He only possesses righteousness. Accordingly a description of His "armaments" follow [other less elaborate descriptions of Yahweh's armament are found in Proto-Isaiah (27.1)]: 'Yahweh looked and was displeased that there was no justice. He saw that there was no one, He was appalled that there was no one to intervene . . . . He put righteousness as His breastplate, and the helmet of salvation on his head; He put on the garments of vengeance and wrapped Himself in zeal as in a cloak. According to what they have done, so will He repay wrath to His enemies and retribution to His foes.' [*Is.* 59.15-18].

from an original Israelite military matrix cannot at this stage be necessarily pre-supposed. This is especially complicated by the fact that within biblical *Job*, which in all probability is a pre-exilic composition,<sup>40</sup> the idea of patient endurance appears to suggest no derivative links with the military world. Indeed within the entire extant prophetic literature no clear derivative links between military endurance and moral endurance are evident. This is surprising given the military nature of ancient Israelite culture. Indeed given the prominence of the notion of spiritual patient endurance in *Job*, where one would reasonably expect such conceptualization, none is found. In other words, we do not encounter the idea of an individual Israelite's or Judahite's spiritual or moral endurance expressed within the transformed framework of metaphoric martial endurance. The only notable exception I can find occurs in *Jer.* 1.17-19 (and its doublet 15.20).<sup>41</sup> What does this conceptually-rare passage within the Hebrew Scripture suggest to the search for the origins and evolution of the notion of endurance, as a spiritual quality in ancient Israel and Judah? That this text chose a military metaphor to describe Jeremiah's moral endurance is of course compelling. Furthermore this appears to be one of the earliest recorded Mediterranean metaphoric accounts of the righteous or spiritual person represented as a "warrior" secure and protected by much-enduring and powerful "fortifications" which can withstand any "enemy assault" and which no missile can breach. The

<sup>40</sup> The vexed question of the dating of *Job* lies outside the scope of this study.

<sup>41</sup> "For your part you shall gird up your loins, stand up (תַּקַּם / και ἀνάστηθι) and speak to them [all that I command you]. Do not be terrified by their presence, for will terrify you in their presence. Today I have made you into a fortified city (עִיר מְצֻרָה) a city gate's iron bolt (עֲפֹד בַּרְזֶל) (omitted in LXX), and a bronze wall, [to stand against all the land] to the kings of Judah and her officials, [to her priests] and to the people of the land.] Though they shall wage war against you (לְחַמּוּ אֵינֶיךָ) / πολεμήσουσιν σε), they shall not overcome you (אֶל-אִי-יִכְלֹוּךָ) / μὴ δύνωνται πρὸς σε), for I am with you and will rescue you," declares Jahweh' [*Jer.* 1.17-19]. With this Jeremiatic depiction of prophetic spiritual endurance, in terms of an exhortation to "stand up," (תַּקַּם / και ἀνάστηθι; i.e. getting ready for the attack by taking up a fighting posture of firmness) and a re-assurance of not being "overcome" (אֶל-אִי-יִכְלֹוּךָ / μὴ δύνωνται πρὸς σε; i.e. not lacking in "battle" endurance and strength) exclusively within metaphoric military language ("they will not overcome you"), expressed exclusively within metaphoric military imagery ("fortified city", "iron bolt" "bronze wall"), we are definitely in touch with one of the earliest Hebrew or Near Eastern texts, expressing spiritual endurance in figurative military categories. [Perhaps the earliest notion of moral endurance portrayed in metaphoric military terms is found in the Egyptian pharaoh, Thutmoses III's hymn-like description of the character of his rulership: 'A king is he, a hero (warrior), excellent fortress of his army, a wall of iron for Egypt.' Vide M.B. Reisner, 'Inscribed Monument from Gebel Barkal', in *ZAS* 69 (1933) 30]. This Jeremiatic textual metaphor presenting an individual's (the young Jeremiah) moral or spiritual endurance (and strength) in all probability precedes or at most is roughly contemporaneous with the beginnings of the Greek philosophical tendencies towards the philosophical appropriation, moral transformation and martyrologization of the warrior's endurance. [It almost certainly pre-dates Plato's *Laches*].



same idea, as I have shown, is of course also represented subsequently in Roman Stoicism.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, in contrast with the Greek and Roman philosophic and literary traditions of "militarized" endurance, certain significant differences do exist. In *Jeremiah's* description of martyrological endurance expressed within the context of metaphoric military language, the prophet's moral endurance is a pure consequence of a divine gift and calling. By virtue of God's favour, rather than any personal moral training, Jeremiah as "warrior" becomes "much-enduring." Furthermore, this Jeremiatic instance of figurative military endurance represents an isolated formulation within the literary traditions of ancient Israel and Judah. It does not appear to form part of a systematic and continuous literary or conceptual convention, whether for illustrative, psychagogic or didactic purposes, as it does with the Greek philosophic and rhetorical traditions. The notion of the prophet as a "much-enduring warrior" did not become a topos or an aspect of a motif in the prophetic or other literary traditions of ancient Israel and Judah. That subsequently within the Greco-Roman period, centuries after the intense Hellenization of Jewish culture, one finds within some of their writing, paradigmatic figures of ancient Israel / Judah (such as Job in *T. Job*), or more contemporary heroes (such as the seven Maccabean martyrs in *4 Macc.* or the persecuted author of *IQH 7*),<sup>43</sup> described in metaphoric language of military or athletic

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<sup>42</sup> For example the Roman Stoic, Seneca, in his *On the Firmness of the Wise Man* writes concerning the wise man's much-enduring impregnable walls: 'Know therefore Serenus, that this perfect man [i.e. the Stoic wise man] full of virtues human and divine, can lose nothing. His goods are girt about by strong and insurmountable defences. Not Babylon's walls which an Alexander entered are to be compared with these, not the ramparts of Carthage or Numantia, both captured by one man's hand, not the Capitol or citadel of Rome, - upon them the enemy has left his marks. The walls which guard the wise man are safe from both flame and assault, they provide no means of entrance - are lofty, impregnable, godlike.' [6.-8]. Vide ch. 2 of the present study.

<sup>43</sup> Within the Qumran documents the idea of moral endurance as a military metaphor is not totally absent. It does appear in isolated instances. The most notable being in one of the doxological Thanksgiving Hymns (*Thanksgiving Hymns IQH 7*). Here the author of the seventh hymn, one who is experiencing some form of severe persecution, describes himself figuratively, in his critical situation, as a "warrior" of endurance who because of his trust in God is enabled to "stand (firm)" against his "despisers," ready to strike them (some scholars have suggested that this might be the Teacher of Righteousness himself, e.g. W. Grundmann, *TWNT* VII.646, however while this is not improbable, it is not possible to draw certain conclusions; vide Vermes, *op. cit.* 165). The language and imagery here is that of combat: 'Clinging to Thee, I will stand (firmly), I will rise against those who despise me and my hand shall be turned against those who deride me; for they have no esteem for me [that Thou mayest] manifest Thy might through me...' [*IQH 7.7*].

endurance,<sup>44</sup> can, I propose, be ascribed to the influence of an already established and systematic topos in Greek thought, though no doubt filtered through the lenses of a Scriptural weltanschauung.<sup>45</sup> It is interesting that in apocalyptic Judaism, a tradition which demonstrates considerable diversity in themes and genre, one finds the notion of moral or spiritual endurance, as one of the character traits of the righteous experiencing the afflictions of life or the eschatological tribulation (which in part may also includes martyrological persecution), in association with the eschatological hope (e.g. *4 Ezra* 7.3-5,9, 11). However in terms of military themes and language two tendencies are apparent. On the one hand in apocalyptic traditions such as those found in biblical *Daniel*, or the Qumranic sectarian document *The War Scroll (1QM)*, the theme of actual battles which are part of the eschatological agenda, play a prominent role. For instance, in *Dan.* it is the battle between the kings of the North and the South (11.7-26). In *1QM* it is the battle between the "sons of light" and the "sons of darkness," the Kittim (who are actual representatives in this world of the celestial and demonic poets in combat). Here the military world view, draws upon actual technical Roman military language of armament and warfare.

Nevertheless, the theological framework of the "battle" is clearly in terms of DH's Divine Warrior doctrine, rather than any Greek philosophical underpinning. The important point, in the present discussion, is that in both these texts, since the anticipated battles refer to an empirical

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<sup>44</sup> The most obvious exception to the general absence of an athletic situation mentioned in a pre-Hellenistic biblical document would be the "wrestling match" in which Jacob participated and which lasted all night. In the LXX, the verb used to describe the "wrestling" - παλαίω - is of course the technicus termus of Greek athletics for "wrestling". From its agonistic connotations it also came to describe any form of "struggling". Here two of Jacob's physical attributes - endurance and strength - are emphasized. Despite wrestling for the duration of the night with Jacob, Elohim could not break down his endurance, that is "overcome" him, until his hip was wrenched. Indeed because of his endurance (and strength) his name is transformed into the agonistic designation "Israel:" 'So Jacob was left alone, and a man wrestled with him (καὶ ἐπάλατιεν ἄνθρωπος μετ' αὐτοῦ) till daybreak. When the man saw that he could not overpower him, he touched the socket of Jacob's hip so that his hip was wrenched as he wrestled with the man . . . . Then the man said, "Your name will no longer be Jacob but Israel, because you have struggled with God and with men and have overcome (תִּשְׁרַע-יִשְׂרָאֵל / ἐνίσχυσας μετὰ Θεοῦ καὶ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων δυνατὸς)." ' [Gen. 32.24-25, 28]. However it is clear that the original Hebrew notion of the "struggle" carried none of the cultural and symbolic connotations of the athletic ideals that the Greek παλεύω carries.

<sup>45</sup> I would propose that in *1QH* 7, this impact is far subtler than in either *4 Macc.* or *T. Job*. Furthermore, since no athletic metaphors exist in ancient Israelite literature, as I have already pointed out, it is useless to look for the notion of endurance figuratively framed within athletic imagery. This clearly suggests to me that the incorporation of such metaphoric descriptions of endurance, which is only found during the Hellenistic period and beyond, was introduced into the literature of the Jewish people as a direct consequence of Greek intellectual influence.

rather than metaphoric eschatological wars, the allusions to the notion of the warrior's endurance, are to be read in empirical rather than metaphoric light.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, among another tradition of early Jewish apocalyptic texts, namely *1 Enoch*, *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch*, the use of military language is almost totally absent, especially in its eschatological sections, namely in the descriptions of the righteous sufferer's endurance. This appears to be one of the features of this genres of Jewish apocalyptic literature. Indeed I detect, in some of the apocalyptic literature maximally, an anti-military ideology, or minimally, a de-emphasis on the warrior as a social model. For instance, among a catalogue of condemned secret knowledge disclosed by the fallen angels to humans, and for which they incur divine punishment, as found in the Enochic "Book of the Similitudes" (37-71), is that of the making of the "instruments of death" - the armaments and weapons of warfare (*1 Enoch* 69.6). Here we find no glorification of the warrior ethos. It would thus appear, that in early Jewish apocalyptic tradition, the notion of eschatological endurance couched in either military (or athletic) imagery is not a thematic or rhetorical issue as it is in Greek and Roman philosophical essays - the most notable exception being perhaps *T. Job*, where athletic imagery of Job's endurance is the most prominent metaphor.<sup>47</sup>

In the religious literature of ancient Israel or Judah, whether historiographical or prophetic, as well as in the subsequent early Jewish apocalyptic traditions,<sup>48</sup> we do not find the idea of an individual protagonist's heroic endurance depicted as a figurative warrior or athlete - the most significant exception being *Jer.* 1.17-19. In these literary corpora, there is no consistent or systematic expression of martial language and imagery employed in a transformed in metaphoric or moral direction as there is within the philosophical literature of the Greek and Roman sages.

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<sup>46</sup> However, that is not to suggest that within the Qumran documents the idea of moral endurance as a military metaphor is totally absent. It does appear in isolated instances. The most notable being in one of the doxological collection of hymns (*Thanksgiving Hymns 1QH 7*). I treat this below.

<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless *T. Job* is not primarily written as an apocalypse, rather than as a testament and martyria. Furthermore the nature of this apocalyptic section in *T. Job* unlike other early Jewish apocalyptic literature tends to be directed more on the future outcome of an individual rather than the nation of Israel. Collins writes: 'An author who chooses Job as his model was less interested in the future of the Jewish nation than in individual piety. So we do not find eschatological predictions of the fate of the nation, but rather a vertical eschatology by which individuals are assumed to heaven.' J. Collins, 'Structure and Meaning in the Testament of Job,' in *Society of Biblical Literature 1974 Seminar Papers*, 110th Annual Meeting (24-27 Oct. 1974) 39.

<sup>48</sup> As Hanson has pointed out, the dawn of early Jewish apocalyptic is to be traced in the prophetic writings.

Accordingly, it has become obvious that the continued usage of the image of the warrior's or the athlete's endurance as a metaphor for moral endurance, within the literature of the Greco-Roman period, suggests, whether consciously or unconsciously an intellectual continuity and succession with the Greek philosophers, beginning with Democritus and Plato's Socrates, now mediated through the eclectic universe of the Greco-Roman worlds of moral ideas, concepts and rhetorical devices. Its presence therefore in any first-century text signals a clear participation with the syncretistic conceptual world of Greco-Roman times.

*B. The Greco-Jewish Sage-Martyr's Heroic "Militarized" Endurance  
(4 Maccabees)*

**i. Greek Influences on 4 Maccabees:** The idea of describing the martyr's endurance in military imagery and language is also clearly evident in an early Jewish martyrological document, *4 Macc*,<sup>49</sup> which, as in the case of the Stoic Seneca's compositions, was most likely near-contemporaneous with the time of the apostle Paul's missionary activities and letter-writing period. This *martyria*, a work which was highly esteemed and influential in early eastern Christian circles,<sup>50</sup> especially in its impact on second-century Christian *martyria* literature, and which shows similarities to the apostle Paul's military metaphor of endurance in the face of persecution,<sup>51</sup> in

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<sup>49</sup> The martyrological situations described in this text, are set in the period of Antiochus IV's reign over Judea. Concerning the date of this text's composition, Hadas has argued for a date ca. A.D. 40. Vide M. Hadas (ed.), *The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1953) 95-99.

<sup>50</sup> The earliest extant Greek text of *4 Macc.* is preserved in two of the most celebrated manuscripts of the Septuagint (LXX). They are the fourth-century Codex Sinaiticus (Ⲛ) and the fifth-century Codex Alexandrinus (A), (though Codex Vaticanus however does not include any of the Maccabean books). This strongly suggests that the fourth and fifth century Greek-speaking ecclesiastical circles, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, which produced these manuscripts, held this book in great esteem. The early existence of a Syriac version, within the Peshitta Bible also indicates the early significance of this book within eastern Christianity. It is interesting that early Latin Christianity rejected this text, for it neither appears within the Vulgate nor in any other Latin biblical collection. There is however an abbreviated and paraphrased form in Latin, *Passio SS Machabaeorum*, most likely originally composed in the fourth century, though now preserved in manuscripts of a later era. Accordingly it does not form part of the Roman Catholic biblical canon. Being based upon the masoretic text and canon of the Hebrew Bible, neither does the Protestant canon of the Old Testament, incorporate *4 Macc.* As such this book, among all branches of Christendom, is almost uniquely esteemed by the Greek, Syriac and Slavic-speaking branches of early and medieval eastern Christianity. Indeed it forms part, till this day, of the Scriptural canon of certain branches of the Slavonic-speaking Orthodox churches.

<sup>51</sup> I am not suggesting that the apostle Paul read this document and explicitly copied it. S.K. Williams, *op cit* comes the closest that I am aware of, that hints at this. Concerning the general similarities between Paul and *4 Macc.*, not simply on the issue of military metaphors and language, he writes: 'The evidence that Paul was familiar with IV Maccabees is less certain than in the case of Ignatius and Hebrews. There are however, attitudes, ideas, and

turn reflects the profound impact of Greek philosophical thought, concepts, language and rhetoric,<sup>52</sup> typical of much (non-apocalyptic) Jewish literature of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman period.<sup>53</sup> This funerary panegyric, most likely composed in Antioch for a religious commemorative occasion,<sup>54</sup> sets out to present the Torah as a "school" in achieving the quintessential Greek philosophical goals, already discussed, namely the overcoming of the passions (πάθη) and desires (ἐπιθυμίας) through the exercise of proper reason (λογισμός) as instructed by the commandments of the Torah,<sup>55</sup> while its protagonists are cast in the mould of the Greek sage-martyr, and quite frequently referred to as "philosophers," disciples of a "philosophy" or celebrated for their "philosophy" (e.g. 5.7, 11; 7.7, 9; 8.15). Indeed the clash between the tyrant and the Jewish protagonists is at times cast as a philosophical clash or polemic, with the protagonists representing a Stoic-affected Jewish "school, which arouses the ire of Antiochus, evaluating it from his own (Epicurean-like) philosophical framework, as an inaccurate expression of Stoicism (5.7) an unworthy, degrading or "irrational" philosophy (φλυάρου φιλοσοφίαν).

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particular expressions which are more intelligible to the exegete, if he assumes this familiarity than if IV Maccabees is left out of the picture.' 241. Among the links Williams cites the notion of endurance. On the other hand I think that it is possible to argue for familiarity without suggesting a direct Pauline knowledge of IV Maccabees. Both authors were writing around the same time within a similar cultural ambiance. Vide ch. 5 of the present study.

<sup>52</sup> Renehan, for instance, who has undertaken a most extensive and thorough examination of this document's philosophical background, has argued in favour of an eclectic middle Stoic influence, which better accounts for the Platonic elements discernible here rather than postulate a Platonic background, as Hadas has suggested; vide R. Renehan, 'The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees,' in *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* Vol. 115 (1972) 223-238. Hadas, on the other hand argues for the author's Platonic tendencies (e.g. the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues, the two-partite soul, the animality of the stars etc.). Furthermore Hadas suggests that the author had the *Gorgias* in mind as a paradigm for the treatment of the text, with the elder Eleazar being portrayed as a type of Socrates; vide M. Hadas, *op. cit.* 115-118. In modern scholarship, Breitenstein issues a cautionary note concerning the text's Greek philosophical background. His position, however has not received widespread approval, vide, U. Breitenstein, *Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut des Vierten Makkabaerbuchs* (Basel, Schwabe & Co., 1978).

<sup>53</sup> C.K. Williams, has argued that many of this text's major martyrological notions, are more in continuity with Greek notions of martyrdom than Israelite or antecedent Jewish martyrological thought.

<sup>54</sup> It is possible that it was composed to be delivered at an assembly commemorating the day of the death of the martyrs. While Jewish tradition offers no indisputable memory of the annual commemoration of the Maccabean martyrs, Hadas points out the very fact of the existence of an early Christian commemoration of these martyrs strongly suggests its appropriation from a corresponding Jewish commemorative practice, vide, M. Hadas (ed.), *op. cit.* 109.

<sup>55</sup> In this endeavour the present text is no different to Philo's treatises. Philo, for instance writes: 'The law exhorts us to philosophize and thereby improve the soul and the ruling mind. Therefore each seventh day stand open thousands of schools, in every city, schools of wisdom, self-restraint, courage and the other virtues....' (*Spec. Leg.* 2.61-62), cited from S.K. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1994) 58. For further discussion concerning the place of Judaism as a school of self-mastery in the age of the Augustan moral revolution, and the search for austerity, vide Stowers *op. cit.* ch. 2.

Accordingly he seeks to convert the elder Eleazar to the "true philosophy" (φιλοσοφήσεις ἀλήθειαν) (5.11). In contrast, the author, recognizes that Eleazar, because of his religious reason and hence his control over the "frenzied surge of the passions," is praised in his martyrological endurance as "philosopher of the divine life" (φιλόσοφε θείου βίου) (7.11): ' . . . . Will you not awaken from your crazy philosophy? . . . . adhere to the true philosophy of the advantageous. . . . Eleazar shattered the frenzied surge of the emotions....Ah you harmonious music of the Torah, you philosopher of the divine life. [*4 Macc.* 5.11; 7.5,7].

Furthermore, according to Hadas, there is an attempt by the author, to implicitly compare the elder Eleazar to the most celebrated Greek sage-martyr, Socrates.<sup>56</sup> These self-conscious Greek philosophical frameworks upon which *4 Macc* is structured, are already announced by the author in his opening statement:

The subject which I am about to demonstrate is most philosophical (φιλοσοφώτατον), that is whether pious reason (εὐσεβῆς λογισμός) is sovereign over the passions (τῶν παθῶν). I consider it therefore correct to advise you to pay earnest attention to the philosophical discourse.' [*4 Macc.* 1.1].

Re-echoing Platonic and popular Hellenistic (esp. Stoic) Greek philosophical principles, this Jewish "philosopher" announces that "λογισμός" is "the intellect with correct judgement the life of wisdom (σοφίας βίου)" (1.15).<sup>57</sup> Just as in Greek philosophy paradigms were set forth as illustrations of the victory of reason over the emotions (e.g. Socrates, Diogenes) so too in this early Jewish text, the author will set forth as perfect paradigms of reason's domination over the passions, biblical worthies (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob) and in particular the Maccabean martyrs.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, like the Stoic (or Cynic) sage, through this λογισμός the Maccabean sages (as well as paradigmatic figures from the Hebrew Bible such as Isaac, Daniel among the lions, and the three

<sup>56</sup> For instance, as in the case of Socrates, there are appeals to persuade the elder Eleazar to save himself from death (e.g. 5.11-13). Both Eleazar and Socrates are elderly. As in the case of Socrates the first sage-martyr, there is a firm resolution not to compromise one's "philosophy" for the sake of expediency. However, in terms of martyrological endurance, the military metaphor applied to Socrates in the *Apol.* is best re-echoed in *4 Macc.* in the elder brother's exhortation (9.23-243. Vide below.

<sup>57</sup> For example in the Cynic pseudepigraphical letter by "Crates" addressed to "Hipparchia" the author exhorts "Reason (λόγος) is a guide of the soul" (*Pseudo-Crates* 31.14 [= Malherbe's edition]). It is interesting to note however that the term for "reason" employed in *4 Macc.* is λογισμός. While Plato and the Cynics referred to "reason" as "λόγος" the Stoics preferred "λογισμός."

<sup>58</sup> For example in one of the pseudepigraphical Cynic letters, ascribed to "Crates," the much-enduring and self-mastered Diogenes is set forth as the paradigm of "freedom over the emotions" or "apathy" (τῆς ἀπαθείας) (*Pseudo-Crates* 34.4). Diogenes and Socrates become models of imitation in the Cynic epistles (*Pseudo-Crates* 35.24).

youths in the fiery furnace)<sup>59</sup> are able to attain and demonstrate courage, endurance and self-mastery (5.22-23) and hence they "despise suffering even unto death" (1.9; 13.1).<sup>60</sup> Just as in the case of the Greek sage-martyr who, in appropriation of the Greek (esp. Spartan) warrior's understanding of the preference of endurance even unto "noble death" than shameful retreat, so here the author of *4 Macc.* presents the idea of martyrological endurance as a "noble death" (10.1; 12.1; 13.14).<sup>61</sup> Again, as in the case of Seneca's proclamation of brave martyrological Stoic endurance as the most public virtue, the "only virtue that is on view" (*Ep.* 67.9), and which therefore publicly authenticates the sagacity of the sage, so also the author of *4 Macc.* acknowledges the elder Eleazar's martyrological endurance as taking place in an exemplary fashion in the "public gaze," therefore confirming his adherence to a Torah-educated "philosophy" and sealing his heroic status:

'You, father, through your endurance (διὰ τῶν ὑπομονῶν) in the public gaze, have made our adherence to the Torah . . . . by your deeds you gave credit to your words concerning divine philosophy (θείας φιλοσοφίας) - you elderly hero . . . .'

But whence does this "wisdom" stem? Just as the Greek sages spoke of the philosophic endeavour as "schooling" so too for this Greco-Jewish author, there exists an acknowledgment of a παιδεία in reason and wisdom. However in this instance it is a "schooling" in reason which derives from the divine Law (τοῦ νόμου παιδεία) (1.17) In this pious 'philosophic' endeavour, the author will portray the martyrological endurance displayed by his text's protagonists as one of the most important illustrations of their "paideia" in reason and self-mastery over the emotions and desires, through obedience to the Torah. This re-echoes the Greek and Roman sage's endurance in the face of persecution, torture or death as a manifestation of his authenticity and his reason over the passions, for the tortures simply provide an opportunity for the demonstration of rational

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<sup>59</sup> *4 Macc.* 17.20-21, 18.12. It is to be noted that for the author of *4 Macc.* the models of the much-enduring martyr, are drawn from the Hebrew Bible, though described in the militarized language of endurance not found in the original. Thus Isaac "endured immolation (ὑπέμεινεν Ἰσαάκ) for the sake of piety" (13.12).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Stoic essays on the sage's disdain of suffering and hardships e.g. Musonius Rufus 'That One Should Disdain Hardships.' This of course constitutes one of the elements of endurance. The term for the Stoic "disdain" of hardships, καταφρόνυσις is re-echoed in one instance in the description of the brothers' "disdain" of the "emotion" of brotherly affection, in the form of περιφρόνυσις (14.1). Again their disdain of the suffering in their martyrological torments is expressed as ὑπερφρόνυσις (13.1) as is the mother's (14.11).

<sup>61</sup> 'When he too had gloriously endured death (ἀοίδιμον θάνατον καρτερήσαντος), the third (brother) was brought forward.' [*4 Macc.* 10.1] 'And when he too had died a blessed death (μακαριῶς ἀπέθανεν) . . . . ' (12.1)].

endurance (11.12).<sup>62</sup> Such obedience to the Torah rather than being "anti-rational" is shown to be a complete "schooling" in the attainment of reason and the exercise of endurance under extreme hardship:

'You mock at our philosophy and say our living according to it is contrary to reason. Yet it teaches us (ἐκδιδάσκει) self-mastery, so that we rule over all pleasure and desires (ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν) and it trains us (ἐξάσκει) to courage / manliness (ἀνδρείαν), so that we willingly endure any suffering (πάντα πόνον ἔκουσίως ὑπομένειν) . . . . it educates us (παιδεύει) . . . . and instructs us (ἐκδιδάσκει) . . . .'  
[4 Macc. 5.22-24].

Again, the impact of Greco-Roman philosophy is evident in the manner he discusses the martyr's endurance of labours. For instance in one his passages (7.22-23) he depicts the martyr's endurance simply in terms of the Greek and Roman sage's endurance under hardship. Here we read about (i) the "weak" or "diseased" soul unable to endure pain because of their domination by the passions rather than reason, (ii) the philosopher who necessarily lives in accordance to reason, that is "the full rule of philosophy," who will demonstrate endurance in pain, precisely because he can control, or has mastery over his passions (περικρατήσειεν τῶν παθῶν), (iii) the protagonist's endurance of labours is for the sake of preserving virtue (διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν), (iv) it is only the sage (ὁ σοφός) who can control his passions and demonstrate wise courage and endurance. (v) The only difference in the understanding of endurance, here, are the names of the paradigms of endurance, the role of πίστις in the God of Israel as well as the cause of religion. It is interesting, however, that the notion of faith, the list of paradigmatic figures, as well as endurance and reason demonstrated for the "cause of religion," however, appear as inserted into an already established philosophical framework. The author's ethical system, according to his own ethical logic, could equally function, without these insertions. They represents a qualification rather than an essential alteration. In other words the impact of the philosophical argument weighs heavier in his system of virtue, reason and endurance:

' . . . . certain persons seem to be dominated by their passions because of the weakness of their reason (ἀσθενῆ λογισμόν). Could anyone who lives as a philosopher according to the full rule of philosophy (τῆς φιλοσοφίας κανόνα φιλοσοφῶν), and believes in God (πεπιστεφκώς) and knows that it is blessed to endure any labour (πόνον ὑπομένειν) for virtue's sake (διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν), fail to control his passions (οὐκ ἂν περικρατήσειεν τῶν παθῶν), for the cause of religion? Only the wise man (ὁ σοφός) and the courageous (ἀνδρείος) who is master of his passions.' [4 Macc. 7.20-23].

<sup>62</sup> ' "You have granted us a kind favour," said he, "you tyrant, though unwittingly, for by these noble sufferings you permit us to demonstrate our endurance (καρτερίαν) toward the Law." ' (11.12).



Again, just as endurance was regarded as one of the indispensable authenticating values of the Greek and Roman sage-martyr's manliness, self-mastery and wisdom, so too in the case of 4 *Macc.* the author regards endurance, that is the capacity to disdain suffering and pain, as one of the key heroic and manly qualities which his protagonists' display under persecution, torture and martyrdom, hence manifesting the supremacy of reason over the emotions:

Many and diverse sources would enable me to demonstrate to you that reason (λογισμός) is sovereign over passions (αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν), but I could far best prove it from the manly heroism (ἀνδρογαθίας) of those who died for virtue's sake (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς) - Eleazar and the seven brothers and their mother. All these despised suffering even unto death and so proved that reason is sovereign over passions.' [4 *Macc.* 1.7-9].

I would argue that in 4 *Macc.*'s presentation and understanding of martyrological endurance, the author is completely in continuity with Greek notions of the much-enduring sage or sage-martyr rather than ancient Israelite prophetic or second-temple apocalyptic martyrological traditions of endurance. This is further attested, in large measure by the fact that within 4 *Macc.* the martyrs' endurance is constantly illustrated by metaphoric military and athletic imagery and language, a tendency which, with one major exception (*Jer.* 1.17-19), appears to be absent in the land of Israel's prophetic and apocalyptic traditions of endurance in persecution or martyrdom.<sup>63</sup> Yet as I have already explained, the predisposition to describe the sage's martyrdom (as indeed the ἀγών of his entire life) in military (and athletic) imagery and concepts was commonplace in Greek and Roman martyrological thinking (except for the Epicureans), beginning with Plato's Socrates.

The author of 4 *Macc.* is of course free to present the notion of martyrological endurance in the language and conceptualizations of his choice. His choice to consistently depict the martyr's endurance in language and imagery which reflects military (and athletic) world, is of course highly suggestive of the Greek philosophic foundational influences shaping the construction of the text. It is interesting that despite an anti-Hellenization (4.23-26) and anti-gymnasium theme in the text (e.g. 4.20),<sup>64</sup> the author still proceeds to explain the sage-martyrs' endurance in athletic terms -

<sup>63</sup> Vide preceding part of this chapter concerning the relative absence of military or athletic imagery or language employed in the designation of moral or spiritual endurance, in the literature of ancient Israel, Judah or early Jewish apocalyptic traditions.

<sup>64</sup> Thus the author explains that there was an attempt to transform the very fabric of the Jewish *politeia* (ἐξεπολιτεύσεν) by Jason the Hellenizing High Priest, acting as Antiochus' agent: 'And so Antiochus appointed Jason to serve as High Priest and to rule over the nation. Jason changed the nation's manner of life and altered its

the *most* Hellenic cultural symbol!<sup>65</sup> Just as in the Greek and *Roman* philosophic literary tradition of suffering, persecution, torture and martyrdom, military metaphors and language were employed, so too in *4 Macc* military metaphors, values and language abound in the description of the sage-martyrs. The sage-martyr is like a soldier who is exhorted to "fight (στρατεύει) the sacred and noble fight (τόν ἀγῶνα) for the sake of piety" (9.23); the mother of the seven martyrs is also compared to a warrior becoming a "soldier of God" (Θεοῦ στρατιῶτι, 16,14). The martyrs' divine reason is an "armament" which overcomes suffering (13.16). Included in this philosophical "militarization" of the Maccabean sage-martyrs is the Greek and Roman emphasis on the sage's "warrior's endurance" - a tradition which, as I have already explained, can be traced back to Plato's Socrates. Similarly, the author of *4 Macc.* portrays the "military" character of his protagonists' rational endurance in their tortures and eventual martyrdom, for the sake of obeying the Torah's commandments not to eat unclean food, in two ways: (i) by the use of military vocabulary and concepts such as "obtaining victory," "vanquishing," "resistance" or "combat" (μάχη / ἀγών)<sup>66</sup> or the juxtaposition of the twin heroic attributes of the warrior - courage and endurance; (ii) by the explicit use of military metaphors.

**ii. The Maccabean Sage-Martyrs' Endurance and Military Language:** In introducing the idea of endurance in his texts the author immediately contextualizes it within a "military" setting by recalling the twin heroic warrior's attributes in battle - courage and endurance - as well as by positing the theme of "overcoming" a stronger enemy through endurance / resistance. Cast in the mould of the heroic much-enduring warrior the sage-martyrs not only gain the admiration of "all mankind" but also of the Hellenistic soldiers who tortured them.<sup>67</sup> It is an irony within the history of Mediterranean ideas, that an ideal that first originated among Greek

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polity (ἐξεπολίτευσεν) in complete defiance of the Torah; not only did he construct a gymnasium upon the very citadel of our nation, but he even suppressed the service at the Temple.' (4.18-20). Vide ch. 3 on athletics in Palestine under Herod.

<sup>65</sup> Vide below in this chapter.

<sup>66</sup> The concept of the ἀγών in Greek culture though for the most part came to be associated with the athletic struggle and contest, it could also apply to any struggle. According to *LS* the term also possessed an explicit military dimension to signify a battle. Its context determines what field of struggle is envisaged.

<sup>67</sup> Martyrological endurance also possesses a redemptive consequence, through the "purging" of the nation (1.11c).

warriors and was eventually transformed by philosophers into a moral concept, should now become a reminder or model of manly heroism to (Greek warriors, who presumably have forgotten this heroic attribute by their cowardice in this situation. The Jewish sage-martyrs become the very models for imitation for the Greek warrior. This, like the earlier Greek texts, postulates a new social phenomenon, a paradigm shift in ideas of heroism and masculinity - the reversal of roles between Hellenistic warrior and Jewish martyr. It is now the warrior who admires the sage-martyr's heroic endurance, the military enemy praises them (e.g. 1.11; 9.26). It is the Jewish sage-martyr, rather than the Hellenistic warrior, who is the new standard of heroic endurance. The icon of the much-enduring Jewish "philosopher" as perfect paradigm and model of imitation for the Seleucid Greek warriors represents a re-appropriation of the oldest military icon of Greek culture - the much-enduring and brave warrior - now no longer embodied in the deeds of the Hellenistic Seleucid warrior, the direct successor of the Greek warrior, but in the martyrological actions of the Jewish martyrs. It is only through imitation of this heroic endurance that the soldier's of Antiochus can be revitalized and achieve victories in their own infantry battles and sieges. This is an ironic ideological twist by the author, whether consciously or unconsciously:

'For the tyrant Antiochus, taking as a model the courage the courage of their virtue, and their firm endurance (ὑπομονήν) under torture (βασάνοις), advertised their endurance (ὑπομονήν) as a paradigm (ὑπόδειγμα) to his own soldiers (τοῖς στρατιώταις αὐτοῦ); he thus got them noble and courageous for infantry battle (πεζομαχίαν) and for siege (πολιορκίαν), and he ravaged and vanquished all his enemies (ἐνίκησεν πάντα τοῦ πολεμίου).'<sup>68</sup> [4 Macc. 17.23-24].

But this victorious military endurance by Antiochus' army is not comparable to the Maccabean sage-martyrs' more noble and paradigmatic moral endurance under torture. It is inferior. In this moral evaluation of endurance, the author of 4 Macc is re-echoing a sentiment held both by Plato and Aristotle and the subsequent sages. The sage's endurance is in accordance to reason, the warrior's is not.<sup>68</sup> In contrast to Antiochus' Hellenistic warrior, the Jewish sage-martyrs' "militarized" endurance is of another and higher moral order. It is irresistibly triumphant, guaranteeing freedom from tyranny. It is even redemptive in its consequences. Indeed, like the tradition already evident in Greek thought both within military and non-military contexts, of the

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<sup>68</sup> For instance, Aristotle would claim that the warrior's endurance is based on 'experience,' rather than reason, and hence cannot be labeled as real bravery (*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.29). Vide ch. 2 of the present study.

redemptive or liberating power of endurance (attested in the Prometheus legend as well as the Spartan notion of the warrior's redemptive endurance for his *polis*), the author of *4 Macc* explains, that through this paradigmatic and heroic "warrior's" endurance the Jewish sage-martyrs manage to attain the ultimate "battle victory" over the tyrant, freedom for the land of Israel from his control and hence the "purging" of the "fatherland" from his despotic tyranny:<sup>69</sup>

'By their courage (ἀνδρεία) and endurance (ὑπομονή) they won the admiration not only of all mankind but even of their very torturers, and they became responsible for the dissolution of the tyranny which oppressed our nation; they triumphed over the tyrant by their endurance (νικήσαντες τὸν τύραννον τῆ ὑπομονῆ) so that through them the fatherland was purged.' [*4 Macc.* 1.11].

The idea of the defeat of a mighty enemy as an inevitable consequence of such noble martyrological "resistance" as exhibited by the elder Eleazar, under torture, is again repeated in the text following the description of Eleazar's much-enduring "resistance" (ἀντέσχειν) to pain and torture. This renders the enemy, no matter how powerful, "powerless" and hence assures a final victory by "overcoming" the opposition: 'When the tyrant had been so manifestly worsted in his first trial, having proved powerless to compel the elderly man....' [*4 Macc.* 8.2].

The theme of "gaining victory" over the tyrant through martyrological endurance is also ascribed to the second-oldest brother. Here a philosophical antithesis is set forth between the tyrant's unreasonable and hence doomed arrogance (ὑπερήφανον λογισμόν) in contrast to the young sage-martyr's triumphant (νικῶμεν), reasonable and virtuous endurance (ὑπὸ τῆς ἡμῶν ὑπομονῆς). The tyrant is judged as "wicked" under the threat of "divine wrath," whereas the second-oldest brother's endurance in martyrdom for the sake of piety lightens his soul and brings him joy:

The agony he endured with fortitude (τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καρτερῶν) . . . . And to the tyrant he said: "Do you not perceive tyrant most cruel of all that you are being tormented more than I, when you see that your arrogant reasoning of tyranny (ὑπερήφανον λογισμόν) is vanquished by our endurance (νικῶμεν . . . ὑπὸ τῆς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἡμῶν ὑπομονῆς) in the cause of piety? In my case lighten my pain by the joys which virtue brings . . . . You cannot vile tyrant escape the judgement of divine wrath.' [*4 Macc* 9.28,30-31].

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<sup>69</sup> Vide also 6.29-30; 11.24: 'Make my blood an expiation / purging (καθάρισον) for them, and take my life as a ransom (ἀντίψυχον) for theirs. Uttering these words, the holy man nobly succumbed to his torments; even in the tortures of death he resisted (ἀντέστη), by virtue of reason (τῷ λογισμῷ) . . . .' (6.29-30); 'Only six youths, and we have dissolved (καταλελύκομεν) your tyranny.' (11.24).

The military idea of "triumphing" or "gaining "victory" over an opposing force through martyrological endurance, is again repeated with reference to the elder Eleazar's sufferings (9.6). This time however the "victory" is over the tyrant's tortures. This victorious endurance is set as a model of imitation by the young brothers:

'But if elderly men of the Hebrews have died for piety's sake, and displaying endurance through tortures (βασανισμούς ὑπομείναντες) have abided in their piety, it is even more fitting that we who are young should die despising the tortures which you impose over which our aged teacher triumphed.' [4 *Macc.* 9.6].

**iii. The Maccabean Sage-Martyrs' Heroic Endurance Described in Military Metaphors:** Besides the use of "militarized" language to signal the heroic nature of the Jewish sage-martyrs' endurance under torture and noble death, the author of 4 *Macc* also employs military metaphors in the service of his text. Here I will draw attention to three metaphors of heroic martyrological endurance. The first one deals with Eleazar's endurance in terms of the metaphor of the image of the "besieged city." The second deals with the image of the "much-enduring guard" not "deserting" his appointed "post." The third metaphor deals with the sage-martyr as citizen-warrior of endurance on behalf of his *politeia* through the steadfast and heroic refusal to taste ritually unclean food (swine's flesh).<sup>70</sup>

After describing all the sufferings and tortures inflicted upon the elder Eleazar, and having referred to his martyrological endurance under these tortures in non-military language, including the use of an epic traveller's unswerving endurance<sup>71</sup> immediately after recording his death, the author summarizes the martyr's heroism in terms of his "rational endurance" expressed and illustrated in the metaphoric military idea of a heroic city's "resistance" under an awesome battle

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<sup>70</sup> It is interesting that the author also constructs a travel metaphor to designate Eleazar's endurance: 'Like an excellent pilot, indeed the Reason of our father Eleazar, steering the boat of piety (λογισμὸν πηδαλιουχῶν τὴν τῆς εὐσεβείας ναῦς) in the sea of passions, (τῶν παθῶν πελάγει) though he was buffeted by the threats of the tyrant and submerged by the triple wave of torture, in no way swerved the rudder of piety, until he had entered the harborage of deathless victory. (7.1-3).

<sup>71</sup> Vide note above. Among the references to Eleazar's martyrological in plain (non-metaphoric) language, the author will simply state that Eleazar "endured the pain" (ὑπέμενε τοὺς πόνους, 6.9), or concerning the seven brothers that "in suffering they endured" (πάσχοντες ἐνεκατέρου, 14.9), et al.

"siege," a resistance which leads to his "overcoming" the enemy forces. The concepts and imagery contained within this military metaphor of moral endurance, in terms of a "besieged city," should be quite familiar by now. It is found in Seneca's description of the sage's lofty tranquillity and endurance as well as in the Cynics' understanding of moral endurance and courage as superior to a city's defensive walls or even the Spartan warrior's endurance in wall-less Sparta (*Pseudo-Diog.* 27.117-25). The Stoic sage by virtue of his life according to reason, and being surrounded by the powerful "wall" of his "impregnable fortress" which is his moral endurance, (Seneca *Ep.* 113.27), can endure and hold out and resist the most powerful of attacks or sieges, namely "life's siege" (Seneca *Ep.* 113.27). Similarly, Eleazar's reason-cultivated endurance under the "siege" of torture and death, is considered nobler than that of any actual besieged city, and "overcoming" his "besiegers:"

'Uttering these words, the holy man nobly succumbed to his torments, even in the tortures of death, he resisted, by virtue of reason (βασάνων ἀντέστη τῷ λογισμῷ), for the Law's sake . . . . No city besieged with numerous and ingenious works has offered such resistance (ἀντέσχε) as did this most saintly man. When his holy soul was set aflame with rack and torture, he overcame his besiegers through the protective shielding of his piety' [*4 Macc.* 6.30, 7.4].

The Socratic-like military metaphor of martyrological endurance recorded in the *Apology*,<sup>72</sup> in the sense of a soldier retaining his divinely appointed post, no matter what the dangers or hardships, is re-echoed in the form of an exhortation by the much-enduring tortured elder brother to his younger brothers. They are to imitate the example of his own "military o~ " and not "abandon their post." Instead as much-enduring "warriors" they are exhorted to "fight the sacred and noble campaign

'As though he was being transformed into incorruption by the fire, he nobly endured the torments (ὑπέμεινεν εὐγενῶς), and he said, "Imitate me (μιμήσασθε με), my brothers, do not desert your post in my fight / struggle (μὴ μου τὸν ἀγῶνα λειποτακτήσητε), do not abjure our brotherhood of nobility. Fight the sacred and noble fight (ἱερὰν καὶ εὐγενῆ στρατείαν στρατεύεσθε) or piety's sake (περὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας). [*4 Macc.* 9.22-24].

It is to be noted, furthermore, that there appears to be an interesting link between the Jewish sage-martyr's endurance in death and that of the Greek citizen-warrior, again mediated through Greek philosophy. As I have already explained earlier in this chapter, the Greek citizen-warrior's

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<sup>72</sup> Vide above, in the present chapter.

"noble death," as a manifest mark of his courage and endurance in battle, was on behalf of (for the sake of) his *polis* (ὕπερ πόλεως) or on behalf of the Greek ideal (ὕπερ Ἑλλάδος).<sup>73</sup> A similar motif now transformed into martyrological moral endurance is found in the Greek proto-martyr, the Aeschylean Prometheus' steadfastness, which is on behalf of humans and manages to transform Zeus into a more humane deity.<sup>74</sup> The Greek sage would apply such a redemptive understanding to the philosopher's martyrological endurance by explaining their own martyrdom or "noble death," as being on behalf of a higher cause, beginning with Socrates' death on behalf of justice or wisdom. Now the Greco-Jewish sage-martyr endures the tortures of "noble death" as a "warrior," for the "sake of piety," (περὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας, ὑπερ τῆς εὐσεβείας, [9.24; 16.13]), as shielding the divine Torah (θείου Νόμου προασπίζοντᾶ [9.15]), "defending Torah with their own blood" (τόν Νόμου ἰδίῳ αἵματι ὑπερασπίζοντας [7.8]). Indeed most extraordinary of all is the image of the much-enduring Maccabean sage-martyrs in the image of the heroic and much-enduring Greek citizen-warrior. While it is true that the entire text of *4 Macc.* appears to be a funeral oration, for the sage-martyrs as much-enduring and heroic citizen-warriors of the Hebrew *politeia*<sup>75</sup> nevertheless in the attested Maccabean martyrs' funerary inscription (17.9-10) whose function is as a permanent memorial to provide a synopsis of the essence, meaning and purpose of their noble death, the author summarizes the message of the entire panegyric as an epitaphic λόγος. He explains that their "endurance" and "looking to God," were instrumental in overcoming the tyrant and vindicating their race against the violence inflicted against the "polity of the Hebrews" (τὴν Ἑβραίων πολιτείαν). Already in the introductory sections of the document, it is clearly stated that Jason the pro-Hellenic High Priest, acting under direct orders from Antiochus initiated a program to alter the "polity" of the land (ἐξεπολίτευσεν) (4.19). Now the author, seeks to summarize and laud the heroes for the result of this "political" battle. He serves as a funerary orator

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<sup>73</sup> Vide 273.

<sup>74</sup> Vide Williams, *op. cit.* 150.

<sup>75</sup> Many of the elements of the classical (Athenian) funeral orations for the fallen citizen-warrior are present. The oration occurs at a public ceremony, as a public funeral. The fallen warriors are eulogized for noble death ὑπερ πόλεως, collectively and / or individually. Vide N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: the Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1986) *passim*.

proclaiming, in summation, over the assembled dead bodies of the fallen, their heroic and triumphant deeds of valiant endurance as defenders of the Hebrew *politeia*. Their heroic endurance against the violent and destructive force of the tyrant and their noble death as Hebrew citizen-warriors, is on behalf of the freedom of their race and *politeia*:

'Indeed it would be proper to inscribe upon their very tomb the following words, as a memorial to those heroes of our people:

"Here lie buried an aged priest, an old woman, and her seven sons, victims of the violence of a tyrant resolved to destroy the polity of the Hebrews (τὴν Ἑβραίων πολιτείαν). They vindicated their race (ἔξεδίκησαν τὸ γένος), looking to God, and enduring torments even to death (μέχρι θανάτου ὑπομείνατες). [4 Macc. 17.8-10]

### *C. Female Sages and Martyrs as Much-Enduring Warriors*

**i. A Woman's Martyrological Endurance: Warrior of God:** As I have already argued,<sup>76</sup> to the Greeks the idea of the warrior's endurance ( and courage) in facing the enemy in the battlefield or torturers in the prison, were universally restricted to men, who "by nature" were considered endowed with the propensity towards these military qualities.<sup>77</sup> Very few exceptions were attested, with the mythological tribe of women-warriors, the Amazons, being the major example.<sup>78</sup> When historical exceptions to the rule were noted by Greek historiographers such as Thucydides, they were explained away as being a display of endurance "beyond their gender" or exceeding their "allotted nature."<sup>79</sup> Likewise in Greek (and Roman) philosophy, it was usually considered that males were the conventional candidates in the attainment and capacity to display moral endurance (and courage) in facing hardships and pain - which as I have argued was often portrayed within a metaphoric military motif. For Plato or Aristotle, for instance, moral endurance and courage were associated with the intrinsic male capacity towards reason (vs. emotion or passion). In the extant attestations referring to Hellenistic philosophy, one observes an interesting, though very limited tendency, within a certain Athenian Cynic circle associated with Diogenes'

<sup>76</sup> Vide 'The Warrior's Endurance and Gender,' in ch. 1 of the present study.

<sup>77</sup> Vide 'The Warrior's Endurance and Gender.'

<sup>78</sup> Vide 'The warrior's Endurance and Gender.' Concerning a study of the myths surrounding the Amazons, vide W.B. Tyrrell, *The Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking*, (Baltimore, London, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984).

<sup>79</sup> Vide 'The warrior's Endurance and Gender.' Concerning a study of the myths surrounding the Amazons, vide W.B. Tyrrell, *The Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking*, (Baltimore, London, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984).



disciple Crates (fl. ca. B.C. 328-24) - who became a Cynic paradigm of endurance, including martyrological endurance (Diog. L. Crates 6.90) - to allow for the possibility of certain *exceptional* women of becoming sages and hence for their capacity to display moral endurance and courage in the hardships of the philosophical ἀγών, ἄσκησις and even the potential of calmly facing and enduring physical attacks and pain. One such woman was his wife Hipparchia (fl. ca. B.C. 300), who took on the philosopher's cloak (Diog. L. *Hipp.* 7.97) and joined him in an austere life of voluntary poverty and renunciation, rejecting her comfortable social rank (Diog. L. *Hipp.* 7.96).<sup>80</sup> Diog. L. reports that on one occasion when Theodorus threatened her physically, after being defeated by her in a public debate, she showed "no sign of alarm" or of any "disturbance." To the Greeks such a disturbance or alarm would normally be expected from a woman in a situation of physical or psychological threat of pain, for as Diog. L. explains this reaction is "natural to a woman:" 'But Hipparchia showed no sign of alarm (κατεπλάγη) or of the disturbances natural in a woman (οὔτε διεταράχθη ὡς γυνή).' [Diog. L. *Hipp.* 7.97].

To Diog. L. such a brave, calm and undisturbed demeanour, so normal for the much-enduring male sage in circumstances of physical threat or torture,<sup>81</sup> was not expected from a female. Subsequently we encounter in the same text, one of the rarest instances of the noun "φιλόσοφος" in ancient Greek texts, preceded by a feminine definite article - τῆς φιλοσόφου (Diog. L. *Hipp.* 7.98). Yet even here, the concept of the female philosopher showing calm (rational) endurance and courage is understood as exceptional and opposed to the "nature of a woman." However in a remarkable Greek philosophical tradition in apparent doctrinal succession to Crates, that associated with the pseudepigraphical Greco-Roman epistles of Pseudo-Crates,<sup>82</sup> the issue of a woman's

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<sup>80</sup> Vide ch. 2 of the present study.

<sup>81</sup> For a discussion of the serene demeanour of the sage (tranquillitas) under circumstances of hardship or torture, vide J.T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel* 59-65.

<sup>82</sup> The collection of epistles ascribed to Crates by Diog. L. are not to be identified with the pseudepigraphical collection bearing the name of "Crates" contained in manuscript 48 of the Vatican Library, and which recently appear in Malherbe's very handy Greek-English edition of Cynic epistles. The Vatican manuscript 48 Crates letters are pseudonymous, and according to Malherbe are to be dated either in the first or second century (A.D.). It would appear that even within this pseudonymous Crates collection of 36 letters, that they do not reflect uniform "Crates" but probably several. The ones which I focus on in this section, that is the "Hipparchia" letters, appear to represent a consistent position on the possibility of female philosophers as well as holding a radical view, at least in Greco-

intrinsic or natural capacity towards physical and philosophic endurance is taken a radical step further. Accordingly within two of these pseudepigraphical Cynic letters addressed to "Hipparchia," the possibility of a woman naturally possessing the same moral attributes as a male sage, including endurance, is attested for perhaps the earliest extant literary instance in Greek thought (*Ep.* 28 & 29). In a revolutionary ancient statement of gender equality, Pseudo-Crates rejects any notion of an *intrinsically* flawed, weak or morally deprived female nature (φύσις) which prohibits a woman from entering the Cynic philosophic ranks.<sup>83</sup> For Pseudo-Crates, his illustrative paradigm, happens to be precisely drawn from the battlefield - female warriors (Amazons), whose "great deeds" (presumably their battle deeds) and reputation for military courage and endurance was universally considered as equal to any male warrior's achievements:

Women are not by nature worse than men (γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἔφυσαν χείρους). The Amazons at any rate who have accomplished such great deeds, have not fallen short of men in anything (ἐν οὐδενὶ ἀνδρῶν ἔμειονέκτησαν). [Pseudo-Crates *To Hipparchia* 28.1-3]

It is of course very interesting, from the perspective of this study's topic, that from an argument derived from the example of warriors, specifically women warriors, Pseudo-Crates can verify his initial philosophic proposal, namely that men and women are by nature morally equal, and hence nothing intrinsically prevents a woman from aspiring to the philosophic life. Of further interest is how Pseudo-Crates defines the essence of being a Cynic sage. For him such a status is exclusively in terms of the capacity to endure circumstances which are unbearable to others. While they are not indifferent to the harshness or the pain they have the capacity to robustly endure it (σφοδρῶς ὑπομένειν). Non-Cynics are "effeminate" and under "false knowledge" and hence unable to show endurance in hardship and pain. In this argument he draws a vital categorical distinction between "weakness" (μαλακία, effeminacy) and "femaleness." By his exhortation to "Hipparchia" to join the Cynic ranks, Pseudo-Crates permits the possibility of a woman guided by

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Roman times, concerning the essential equality of the male and female "natures." A position, which in the history of ideas can only be rivaled by Paul's statement in *Gal.* 3.28. For a brief discussion of the Pseudo-Crates epistolary collection, as well as a bibliography, vide, A. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles* SBL/SBS 12 (Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1986) reprint, 10-13.

<sup>83</sup> By this assertion, this particular Cynic tradition is quite different to other co-contemporary Cynic anthropological views. For instance within the Pseudo-Diogenes collection of Cynic letters one is informed that *even* though Hipparchia is a woman she is encouraged in her yearning for philosophy (Pseudo-Diog. *Ep.* 3).

Cynic philosophical training to endure those situations which cannot be endured by any non-Cynic male (or woman). In his exhortation for her to embrace the Cynic life and attain to endurance in hardships, the author addresses her in the language and mode of the standard Greek pre-battle exhortation to combat endurance - "stand firm!" - in effect rendering her a much-enduring warrior" of the Cynic way of life, and he her "military commander: '

It is not because we are indifferent to everything that others have called our philosophy Cynic, but because we robustly endure (σφοδρῶς ὑπομένειν) those things which are unbearable (ἀνυπομόνητα) to them because they are effeminate or subject to false opinion . . . . Stand fast (Μένε) therefore and live the Cynic life with us (for you are not by nature inferior to us) . . . . ' [Pseudo-Crates *To Hipparchia* 29.10-14].

This Cynic possibility for a women motivated by philosophic reason (rather than passions and desires), to bear the unbearable, though not in a state of indifference to its harshness, is taken up by the author of *4 Macc.* in his treatment of the elderly mother of the seven martyred brothers. As in the case of the martyred men the Greek philosophic notion of reason over the emotions or passions, is fused with a biblical understanding of unswerving dedication to the Mosaic Torah and God. However in her case, unlike the male martyrs, the author of *4 Macc.* presents the mother's "martyrdom" and her "torture" not so much in terms of the experiences of her own physical torture and death by fire but, rather in term of witnessing the horror of her sons' torments, for in the author's anthropological perspective such psychological and empathetic maternal torture forms a greater mode of torment than any physical torture which the mother had to endure, and overcame by her capacity to pious reason, which granted her a manly courage and unswerving endurance. As a visible manifestation of such a manly courage and endurance, in accordance to reason, the author explains that she did not weep (for the author, the mark of weakness and effeminacy):

**Non-Indifference:**

'How numerous, then, and how great, were the torments of the mother, as she suffered with her children as they were racked by the wheel and by fire.' [4 *Macc.* 15.22].

**Pious Reason Over Passions:**

'But devout reason gave manly courage to her heart in the midst of these emotions, and nerved her to ignore the immediate claims of maternal affection. And although she saw the destruction of seven children and the manifold variety of their torments that heroic mother counted all these things as naught because of her faith in God.' [4 *Macc.* 15.23-24].

**Unswerving Pious Reason over Maternal Emotions:**

' . . . . . the mind of even a woman despised torments even more manifold (than the males). For the mother of the seven youths endured the agonies of everyone of her children . . . . . But sympathy for her

offsprings did not move the mother of the youths, whose soul was like Abraham's (pious and reason-centered) soul.' [4 *Macc.* 14.11-12, 20].

'Nevertheless though so many considerations affecting maternal love drew the mother to sympathize with them (i.e. her sons), yet in the case of none of them did their manifold tortures avail to sway her reason . . . One by one the mother saw her sons tortured and burned and swerved not for the sake of piety . . . . nor . . . . did you weep' [4 *Macc.* 15.11,14,20].

Again, as in the case of the men, the mother is also presented as a paradigm of endurance (and courage) derived from pious reason. In this instance however the author reflects the less radical Critean philosophic view of women, namely that certain exceptional women can demonstrate heroic physical and moral endurance associated with the "life in accordance to reason." Like Crates' Hipparchia, the mother-martyr is able to attain to such an endurance (as well as courage and reason) *despite* her gender and maternal inclinations, for in the anthropological *weltanschauung* of this Greco-Jewish author, pious and rational endurance belongs to the domain of the male. As a direct consequence of such pious reason, the mother - a woman and in advanced age - can endure the unendurable for a woman, namely witnessing her sons' tortures.<sup>84</sup> And it is precisely this woman's endurance which illustrates best the author's central thesis, that "pious reason is sovereign over the passions:"

'If then, a woman - elderly at that, and the mother of seven sons - endured seeing her children tortured to death, it must be acknowledge that pious reason is sovereign over the passions. Thus I have demonstrated that not only men have shown mastery over the passions but that even a woman could despise the fiercest tortures.' [4 *Macc.* 16.11 -2].

In this martyrological context of the mother's endurance, the author, on the other hand, reflects a significant aspect of the Pseudo-Crates (cf. Crates) "feminist" perspective. Like Pseudo-Crates' description of the much-enduring Hipparchia, the author of 4 *Macc.* makes rare references, at least in the history of Greek-speaking literature, to a woman in metaphoric military terms or language. Included in some of the figurative military descriptions is the incorporation of the quintessential Greek icon of manliness - the much-enduring warrior:

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<sup>84</sup> The brothers are also said to have endured the pain of watching the suffering of the others: ' . . . . but they, not only in looking on, not only in hearing the utterances of the instant threat, but even in suffering they endured . . . . ' (14.9). However the author does not emphasize this aspect of their suffering to the same degree as the mother's maternal affection which he finds in the natural order of the cosmos (15.13-19).

(1) In her pious and rational endurance in the face of her sons' torments the sage-mother is as a warrior armed with a most defensive shield - an ὑπερασπίστρια τῆς εὐσεβείας (15.29) - withstanding the tyrant's attempts to destroy her ancestral religious values.<sup>85</sup>

(2) Following the author's mixed figurative martial (athletic and military) description of the mother (15.29), the ensuing sentence (15.30) proceeds to depict the defeat and overcoming of the torments and attacks of her maternal emotions in the absolute and most emphatic vocabulary of endurance - καρτερία and ὑπομονή. Its textual placement here suggests that this is to be read in the context of this metaphor rather than the ensuing one (15.31-32).<sup>86</sup> Consequently in the description of the mother's endurance in 15.30 it would appear that the double language of endurance is meant to be understood as further comment to the preceding martial metaphor. Here,

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<sup>85</sup> The normal term for a warrior armed with a shield is ἀσπιστής, LS. The prefixed ὑπερ, lends and underlines the notion of "withstanding" or "protecting." This rare and explicit use of military designations to describe a particularly heroic female figure, either as "warrior" or "military defender" is found again, at least in monotheistic literature, within early Byzantine Mariology. In fifth century Christian Constantinople, the Virgin Mary would begin to be described in metaphoric military epithets, in the earliest layers of the *Akathist Hymn* (Ἀκάθιστος Ὕμνος). She is hailed in the language and imagery of military endurance as a "defense against invisible foes," and as an "impregnable wall." (cited from V. Limberis *op. cit.* 122; Limberis categorizes these new Mariological metaphoric images as part of a series of "architectural" motifs. Certainly while they do possess some architectural dimensions, I would nevertheless consider these two verses, in their overarching thrust, as primarily military). Limberis furthermore explains that it would not be until the seventh century that the Virgin Mary is eventually considered as the military protectress of the city of Constantinople. In the face of the Avar menace to Constantinople (A.D. 626), the Patriarch Sergius, would compose a new proomion to the *Akathist Hymn*, in an effort to "rally the citizens under the protection" of the Ὑπερμάχος στρατηγός, their heroic military general (*idem* 129) and displace the still pervasive influence of the pagan Tyche Constantinopolis. Within the more developed "Akathist Hymn" the poet speaks on behalf of the city of Constantinople, and describes the Theotokos in a series of military epithets - the triumphant ὑπερμάχος στρατηγός, to whom thank offering is ascribed for victory, deliverance and freedom from the terrors of the awesome enemy: 'To you heroic general (Ὑπερμάχῳ στρατηγῷ), do I your city, ascribe thank-offerings of victory (τὰ νικητήρια). For you, O Theotokos (Θεοτόκε), have delivered me from terrors (Ὡς λυτρωθεῖσα τῶν δεινῶν). But as you have invincible power (κράτος ἀπροσμάχητον), do you free me from every kind of danger . . . . ' In the same Hymn, within one of the troparia following the 4th ode, the Virgin Mary is described as a military defender. She is a "refuge," "rampart," "strength" and "protector" to all: 'Hail O Virgin, protector of all (τὸ φυλακτικὸν πάντων), their rampart (χαράκωμα) their strength and their divine refuge.' Since *4 Macc.* was clearly in use by the Byzantine Fathers (for instance, the influential fourth-century Father, St. Gregory Nazianzus, would pronounce the elder Eleazar as Christendom's "proto-martyr"), and since the Maccabean martyrs had already entered in the Byzantine liturgical cycle, I wonder to what extent would *4 Macc.*'s "military" description of the mother-martyr as much-enduring "defender of piety" (ὑπερασπίστρια τῆς εὐσεβείας) may have served as a possible partial influence and inspiration, in some of the subsequent Byzantine "militarized" Mariological hymnographic epithets? Limberis' interesting scholarly study seeks to answer the question of the origins of the Byzantine Mariological hymnographic sources for the most part in pagan goddess hymns, Byzantine imperial cult panegyric rhetoric, etc. I would suggest that for various theological reasons, *4 Macc.* to my knowledge the oldest monotheistic text which portrays a woman in metaphoric military images of endurance and protection, may have exercised some influence upon the Constantinopolitan Mariological language.

<sup>86</sup> That 15.30 cannot be considered as a structural aspect or introduction to the author's storm metaphor, is that whereas in 15.30 the mother's endurance is being compared to humans, men and heroes (pl.), in 15.31-32 the theme and context of her endurance is metaphorically shifted and compared to a singular object - Noah's ark (not Noah) buffeted in the cataclysmic waves.

in one of the rarest textual passages in antiquity, her καρτερία is posited as nobler than men's fortitude in athletic or military action, as her ὑπομονή is affirmed to be more heroic and superior to a male athlete's or a warrior's. To consider a female's endurance as equal to a man's, would be regarded as quite unique in Greco-Roman antiquity. To consider a female's "martial" endurance as *superior* to a male's is absolutely revolutionary:

'O mother of the nation, warrior-defender of piety (ὑπερασπίστρια τῆς εὐσεβείας), and victor in the contest of the heart (ἀγῶνος ἀθλοφόρε) More nobler than men in fortitude (πρὸς καρτερίαν γενναιοτέρην) and more heroic than men in endurance (καὶ ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ὑπομονὴν ἀνδρειότερα). [4 Macc. 15.29—30].

(3) But, perhaps the most striking impact of the notion of the warrior's endurance to impact upon this Greco-Jewish author's depiction of the mother's martyrological endurance, occurs in a metaphor at 16.14-15. Here a woman (the elderly mother) in a rare occasion in Greek literature, is described explicitly as a "warrior" (στρατιῶτης), indeed as a warrior of endurance, who through her "military" fortitude managed to "vanquish" the tyrant Antiochus and "stand firm" in witnessing Eleazar's martyrdom:

'O mother, elderly woman, through piety a warrior of God (Θεοῦ στρατιῶτι), through endurance you even vanquished the tyrant (διὰ καρτερίαν καὶ τύραννον ἐνίκησας), and in deeds and in words you have proven yourself stronger than a man (δυνατωτέρα . . . . ἀνδρός). For when you were seized along with your children, you stood firm (εἰστήκεις) as you watched Eleazar undergoing tortures . . . . ' [4 Macc. 16.14-15].

(4) I find a remarkable similarity between the mother's attitude and demeanour to her sons' tortures and her exhortation for endurance and courage, and that of the Spartan parents towards their sons in military training. Thus as I have already commented, Lucian mentions that during the training for the cultivation of endurance in pain, of the young Spartan warrior-athletes, the parents including the mothers would watch the horrific tortures inflicted upon them, and yet would exhort them to endure the pain:

' . . . . if you see them (i.e. the young Spartan warriors) getting flogged at the altar and dripping blood while their fathers and mothers stand by and are do far from being distressed by what is going on that they actually threaten to punish them if they should not endure under the stripes, and exhort them to endure the pain as long as possible and be steadfast under the torture.' [Anach. 38].

The elder mother's exhortations to her sons as warrior-martyrs is likewise towards endurance under torture, though in this case unto death. Her exhortations also re-echoes the Spartan mothers exhorting their warrior-sons prior to battle to a choice between noble life or noble death - either a

noble endurance unto death or else a glorious triumphant return. There is no middle ground here, for such a middle ground is clouded in cultural concepts of shame. So too the mother-martyr exhorts her sons to an endurance unto death:

' . . . . each child severally and all together the mother urged on to death' [4 *Macc.* 15.-2].

' . . . . by her supplications she rather encouraged them to death for the sake of piety.' [4 *Macc.* 16.13].

#### *D. Martyrological Endurance: Other Related Themes Soteriology and Martyrological Endurance*

For the author of 4 *Macc.* Martyrological endurance possesses a most powerful soteriological impact. A martyrdom "for the sake" (ὕπέρ) of God and Torah in which an endurance is demonstrated motivated by pious reason leads to an immediate presence before God, after death. Here however, unlike the Greek sage's immortality of the soul, the author envisages an after life in which the martyr dwells in the realms of the God of Israel (Paradise). Furthermore, unlike certain early Jewish apocalyptic tendencies, there is no intermediate eschatological awaiting, or purgative state of after-life existence.<sup>87</sup> Like the Greek sage who is ruled by reason and self-mastery, endures the sufferings of martyrdom motivated by this hope. As with the case of the Greek sage-martyr, this in part also explains the martyr's readiness and eagerness for martyrdom. This hopeful endurance is at times expressed in military language and concepts. Accordingly the idea of martyrological endurance is regarded as a "weapon," an "armament" or as a model for military imitation:

'Let us then arm ourselves (καθοπλισώμεθα) with that control over suffering / passions (i.e. endurance) which comes from divine reason. When we have died in such fashion, Abraham and Isaac and Jacob will receive us, and all the patriarchs will praise us.' [4 *Macc.* 13.16-17].

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<sup>87</sup> As Williams explains: ' . . . . in that work (i.e. 4 *Macc.*) the martyrs die for their faith, comforted by the hope that they will enter directly into the heavenly presence of the patriarchs (13.17). Vide S.K. Williams, *op. cit.* 245. Concerning a discussion of Jewish apocalyptic doctrines of the resurrection and Paradise, vide J.H. Charlesworth, *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol. 1 (Garden City, Doubleday, 1983) xxxiii-xxxiv. As Charlesworth explains, with two significant exceptions (*Is.* 26 and *Daniel* 12), the Hebrew Scripture does not teach about the resurrection of the dead or the immortality of life after death in the manner that the New Testament does: 'Sheol and the netherland . . . is described as the abode of the dead, not of people who continue to live after death. Only through his reputation or a son does his life continue on earth.' Charlesworth *op. cit.* xxxiii. This view of the after-life, would gradually be revised in the second temple period, where belief in the resurrection of the dead and a triumphant after-life would emerge as part of early Jewish eschatological doctrines, and incorporated within the Septuagint collection (e.g. 2 *Macc.* 7.14), including belief in the immortality of the soul (e.g. *Wisd. Sol.*). The author of 4 *Macc.* however is unique, among early Jewish writers, in postulating an immediate journey to the presence of God at the moment of death.

The tyrant himself, and his whole council were amazed at their endurance (ἐθαύμασαν αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπομονὴν ὑπομονήν) through which they now have their stand before God, and live the life of eternal blessedness . . . .because of them our enemies did not prevail over our nation . . . .For the tyrant Antiochus taking as a model the courage of their virtue and their endurance under torture advertised their endurance as a paradigm for is own soldiers.' [4 *Macc.* 17.17-18, 20, 23].

Likewise this salvific martyrological endurance, demonstrated by the Maccabean martyrs, is the cause of the divine condemnation and destruction of the opponents and torturers, as well as their eternal condemnation.<sup>88</sup>

*E. Athletic Endurance, Persecution and Martyrdom  
(4 Macc. and T. Job)*

**i. Prologue:** Besides the use of military language and imagery, I have already noted, the tendency among Greek and Roman philosophical circles (with the exception of the Epicureans), to portray the much-enduring sage or sage-martyr in athletic language or imagery of endurance, drawn from the vocabulary and concepts of the gymnasium or the stadium (to vividly describe the training and struggle against the passions, pain, hardship etc.), and which formed part of the more general ἀγών motif.<sup>89</sup> As in the case of military metaphors of endurance, so too with the widespread Hellenization of the ancient eastern Mediterranean, following the wake of Alexander's campaigns in the Near East, the metaphoric usage of the entire spectrum of athletic imagery and concepts, including that of endurance, began to be appropriated in certain early Jewish literature. Most notably one finds this in the writings of Philo,<sup>90</sup> though much less so in Josephus<sup>91</sup> But of

<sup>88</sup> For example, 9.8-9, 24, 30-32; 10.11, 21; 11.1,3, 23-25; 12.12, 14, 18, 19; 17.21.

<sup>89</sup> Vide ch. 3 of the present study. For the definitive study on the agon motif in classical, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman philosophy, as well as its impacts upon the apostle Paul, vide V. Pfitzner *op. cit.* Sometimes the much-enduring sage would be depicted in mixed military and athletic images of endurance, vide below.

<sup>90</sup> Athletic metaphors are quite abundant in the writings of Philo, which he employs not only to make philosophical arguments, but also to illustrate theological and biblical themes. For example he describes the Moses' death, as a "starting gate to begin the race to Heaven . . . ." (*Mos.* II.291). Drawing from the image of the long-distance race (the dolichos), Philo seeks to posit a biblical understanding of the cohesion of the universe, by explaining that the "Word extending from the centre to the outer limits and from the outer parts back to the centre, runs the long-distance race of nature's undefeated course (δολιχεύει τὸν τῆς φύσεως δρόμον)." (*Plant.* 12). It is interesting that in the same essay when describing a drunkard, he does so in the image of a boxer who lacks endurance: 'He not only lets his hands drop from exhaustion like a defeated boxer, but his head rolls sideways, his legs give way and he falls with an utter collapse of the whole body.' [*Plant.* 145]. For a discussion of Philo's use of athletic metaphors vide H. Harris, *op. cit.* 61-95.

<sup>91</sup> In comparison to Philo, most of Josephus's references to athletics tend to be literal. However his use of athletic metaphor is rare, but when employed he tends to describe military matters. For instance in his war chronicles (*BJ*) he likens Vespasian's task in the siege of Jerusalem as one of a gymnasiarch "training" his "athletes" for the coming games: 'he trained his troops for the coming Games (ἀγῶνας); he foresaw for them the pain (πόνον) of the contest



special interest, for the present study, are the athletic metaphors in both *4 Macc.* and *T. Job*. Within both these latter texts, more than in any other early Jewish documents, metaphoric depictions of athletic endurance are employed. As in the case of Philo, both these texts incorporate a Jewish theological perspective, to the Greek athletic metaphor. This is the original contribution of early Jewish thought upon the history of the Greek philosophical ἀγών motif.

**ii. The Maccabean Martyrs as Athletes of Endurance:**<sup>92</sup> The full gamut of the language and concepts associated with the Greek and Roman (athletic) agon motif as found in philosophical texts, is also present throughout this early Jewish martyrological document. Here I shall only focus on those which depict the sage-martyrs as athlete's of endurance. Two passages (6.8-10 & 17.11-16) are of particular interest since the idea of endurance is incorporated as a central idea within a full range of athletic images of the philosophical agon motif. In the first one these two, the author describes the elderly Eleazar under torture as a "heroic athlete" (γενναῖος ἀθλητής). Through his ability for endurance under pain (ὑπέμενε τοὺς πόνους), inflicted by his antagonists the military guards, he manages to prevail with fortitude over the physical torments as well as his opponents (διεκαρτέρει) despite his years and the severe beating he received (τυπτόμενος). The idea of "blows" or "beating," would suggest the comparative depiction of Eleazar in terms of the combative figure of an elderly (γέρον) "wrestler" or "boxer" who while fallen on the ground manages, through sheer endurance, to arise and continue the contest. His face is described as "bathed in sweat" (ιδρῶν), his breathing as "panting" (ἐπασθμαίνων σφοδρῶς). The "spectators" although comprised in part with the opposition supporters, nevertheless admire (ἐθαυμάζετο) his heroic endurance:

'With his foot one of the savage guards struck his flanks to make him rise up when he fell. But he endured the pain (ὑπέμενε τοὺς πόνους), despised the compulsion, prevailed with fortitude over the torments (διεκαρτέρει), and like a heroic athlete under blows, prevailed over his torturers, elderly man as he was. With his face bathed in sweat and his panting breath coming hard, his stoutness of heart won the admiration even of his torturers.' [*4 Macc.* 6.8-10].

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. . . . He felt the nervousness of an athlete before a contest (ἀγωνίαν), for he could see that the Jews would be opponents hard to defeat in a grapple (δυσμεταχειρίστους).' [*BJ IV* 88-91]. Vide Harris *op. cit.* 51-52.

<sup>92</sup> I draw substantially in this particular part of the chapter from a preliminary draft of a paper submitted by L. Stewart ('The Agon Motif in IV Maccabees,') for a Ph.D. seminar on the book of *4 Maccabees*. (Dept. Rel. Studies, Brown University, Spring semester, 1986).

Following the recording of the funerary inscription (17.9-10), where all the martyrs are collectively lauded for their victorious endurance, the author launches immediately into his lengthiest athletic metaphor (17.11-16) described by Hadas as "almost a Pindaric ode."<sup>93</sup> This second extended metaphor, also places the notion of endurance as the central idea, indeed it may be described as an athletic test of endurance. Unlike the first metaphor, this metaphor deals with all the martyrs. He describes their martyrological efforts as a "divine athletic contest" (ἀγών θεῖος). The contest in which all the martyrs participated was "umpired", by virtue (ἡθλοθέτει γάρ τότε ἀρετῇ) in a test of endurance (δι' ὑπομονῆς δοκιμάζουσα) whose victory earned an incorruptible prize, life beyond physical death (ἀφθαρσία ἐν ζωῇ πολυχρονίῳ). Here again we meet a theme already expressed in the Greek military metaphors of martyrological endurance and reechoed in *4 Macc*. The sage-martyr through his endurance achieves an everlasting reward or prize - some form of immortality or after-life. The "prime contestant" (προηγωνίζετο) was Eleazar. The mother also "competed" (ἐνήθλει) as did the seven brothers (ἡγωνίζοντο). The tyrant entered the contest as the athletic rival, the "antagonist" (ἀντιγωνίζετο), while those who watched (ἐθεώρει) this trial of endurance, that is the "spectators," were the world and humanity. The "winner" (ἐνίκη) in this contest of endurance was reverence for God, who herself "crowned" (στεφανοῦσα) her "athletes" (ἐαυτῆς ἀθλητάς). All the spectators were astounded (ἐξεπλάγησαν) in "admiration" (ἐθαύμασαν) by these "athletes" (ἀθλητάς) of heroic endurance:

'Divine indeed was the contest of which they were the issue. Of the contest virtue was the umpire and its score was for endurance (δι' ὑπομονῆς δοκιμάζουσα). Victory was incorruptibility in a life of long duration. Eleazar was the prime contestant; but the mother of the seven sons entered the competition as did the brothers. The tyrant was the adversary, and the world and humanity were the spectators. reverence for God was the winner, and crowned her own athletes. Who did not marvel at the athletes of divine legislation, who was not astounded by them?' [*4 Macc*. 17.11-16].

Other instances of the presence of athletic imagery or conceptualization of endurance are also found in the text, as a figure for martyrological endurance. Yet these are briefer in style and content and may simply involve one or more ideas from the language of athletics. Two are pertinent to the present discussion, again re-echoing themes already found in the Greek and Roman agon motif,

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<sup>93</sup> Concerning this metaphor, Hadas writes: 'This peroration, almost a Pindaric ode in effect, is the most extended use of the figure of the athletic *agon* . . . . ' Hadas *op. cit.* 234.

though now to some extent refiltered through the lenses of early Jewish theology. The first one (5.23) is actually one aspect of a unit which draws from the language of Greek *paideia*. It deals with the idea of "education" (παιδεία) and "training" (ἐξάσκησις).<sup>94</sup> The speaker, the elder Eleazar, in his capacity as "philosopher" of the Torah, instructs the tyrant. He explains that living according to the Torah, is a "philosophy" (5.22) and is not antithetical to reason (5.22). On the contrary, the Torah functions as a "schoolmaster" offering education (παιδεύει) in temperance (σωφροσύνην) so that one can have mastery over pleasure and desire. The speaker also employs an athletic image. The functions of the Torah, is furthermore, as a "gymnasiarch" who "trains" and develops its "athlete," that is the Jewish sage, in the virtue of courage (ἀνδρείαν ἐξασκεῖ). As a consequence of this "training" a trainee is able to willingly endure in all forms of pain or hardship (πάντα πόνον ἔκουσίως ὑπομένειν):

'You mock at our philosophy, and say our living according to it is contrary to reason. Yet it teaches us temperance, so that we rule over all pleasures and desires; and it trains us to courage, so that we willingly endure any adversity; and it educates us in justice . . . . ' [4 Macc. 5.22-24a].

The second relevant passage deals with the theme of the sage-martyrs' "triumphant endurance" set in a figurative athletic context (9.8-9). After listening to Antiochus' exhortations to yield to his requests, at the cost of death, the author of the text proceeds to describe the response given by the seven brothers. He portrays them as collectively and simultaneously voicing their refusal to comply with his orders. Recalling the example of triumphant martyrological exhibited by the elder Eleazar, invite the tyrant to start their trial, for they too are not intimidated by the imminent sufferings and death, for they cannot be really hurt by these afflictions. Through their martyrological suffering and endurance (κακοπαθείας καὶ ὑπομονῆς) they will win the (athletic) "prize" of virtue (τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλα ἔξομεν): 'We by our suffering and endurance (ὑπομονῆς), shall obtain the prize (ἄθλα) of virtue, and we shall be with God, on whose account we suffer....' [4 Macc. 9.8].

Why the use of the image of athletic endurance in this early Jewish document? It is of course not possible to answer this without reference to the function of the agon motif in general here. I would suggest the following reasons: (1) The idea of the sage's or the martyrs' "struggle" fits well

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<sup>94</sup> This is a Greek technicus term for athletic training or preparation, usually in the gymnasium, which as also a place of education. Vide ch. 3 of the present study.

with the athletic notions found in the agon motif, as is evident in Greek and Roman philosophical texts. As in the case of the military metaphors it served to illustrate vividly, in a culture perfectly familiar with athletics, the heroic endurance of the protagonists. Within the eclectic world of ideas in Greco-Roman times, the author of *4 Macc.* for similar reasons, deliberately chooses the image of athletic endurance as an illustrative tool for his readers, to punctuate his main virtue endurance,<sup>95</sup> which is also an athletic virtue as well as its gargantuan nature in the martyrs' sufferings.

(2) In Greek and Roman philosophy, the agon motif was employed as a metaphor for the sage's "training" and eventual "contest" (e.g. wrestling) against the passions and desires. Here too, the central opponent is not necessarily Antiochus. Rather he represents the occasion and situation for confronting the real adversary, namely the passions themselves.<sup>96</sup> As in Greek and Roman philosophical literature, this motif serves the author's purpose of clearly conveying, in familiar images of heroic endurance in struggle, his central thesis through their "training" and "*paideia*" in the Law, the sage as "athlete" is able to develop his life according to reason which in turn fosters endurance - As evidence of this thesis, offers a specific situation the tortures inflicted upon the Maccabean martyrs. The metaphor of athletic endurance serves this purpose well. Though this heroic "athletic" endurance (which some woman can also possess) in such a situation of grueling struggle, the martyr is thus able and equipped to "overcome" and master the passions (and hence fears of pain, torture and death) and thus in dying for the sake of religious piety attain to the highest "prize" - eternal life. The athletic metaphors serve as useful illustrations of this thesis.

**iii. Job as Athlete of Endurance (*T. Job*):** The appropriation of biblical heroes as champions of endurance became quite prevalent both in early Jewish and Christian thought and was expressed in various literary genres — the testament, the apocalypse, the martyria, the letter or

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<sup>95</sup> The use of the term ὑπομένειν or its cognates features as the most widely used moral concept in *4 Macc.* occurring on over 25 occasions. When one adds to the text's vocabulary of endurance καρτερεῖν (or cognates) it is unambiguously clear that this concept dominates the text.

<sup>96</sup> Vide Pfitzner *op. cit.* 64.

moral exhortation. Biblical worthies such as Abraham, Joseph,<sup>97</sup> Daniel, Hannaniah, Mishael, Azariah, the prophets and others, would serve as archetypes of endurance.<sup>98</sup> But it would be the figure of Job, who like Odysseus in the Greek world, would become the hero of endurance *par excellence* within the Jewish world and eventually into early Christian literature. The endurance of Job, in short, had become proverbial and was firmly embedded within the Jewish religious psyche of the time of Paul and beyond. Such a Joban tradition is attested by the early Jewish testament

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<sup>97</sup> For instance in *T. Jos.* biblical Joseph is portrayed as a model of endurance, especially in his temptations. Furthermore, it is interesting that for this Greco-Jewish document, endurance (ὑπομονή) as an ethical attribute, is considered as "the giver of many good things:" 'In ten temptations He showed me approved, and in all of them I patiently endured (ἐμακροθύμησα), for patient endurance (μακροθυμία) is a mighty medicine and endurance (ὑπομονή) gives many good things.' [*T. Jos.* 2.7]. Josephus also understands Joseph as a champion of endurance. In a passage concerning the biblical account pertaining to Potiphar's wife, Josephus re-echoing Greek philosophical concepts explains that Joseph had sought to instruct the seducing woman in the mastering of her passions, while he is depicted as a hero of endurance (over the passions): 'No, he (= Joseph), besought her to govern her passions . . . . while for his part, he could endure (ὑπομένειν) anything rather than be obedient to this behest . . . . ' [*Ant.* 2.43]. Indeed Josephus employs the military language of endurance to portray Joseph as a much-enduring "warrior" in "battle" against temptation. Joseph "resists" and does not "yield" his ground: ' . . . . he resisted her entreaties and did not yield to her threats, choosing to suffer unjustly and to endure (ὑπομένειν), even the severest penalty . . . . ' [*Ant.* 2.50]. For further comments on Joseph as an ethical model, vide H.W. Hollander, *Joseph as an Ethical Model in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, SVTP 16 (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1981) esp. 28-30. It is very interesting that Hollander recognizes one of my basic theses, namely that the concept of endurance (ὑπομονή), as employed in early Jewish literature has a Greek philosophical background, rather than continuity with the religious literature of ancient Israel. He writes: 'This term, even more frequently than μακροθυμία, is traditionally used to describe the attitude of the righteous man in his distress. It is also the traditional attitude of the Cynic-Stoic wise man in his ἀγών against the passions, characterizing his patience and endurance in times of troubles. And so it has become also one of the most eminent features of the 'martyr' in the martyr-literature: it is clearly not accidental that ὑπομονή is used in the LXX comparatively often in 4 Macc. The term itself has an obviously Greek, non-Jewish background . . . . The same can be said of μακροθυμία in the sense of 'patience, endurance', a meaning which is found only a few times in the LXX.' *Idem* 29.

<sup>98</sup> For instance, *T. Jos.*

known as the *Testament of Job*.<sup>99</sup> This document's Greek text,<sup>100</sup> which is a little bit longer than Paul's *I Corinthians*, is a panegyric in praise of the virtue of endurance (ὑπομονή), a virtue which as I have already explained, had become prominent in Greek and Roman philosophical circles especially during Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times. Furthermore it presents the protagonists' endurance in athletic (and military) imagery, reflecting another feature of the Greek and Roman moral exhortation (including a martyrological context), becoming an interesting case-study of the transforming effect upon early Jewish thought, of Greek ideas and rhetoric on a Hebraic biblical theme. Its literary format and style reflect both a testament and a martyria.<sup>101</sup> Unlike canonical *Job*

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<sup>99</sup> Certain elements within *T. Job* almost certainly indicate that the author in re-writing the story of canonical *Job* used the LXX rather than the MT (e.g. Job's friends are kings), vide J.J. Collins, 'Structure and Meaning in the Testament of Job,' in *SBL, 1974 Seminar Papers* Volume I, 35-36. I pre-suppose in this study that *T. Job* is an early Jewish document (1st century B.C. / A.D.) rather than a Christian text; so M. McNamara M.S.C., *Intertestamental Literature*, OTM 22, (Wilmington, Michael Glazier, 1983), pp. 103-4; J.J. Collins, 'Testaments,' in M.E. Stone *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* CRINT section 2, (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1984), Collins postulates an Egyptian Jewish provenance, ca B.C. 100 - A.D. 150, pp. 353-4, while in his later essay, 'The Testamentary Literature in Recent Scholarship,' in Kraft & Nickelsburg *op. cit.*, admits that the consensus dating is to "the turn of the era" (so Delcor, Kee, Schaller, Philonenko, Spittler) p.276. Delcor, in fact, seeks to narrow the date to approximately B.C. 40, by interpreting the reference to the "King of Persians" as an allusion to Pacorus; M. Delcor, 'Le Testament de Job, la priere de Nabonide et les traditions targoumiques,' pp. 73-74 in *Bible und Qumran*, (ed.) S. Wagner, (Berlin, Evangelische Haupt-Bibelgesellschaft, 1968) pp. 57-74. Attempts to link *T. Job* with the first-century early Jewish Therapeutae community (Philonenko, Spittler), are to be taken with some caution. At present, our knowledge and evidence concerning the Therapeutae is so paltry, that attributing any extant early Jewish literary work to them must unfortunately be considered as conjectural. For an opposing viewpoint, vide, M. Philonenko, 'Le Testament de Job et les Therapeutes,' in *Semitica* (1958) 41-53.

<sup>100</sup> While I pre-suppose a pre-Christian dating for the original composition of *T. Job*, nevertheless the textual attestations from the extant Greek mss (the text survives in three main Greek mss - *P* [Paris], *S* [Meson, Sicily], *V* [Vatican]) do suggest in places some traces of Christian revision or paraphrasing (esp. *P* & *V*). Accordingly, a cautionary note is in order concerning the employment of the extant Greek mss of the text in the study of Christian origins. For editions and discussions of the various texts, (for *P*) vide S. Brock, *Testamentum Iobi* (Leiden, Brill, 1967), *P* tends to represent a separate textual tradition to the other two significant mss; (for *V*) vide K. Kohler, 'The Testament of Job: An Essene Midrash on the Book of Job Reedited and Translated with Introductory and Exegetical Notes,' in G. Kohut (ed.), *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohl*, (Berlin, 1897) 264-338, (for *S* and *V*) vide R. Kraft (ed.), with H. Attridge, R. Spittler, J. Timbie, *The Testament of Job According to the SV Text*, T & T, Pseudepigrapha Series 4 (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1974). However *T. Job's* developed and systematic use of the athletic metaphor of endurance does not require a Christian revisionist since, as I have already shown, the theme already existed in the Greco-Roman world and was used by such early Jewish writers as Philo and the author of *4 Macc*. Furthermore as I will discuss in the ensuing Section, the topos of metaphoric athletic endurance in first-century Christian writings only occurs in one document, namely *Heb*. Additionally the theme of endurance is so central to the text, as a characterization of Job's struggle or conflict, that there can be no surprise in the location here, of athletic figures. What is surprising is the prominence of athletic metaphors of endurance over military ones (which is not a characteristic trait of the earliest Christian literature). It is interesting, for example, that in the Christian use of the tradition of Joban endurance in *Jas.*, there is no attempt to depict it for his readers with the use of athletic imagery.

<sup>101</sup> Compared to other early Jewish documents, this document has received relatively little attention. Therefore concerning its literary genre, while some scholarly work has been undertaken, it has not been sustained nor widespread. Therefore no universal consensus exists on the literary nature of this text. However, there can be little doubt that its overall genre is that of a *testament*, that is, of a father who is on the point of imminent death who

however, where Job's endurance is set in the face of innocent human suffering, the author of *T. Job* transforms this concept into a combative one set within the framework of the hero's paradigmatic struggle with Satan. Now, Job's list of sufferings are amplified, intensified and as Jacobs suggests, become the "equivalent of the martyr's tortures"<sup>102</sup> as does his endurance, which as in other *martyria* is described in athletic and military imagery.<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, whereas in canonical *Job* the vocabulary of endurance is rare, though the concept is certainly present, in *T. Job* the vocabulary of endurance as a description of Job's character is introduced from the very beginning of Job's "testamentary" or revelatory speech to his children:

'Gather round, my children. Gather round me so that I may show you the things which the Lord did with me and all the things which have happened to me. I am your father Job, fully engaged in endurance (ὑπομονή) [*T. Job* 1.4-5].<sup>104</sup>

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summons his children (usually sons) to give advice, exhortations and issue a forecast (vide Collins *op. cit.* esp. 37-40). Nevertheless this testament also contains other literary forms. For instance there are traces of apocalyptic, in the introductory sub-section of the first major literary unit of this document. This is not necessarily unusual for a testament (e.g. *T. Adam*, for a discussion on the testament as an ancient literary style and how it pertains to this document vide, I. Collins, *op. cit.* On the other hand, in a study of its literary motifs, I. Jacobs, following and applying the model established by Fischel, classifies this text as an early Jewish *martyria*, that is an account of one who suffers and endures great pain, persecution and hardships, at the initiation of an evil and tyrannical adversary for the cause of God, and who is forewarned about his imminent ordeal if he decides to persevere with his witness. Like other Greco-Roman and early Jewish *martyria* the notion of the protagonist's heroic "athletic" endurance is also present, as I will elaborate below. Vide I. Jacobs, 'Literary Motifs in the Testament of Job,' in *JSS* Vol. 21, Nos. 1-4 (1970) 1-10. Besides its theological predisposition, it also shares much with the Greek and Roman *martyria*. Vide A. Musurillo, *The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs*, (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1954).

<sup>102</sup> Jacobs *op. cit.* 2.

<sup>103</sup> It is most likely that the subsequent Christian tradition of designating Job as the "athlete of the Church" before the coming of Christ (Jerome, *Contra John of Jerusalem* 1.30) derives from *T. Job*.

<sup>104</sup> From Spittler's text. The Joban tradition of endurance appears to have also inspired some first-century Christian circles in their ethical discussions. Thus the hortatory early Christian document, *James*, posits as a model worthy of Christian imitation, the endurance of Job (as well as the biblical prophets), which the author pre-supposes is already proverbial to his Christian audience (ἠκούσατε), not too many years after the martyrdom of Paul. While *Jas.* 5.11 may have some literary dependence on *T. Job* - F. Spitta, *Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentum*, III/2 (Göttingen, 1907) 170-78 - it is not necessary to draw such a conclusion. After all, Job's endurance was proverbial in the early Jewish world. Consequently *Jas.* 5.11 may very well have drawn its motif from the popular Joban endurance tradition without specific dependence upon *T. Job* (vide, J.J. Collins, 'Testaments,' *op. cit.* p. 353). Contemporary scholars of this NT document generally agree that its text was originally composed in Greek in the late first-century (ca. 80-100) and that its author, a Jewish Christian, was not James the apostle and "ἀδελφόςθεος;" vide W.G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, rev. ed., ET by H.C. Kee, (Nashville, Abingdon, 1981) pp. 411-14; also R. Kugelman C.P., *James & Jude* NTM 19 (Dublin, Veritas, 1980) pp. 10-13. Some scholars, nevertheless identify the author of *Jas.* with the apostle James. Hence these scholars set the document's date of composition as perfectly contemporaneous with Paul and Pauline Christianity; e.g. R. Tasker, *The General Epistle of James*, TNTC (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1957), F. Mussner, *Der Jakobusbrief*, HTKNT, (Freiburg, 1964). The Christian origins of the text however is now no longer a serious point of scholarly dispute (cf. Martin Luther's Jewish hypothesis): 'As an example (ὑπόδειγμα) of suffering / endurance (κακοπαθίας) and patience (μακροθυμία), take the prophets who spoke in the Name of the Lord. Behold we call those who endured (τοὺς ὑπομείναντας) blessed. You have heard of the endurance of Job (τὴν ὑπομονὴν Ἰὼβ) and you have seen the purpose of the Lord. . . . ' [5.11].

Following the prologue (1.1-7),<sup>105</sup> where the author sets the scene of Job's testament to his children, the content of the ensuing testamentary speech itself is structured into two natural sections. The first section deals with Job's martyr-like conflict with Satan (who becomes his torturer), and his eventual triumph through his heroic martyrological endurance (1.8-6.31), while the second section (7.1-11.29) deals with the conflict with the visiting kings, followed by an epilogue (12.1-19). While the theme of conflict permeates the entire document nevertheless the idea of heroic endurance is restricted to the first section. This initial major section serves as Job's "testament" where he discloses key aspects of his much-enduring struggle with idolatry and Satan. Within this testament-martyria, in an apocalyptic sub-section (1,12-29), the theme of the conflict is introduced. In a night apocalypse where an archangel reveals the true nature of a nearby temple and to whom the drink-offerings are poured, is the "devil, by whom all human nature is deceived" (1.13). Job pleads with the angel to be divinely commissioned and appointed as a purger (καθάρισαι) of the "place of Satan" (1.15). The celestial messenger then discloses the consequences that he, Job, must endure if indeed he does make such an attempt (1.20-27). This revelatory speech is rhetorically structured in the form of two juxtaposed metaphors. The first one is military. Satan is displayed as a cunning (or evil) warrior, waging destruction against Job (1.20), inflicting all kinds of wounds (1.21), confiscating his property (1.21) and carrying his children away (1.22). So far the image of the opposition is that of a ravaging warrior. In the ensuing archangelic statement (1.23), where the subject is now Job, the language and imagery changes from military to athletic. Job, accordingly is promised to be empowered, in this confrontation, not as a warrior (which is what the reader would expect) but rather as a combative athlete of great endurance standing firm against the blows of temptation and hardship, a theme often encountered in Greek and Roman philosophical essays. In the subsequent archangelic conditional disclosure, a synthesis of the two previous images is present linked by the common "ταῦτα" (1.24). If Job can endure the "military" wounds as well as the blows of his athletic

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<sup>105</sup> I am using (unless otherwise indicated, henceforth) as my basis for the text of *T. Job's* text, Kohler's text [= Mai's edition of V] and numbering.



contest, against Satan (these two modes of hardships and hence endurance are now collectively designated as "ταῦτα") - in this sense the author alludes to Job's endurance both in a "military" and "athletic" framework - then he too like a champion athlete or warrior of heroic endurance will receive renown for his name and gain a reward. Indeed his endurance shall prove more triumphant and more victorious than any warrior's or athlete's for all things shall be returned to him and he shall attain the "crown" of eternal life. Here again we encounter an important element of the Greek, Roman and early Jewish understanding of martyrological endurance, already evident in Plato's Socrates - the protagonist endures his suffering knowing that beyond death there lies the hope of an eternal reward or state of being. This knowledge motivates a triumphant endurance:

Thus says the Lord: "If you attempt to purge the place of Satan (τὸν τόπον τοῦ Σατανᾶ) he will rise to wage war against you with wrath (ἀναστήσεται σοι μετ' ὀργῆς εἰς πόλεμον) and he will demonstrate all his cunning against you. He will bring on you many wounds and misery and he will take away for himself your goods. He will carry off your children and inflict much evil upon you. For you will be like a sparring athlete (ὡς ἀθλητῆς πυκτεύων), enduring pains (καρτερῶν πόνους) and receiving your reward (μίσθον), and enduring both temptations and hardships (καὶ τοὺς πειρασμοὺς προσκαρτερῶν καὶ τὰς θλίψεις). But if you endure these things (ἐάν ταῦτα ὑπομένης) I will make your name renowned in all generations of the earth till the consummation of the age. And I will return you to your goods and it will be repaid to you doubly what was destroyed, so that you may know that the Lord is impartial - rendering good things to each one who obeys. And to you shall be granted an incorruptible wreath (στέφανον ἀμάραντινον). And in the resurrection you shall be raised to eternal life." [T. Job 1.1.20-27].

In the conclusion of the apocalyptic sub-section (1.28-29), Job take up the word again. He responds to the heavenly messenger. His response is truly unique in the history of the usage of and understanding of the concept of endurance in the Greco-Roman period. He takes up the dual image of the warrior and the combative athlete and affirms that he is willing to demonstrate heroic endurance, that is a form of endurance which takes on all oncoming charges, even unto the point of death, Such a heroic form of endurance can be applied to both the warrior and combative athlete imagery (1.28). But now this aggressive, combative and heroic endurance is for the sake of "love," the love of God (ὑπὲρ τ' ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ). This becomes one of the rare instances in the evolution of the moral concept of endurance, where the notion of "combative" or "martial" moral endurance is linked conceptually with the idea of love (one of the gentler virtues):

'And I my children, replied to him, "I will endure until death all that comes upon me (ὑπομένω μέχρι θανάτου πάντα τὰ ἐπερχόμενα μοι), for the sake of the love of God (ὑπὲρ τ' ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ)."' [T. Job 1.28-29].

In the final literary division of this first section of *T. Job* (6.24-31) we find a repetition of the athletic endurance motif, which served to initiate the Job - Satan conflict section. The archangelic promises disclosed in Job's apocalypse is now fulfilled. Job as "athlete" of heroic endurance manages to defeat his more powerful adversary. Job is presented as a much-enduring manly athlete while Satan is described as effeminate and cowardly. Job issues a challenge of combat (lit. "wage war") to Satan, accusing him of being cowardly in his hiding tactics (6.24-25).<sup>106</sup> As a consequence of the challenge, Satan is forced to reveal himself from his hiding place, behind the back of Job's wife, weeping (a sign of effeminacy, shame and cowardice). Despite his supernatural powers in comparison to Job ("you are flesh I am spirit," 6.26), he declares his defeat, his absence of endurance in the contest with Job. He is like an "athlete" involved in a wrestling contest with Job (6.28), and despite his superior strength, his strategic superiority having pinned the inferior wrestler, yet because of his endurance the advantaged wrestler admits defeat. He admits that this is what happened to Job in the contest. Though being the disadvantaged wrestler by sheer endurance he manages to attain victory over Satan's wrestling tactics (6.29):

'And turning towards Satan I said, "Why don't you come before me? Cease hiding you rascal? Does a lion show his strength in a cage? . . . . I now say to you, come out and fight with me!" He then came out from behind my wife, standing before me weeping and saying: "Look Job, I am weary and I am retreating (ὕποχωρῶ) from you, even though you are flesh and I am spirit. You suffer physical pains but I am tormented deeply. I became like one athlete wrestling another (ἐγενόμην ὄν τρόπον ἀθλητῆς παλαίαν μετ' ἀθλητοῦ) and one pinned the other with the upper one silencing the lower one by filling his mouth with sand and bruising his limbs. But because he showed endurance (καρτερίαν) and did not grow weary finally the upper one cried out in defeat. So you also Job ere the one below and in wounds and pain. But you were victorious over my wrestling tactics (ἐνίκησας τὰ παλαιστρικά μου) which I employed against you." ' [*T. Job* 6.24-29].

Job thus summarizes a key theme of the entire first major section - his contest with Satan is to be a paradigm of endurance in affliction for his children, who in effect become representatives of those (convert?) Jews who may suffer persecution and even martyrdom because of their religious allegiance and observances.<sup>107</sup> Accordingly Job exhorts the need for patient endurance

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<sup>106</sup> The document characterizes the deceptive nature of Satan in terms of a predilection for disguise, impression and hiding (cf. 2 *Cor.* 11.13-15)

<sup>107</sup> I. Jacobs has suggested that in *T. Job* we are in touch with an early Jewish text intended to portray the sufferings of the convert (Gentile) missionary and witness to Judaism (Job was not a Hebrew). Jacobs suggests the existence of similar Jewish traditions concerning the non-Hebraic biblical figures of Abraham and Jethro, *op. cit.* 1-10.

(μακροθυμία), which is greater than anything (6.30-31). What is significant in this concluding statement, is the use of μακροθυμία, a virtue which in the early Christian literature will be employed in a passive non-combative sense of endurance (patience, long-suffering), now associated with aggressive ("athletic") endurance - ὑπομονή and καρτερία:

"Then Satan ashamed departed from me. Now then my children demonstrate patient endurance (μακροθυμύσεται) in all grievous things that happens to you. For patient endurance (μακροθυμία) is greater than anything.' [T. Job 6.30-31].

#### IV. Concluding Remarks

Up to the time of Socrates the notion of the noble death was essentially ascribed to the heroic warrior - the one who in battle preferred standing firm, rather than flee or surrender. To him the bard or the *polis* ascribed immortal glory. While the idea of endurance in dying for a cause was already evident in Aeschylus' Prometheus, nevertheless it would be Socrates' death which would have the greatest impact upon the development of the notion of persecution and more specifically of "martyrdom" - dying nobly for a cause, conscience or principle - and hence the idea of martyrological endurance, namely standing firm in persecution, torture and death rather than fleeing, begging for mercy or recanting.<sup>108</sup> Indeed the sage more than any other figure, including the heroic warrior, has the right attitude to death, because he alone understands its nature. He alone demonstrates the right demeanor, endurance and courage in death, hence he is braver than the heroic warrior (*Phaedo*). Beginning with Plato, the sage-martyr displaces the warrior or the athlete as the prototypical icon of authentic brave endurance. Consequently, at least in philosophical discussion, he rather than the much-enduring courageous warrior, becomes the authentic paradigm of the "virile man" and his death the most "noble death."

Paradoxically however, despite the lines of demarcation drawn between the much-enduring courageous sage-martyr and the warrior of brave endurance, the philosophers, beginning with Plato's Socrates still considered the image of the much-enduring warrior willing to die for his *polis*, honourable enough to appropriate for didactic or illustrative purposes by metaphorically

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<sup>108</sup> In this study I consider endurance in suffering persecution or non-capital punishment (exile, imprisonment, flogging etc.) a sub-category of "martyrological" endurance. However, unless qualified it has, and will continue to refer to that term that type of endurance demonstrated prior to actual martyrdom.

explaining the heroic dimensions of the sage-martyr's brave endurance, to a Greek public still enthralled by the patriotic symbol of the much-enduring warrior. Thus Plato, the first ancient Greek author to deal with the theme of the sage's martyrdom, presents Socrates' impending death in the *Apology*, in military metaphors. Here Socrates defines his own martyrological endurance with the classical military framework of "standing firm" in one's appointed post, even when under attack, and at the cost of death. To flee or abandon his appointed post is unthinkable. This symbolic or metaphoric alliance between the much-enduring brave sage-martyr and the heroic warrior of endurance, that is, the identification of the martyr as a "warrior" for reason or truth, willing to "stand firm" even unto death, first found in Plato, will find much further expression in subsequent Greek, Hellenistic and Roman philosophical thinking, especially in Cynic and Stoic circles, where the impact of Socrates' martyrological courage and endurance continued.

Accordingly, the Stoic sage like the much-enduring heroic warrior was to despise torture and death and demonstrate a calm endurance. However the sage's endurance in persecution and martyrdom is greater and more courageous, for he is guided by reason. An important note, here concerns the redemptive value of martyrological endurance. For Seneca, paradigms of courage and endurance in martyrdom, such as Socrates, liberates us from fear of death and imprisonment. In addition to military imagery and language, Greco-Roman philosophy, did not hesitate to also compare the sage under persecution and exile as well or facing torture and death, as an "athlete" of brave endurance, an illustration which is found, for instance, in the discourses of the Cynic and exiled sage, Dio Chrysostom.

These Greek and Roman "martial" motifs of endurance also find their way in early Jewish *martyria* literature such as *4 Macc.* and *T. Job*. The Jewish protagonist now displays martyrological endurance as both "warrior" and "athlete" - a motif which is, by and large, absent in the religious literature of ancient Israel and Judah, as a consistent and systematic theme. Here we find a reechoing of many of the Greek and Roman themes of "martial" martyrological endurance - rational endurance (in the "inner battle" between the passions and reason), victorious endurance, intimidating endurance, liberating endurance, redemptive endurance (in a social or political sense),

soteriological endurance, heroic endurance and masculine endurance (which in *4 Macc.* as in the Cynic Crates tradition, does not preclude the possibility of heroic woman, though "despite her gender"), as well as the exhortation to "stand firm" in one's appointed "military post." Additionally, especially in the "athletic" sense, persecution or martyrdom offered and opportunity to "train one's endurance. In these developments of the notion of heroic martyrological endurance, within early Jewish circles, we nevertheless find a new element in the on-going history and evolution of the notion. The Jewish sage martyr, guided by reason displays martyrological endurance for the sake of piety or God (*4 Macc.*). Indeed in *T. Job* martyrological endurance is for the sake of the "love of God." The latter is one of the rarest juxtapositions of the language of love and aggressive "martial" endurance attested in the pre-Pauline period, of literature written in the Greek language.

Whether in Greek philosophical writings, as well as in early Jewish religious literature, by Greco-Roman times there is a clear and established pattern discernible concerning the prototypical paradigms of heroic endurance. In this paradigm shift the figure of heroic endurance, is no longer the warrior or the athlete it is the sage or sage-martyr. In a paradoxical manner, the employment of "martial" imagery simply re-enforces this, and serves as a final hint of the origins of this transformed moral notion.

## SECTION 1 CONCLUSION:

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### **A Paradigm Shift: The Moral Transformation of the Idea of Heroic Endurance From Military Morality to an Aggressive Philosophic Virtue**

In describing the creative and transforming genius of the ancient Greeks through a particular example, namely that of art and ethics, Grace Macurdy observes that 'each form (of art) starts from crude, almost unconscious beginnings and finally reaches its perfection of beauty appropriate to its kind. In the field of ethics the simple tribal morality, achieved before the period of the epic and finding expression in it, developed, as the Greek spirit expanded, enlarged by the thought and form of epic and lyric poetry, philosophy, drama, and history, until it came to its perfection in Socrates and Plato with the vision of the Eternal Beauty and Eternal Goodness.'<sup>1</sup> Within Macurdy's process of Greek ethical transformation and evolution one may place the idea of endurance, beginning (for the most part) in Mycenaean times as a quality of the warrior and epic traveller, and reflecting a tribal code of survival as well as conquest,<sup>2</sup> found expression in the epic, elegiac and lyric poets, dramatists and historiographers, depicting a necessary attribute of the two heroic Greek archetypes - the warrior and the epic traveller. With the dawning of the Greek philosophical endeavour this notion is now appropriated and undergoes a moral transformation within the discourses and writings of the sages as one of the most praiseworthy and commendable ethical values or virtues of the wise man. Through the agency of Greek and Roman philosophy this notion would also impact upon early Jewish martyrological thinking.

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<sup>1</sup> For example the *Symposium* declares: 'Man must live contemplating Beauty.' (210, 211). Vide G.H. Macurdy, *op. cit.* 171.

<sup>2</sup> While there is no doubt that the vocabulary of endurance in archaic Greek warrior and epic cultures was also found in other fields of human endeavour, besides warfare and travel, for instance as a desirable trait applied to exceptional women (e.g. Penelope's patience), it is safe to say that by and large the notion originally appears as a heroic attribute in its two archetypal realms, and throughout its evolutionary process it still preserves hints of its germinal "aggressive" martial morality.

By the first-century (A.D.) the notion of the epic traveller's endurance had become an established motif within philosophical metaphors of the "storm" or "dangerous journey." In the sage's or the novice's "epic journey" towards wisdom or its preservation, endurance is necessary against the dangers, hardships or alluring "Sirens' Song" which threaten to deviate the sage-traveller from his destination. In other instances it is the search for endurance itself which makes the novice embark on his journey. Thus in a first-century (A.D.) Cynic-influenced eclectic popular moralistic document, *The Tabula of Cebes*, the vocabulary of endurance reaches the apex of its moral transformation when Endurance described as Καρτερία is in fact personified or mythologized. In this instance the hypostatized Endurance is portrayed, along with her "sister" - self-mastery (Ἐγκράτεια) - as one of the two "radiant and healthy" women.<sup>3</sup> Καρτερία encourages and beckons the travellers to complete the dangerous journey, along a slippery path towards her, and exhorting them not to "shrink back" but to "endure" a little longer. (16.1-3).

However, of the two prototypical uses of Greek endurance, it would be the symbol of the warrior's battlefield fortitude which would attract the greater philosophical attention. Indeed it is obvious from Plato's *Laches* that the starting point in the appropriation of the notion of endurance was inspired by the military. In this process of the moral transformation of the heroic warrior's endurance, a fundamental twofold tendency is observable.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand moral endurance becomes thoroughly demilitarized. It is no longer associated with any other "transformed" military concept such as courage or strength. In this autonomous and demilitarized philosophical mould it tends to be associated with certain gentle and cognitive virtues. Accordingly in this linking of moral endurance with wisdom or reason, from a Greek perspective the notion of endurance reaches its transformed moral apex by assuming the ethical categorical status of "wise endurance." This form of endurance from Aristotle onwards is no longer applied to the military understanding of this

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<sup>3</sup> This treatise falsely attributed to the fourth-century Cebes of Thebes, in actuality most likely represents the work of a Cynic-affected eclectic philosophic author or circle of Greco-Roman times. For a summary discussion on the philosophical and religious milieu which produced the pseudepigraphical treatise, vide J.T. Fitzgerald & L.M. White, *The Tabula of Cebes* (Chico, Scholars Press, 1983) 20-27.

<sup>4</sup> It is not necessary here to summarize again the various trends discernible in Greek and Roman expressions of moral endurance. For a summary vide 'Concluding Remarks' in chs. 2, 3, & 4.

notion.<sup>5</sup> Its antithetical type, that is "foolish endurance" expresses a form of endurance devoid of any cognitive associative virtues. It is an unworthy form of endurance motivated by the passions or the vices. The incorporation of commendable endurance within Greek philosophy as the appropriate aggressive ethical virtue in circumstances of hardship and conflict, was also characterized by a diversified rhetorical expression, most notably within list of hardships, comparisons, lists of virtues, praise and self-praise as well as in the *imitatio*.

The other overall evolutionary tendency was not as thorough. It left clear marks of its original combative military matrix.<sup>6</sup> To begin with, military language and metaphors incorporating the idea of endurance were abundant as illustrations of the heroic sage's moral "warfare" or the sage-martyr's steadfastness under torture or even martyrdom (a tradition first established by Socrates). Its constant association with the idea of courage, also re-echoed its military past. Furthermore the metaphoric expression of the sage's moral endurance within an athletic framework, also hinted at this notion's aggressive military past. Yet interestingly, even in its demilitarized format, moral endurance in Greek and eventually Roman ethics still represented one of the aggressive Greek virtues,<sup>7</sup> and retained echoes of its military matrix, being most usually and naturally situated in discussions of circumstances of conflict, suffering, hardship or struggle - a masculine virtue to which women, barbarians, the "soft," the "weak" and males with feminine characteristics were considered, by and large, incapable of attaining.

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<sup>5</sup> For the Greek philosophers of the post-Platonic age, the distinction between the soldier's endurance in battle and that of the sage's concerned the quality of wisdom involved. The soldier acted out of training and habit. The sage's endurance was motivated by wisdom and hence represented a "rational" expression. His rational endurance was superior to that of the warrior or athlete. Consequently within this process of moral transformation a new hero or paradigm of endurance (and courage) emerges on the Greek landscape - the sage!

<sup>6</sup> Vide Appendix 2 in the present study.

<sup>7</sup> I base my distinction between the Greek "aggressive" and "gentle" virtues upon the work of Macurdy *op. cit.* who coined the idea of the "gentler virtues." According to Macurdy, who analyzes the humane virtues as they are expressed in Greek epic poetry, the tragedians, the historians and Attic orators, these qualities were evident very early even in Homer's warrior aristocratic culture, beginning with epic "shame" which frequently designated the idea of pity (though as I have discussed in this section, sometimes the idea of shame was also connected with the "aggressive virtues" to designate a sense of disgrace associated with cowardice and the absence of endurance) to which the Homeric heroes often dreaded to submit, and ἔλεος or pity. Among the other gentler virtues of the Greeks, Macurdy lists Hesiodic δίκη (righteous judgement), Platonic δικαιοσύνη (justice). etc.



In the absence of a comparable systematic and established psychagogic or ethical trend in the Hebraic expression of moral or spiritual endurance, to what extent does the apostle Paul's understanding and formulation of the notion of endurance participate in the Greek and Roman philosophical and psychagogic traditions? I analyze this question in the ensuing section.

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**SECTION 2**

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**THE IMPACT OF THE GREEK SAGE'S MILITARIZED AND  
DEMILITARIZED MORAL ENDURANCE UPON EARLY  
(PAULINE) CHRISTIANITY - THE FURTHER  
TRANSFORMATION OF HEROIC ENDURANCE**

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**CHAPTER 5**  
**THE APOSTLE PAUL AS MUCH-ENDURING SAGE AND**  
**WARRIOR OF CHRIST: MILITARIZED AND DEMILITARIZED**  
**ENDURANCE IN THE PAULINE LETTERS**

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**I. Prologue and Synopsis**

In this section of the dissertation I argue that despite certain unique dimensions to Paul's treatment and understanding of the concept of moral endurance, nevertheless, by and large, his employment of this idea appears to be in direct continuity with the Greek (and Roman) philosophical understanding. It is interesting that while a NT document such as *Jas.* can relate endurance with such OT figures as Job and the prophets, nowhere does Paul explicitly mention such biblical heroes in relation with the notion of endurance.<sup>1</sup> Several elements suggest Paul's participation with the Greek philosophy of endurance. As in the Greek philosophical tradition, where the transformed notion of endurance is considered as one of the most admired and heroic moral attributes of the sage or other exemplary figures, rhetorically expressed either in the form of praise or self-praise, so for Paul, endurance is treated as a highly commendable moral virtue. He too employs it both in the form of self-praise (to describe his and his co-workers' apostolate), as well as to laud members of the Pauline ecclesial communities. Again the various Pauline adverse contexts or circumstances in which the idea of endurance is suggested (whether explicitly or implicitly), more closely re-echoes both in its wide range and its *sitz im leben* the Greek philosophic tradition than the Hebrew Bible, the LXX or the Gospel traditions of endurance. Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, a characteristic tendency in the formulation and discussion of moral endurance was its consistent association with other virtues. Indeed for the most part endurance hardly features as an independent virtue. It may even be described as a cooperative

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, I suggest that within Paul's *inclusio* (2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12) his second major comparison with the "super apostles" (11.21-12.5) contains an implicit comparison with the most celebrated Greek epic traveller, Odysseus (esp. 11.25-12.5). Vide ch. 1, n. 32 in the present study. For a discussion of Paul's *inclusio* vide below in the present chapter.

virtue. As a consequence of its military origins it was frequently associated with courage and subsequently with such other aggressive ethical attributes as strength and self-mastery. In its demilitarized form, however, moral endurance tended to be associated with the gentler virtues such as wisdom, nobility, reason, knowledge and others. This tendency is also evident with Paul who consistently links moral endurance with other commendable aggressive and gentle moral attributes. In the depiction of its fundamental character, Paul also mirrors the most basic dichotomy in the Greek philosophic understanding of moral endurance, namely a commendable (wise) and unworthy (foolish / irrational) endurance. In its literary expression Paul also reflects the wide range of vocabulary and rhetorical conventions associated with the presence of the notion of endurance found in Greek and Roman philosophical traditions, a pattern which is not evident in the non-Pauline writings of the New Testament collection. For example the most popular rhetorical convention to describe the sage's endurance in adverse situations was the use of the *peristasis catalogue*.<sup>2</sup> This is clearly reflected in Paul's correspondence. However as in Greek and Roman philosophy, within the Pauline letters,<sup>3</sup> the notion of endurance is also found within lists of

<sup>2</sup> This term is employed by modern scholars to designate a list of hardships in a literary piece (e.g. Plato *Resp.* 2.361E-362A; Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 8.15-16; Paul *1 Cor.* 4.9-13, *2 Cor.* 4.8-9, 6.4-10, 11.23-33 etc.). For a recent definitive scholarly discussion on the usage, function and variety of the *peristaseis* in Greek and Roman antiquity, together with a synoptic survey of modern research in this topic, vide J.T. Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* Also, R. Hodgson, 'Paul the Apostle and First-Century Tribulation Lists,' in *ZNW*, 1983, pp. 59-80.

<sup>3</sup> The consensus of modern scholarly opinion is to accept only seven of the letters traditionally associated with the Pauline collection as the direct compositions of the apostle Paul. These undisputed letters are *Romans*, *1 & 2 Corinthians*, *Galatians*, *Philippians*, *1 Thessalonians* and *Philemon*. However of the rest of the letters included within the canonical Pauline collection, three letters, namely *2 Thessalonians*, *Ephesians* and *Colossians* for various literary, linguistic, theological and Christological reasons, scholars are currently uncertain of their Pauline authenticity, with the latter being dubbed as "deutero-Pauline. This study on various grounds accepts *2 Thessalonians* and *Ephesians* as the work of the apostle Paul himself. With the possible exception of *Colossians*, of the remaining letters in the New Testament Pauline collection, that is *1 & 2 Timothy*, *Titus* (the so-called Pastoral Epistles) and *Hebrews*, there is almost universal agreement by contemporary Pauline scholars that these documents were not written by the historical apostle Paul. While *Ephesians* and *Colossians* are interpreted by many scholars as "deutero-Pauline," the Pastorals are understood as the product of a disciple(s) of Paul or Pauline "school." *Hebrews* on the other hand, from the earliest patristic times till this day has been understood as non-Pauline (e.g. Origen), and has stimulated various ingenious candidates as its author from the "eloquent Apollo" to Aquilla, Priscilla, Timothy, the Blessed Virgin, Philip etc., have been suggested. For a learned discussion on the list of suggested authors for *Hebrews*, both in antiquity and in modern scholarship, see H.W. Attridge, *Epistle to the Hebrews. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, Hermeneia Series, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1989, 1-6. Among the most recent attempts to revive a Pauline authorship based on Clement of Alexandria's hypothesis, vide C. Voulgaris, *Η ΠΡΟΣ ΕΒΡΑΙΟΥΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ: ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΤΙΚΑ, ΠΑΡΑΛΗΠΤΑΙ, ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΥΣ, ΤΟΠΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ*, (Athens, University of Athens, 1986). This dissertation for the sake of precise classification will adopt the following nomenclature: (i) For the authentic letters of Paul (I include *2 Thess.* & *Eph.*) the various genitive constructions of "Paul" or simply "Pauline" will be employed. (ii) With reference to *Colossians* I shall adopt the consensual "deutero-Pauline. (iii) Concerning *1 & 2 Timothy* and *Titus* I shall refer to them with the

virtues,<sup>4</sup> imitatio or personal example,<sup>5</sup> inclusio,<sup>6</sup> comparisons,<sup>7</sup> the diatribe,<sup>8</sup> praise and self-praise.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore Paul re-echoes the general literary pattern of depicting endurance either in its demilitarized form or as part of a military metaphor. Indeed in the case of the latter, Paul appears to show a preference for the "stand firm" imperative (which, as I have already explained in Section 1, formed part of Greek and Roman moral exhortation), with similar motifs to the Greek and Roman military "stand firm" metaphors. As in the case of the sage who assumes the role of a heroic military "commander" of proven endurance in the "battlefield," exhorting his "troops," namely those to whom he is a psychagogue, to "stand firm" in the face of various adverse situations, so Paul also re-echoes a similar pattern of exhortation and psychagogic responsibility. However, in Paul there appears to be a conscious pattern in his use of militarized or demilitarized endurance. Endurance conceived in military metaphors usually depicts the heroic nature of the adversity. By contrast his use of endurance outside the framework of figurative military language at times is intended to depict an adverse situation of social or personal abasement. In this chapter I divide my analysis of Pauline endurance into two parts, based on the Greek (and Roman) literary tendency, (attested in Section 1 of the present study), to present endurance in a thoroughly demilitarized format or within a military metaphoric framework. In the first instance I deal with the place, character, function and rhetoric of endurance, for the most part in its demilitarized format, within the Pauline letters. Here I use two passages from *2 Corinthians*, (6.4-10 & 11.1-12.12) as the

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commonly-accepted epithet - "Pastoral Epistles." (iv) Wherever reference is made to *Hebrews*, that term shall be used. To signify collectively all those texts which are not from the hand of the apostle Paul himself, namely (ii) - (iv) (i.e. the deutero-Pauline, the Pastorals and *Hebrews*, I shall employ the nominal designation "Corpus Paulinum" (CP).

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of lists of virtues and vices as a rhetorical convention employed in Greco-Roman philosophic traditions see A.J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook*, LEC series (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1986) 138-141.

<sup>5</sup> That is the presentation of an exemplar of endurance worthy of imitation. Within the Pauline literature such paradigms of endurance are either Paul or Christ. For a discussion of the use of the imitatio in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman moral exhortation, vide A. Malherbe, *op. cit.*, also B. Fiore.

<sup>6</sup> Vide my discussion, in this chapter, on wise and foolish endurance in *2 Cor.* 11.1-12.12.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the Greco-Roman (and Pauline) rhetorical convention of the comparison vide C. Forbes 'Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric,' in *NTS* 32, 1986, 1-30; P. Marshall, *op. cit.* 53-55, 348-353.

<sup>8</sup> For the most significant current investigation of the Pauline diatribe, vide S.K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (Chico, Scholars Press, 1981) passim.

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of these conventions in Greek and Roman antiquity vide Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 107-114; Marshall *op. cit.* 353-357; Forbes *op. cit.* 8-10, 14-22.

basic models of analysis and exegesis.<sup>10</sup> In the ensuing analytical section I investigate two Pauline texts which present the Corinthians (*1 Cor.* 16.13) and Galatians (*Gal.* 5.1) as much-enduring "warriors," in the face of certain situations of conflict and opposition, while simultaneously and by implication Paul designates himself as an exemplary "commander" of heroic endurance.

However, while it is clear that in his characterization, employment and literary expression of the idea of moral endurance Paul uses a Greek framework, nevertheless it is important to understand that his original and overarching inspiration and model of endurance is the crucified and kenotic Christ. From here he formulates his unique contribution to the evolution of the idea of endurance in the ancient Greek-speaking world. Included in this redefinition or "Paulinization" of moral endurance, are the following elements: (i) The idea of endurance as an aspect of the empowering grace of Christ, rather than a virtue attained exclusively through moral self-development. As such his encounter with hardships is not as one who is equipped through reason to overcome it through endurance but rather as one who is weak and vulnerable, yet in this fragility is empowered by God to endure. In this Paul is in continuity with Hebraic Scriptural theology. What the sage ascribes to philosophy and reason, Paul ascribes to God. (ii) Another aspect of his weakness is the idea that some of the hardship situations, which he faces in the course of his apostolate, and in which Paul demonstrates his self-praising "wise" endurance, represent situations of debasing "shame" in his mission (e.g. manual labour, physical sickness or handicap, insults, de-humanizing punitive violence, calamities and persecutions), situations which his rivals (in Corinth) do not adopt or face in their apostolate of "strength" and social "eloquence." It is interesting that such abasing situations of hardship, where endurance is required, are usually not depicted by Paul within the literary framework of military metaphors (the only possible exception being his brief self-portrayal as a much-enduring "warrior" in *2 Cor.* 6.7b where this image appears suddenly in an otherwise non-metaphoric expression of endurance). On the other hand, in his use of the "stand firm" military metaphors of endurance, Paul frames the particular hardship or conflict in more heroic terms as a "battle." Likewise he also characterizes such endurance as

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<sup>10</sup> Note however, that Paul employs the idea of endurance with the assistance of military imagery in *2 Cor.* 6.7cde.

heroic. Here the circumstances are not shameful nor necessarily abasing but rather heroic in their nature. In the latter understanding of endurance in conflict he is closer to the Greek usage, than his "demilitarized" circumstances, since the hardship circumstance is understood as an opportunity for the demonstration of strength through reason.<sup>11</sup> In either case however, the manifestation of strength comes about only because of the intervention of divine grace in the life in Christ. (iii) The ethical association of this aggressive Greek virtue with the notion of love (ἀγάπη), an association which in antiquity only occurs in the *T. Job*. (iv) Paul's dichotomy between his "wise" and "foolish" endurance, while corresponding in its pattern to the Greek characterization of moral endurance, nevertheless is not identical in its content. For Paul the concept of "wisdom" does not involve, necessarily the principles of rationality or reason. Rather the ruling principle of wisdom is that which accords to the principles of divine or spiritual wisdom (e.g. humility, kenotic weakness, servility, love and communal accord) and the authentic knowledge of God.

## **II. Demilitarized Endurance: The Place, Character and Rhetoric of Moral Endurance in the Pauline Gospel, and Similarities With Greek and Roman Philosophy (2 Cor. 6.4-10 & 11.1-12.12)**

### *A. Pauline Endurance - A Wider and More Complex Expression Within the New Testament Writings*

**i. Prologue:** Within that wide collection or "library" of various canonical early Christian writings known as the New Testament, the concept, vocabulary and rhetoric of endurance is certainly found, in many of the texts and in several instances.<sup>12</sup> Its incorporation within these earliest Christian literary traditions, was for the most part in the sense of a positive and desirable moral attribute. However, with the exception of the authentic Pauline letters (and within the

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<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of the Pauline use of the notion of "reason" vide S.K. Stowers, 'The Use and Abuse of Reason,' in D.L. Balch, E. Ferguson, W.A. Meeks (eds.), *Greeks, Romans and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1990) 253-256.

<sup>12</sup> For a comprehensive catalogue of the occurrence and frequency of the primary vocabulary of endurance in the letters of Paul and the Corpus Paulinum, together with a tally of its frequency within the entire NT, vide note 13 below. The concept of endurance in the New Testament, when expressed explicitly, is conveyed by a colony of terms, each possessing various shades of semantic meaning, which for the most part consists of the following nominal / verbal terms: (1) Terms primarily denoting the notion of endurance: ὑπομονή / ὑπομένειν, ἀνοχή / ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντέχεσθαι, καρτερία / καρτερεῖν / προσκαρτερεῖν, μακροθυμία / μακροθυμεῖν, στήκω (ἰστημι), ὑποφέρειν. (2) Terms which may denote endurance depending on their content: κατέχειν, κρατεῖν, μενεῖν (ἐμμενεῖν, ὑπεμμενεῖν, περιμμενεῖν), στεγεῖν, φερεῖν. However it is within the Pauline and deuterio-Pauline collection that the widest vocabulary of endurance is exhibited.

Corpus Paulinum) most of the other NT documents, by and large, employ this concept, almost exclusively, in the context of the righteous suffering of the "elect" for the most part in a persecutory, martyrological and eschatological sense. This is particularly the case within the synoptic Gospel tradition (and the *Apocalypse*). In some instances however, the tribulations of the "elect" may not exclusively involve persecution or martyrdom, but incorporate the notion of tests of faithfulness to God where endurance assures the soul's perfection. This is most evident in James.<sup>13</sup> In these (non-Pauline) early Christian cases, endurance is chiefly designated by one of its key Greco-Roman terms, ὑπομένειν, ὑπομονή). Its conceptual-linguistic framework tends to avoid military or athletic metaphors, with the exception of *James* (1.12), which features athletic imagery of endurance,<sup>14</sup> and the *Apocalypse* where military language often accompanies the notion of martyrological endurance.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Certainly while in *Jas.* endurance in persecution or martyrdom is in part envisaged, nevertheless it is also associated with tests of faith and character formation. The author therefore describes the development and stimulation of moral endurance. Successful trials of faith produce endurance. Such an endurance derived and nourished through trials of faith leads in turn to the perfecting of the soul. This forms part of the document's opening statement, following the introductory prescript, and sets the treatise's general theme of endurance in affliction (martyrological and character forming): 'James a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ, to the twelve tribes in the diaspora. Greetings. Count it all joy (χαράν). my brothers, when you meet various trials, for you know that testing (τὸ δοκιμὸν) on behalf of your faith produces endurance (καρτεργάζεται ὑπομονήν). Let this endurance effect a perfect product so that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing.' [*Jas.* 1.1-4]. In his understanding of endurance, however, the author appears to be re-echoing certain Stoic elements, in particular the notion of the novice's (*proficiens*) endurance in the face of affliction as a requisite trial towards the attainment of moral perfection, the idea of cheerful or serene endurance in the face of hardship, as well as the understanding of affliction as a joyful opportunity to demonstrate character, namely through authentic endurance. This "Stoic" understanding of endurance is further reflected in this early Christian document through the metaphorization of the "blessed" life in terms of an athletic trial where the much-enduring athlete is "crowned."

<sup>14</sup> As in Greek and Roman philosophy the text's ideal figure, the much-enduring blessed one (1.12a), is metaphorically presented in the Greek heroic image of the athlete of endurance, a tendency also evident in such philosophically-affected early Jewish documents as *4 Macc.* and *T. Job* (as noted in Section 1 of this dissertation): 'Blessed is the one who endures temptation (μακάριος ἄνθρωπος ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν), for when he has endured the trial (ὄτι δοκιμὸς). he will receive the crown / wreath of life (τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς). which God has promised to those who love Him.' [*Jas.* 1.12]. In this instance however, unlike the Greek and Roman Stoics, the attainment of moral perfection through endurance is not through reason, but rather by faith. To that extent it resembles more such early Jewish writings as *T. Job*. Indeed it is interesting that, when seeking paradigms of endurance, the author of this early Christian text, will in fact draw upon biblical Job as well as the prophets of ancient Israel and Judah. This choice suggests that *Jas.* desires to stress two contextual aspects of moral endurance, (i) κακοπαθία - endurance to withstand persecution or even martyrdom for the sake of the Name (prophetic endurance), (ii) ὑπομονή - endurance in trials (Joban endurance, τὴν ὑπομονήν Ἰώβ). While the Joban tradition in *Jas.* (5.11) may have some literary dependence on *T. Job* - F. Spitta *Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentum*, III/2 (Göttingen, 1907) 170-78 - it is not necessary to draw such a conclusion. Job's endurance was proverbial in the early Jewish world. Consequently 5.11 may very well have drawn its motif from the popular Joban endurance tradition without specific dependence upon *T. Job*, vide J.J. Collins, 'Testaments,' *op. cit.* 353. What is intriguing is that Paul never employs the Joban endurance tradition in his letters. Both these contexts in *Jas.* possess an eschatological dimension, which is introduced by the common exhortation to



**ii. The Apostle Paul's Wider Expression of Endurance:** When one turns to the writings of the apostle Paul, a noticeably different picture emerges. To begin with, the notion of moral endurance, here, is expressed by a wider range of those Greek terms whose primary semantic meaning explicitly conveys the sense of endurance.<sup>16</sup> This vocabulary of endurance also occurs more frequently here. Again, the rhetoric of endurance is more complex, as is its character and function. The settings of adversity in which this notion is employed by Paul also tends to represent a far greater variety of circumstances than only martyrological or character testing. Likewise, and perhaps even more significant for the present study, whereas the tendency within

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a "patient waiting" or "long suffering" (μακροθυμία) until the parousia. Here again, while an agricultural metaphor is used, no military imagery is evident: 'Be patient (μακροθυμήσατε), therefore brothers, until the coming of the Lord (τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ Κυρίου). The farmer waits for the precious crop from the earth, being patient with it (μακροθυμῶν) . . . . You also must be patient (μακροθυμήσατε). Establish your hearts for the coming of the Lord is at hand. As an example of suffering endurance (κακοπαθίας) and patience (μακροθυμίας), take the prophets who spoke in the Name of the Lord. Behold, we call those who endured blessed / admirable (μακαρίζομεν τοὺς ὑπομειναντας). You have heard of the endurance of Job (τὴν ὑπομονὴν Ἰὼβ) and you have seen the purpose of the Lord . . . . ' [Jas. 5.7-11].

<sup>15</sup> This is one of the rarest examples within a first-century apocalyptic document, whether Christian or Jewish, which incorporates the metaphoric image of the warrior's endurance. It represents the earliest attempt to metaphorize the Hebraic "holy war" tradition, perhaps influenced by the established Greek philosophical tradition of the "battle" motif. Vide Bauckham for comparisons between the Qumranic *War Scroll* and the Johannine *Apocalypse*, 'The Apocalypse as a Christian War Scroll,' in R. Bauckham *The Climax of Prophecy, Studies on the Book of Revelation* (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> The concept of endurance in its most essential sense was denoted in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times by various terms. Some of these terms such as ὑπομένειν / ὑπομονή, καρτερεῖν / καρτερία explicitly conveyed this meaning as their primary semantic sense. Other words, such as μένειν, or κράτειν carried other primary meanings though occasionally expressed the notion of endurance (vide note 6 above). Of those words in the NT which convey the notion of endurance as their primary meaning, it is safe to say that, comparatively speaking, they appear more frequently within the Pauline letters and the Corpus Paulinum. For instance, ὑπομένειν (and cognates) appears 19 times outside the Pauline and Paulinic literature. Of this tally it must be remembered that seven of these occurrences are in the *Apocalypse*, a document which is clearly martyrological and eschatological in its context. In many ways its language and concepts are unique and certainly cannot be considered as reflecting the same conceptual matrix as the rest of the NT documents. But even with the inclusion of the *Apocalypse*, the frequency of ὑπομένειν / ὑπομονή within the Pauline and Paulinic literature is still greater (25 instances) (*Rom.* 2.7, 5.3, 8.25, 12.12, 15.4,5, *1 Cor.* 13.7, *2 Cor.* 1.6, 6.4, 12.12, *1 Thess.* 1.3, *2 Thess.* 1.4, 3.5, *Col.* 1.11, *1 Tim.* 6.11, *2 Tim.* 2.10, 3.10, *Heb.* 10.32,36, 12.1,2,7). Again, ἀνέχεσθαι (and cognates) occurs on 15 occasions in the NT. Most of these usage's (8 instances) occur within the Pauline letters and the Corpus Paulinum (*Rom.* 2.4, 3.26, *1 Cor.* 4.12, *2 Cor.* 11.1,19,20, *Eph.* 4.2, *Col.* 3.13, *2 Thess.* 1.4, *2 Tim.* 4.3, *Heb.* 13.22). Likewise, ὑποφέρειν occurs on three occasions within the NT. Two of the these instances are in the Pauline and Paulinic writings (*1 Cor.* 10.13, *2 Tim.* 3.11). Στήκειν is found twelve times in the NT, of which 7 instances are within the letters of Paul and the Corpus Paulinum (*Rom.* 14.4, *1 Cor.* 16.13, *Gal.* 5.1, *Phlp.* 1.27, 4.1, *1 Thess.* 3.8, *2 Thess.* 2.15). Στέγειν used in the sense of endurance occurs 4 times within the NT. All instances are in the Pauline and Paulinic writings (*1 Cor.* 9.12, 13.7 and *1 Thess.* 3.1,5). Μακροθυμεῖν / μακροθυμία likewise occurs more frequently within the Pauline and Paulinic literature (*Rom.* 2.4, 9.22, *1 Cor.* 13.4, *2 Cor.* 6.6, *Gal.* 5.22, *Eph.* 4.2, *1 Thess.* 5.14, *Col.* 1.11, 3.12, *1 Tim.* 1.16, *2 Tim.* 3.10, 4.2, *Heb.* 6.12, 15). It is only with the verb ἀντέχεσθαι (4 times in the NT) that we find an equal distribution between the Pauline / Paulinic literature and the rest of the NT (*1 Thess.* 5.14, *Titus* 11.9). By and large, only with words whose semantic field occasionally carries the meaning of endurance, such as μένειν (waiting), φέρειν (carrying), κρατεῖν (holding), that one finds a prominence within the non-Pauline / Paulinic documents. Their usage is most usually related in the ordinary or primary sense of the word.

the non-Pauline books of the NT, military metaphors of moral endurance are absent (with the exception of the *Apocalypse*) in the Pauline letters we find the notion of endurance both in a metaphoric military sense as well as in a thoroughly demilitarized format.

Why this difference in the employment of this notion within the New Testament documents? Why do the letters of the apostle Paul as well as the Corpus Paulinum differ from an almost mono-dimensional treatment of the notion of moral endurance?<sup>17</sup> I would suggest that the essential difference may be explained in terms of the foundational influences affecting these early Christian documents' construction of moral endurance. In the case of the letters of Paul and the Corpus Paulinum, we are again in touch with several of the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions of moral endurance, manifest in the eclectic ideological world of the first century Mediterranean, now filtered and refocused (as in the case of *4 Macc.* or Philo's treatises) through the lenses of certain Hebraic theological and scriptural traditions as well as the unique Pauline Gospel.<sup>18</sup> This participation may in large part be explained as an aspect of the apostle Paul's self-defining missionary and psychagogic principle of adaptability, an adaptability conditioned by the audience he addresses (*1 Cor.* 9.20-23).<sup>19</sup> Given his absolute apostolic commitment to "gentiles" or "Greeks,"<sup>20</sup> it is reasonable to expect from this "polytropic" apostle a significant level of

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<sup>17</sup> Indeed within the letters of Paul we not only have access to the earliest but also the most elaborate and systematic employment of this notion in early Christian literature, up till Tertullian's composition of *De Patientia*.

<sup>18</sup> As with other Hellenistic notions and motifs, the apostle Paul appropriates this concept, though now of course orienting it towards a Christian direction. Yet the basic Hellenistic (inc. Greco-Jewish) traditions of endurance are unmistakably present. In this appropriation of the various aspects of endurance, the apostle Paul is no different than a Seneca or a Philo. Nevertheless the unique contribution of Paul's understanding, application and creative development of this basically Greek notion, within the history of ideas lies not only in the manner of his Christianization or perhaps more accurately in the Paulinization of this notion, but also in his contribution to the Christology of endurance. In short the uniqueness of Paul's notion of endurance is that, this Greek notion, is now for the first time, in our extant Greek-language literary history, understood through a Christocentric hermeneutic. It is not difficult to conclude that within the Corpus Paulinum we find the most likely source for the subsequent (second century) positive and multi-faceted Christian employment of this hitherto pagan and Hebraic notion.

<sup>19</sup> For a detailed treatment of Pauline psychagogic adaptability in the light of Epicurean adaptability, vide C. Glad, *Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy*, Ph.D. dissertation (Brown Univ. Dept. religious Studies, 1991) book forthcoming. Concerning his audience vide note below.

<sup>20</sup> In the letters of the apostle Paul the category "Greek" is synonymous with the category "Gentile", that is non-Jewish. It is clear from a reading of the Pauline letters (as well as most of the Paulinic literature) that the audience being addressed is essentially gentile. Even in *Romans*, where scholars had previously concluded in favour of the inclusion of a Jewish Christian readership for his letter, it has recently been shown rather persuasively that such a conclusion is not necessary. (Vide, S.K. Stowers, *op. cit.* pp. 21-33). It is also the apostle Paul's belief that he is commissioned with the task of preaching the Gospel to the gentiles. His unique sense of responsibility for the non-Jews of the Roman empire, comes through constantly throughout his letters (*Rom.* 1.1-5-6, 13-4; 11.11-14; 15.14-29; *Gal.* 1.15-16; 2.7-9.).

participation and involvement with Greek conceptual and rhetorical conventions, a trend which Pauline scholarship has fairly recently re-discovered and demonstrated very convincingly. I maintain that any understanding of Pauline endurance must therefore be read in the light of Greek notions of this concept in its various levels of complexity, for it is precisely in this manner that the apostle Paul's readers would have most naturally understood the notion. This degree of Pauline involvement with Greek philosophic notions of endurance, I suggest, is a major factor in explaining the difference between the variant approaches to endurance found within the NT.

In this part of the chapter, I will concentrate upon showing the similarities evident between Paul's and the philosopher's employment of moral endurance, a participation which suggests a fundamental involvement with many of the established elements of the philosophic understanding of this notion.<sup>21</sup> I take as my quintessential text for the present discussion of Pauline endurance, one of Paul's most detailed and characteristic treatments of this idea, namely *2 Cor.* 6.4-10. Most interestingly this epistolographical pericope reflects in succinct summary form, most of the discussion on the place, function and rhetoric of the Greek and Roman sage's endurance, discussed in Section 1, though now appropriated and re-directed towards a Pauline Christian position. For a model of the character of Pauline endurance and its similarities with the philosophic traditions of wise and foolish endurance I concentrate upon an *inclusio* (*2 Cor.* 11.1-12.12) whose entire theme, I suggest, is dominated by the notion of desirable and undesirable endurance. Given the centrality of the Corinthian correspondence for an understanding of the place of (de-militarized) moral endurance in the Pauline ethic, I begin with a brief discussion of the situation in which Paul found himself in Corinth in the wake of an increasing opposition to him.

*B. Paul's Deteriorating Situation and Increasing Opposition in Corinth  
and the Literary Structure of 2 Corinthians*

That Paul established and nurtured Christianity in Corinth is attested by Luke's account (*Acts* 18.1-17), but also by several statements in Paul's Corinthian correspondence, both explicit and metaphoric. Thus, for instance in the first major literary section of *1 Cor.*, namely 1.10-4.21,

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<sup>21</sup> It is a basic thesis of the present study that the notion of endurance in its rich multivarious expressions, as found in the letters of Paul and the *Corpus Paulinum* with certain variations, coincides extensively with the various literary traditions of endurance as they developed and evolved in the Greek world, beginning with Homer.

which Fitzgerald has characterized as a "letter of admonition"<sup>22</sup> we find the notion of Paul's "parenthood" over the Corinthians emphasized. He is their "father" having "begotten" (γεννάω) them as his "beloved children:"<sup>23</sup>

It is not to shame you that I write this, but to admonish you as my beloved children. For even if you were to have ten thousand schoolmasters in Christ, yet you do not have many fathers. For in Christ Jesus I begat you (ὡμᾶς ἐγέννησα) through the gospel.' [*1 Cor.* 4.14-15].

The initial trust, love and friendship which characterized Paul's original relationship with the Corinthians would soon begin to deteriorate in some sections of the community and eventually, for several reasons, would seriously rupture, resulting into enmity towards Paul. Hints of this disenchantment are already evident at the time of the composition of *1 Cor.* which, in large part, had been caused by Paul's refusal to accept any financial remuneration from the Corinthians, insisting rather to earn his livelihood from manual labour (4.12). This became a source of great offence in Corinth,<sup>24</sup> particularly among those whom Marshall designates as the 'hybrists, being interpreted as Paul's refusal of friendship.'<sup>25</sup> It contributed to the accusation of "inconsistency" being increasingly leveled against Paul - a charge which the subsequent missionary intruders into Corinth, the "super apostles" would seriously exploit with the assistance of the offended "hybrists." Nevertheless, with the exception of Apollos who had co-operated with Paul in the didactic and psychagogic mission at Corinth (*1 Cor.* 3.6), at this stage of the history of Christianity in Corinth no outside preachers had intruded into Paul's community. This picture was soon to change. Sometime between the composition of *1 Cor.* and the composite (two-fold) *2 Cor.*,<sup>26</sup> Paul paid an "intermediate" or second pastoral visit to Corinth (*2 Cor.* 2.1, 12.14, 13.1).

<sup>22</sup> J.T. Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 117.

<sup>23</sup> Paul also uses the "maternal" image of nurturing the Corinthians with "milk:" 'I gave you milk to drink, not solid food. For you were not yet strong enough.' (*1 Cor.* 3.2). For a discussion of Paul's "spiritual fatherhood" in Corinth and elsewhere, vide P. Gutiere, *La paternite spirituelle selon Saint Paul* (Paris, J. Gabalda, 1968).

<sup>24</sup> Vide discussion on the Pauline inclusio in this chapter.

<sup>25</sup> Marshall, *op. cit.* esp. ch. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Concerning the textual problem of *2 Cor.*, in this study, I follow Furnish's two-letter hypothesis (1-9 & 10-13) in terms of literary structure. Several internal thematic and tonal indicators suggest a clear differentiation. For a discussion vide V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians, Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary*, AB (New York, London, Doubleday, 1984) 30-32. The classical discrepancy which also persuades me (at least at the time of the composition of the present dissertation) is that, whereas in 10-13 Paul is speaking to the Corinthians in a severe tone and in the context of a serious defection from his apostolic authority, in 1-9, a reconciliation is basically presupposed. In terms of chronology of composition, however, I do not follow Furnish. Rather on internal literary grounds, I support the view that 10-13 (the so-called "letter of tears") precedes the subsequent "letter of joy" (1-9); so A. Hausrath, *Der Viere-Capitelbrief des Paulus an die Korinther* (Heidelberg, Bassermssn, 1870), J. H. Kennedy,

This proved to be an extremely painful and disappointing experience for Paul (2 Cor. 2.1-11). Certain eloquent Jewish-Christian preachers had entered into Corinth (2 Cor. 11.4), perhaps as a result of a direct invitation and recommendation by the "hybrists" (2 Cor. 3.1).<sup>27</sup> They preached "another Jesus," dispensing "another Spirit" and teaching "another Gospel" (2 Cor. 11.4) and established a rival apostolate to Paul's. They found willing and natural allies especially among the "hybrists" and with others who had already grown disenchanted and / or had opposed Paul's "adaptability" and inconsistency (1 Cor. 9.19-23, 2 Cor. 1.17-19, 10.1), "duplicity" (2 Cor. 1.13), "servility" (2 Cor. 10.1) weakness (2 Cor. 10.10), ineloquent demeanour (2 Cor. 10.10) and lack of the manifestations of divine power (2 Cor. 12.1-6). Under a seemingly attractive banner of opposition based on these inter-related views of Paul as a weak and unworthy leader, they rapidly managed to persuade the majority of the Corinthians in the formation of a united front, quite ready to accept the new leadership and abandon Paul as their "spiritual father" and join their ranks, an invitation which they eagerly and indiscriminately accepted (2 Cor. 11.4, 19-20).<sup>28</sup> Furthermore it would seem that during this intermediate visitation Paul had been publicly humiliated before the Corinthians by his eloquent opponents (2 Cor. 12.21), and made to feel like a "nothing" (οὐδὲν) (2 Cor. 12.11), without any expression of moral support from his community, from his "spiritual children." In the context of this ecclesial disorder (2 Cor. 12.20),

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*The Second and Third Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (London, Methuen, 1900), Plummer (1915), K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul* (London, Rivington's, 1927), M.S. Enslin, *Christian Beginnings* (New York, London, Harper, 1938), F. Filson (1953). More recent scholars, such as F.T. Fallon, *2 Corinthians*, NTM 11 (Dublin, Veritas, 1980) and M.L. Soards, *The Apostle Paul: An Introduction to his Writings and Teaching* (New York, Paulist press, 1987), have also represented this chronological perspective. Nevertheless a persuasive argument can also be made in support for the textual integrity of 2 Cor., so E.B. Allo (1956), R.V.G. Tasker (1958), P.E. Hughes (1962), A.M.G. Stephenson (1964), R. Bates (1965). Kummel for instance argues that the tonal discrepancy between 1-9 and 10-13 could be explained in terms of a "lapse of time" in Paul's dictation of the letter to a scribe, where the train of thought had shifted, W.G. Kummel *Introduction to the New Testament*, ET (Nashville, Abingdon, 1975) 290-91. In terms of the present study, however, the latter position does not seriously affect the results of my analysis concerning Paul's use of the notion of endurance, since the theme is a constant in this letter(s).

<sup>27</sup> This is a plausible scenario suggested by Marshall *op. cit.* 265. The intention of the hybrists would have been to challenge and displace Paul's authority.

<sup>28</sup> Marshall argues that the division between the "hybrists" and Paul had already occurred in Corinth before Paul's composition of 1 Cor. and indeed, even at this early stage, they were attempting to replace Paul as their apostolic leader. *Ibid.* 263-264.

Paul left for Ephesus. Not long after his departure the grieved and humiliated Paul composed his hard-hitting "letter of tears" - most of which is preserved in 2 *Cor.* 10 - 13:<sup>29</sup>

For I wrote you (ἔγραψα ὑμῖν) out of much affliction (ἐκ γὰρ πολλῆς θλίψεως) and anguish of heart (καὶ συνοχῆς καρδίας) and with many tears (διὰ πολλῶν δακρύων) . . . . ' [2 *Cor.* 2.4].

The grounds for the opposition and Corinthian defection, mentioned above, attested in a number of unsystematic explicit fragments and allusions within the text of 2 *Cor.* 10 - 13 (as well as 1 - 9), reveal Paul on the defensive and offensive, in the face of a tirade of inter-related attacks leveled against his person, character and apostleship, by this new elite group, whom Paul ironically designates the "superlative apostles" (τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων: 2 *Cor.* 11.5, 12.11).<sup>30</sup> In his apologetic mode, within the "letter of tears," Paul endeavours to defend himself against these charges employing such standard Greco-Roman rhetorical devices as the σύγκρισις, irony, self-praise and the *peristasis catalogue*. His protreptic concern, which is woven within his apologetic thrusts, aims to persuade the Corinthian "rank and file" to abandon the "super apostles" and return to the original and foundational apostleship and message - an aim which he efficiently and imminently achieves as a result of the overwhelming impact of the "letter of tears" - as affirmed in 2 *Cor.* 7.5-11, where he refers to the Corinthians' loyalty and acceptance of his apostolic authority:

'But God, who comforts the downcast, comforted us by the coming of Titus, and not only by his coming but also by the comfort with which he was comforted in you, as he told us of your longing, your mourning, your zeal for me, so that I rejoiced even more.' [2 *Cor.* 7.6-7].

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<sup>29</sup> Paul did not deliver the letter himself preferring to send a member of his apostolic circle, Titus (2 *Cor.* 2.3-4, 9,13, 7.5-16).

<sup>30</sup> All the previously-mentioned charges leveled against Paul are basically inter-connected and deal with the view of Paul as an inconsistent and contradictory man. They recognized that his letters of indignation were "weighty" (βαρεῖαι 10.10) and reflective of leadership. Yet they could not reconcile this image of strong leadership, so long as he was at a distance with his actual presence in Corinth. According to their interpretation there was a serious disparity between the letter-writing Paul and the "close up" Paul. To begin, his physical appearance apparently did not conform to their standard of acceptability. Indeed his appearance was described as "weak" (10.10). Furthermore, his demeanour seemed to change. When away he expressed himself with "boldness" yet when present he seemed "servile" and "meek" (2 *Cor.* 10.1), unwilling to offend and take firm stands. He did not seem as cultured as his letters suggested, since his rhetorical style and eloquence in his speeches were weak, being "of no account" (10.10). This inexplicable inconsistency (already fueled by some of his statements in 1*Cor.* 9.19-23) regarding his willingness to adopt a multi-adaptable psychagogic strategy, was interpreted by his opponents to signify a duplicitous character, one that was untrustworthy in its polytropy. They considered him therefore a flatterer and coward willing to accept any easy means to gain his way. These inter-related charges and united opposition elicited the "letter of tears."

As a consequence of his persuasive "letter of tears" Paul composes his "letter of joy" (1-9). Nevertheless, even after his triumph, Paul still affected by the former situation, does not hesitate to re-enforce his hard-fought advantage, and continue to re-echo aspects of his apologetic and protreptic argumentation presented in 10-13, hence providing us with further corroborative explicit references and allusions concerning Paul's elitist opponents, the content of their boasting and their critique of Paul. Consequently it is quite evident that thematic coherences between the two sections of the composite letter exist. As Furnish observes, "In both sections of the canonical letter, the fundamental theme is apostleship, and the specific issue is the nature and authority of the Pauline apostolate."<sup>31</sup> I would suggest that a significant element of the coherence between 10-13 and 1-9, deals with the notion of Paul's apostolic endurance in weakness in contrast to: (i) The Corinthians' continued attraction and adherence to a "worldly" form of wisdom (cf. divine wisdom) and external displays of power or strength (which is manifested by their Christ-less arrogance, factionalism and intra-community quarrels, *1 Cor.* 4.6).<sup>32</sup> (ii) His rivals' boastful, pompous and arrogant apostolate characterized, according to Paul, with a pre-occupation with worldly concern for power, "fleshly" wisdom and human achievements (e.g. *2 Cor.* 10.15-17, 11.10, 16, 18). This clash between two antithetical and competing early Christian value systems concerned with establishing the proper criteria or "signs" which constitute the correct measurement of the authentic Christian life, attitudes and beliefs, together with the place of endurance in this debate, becomes the center of my discussion in the ensuing part of this chapter.<sup>33</sup>

*C. Endurance in Hardship and Weakness:  
Paul and the Philosophers*

**i. Great Endurance and Hardship:** Hardship, in Greek and Roman philosophical thought, was not perceived as a negative but rather as a positive situation (or as the Stoics explained as an "indifferent" event) which provided the sage, with an opportunity to test and reveal

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<sup>31</sup> Furnish, *op. cit.* 37.

<sup>32</sup> For Paul intra-community conflict is a sign of a community of people without Christ, that is community based on sarxic rather than pneumatic principles. The same is true of a quarrelsome person (*Rom.* 1.29, *2 Cor.* 12.30, *Gal.* 5.20).

<sup>33</sup> Concerning the identity of Paul's opponents in *2 Cor.*, vide Furnish's discussion on the 'False Apostles,' *op. cit.* 48-54.

his inner character and virtues. Thus Isocrates can stipulate that in contrast to wealth, which can cloak a base personality, adversity, "speedily reveals every man as he really is." (*Archidamus* 102). Accordingly, hardship was a positive opportunity for the sage to manifest his list of virtues, particularly those most necessary in the successful confrontation with adversity, masculinity or courage (ἀνδρεία) and endurance (ὑπομονή). The sage relying on his inner moral resources, which he has cultivated both by training and the exercise of reason, securely rests in his fortress surrounded by the impregnable walls of his virtues, built by reason and is able to withstand or endure any insult, injury, pain, exile or other hardship. His serene endurance *ipso facto* reveals his sagacity and inner strength.<sup>34</sup> Any inability to demonstrate such a powerful endurance in adversity was consequently a clear sign of an irrational person (ἄφρων, *stultus*), one who is overcome by his passions or emotions, an inconsistent character which is weak, pampered, cowardly, duplicitous and effeminate. Accordingly Seneca explains those who are hurt at the slightest injury, reproach or insult "have grown spoiled" and unable to endure the heavier and more challenging hardships of life. The wise man on the other hand does not even have to employ his endurance for such trivial insults, reserving it for the more serious adversities:

These and similar reproaches - what shall I call them but the complainings of a squeamish temper? And it is generally the pampered and prosperous who indulge in them; for if a man is pressed by worse hardships, he has not time to notice such things. By reason of too much leisure, natures which are naturally weak and effeminate, and from the dearth of real injury, have grown spoiled, and disturbed by these slights . . . . but no one can slight the sage . . . . The sage does receive some wounds, but those that he receives he overcomes, arrests and heals. These lesser things he does not even feel, nor does he employ against them his accustomed virtue of enduring hardship, but he either fails to notice them or counts them worthy of a smile.' [Seneca *Constant.* 10.2-3, 4].

Seneca can therefore reserve his praises for he who shows endurance in severe circumstances such as illnesses and in torture (*Ep.* 66.3537, 49-50.). In this connection Fitzgerald explains, that the sage's hardships serve as 'literary foils in the depiction of his . . . . endurance.'<sup>35</sup> In summation; therefore the following elements characterize the Greek and Roman sage's understanding and employment of moral endurance in hardship: (i) It represents *par excellence* one of the sage's key aggressive ethical virtues (or at least a sub-category of a parent virtue) in facing situations of hardship, suffering, conflict or danger. As such it suggests a heroic dimension. (ii)

<sup>34</sup> Vide my discussion on the sage's endurance in chs. 2, 3 & 4, of the present dissertation.

<sup>35</sup> Vide Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 59.



Endurance in hardship authenticates and signals manifestly the active sagacity of the philosopher, an irreproachable, unpampered, strong, masculine, self-mastered and consistent character, since endurance is a vital aspect of the sage's rational and virtuous life. His endurance consequently is a wise or rational endurance, in circumstances of hardship. (iii) It is an indispensable moral attribute in the sage's overcoming of various forms of adversity - no matter how great - which others are unable to face and hence crushed into leading a defeated life. (iv) His suffering is not a sign of weakness, shame or evil but an opportunity to demonstrate his inner strength through courage and endurance (cf. Hebraic notions of suffering).<sup>36</sup> If that reflects a representative view of endurance in suffering among Greek and Roman sages, how does Paul view hardships and suffering? Are they seen as an opportunity for the demonstration of his strength through endurance and courage? What is the place, role, function and nature of moral endurance in the overall Pauline ethic of suffering? Is there a fundamental principle determining Paul's view of suffering, and hence endurance? How is endurance attained? What similarities are there with the Greek philosophical understanding? What are the key differences? Before I draw the various similarities between Pauline endurance and the sage's fortitude, it is important to spell out the differences, for here we are in contact with Paul's unique contribution to the Greek-speaking history and evolution of the notion of moral endurance.

**ii. Paul's Christological Principle of Weakness, Hardship and Endurance: The Unique Pauline Perspective:** As in the case of Greek and Roman philosophy so too in the letters of Paul, endurance in hardship and suffering forms an important aspect of the ethics of Paul's Gospel. However certain basic differences do exist between his understanding of endurance in hardship and that of the philosopher. For Paul the archetypal principle of Christian affliction is the suffering which characterized the life, ministry and especially the crucifixion and death of Christ - a suffering in which the authentic believer is inescapably a participant in a "spillover effect" (2 *Cor.* 1.5, 4.11-14 *Philp.* 3.10, *Rom.* 6.3-6). Indeed the death of Christ within the

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<sup>36</sup> Among the various Hebraic biblical and post-biblical views of suffering one can mention three major traditions: (i) Suffering as a consequence of the Fall (*Gen.*). (ii) Suffering as a consequence of individual or parents' sin. (iii) Suffering as a test of character (*Job*).

Pauline Gospel may be described *par excellence* as the pivotal event.<sup>37</sup> Incorporated in this understanding of participatory Christological suffering however is also the notion of ultimate vindication, hope, comfort and resurrection (e.g. *2 Cor.* 1.5-7, 2.14, 4.11-12,14):

'For as we share abundantly in the sufferings of Christ (τὰ παθήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ), so through Christ we share abundantly in comfort (παράκλησις) too.' [*2 Cor.* 1.5].

'For while we live we are always being given up to death for Jesus' sake . . . . (but) He who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus . . . . ' [*2 Cor.* 4.11, 14].

'All I want is to know Christ and to experience the power of his resurrection, to share in his sufferings and become like him in his death, in the hope that I myself will be raised from death to life.' [*Phlp.* 3.10-11].<sup>38</sup>

This two-dimensional dialectic of suffering-comfort is in sharp contrast to the mono-dimensional view held by some of the Corinthians of "another Jesus," one who is purely celestial, one who is only present in power and glory and one who is attainable only by wisdom (*1 Cor.* 2.8) or mystical ecstasy. For Paul, such views were dangerous for they were coloured by a false human wisdom,<sup>39</sup> since they failed to take into account the centrality and reality of Christ crucified (Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον) (*1 Cor.* 1.23). To the "puffed up" and quarrelsome Corinthians Paul's preaching of Christ crucified was considered as too "weak" (ἄσθενές) (*1 Cor.* 1.25) as

<sup>37</sup> Vide L.E. Keck, *Paul and his Letters* (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1981) 32-48.

<sup>38</sup> In *Rom.* 6.3-6 Paul employs the concepts of "co-crucifixion" and "co-burial" in reference to the believer's baptism in Christ: 'For surely you know that when we were baptized into union with Christ Jesus we were baptized into union with his death. By our baptism, then, we were buried with him *and shared his death*, in order that just as Christ was raised from death by the glorious power of the Father, so also we might live a new life.'

<sup>39</sup> In discussing Paul's understanding of the concept of reason and wisdom, Stowers has pointed out that Paul's critique of false wisdom in his Corinthian correspondence (esp. his classical text *1 Cor.* 1.18-25) need not necessarily be interpreted as a sweeping attack upon Greek and Roman philosophy, nor even on the notion of reason, as has been the traditional interpretation in the past. Rather according to Stowers, in continuity with Greek philosophy, Paul is acting as a concerned teacher confronting his conceited, divided and arrogant students (as a consequence of their possession of a false "knowledge"). His task in admonishing them, sometimes in veiled allusion (λόγος ἐσηματωσμένον, *1 Cor.* 4.6) also in accordance with Greek gentle (cf. harsh) psychagogy, sometimes explicitly, is to treat them as "kings" (*1 Cor.* 4.8) in order to gently break their "puffed up" state, so as to make them receptive to authentic teaching, to spiritual wisdom and hence return to a state of communal harmony (a model of imitation already established by Paul and Apollos, *1 Cor.* 3.5-9). For Stowers the false human wisdom that Paul is attacking in Corinth in 1.18-4.21 is not any particular Greek system but rather false behaviour and attitudes in the pursuit of wisdom: 'But what is this false wisdom which is the root of the problem? . . . . It seems clear that Paul is not referring to reasoning as such or the faculty of reason even in 1.18-25. At most as the reference to Greeks and Jews might suggest (1.24) the opposition might be certain traditions of rationality. Nevertheless it is extremely difficult to detect any criticism of a particular kind of wisdom, and scholars have produced nearly endless speculations on the subject. In fact, Paul seems to have no concern of any particular teachings. Rather his attitudes is entirely on wrong attitudes and behaviour in relation to the pursuit of wisdom. This is perhaps why he uses such a vague and general term as "wisdom." Wisdom as such and its pursuit is not condemned. In fact there is a genuine wisdom from God (1.30; 2:6-3:4; 3:18). Paul attacks "worldly" and "fleshly" wisdom. This he defines by referring to aspects of the Corinthian behaviour. . . . Stowers, 'Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,' in Balch D.L., E. Ferguson, W.A. Meeks, *op. cit.* 257-258.

"foolishness" (μωρῖαν) (*1 Cor.* 1.23) or even "scandalous" (σκάνδαλον) (*1 Cor.* 1.23) - a Christ devoid of power. To that extent Paul's opponents, in viewing suffering as "foolishness" do not participate in the general Greek philosophical tradition of seeing the suffering wise man in terms of strength.<sup>40</sup> Rather in the Greek topos of the "foolish" wise man, the sage or sage-martyr is only understood as "foolish" by popular opinion rather than the absolute standards of wisdom. For Paul, in the Christ event a compelling weakness (ἀσθένεια) / strength (δύναμιν) paradox exists, held together in dynamic tension. As Stowers points out, for Paul in the suffering Christ event, God assumes the role of a divine psychagogue gently challenging the conceit and arrogance of the "power" of false wisdom.<sup>41</sup> The paradox is that this challenge and psychagogy is undertaken in apparent "weakness" and apparent "foolishness." Paul explains to the Corinthians, that precisely through the crucifixion of Christ, that is from an event which appears from a human perspective (or as Paul would term it - "fleshly" or "cosmic" wisdom -) as weakness, in fact God chose to reveal his power (δύναμιν) and wisdom (σοφία) (*1 Cor.* 1.25). For that which appears weak or foolish to a "sarxic" or "cosmic"<sup>42</sup> perspective ("to those who are perishing"), nevertheless to those who are "called" (τοῖς κλητοῖς), to those who are "saved" (τοῖς σωζομένοις), to those who "believe" (τούς πιστεύοντας), that is to those who are truly wise, possessing a divine or pneumatic perspective, the Cross (and hence the entire ministry characterized by suffering) is not weakness but the revelation of divine power and wisdom:

For the word of the Cross is folly (μωρία) to those who are perishing, but to those who are being saved (τοῖς δὲ σωζομένοις) it is the power of God (δύναμις Θεοῦ). For since . . . . the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach (τῆς μωρίας τοῦ κηρύγματος) to save those who believe (τούς πιστεύοντας). For Jews demand signs (σιμεῖα) and Greeks seek wisdom (σοφίαν) *but we preach Christ crucified* a scandal to Jews and folly to the Gentiles, but to those who are called (τοῖς κλητοῖς), both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. *For the foolishness of God* (τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ) *is wiser than men* (σοφώτερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων), *and the*

<sup>40</sup> To that extent Paul's declaration of the "foolishness" of the Cross to the "Gentiles," certainly cannot necessarily have in view the Greek philosophic tradition of the sage-martyr (vide ch. 4), an important Greek tradition to which the "super apostles" are clearly not in alignment.

<sup>41</sup> Stowers writes: 'Unlike the (Hellenistic) moralists, however, he (Paul) stresses that God himself as acted in history through Jesus Christ as a kind of divine psychagogue to challenge conceit and pretension to wisdom . . . . 'He catches the wise in their craftiness' (3.19).' *op. cit.* 260.

<sup>42</sup> I use the phrase "sarxic wisdom" as synonymous to Paul's designation of "false wisdom." The term sarx derives from the Greek word used by Paul - σάρξ - to designate the fallen principle of "flesh" in contrast to "πνεῦμα." Likewise the term "cosmic wisdom" (σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου), that is "earthly wisdom" is the antithesis of God's wisdom (σοφίαν Θεοῦ).

*weakness of God (τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ Θεοῦ) is more powerful than men (ἰσχυρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων).*' [1 Cor. 1.18-25].

It is this Christological paradox of divine strength in apparent weakness, and divine wisdom in apparent foolishness and lack of human sophistication or eloquence, that forms for Paul the initial inspiration, the original pattern and the overarching principle which shapes his understanding of the suffering and endurance of the apostle and believer! He deals with the weakness-strength dialectic in various ways to describe his apostolate. In his communication with the Corinthians, for various psychagogic reasons, Paul will thus at times assume various perspectives on the issue of the believer's hardships. (i) At times he will ironically assume the role and value system of the sarxic Corinthian, who sees weakness in the Cross and hence in the Pauline apostolate. In these instances Paul presents his own apostolic hardships as a sign of (cosmic or sarxic) "weakness," of an absence of (cosmic) "power" and "wisdom." Simultaneously he also ironically presents the "puffed up" Corinthians, who are certain in their (sarxic) wisdom, as "wise" and "rich" (in a cosmic or fleshly sense). Like the sage they too think they are as "kings" in their "wisdom." Unlike the sage however they refuse to accept the role of suffering and the "practice of death" (μετέτη θανάτου) in the pursuit of wisdom.<sup>43</sup> They possess a "short cut" to wisdom which avoids hardships for they have "already" (ἤδη) become "filled," (κεκορεσμένοι) "rich" (ἐπλουτήσατε) and "wise" (φρόνιμοι). From the Corinthians' perspective of "power" Paul's apostolic suffering involves "foolishness," an admission which Paul ironically makes for himself:

'Already you are filled (κεκορεσμένοι)! Already you have become rich (ἐπλουτήσατε)! Without us you have become kings! And would that you did reign, so that we might share the rule with you. For I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last of all like men sentenced to death; because we have become a spectacle to the world, to angels and to men. We are fools for Christ' sake (μωροὶ διὰ Χριστόν), but you are wise in Christ (φρόνιμοι ἐν Χριστῷ). We are weak, but you are strong. You are held in honour but we in disrepute.' [1 Cor. 4.8-10].

In other instances Paul stresses his hardships in terms of the reality incurred in the various apostolic sufferings as a reflection of his transient physical or "somatic" weakness. This suffering comes as a result of his unity with the crucified Christ - for as he explains, in the course of his missionary travels he carries in his body (σῶμα) the death of Jesus (2 Cor. 4,10)!<sup>44</sup> Consequently

<sup>43</sup> For discussion of the Greek sage's understanding of death, vide ch. 4 in the present study, also below.

<sup>44</sup> Paul's ruling principle of the Cross, as a determinative of his physical and psychagogic demeanour of "weakness" (2 Cor. 10.10) also stressed the idea of a "co-death." For Paul this is a characteristic of those who are "in Christ"

he suffers in solidarity with the death of Jesus. He shares in this death, in the course of the expression of his apostolate, a feature which his opponents (whose perspective is "fleshly") have misunderstood in absolute terms of "weakness," since they fail to realize that he also receives empowerment to strengthen his own fragility in the "flesh" (here used as a synonym for ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν),<sup>45</sup> from the life of Jesus. Nevertheless, for Paul the great empowerment is best manifested in the inner being which does not "waste away." In almost Platonic terms he proceeds to describe his weakness as temporary, as transient, since it belongs to the realms of the seen - as preparation in life for eternal glory, which according to Paul in 2 *Cor.* 4.16-5.10, eventually occurs after death (5.8). His opponents evaluate from the viewpoint of the seen, the physical and the transient not from an eternal perspective:

For while we live we are always being given up to death (εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόμεθα ) for Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may be manifested in our mortal flesh (ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν) . . . . Though our outer nature is wasting away, our inner nature is being renewed every day. For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory, because we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen, for the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal.' [2 *Cor.* 4.11, 16-18].

Again from the perspective of Greek philosophy the opposition in Corinth has a very superficial conception of the authentic criteria which constitute the life of wisdom. Death (and suffering) played an important role in Greek philosophy since Plato's *Phaedo*.<sup>46</sup> The sage's life was essentially to be a life in which he (metaphorically) "practices death" (μελέτη θανάτου) (64A, 67E, 81A), namely through a denial of the irrational appetites, passions, concerns and demands of the physical body, and the pursuit of a spiritual life, that is the life of purity, where the soul is preserved from any physical stains. Life therefore is a training ground in this spiritual purity, a preparation for the eventual separation between the body and the soul, which comes from biological death (81 A). The pursuit of philosophy therefore trains the initiate to die to his bodily appetites (81A). This theme runs through all subsequent philosophy. In the time of Paul, Seneca

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since they share and participate in His suffering (e.g. 2 *Cor.* 1.5, 6), as well as death (e.g. *Rom.* 6.1-11, 2 *Cor.* 5.14, *Gal.* 2.19). While this is particularly true of the apostolic circle (2 *Cor.* 1.5), it is not exclusively so, since all believers also participate in this life of affliction (2 *Cor.* 1.6).

<sup>45</sup> Σῶμα and σὰρξ are not always used interchangeably in Paul's letters.

<sup>46</sup> For a recent discussion on Greek philosophy and the role of metaphoric "death," vide D.E. Aune, 'Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems,' in E. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), *Paul in his Hellenistic Context* (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1993) 291-312. Some of the immediate points I make, I owe to his study.

was expressing similar viewpoints on the "dying sage" and the "suffering sage." We also find in Paul this emphasis on the suffering and "death" of the apostle in the course of his missionary life. The apostle in fact carried in their body the death of Jesus (2 *Cor.* 4.11). Yet, while Paul is closer to the philosophers in his preaching of the suffering and death of Christ, as a revelation of divine wisdom, than are his opponents in their emphasis on power, nevertheless important distinctions exist between Paul's understanding of suffering, death and hence endurance, and that of the Greek or Roman sage. (i) Both the Platonist and Paul understand the present "physical" existence as temporary. For Paul (2 *Cor.* 4.16-5.10) and the (Platonist) sage liberation from the world of the transient comes after death. For the Platonist this is the moment of the separation of body and soul, for Paul it is being 'at home with the Lord.' (ii) Both sage and Paul admit to present suffering. For Paul however this suffering is characteristic of the life in the present aeon. (iii) Both sage and Paul admitted the significance of "death" in the life of authentic wisdom. For Paul, however, this "death" does not occur as a result of any self-conscious study or practice, rather it is the direct consequence of the mystical union between believer and the crucified Christ. A "co-death" occurs in the principle of "flesh" active within the believer.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore in this "death" the separation is not between body and soul but between flesh and spirit. (iv) While, like Paul the philosopher took into account suffering as an integral aspect of the life of wisdom (cf. super apostles), nevertheless it was understood as an indifferent. The sage may even feel injury or insult, nevertheless because of his life of reason and virtue these adversities do not really affect him, in fact if the magnitude of the hardships is not considerable he does not even need to exercise any endurance. Rather, as Seneca remarks, he simply smiles. Furthermore his great and limitless endurance, when the circumstances are truly adverse, arises directly from his reason which renders him invincible, what the Stoics described as an impregnable fortress. For Paul, suffering was not an indifferent event. It

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<sup>47</sup> Within Pauline anthropology while the notion of "flesh" (σάρξ) is at times ambivalent, at times used interchangeably with σῶμα (2 *Cor.* 4.11), nevertheless, as a rule, it is not to be identified with "body" (σῶμα). It essentially represents the perspective and principle of transiency, immaturity and sin rather than wisdom, as he reminds the divisive Corinthians: ' . . . . and even yet you are not ready, for you are still of the flesh (σαρκικοί ἐστε). For while there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh (οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε) and behaving according to the principles of (ordinary) humans.' [1 *Cor.* 3.2-3]. Σάρξ and its effect (τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός) is, for Paul, the antithesis of the workings of Πνεῦμα (*Gal.* 5.16-26). However within the letters of the Pauline School "flesh" is not always employed in this pejorative sense (e.g. *Col.* 1.24).

was an unpleasant, despairing, abasing and overwhelmingly crushing experience (e.g. 2 *Cor.* 1.8-9). Unlike the strong, rational and serene Greek and Roman sage, who possesses limitless endurance, Paul, on the other hand applies his dialectic principle into his understanding of suffering and endurance. He is weak, fragile, an "earthen vessel" unable to withstand pressure, pain, conflict, persecution or affliction, for he becomes "unbearably crushed" in his apostolic service (e.g. 2 *Cor.* 1.8).<sup>48</sup> Indeed unlike the much-enduring and courageous sage, he experiences "weakness....much fear and trembling" (ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ) in moments of danger or pressure (1 *Cor.* 2.3). In Greco-Roman times this would be a remarkable confession for a male. It is in effect a shameful admission, in which he portrays his character in a thoroughly "weak" posture. As I have already explained (in Section I), fear was the mark of a coward, one of the most shameful moral attributes. It was the sign of a flatterer, an inconsistent, weak and untrustworthy character.<sup>49</sup> Paul admits these attributes to himself of his "sarxical" or "unsaved" self. I think Paul is implicitly suggesting that such a limitless and great endurance and courage is universally impossible to a human. It is simply beyond his own power, when living outside the "life in Christ," the "life of Jesus" (e.g. 2 *Cor.* 10.3-6). In the final analysis such an endurance (or courage) is a sign of the presence of the divine δύναμις, for such a heroic and herculean endurance as he can boast of, cannot derive from his own character resources, from his own inner strength, from his own moral perfection. Rather the source of Paul's endurance derives from the grace of God. As God raised Jesus from the death of the Cross to life so Paul can be strengthened in his moral and somatic weakness with the same transforming power of deliverance and is capable of great endurance in the face of dangers and hardships. His weakness is hence both doxological and revelatory in that it reveals and glorifies God's power at work in his apostolate:

'For we do not want you to be ignorant, brethren, of the affliction we experienced in Asia. For we were so utterly, unbearably crushed beyond our strength (καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπὲρ δύναμιν ἐβαρήθημεν) that we despaired of life itself. Why we felt that we had received the sentence of death; but that was to make us rely not on ourselves but on God who raises the dead; he delivered us from so deadly a peril, and he will deliver us; on him we have set our hope that he will deliver us again.' [2 *Cor.* 1.8-10].<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Unless Paul is deliberately exaggerating here his human fragility for doxological reasons.

<sup>49</sup> For the relationship between these character elements in Greco-Roman antiquity, vide Marshall *op. cit.* 281-325.

<sup>50</sup> There have been various suggestions offered by scholars concerning the precise nature of the unbearable affliction which utterly crushed Paul in Asia, to a point beyond his own resources. Some have suggested the riot in Ephesus

'The signs of an apostle were performed among you in absolute endurance (ἐν πάσῃ ὑπομονῇ), with signs and wonders and mighty works (τέρασιν καὶ δυνάμεσιν).' [2 Cor. 12.12].

He discloses very clearly the secret of this paradoxical process of transforming and empowering endurance in weakness, in his letter of reconciliation. It is through the "life of Jesus" (ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) within his "body" (σῶματι), or as he metaphorically expresses the paradox, it is through the "treasure" (θησαυρόν) that he possesses in his fragile "earthen vessel" (ὄστρακίνοις). This apparent paradox points to the overwhelming epiphanic power of God, as the source of this extraordinary and limitless endurance in not being crushed, perplexed, despairing or destroyed in the course of his apostolic service despite his own physical and moral weakness:

'But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the overwhelming power belongs to God (ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ) and not to us. We are afflicted in every way (ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενοι), but not crushed (ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι), perplexed but not driven to despair (ἀπορούμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπορούμενοι), persecuted but not forsaken (διωκόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγκαταλείπόμενοι), struck down but not destroyed (καταβαλλόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπολλύμενοι), always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus (ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) may also be manifest in our bodies. For while we live we are always being given up to death for Jesus's sake, so that the life of Jesus may be manifested in our body.' [2 Cor. 4.7-12].

Given the prominence of the idea of suffering in Paul's Christology and anthropology,<sup>51</sup> it is no surprise to find the notion of endurance present in his letters. What is surprising, however, given the centrality in the Pauline Gospel of the death of Christ,<sup>52</sup> as well as the consequential general principle of kenotic humility and apparent weakness (*Phlp.* 2.5-11, *1 Cor.* 1.23-31, *2 Cor.* 8.9; 12.5, 9), is that in the usage of the idea of endurance to designate his (and co-workers') apostolate, Paul appears to be drawing more on the model of the much-enduring Greek and Roman sage.<sup>53</sup> Already in his unique understanding of endurance, it is interesting to observe certain

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described by Luke (*Acts* 19.23-40), or an associated imprisonment (in which he composed his letter to the Church at Philippi). Others have suggested the suffering of a severe and life-threatening illness. For a discussion, vide Furnish, *op. cit.* 122-125.

<sup>51</sup> For a study of the language and rhetoric of suffering in the Corinthian correspondence, specifically *1 Cor.* 4.9-13, vide K.A. Plank, *Paul and the Irony of Affliction*, SBLSS (Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1987).

<sup>52</sup> Concerning the centrality of the Cross in the Pauline Gospel, vide D.E.H. Whiteley, *The Theology of St. Paul* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974) 130-150; L. Morris, *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*, 3rd revised edition (Grand Rapids, Eerdmann, 1987); J.S. Pobee, *Persecution and Martyrdom in the Theology of Paul*, JSNTSS 6 (Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1985).

<sup>53</sup> Within the letters of Paul and CP, the idea of Christ's endurance appears only in *Heb.* 12.2. Yet even here the author presents Christ in Greek images as a "much-enduring athlete." It would seem that while Paul clearly envisages his sufferings as participation in solidarity with Christ's suffering, yet in terms of endurance the evidence suggests that it was the image of the much-enduring sage that he composed his notion of endurance where its context is not entirely martyrological.



similar patterns: (i) The role which the sage ascribes to the "life according to reason," the "life of virtue," as the source of his great and limitless endurance in hardships, the apostle Paul ascribes to "the life of Jesus. (ii) A doxological dimension is also present, when both the sage and Paul boast of great endurance.<sup>54</sup> (iii) The idea of the righteous apostle who in his suffering is regarded as "foolish" is also a recurring theme for the sage in Greek and Roman philosophy,<sup>55</sup> as is the idea of the self-abasing (ironic) sage.<sup>56</sup>

*D. Endurance in Hardship as a Commendable Virtue:  
Paul and the Greek Rhetoric of Praise and Self-Praise*

**i. Endurance in Hardship and the Praising of Others:** Among the various Greek (and Roman) philosophical systems, as I have already explained, the concept of endurance held a significant place within the hierarchy of moral values. It was one of the most important and commendable character attributes. Its importance and esteemed place in the various ethical systems arises for reasons already outlined earlier in this study. Could someone therefore in the Greco-Roman world boast of his own endurance? If so what were the consequences and ramifications? What were the rules governing self-praise? Alternatively, when praising others, did the Greek or Roman sage consider such attributes as endurance?

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<sup>54</sup> Vide my ensuing discussion on 'Endurance as a Commendable Virtue, Praise and Self-Praise.'

<sup>55</sup> Vide Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 100-107. Fitzgerald describes a theme already evident in Plato's *Resp.* (Book 2). In a discussion on the nature of justice and the just man Glaucon argues for the position of the priority of seeming just rather than being just. The just man will be rejected by the populace and endure much suffering. Here Glaucon offers a list of hardships. This theme of the suffering sage as a "fool" was taken up and developed in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times. Fitzgerald cites Cicero *De Republica* 3.17.27, as an example closely resembling Paul's argument in *1 Cor.* 1-4 (esp. 4.8-13). Here the unjust are crowned with honours while the just man must endure a list of debasing and shameful punishments (persecution, torture, exile, poverty etc.), the unjust man will be honoured, esteemed, lauded, be conferred with power, wealth and influence. The suffering and the endurance of the just man is thus considered from the perspective of the unjust as "foolish," as is his choice of life. The theme of the popular rejection of the wise sage as "foolish" is also re-echoed by Seneca: ' . . . let some men even think you a fool. Allow anyone who so desires to insult you and treat you unjustly; for if virtue dwells within you will suffer nothing.' (*Ep.* 71.7). Stowers points out, the Stoic paradoxical slogans "only the sage is rich," "only the sage is king" are now applied by Paul to the conceited Corinthians, hence identifying them with this philosophical position. Paul here argues for the uniqueness of his position towards the concept of reason: 'Although Paul is using the same rhetorical device and the same motifs as the philosophers, there is a different attitude towards reason implied. The philosophers employed hardship lists to illustrate the invincibility of their reason. Nothing could affect their inner tranquillity and virtue. Paul, in contrast, uses hardship lists to show that he and other Christians are truly fragile and vulnerable. Any power that they do have to succeed and endure such hardships comes from God and not an inner bulwark. They succeed in spite of human vulnerability rather than overcoming it. In fact it is the Corinthians whom Paul suggests are like the philosophers.' *op. cit.* 13.

<sup>56</sup> Vide C. Forbes, *op. cit.* 1-30.

Among the most universally recognized items of admiration and praise for another human, the Greco-Roman world almost universally acclaimed the virtues which a person possessed. While isolating certain virtues for mention, Dio Chrysostom could nevertheless explain that in his time "every virtue" was praised:

'...virtually all praise (ἐπαινοῦσιν) and refer to as "divine" and "august" such things as courage (ἀνδρείαν) and righteousness (δικαιοσύνην), and wisdom (φρόνησιν) and in short every virtue (ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν)' [Dio Chrys. *Or.* 69.1].

Likewise the various extant Greek teacher handbooks containing suggested elementary exercises (προγυμνάσματα) in rhetoric for students in the most basic levels of secondary education, compiled and edited by the Alexandrian Aelius Theon (ca. 1st century A.D.)<sup>57</sup> Hermogenes (ca. early 2nd cent. A.D.),<sup>58</sup> Libanius' student Aphthonius of Antioch (4th cent. A.D.)<sup>59</sup> and Nicolaus the Sophist (fl. ca. 457-464)<sup>60</sup> show us that the *encomium* (ἐγκώμιον) or lengthy form of laudation was an essential lesson in student exercise in Greco-Roman, late antique and early Byzantine education. This fact reflects in turn upon the widespread knowledge of the use of laudation by any Greco-Roman possessing the most rudimentary rhetorical education of the period. Whereas, for example, the teaching of the art of letter writing was of marginal concern in grammatical handbooks and the elementary rhetorical exercises (essentially subsumed by so-called "characterization" exercises),<sup>61</sup> by contrast developing skills in the composition of laudation was of major concern in the introductory school lessons in rhetoric. Theon explains in summary form the function of the encomium and its basic content, in his introduction to his discussion of this form of speech. It is clear that virtuous action and character attributes are at the heart of encomiastic

<sup>57</sup> For a detailed discussion and commentary on Theon's progymnasmata, its textual transmission, a critical text and a new translation vide J.R. Butts, *The Progymnasmata of Theon: A New Text with Translation and Commentary* (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1986).

<sup>58</sup> The text of Hermogenes' progymnasmata is to be found in L. Spengel (ed.) *Rhetores Graeci*, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1966) 14-15. For an English translation vide C.S. Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic to 1400 Interpreted from Representative Works* (New York, MacMillan, 1928) 23-38.

<sup>59</sup> Aphthonius in Spengel *op. cit.* 42-44. For a discussion of his progymnasmata vide G.A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1983) 60-66.

<sup>60</sup> Nicolaus the Sophist, *Progymnasmata* (ed.) J. Felten, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1913), also Kennedy *op. cit.* 66-69.

<sup>61</sup> For a discussion of the place of letter writing in Greco-Roman education, vide, S.K. Stowers, *Letter Writing*, 32-35. Stowers writes: 'Letter writing was learned in the secondary level of education, although we do not know how widespread this instruction was or exactly what was taught. Grammatical handbooks show a passing interest in letter writing and presuppose a knowledge of basic forms. The elementary exercises in rhetoric (progymnasmata) were also taught to various degrees in secondary education . . . . The progymnastic exercises of Theon and Nicolaus say that letter writing is a useful exercise for developing characterization and impersonation of style . . . .' (32-33).

praise: 'An encomium is a speech which sets forth the significance of the virtuous actions and the other good points of some specified character.' [Theon, *Progym.* 9.1-2].<sup>62</sup>

Here one finds many topics suggested for praise. These included externals such as place of birth, race, education, wealth or physical appearance. However attributes (virtues) of the soul and noble actions or achievements which derive and are consistent with such virtues were emphasized as the main topic in commendation (or comparisons). Theon explains:

'Good qualities of the soul are the virtuous character traits and actions consistent with them, for example that he is wise (φρόνιμος), self-controlled (σώφρων) courageous (ἀνδρείος), just (δίκαιος), pious (δσιος)- free (ἐλεύθερος), magnanimous (μεγαλόφρων) and such things as these.' [*Progym.* 9.21-24].

Concerning the topics of praise Fitzgerald explains that ' . . . . it was the exhibition of virtue in situations of danger and difficulty that was traditionally accorded the greatest praise. And in this regard the ancient rule of thumb was quite simple "the greater the difficulty the greater the glory"....'<sup>63</sup> Given this background it is not surprising that in the writings of the sages one finds the notion of endurance (and courage) among the various praiseworthy character attributes assigned to figures of admiration. For instance, Aristotle describes endurance and self-mastery as wonderful (σπουδαίων) and praiseworthy (ἐπαινετῶν).<sup>64</sup> Diogenes Laertius reports that the essential quality with which Antisthenes and the poet Philemon characterized and praised Crates as a sage was his endurance especially in poverty (*Diog. L.* 87). Dio Chrysostom praises Odysseus as a "hero" capable of endurance in his travels (*Or.* 1 3.4).<sup>65</sup> Likewise Socrates was (almost) universally hailed for his martyrological endurance, becoming a prototype of the much-enduring sage-martyr.<sup>66</sup>

A similar choice of admirable virtue in hardship is also made by Paul when he chooses to praise the suffering Thessalonian believers. Thus in the very opening words of Paul's first extant letter, he commends the Thessalonians precisely because of their endurance. Accordingly we read

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<sup>62</sup> Hermogenes writes: 'Encomium is the setting forth of the good qualities that belong to someone in general or in particular: in general, as the encomium of man; in particular as encomium of Socrates.' *op. cit.* 30. Hermogenes distinguishes between *praise* and *encomium* in terms of length. The encomium is a lengthier form of praise. Nevertheless both praise and encomium are a form of laudation.

<sup>63</sup> Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 108. Among Greco-Roman philosophers, vide Cicero *Off.* (1.19.64), Seneca *Ep.* 82.10-11, *Prov.* 3.4.

<sup>64</sup> *Eth. Nic.* 7.1.6

<sup>65</sup> For further laudation of endurance vide Section I in this dissertation.

<sup>66</sup> Vide ch. 4 in the present study.

in his thanksgiving prayer, (immediately following his prescript), among the attributes which he isolates as worthy of remembrance before God, Paul also underlines their endurance produced by hope (ὕπομονῆς τῆς ἐλπίδος, *1 Thess.* 1.3).<sup>67</sup> In his ensuing letter to the Thessalonians,<sup>68</sup> Paul can allow himself to boast of them to the other ecclesial communities again because of their possession of endurance (*2 Thess.* 1.4) and faith. Such is the level of Paul's commendation of this attribute that not only is it placed on an equal footing with faith but can also elicit his boasting. The context, here, of this commendable endurance in hardship is not exclusively in reference to persecution (or potential martyrdom) - expressed by ὑπομονή - but it also includes general affliction (θλίψεσιν)- expressed by ἀνέχεσθαι:

Therefore, we ourselves boast (ἐγκουχᾶσθαι) of you in the churches of God, for your endurance (ὕπομονῆ) and faith in all your persecutions and in the afflictions which you are now enduring (ταῖς θλίψεσιν αἷς ἀνέχεσθε) [*2 Thess.* 1.4].

**ii. Endurance and Self-Commendation:** Self-praise or boasting in the Greco-Roman world could take several forms. One form, for the most part, employed by eminent statesmen and military generals, involved the enumerating and cataloguing of one's great and impressive deeds or accomplishments. This was particularly the case with eminent, celebrated or heroic men. For example, Augustus on the *Monumentum Ancyranum* can boast: 'Twice I received triumphal ovations. Three times I celebrated curule triumphs. Twenty times and one did I receive the appellation of imperator.' [*Monumentum Ancyranum* 37].<sup>69</sup>

On the other hand, because of the high esteem in which virtue was regarded, one could in certain situations, boast of his virtues. In particular such self-commendation of virtue, was more appropriate and less offensive when it related to the endurance of various circumstances of danger and hardship, such as courage and endurance. Most usually this form of self-praise, being considered less pompous, less arrogant and less offensive was more popular among the Greek and Roman sages. Not surprisingly its most natural associative rhetorical vehicle was the peristasis

<sup>67</sup> The other attributes are "work of faith" (ἔργον τῆς πίστεως) and "labour of love" (κόπου τῆς ἀγάπης). The juxtaposition of love, faith and hope will also be re-echoed in his celebrated Corinthian encomium in praise of Christian love (*1 Cor.* 13.13). It is interesting however, that in the latter context, endurance is associated as an aspect of love rather than hope (13.7).

<sup>68</sup> Concerning my recognition of *2 Thess.* as an authentic Pauline letter, vide 'Introduction,' in this study.

<sup>69</sup> E.G. Hardy (ed.) *Monumentum Ancyranum*, (Oxford, 1923). Above quotation cited from Furnish, *op. cit.* 515.

catalogue.<sup>70</sup> Various rules governed the practice of self-commendation.<sup>71</sup> Among the most significant, for the purposes of the present discussion, dealt with the concern not to render such boasting offensive or pompous. Accordingly it was significant to appear to show reluctance and not to draw attention to the self. Rather one was to praise the virtues at work. The use of hardships, was not for its own sake but rather to demonstrably show that the self-confessed protagonist is possessed with virtue. Most usually this form of self-praise was practiced, since self-praise was considered, in the final analysis, as a last resort. For instance the Stoic sage would avoid externals or indifferents in the exercise of self-praise. Rather it would be such virtues as endurance and courage which were the subject of the boast. Likewise within the pseudo-Diogenes collection of Cynic letter there is the explicit recognition that moral endurance is the legitimate subject of boasting. Thus in *Ep.* 27, the author (ostensibly Diogenes of Sinope), affirms that in comparison to the Spartans, who are celebrated for their military endurance, and who acted in opposition to him, he alone believes himself to be worthy of boasting of endurance. He therefore asks "Anniceris" a rhetorical question: 'Who would boast of endurance under frightful circumstances with Diogenes present?' (27.).

The function of boasting of one's endurance was clear. The demonstration of endurance in hardship could serve as an example for others, to encourage them in their own hardships (Plutarch *Mor.* 544-D-E). It could serve as an apologetic against charges leveled by critics or opponents (Pseudo-Diog. *Ep.* 27.17-18, Plutarch *Mor.* 540C-541E). It could possess a doxological dimension, in order to give glory to God. The latter also rendered self-praise more acceptable (Plutarch *Mor.* 542E), to the hearer or reader.

I now ask, if the apostle Paul, was placed in a situation where he had to commend himself and / or his co-workers to a first-century Greco-Roman audience in Corinth, how would he undertake it, in the light of two issues: (i) His Christological principle of weakness. (ii) His opponents in Corinth (the "super apostles") had already boasted of their great missionary deeds (2 *Cor.* 10.12-

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<sup>70</sup> Vide discussion below ("The Rhetoric and Context of Endurance"), on the Greek and Roman list of hardships, as a rhetorical convention designed to demonstrate the protagonist's wise endurance.

<sup>71</sup> Vide Plutarch, *De laude ipsius* (*Mor.* 539A-547F); also H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, *Studia ad Corpus hellenicum Novi Testamenti* 4, (Leiden, Brill, 1978) 367-93.

16), their rhetorical expertise and eloquence (2 Cor. 11.5-6) their spiritual power and authority in terms of their mystical or ecstatic experience (2 Cor. 5.12-13, 12.1-4), their claims to perform miracles (2 Cor. 12.11-12), their boldness (2 Cor. 10.1-11), as well as their claim to an impregnable reason (2 Cor. 10.3-6),<sup>72</sup> in terms which, based on Greco-Roman rhetoric as well as Stoic philosophy, might be described as externals or indifferents, rather than virtues? It is evident that in his Corinthian correspondence (and re-echoed in his other letters), that it would be the sage's model of self-commendation which served Paul's purpose - though now guided by his Christological principle, whereby he may identify hardships as weaknesses, which simultaneously also rendered his boasting less offensive. This is perhaps depicted most clearly in the concluding statements of his *inclusio* concerning wise and foolish endurance (2 Cor. 11.1-12.12). Here his "strong" and "wise" apostolic endurance derives from the grace of Christ. Likewise his signs and wonders and mighty deeds which are manifested in his own situations of weakness and fragility, also derive from Christ. As such his endurance which is a mighty apostolic sign glorifies Christ rather than himself yet simultaneously draws inoffensive attention to his "virtuous" accomplishments:

I will not boast except of weaknesses . . . . He (i.e. Christ) said to me, "My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made fully present in weakness. I will all the more gladly boast of my weaknesses, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. For the sake of Christ then, I am content with weaknesses (ἀσθενείαις), insults (ἐν ὑβρεσιν), deprivations (ἀνάγκαις), persecutions (ἐν διωγμοῖς) and pressures (στενοχωρίαις), for when I am weak (ἀσθενῶ) then I am strong (δυνατός). I have been a fool. You forced me into it for I ought to have been commended by you . . . . The signs of a true apostle were performed among you in utmost endurance (ἐν πάσῃ ὑπομονῇ) by signs and wonders and deeds of power.' [2 Cor. 12.5,9-12].

*E. The Place, Rhetoric and Function of Pauline Endurance:  
Demilitarized Endurance, Similarities (& Differences) with Greek Philosophy  
(2 Cor. 6.4a-10c as Model)*

**i. 2 Cor. 6.4a-10c as a Synopsis of Paul's Understanding of Moral Endurance and its Links to Greek Philosophy:** In the self-commendation of his (and his co-workers') apostolic διακονία, both in the preceding text as well as in 2 Cor. 6.4a-10c, he stresses, above all attributes, his great endurance (irrespective of its source) in the midst of prodigious hardship

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<sup>72</sup> For a discussion on Paul's opposition in Corinth and the "super apostles" and their boasts, vide the next section, on wise and foolish endurance, below.

(weakness) and suffering.<sup>73</sup> The model upon which Paul seeks to frame and designate his apostolic endurance, to his readers, as noted above, is that of the wise and steadfast Greek (or Roman) sage. The most obvious elements of similarity include the following: (i) The mention of the magnitude of his apostolic endurance. (ii) His stress upon endurance as a subject of (apostolic) laudation and commendability. Paul like the sages can praise others for their endurance as well as praise his own. Like the sages he views endurance as one of the most praiseworthy ethical attributes in situations of hardship, affliction, conflict and danger. It is an authenticating indicator of a praiseworthy, unpampered and virtuous character. (iii) The use of certain Greek and Roman rhetorical conventions which underline the notion of the sage's endurance, are also found in the letters of Paul (esp. *1 & 2 Cor.*). These include, boasting, self-praise, the list of virtues, the comparison, the peristasis catalogue and the military metaphor. (iv) The wide variety of hardship contexts where endurance is demonstrated. This also suggests the protagonist's capacity for great endurance. (v) The associative links between his endurance and other virtues. (vi) Paul's characterization of his endurance as wise in contrast to "foolish" endurance demonstrated by the Corinthians' at the hardships imposed by the "super apostles." (vii) Paul's self-praise in terms of his great endurance, also serves various purposes, as an *apologia*, as a character reference, as a model of imitation and as a glorification of God's power.

This Pauline conceptualization and employment of this notion, as it re-echoes the Greek and Roman sage's understanding of endurance, is however most systematically and synoptically evident in a paranaetic passage within his Corinthian correspondence - *2 Cor.* 6.4a-10c - where the apostle understands himself (and his co-workers) in the image of the much-enduring sage, as outlined in Section 1 of the present dissertation, and represents a further stage in the history of the evolution of the Greek idea of endurance, now as an attribute of the apostle and servant of Christ. The Greek philosophical background to *2 Cor.* 6.4a-10c has been definitively demonstrated by both Fitzgerald and Furnish in their respective independent research.<sup>74</sup> Hence, the present analysis

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<sup>73</sup> In his Corinthian correspondence, Paul at times speaks in the first person plural when discussing apostolic endurance (e.g. *1 Cor.* 4.12, *2 Cor.* 6.4. In this study, unless otherwise indicated, I treat these primarily as Pauline self-designations.

<sup>74</sup> I refer the reader to Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 184-201, and, Furnish *op. cit.* 342-359.

will not seek to reduplicate their work. My focus in the present analysis is simply to focus exclusively on the notion of endurance as it affects, explains and integrates the entire passage. While, to a large extent, I draw on these two scholars, nevertheless I also seek to complement their work, by suggesting a further dimension in the reading of endurance here. Furthermore I employ this text as a launching pad for the discussion of similar aspects of endurance found in Paul's other letters.

**ii. Apostolic Endurance and Self-Commendation:** Endurance, here serves primarily as a character reference, as both Fitzgerald and Furnish have already observed. This self-commendation in terms of great endurance, serves in the first place as a character basis, for persuading the Corinthians to the appeals of his immediately preceding and proceeding exhortations (2 *Cor.* 5.20-6.2 & 6.11-7.3).<sup>75</sup> He seeks their acceptance of him as an authentic and heroic "ambassador" of Christ, as their psychagogue or "spiritual father," by their embrace again of the hegemony of his apostolate and his Gospel of reconciliation in Christ, and hence of reconciliation to God again (5.15-21).<sup>76</sup> In seeking to persuade them of these appeals he showcases his apostolic endurance. In other words, among the various praiseworthy character attributes that Paul could have chosen to commend himself in a positive moral sense to his Corinthian audience, that endurance is chosen would make perfect sense to a Greco-Roman readership. As I have already explained, this was one of the most admired and praiseworthy virtues of the sage in adversity. Indeed already in Plato, tested endurance in a wide context of hardships was an important criterion for the choosing of the highest office of public administration,

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<sup>75</sup> Fitzgerald treats the entire text of 2 *Cor.* 6.3-10 primarily as a paranaesis, and secondarily an apologia, occurring ' . . . . the appeals of 5.20-6.2 and that of 6.11-13, and provides the *character basis* on which the appeals are made.' Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 188.

<sup>76</sup> Paul explains that as in the death and resurrection of Christ, God has ushered a new creation reconciled to Himself (5.15-19), so he as a new creation, that is as an ambassador of Christ (5.20a) becomes a vessel whereby God is making His appeal (*παρακαλοῦντος*) through him (i.e. Paul) and the Pauline apostolic circle (*δεόμεθα*) (5.20b) for an end to the old relationship of enmity in preference to the possibility of reconciliation to Him by not counting humanity's sins (5.19, 21). Paul's exhortation to the Corinthians is for a return to his Gospel which they had already received, prior to the infiltration and missionary work of his opponents, the "super apostles." Hence they must accept him as an authentic apostle of God, an authentic ambassador of Christ. In terms of Pauline soteriology the language or image of reconciliation is one among several which Paul postulates to portray the re-union between man and God. Among the other images, Paul draws from the language of slavery or captivity (redemption, 1 *Cor.* 7.23; *Rom.* 3.24-25), from the courtroom (justification, *Rom.* 5.1, *Gal.* 2.16) as well as the world of sacrifice (blood atonement, *Rom.* 3.23-26, 5.9).



the philosopher-king (*Resp.* 413DE-414A). By choosing to commend himself in terms of "great endurance" he feels he can persuade the Corinthians to his appeal not only for reconciliation to God but also to the "weak" Pauline apostolate (6.1 1-7.3).<sup>77</sup> Accordingly Paul can begin his paranaesis by explaining that in his apostolic service (διακονία) no obstacle or fault may be found (6.3). Indeed all aspects (ἐν παντί) of his διακονία are irreproachable since it is characterized by his great endurance (6.4) in the various circumstances of hardship:

'We put no obstacle (προσκοπήν) in any one's way, so that no fault may be found with our service (μη μωμηθῆ ἡ διακονία). But we commend ourselves (συνίσταντες) in every way (ἐν παντί) as servants of God in much endurance (ἐν ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ) . . . . ' [2 *Cor.* 6.3-4abc].

There is another element in Paul's choice of endurance as his apostolic self-designation. It serves an apologetic function, where Paul is cementing his prior successful defence (2 *Cor.* 10-13), against the various inter-related charges leveled by the super apostles, surrounding his "weakness" - physical appearance, non-eloquence in speech, servility adaptability or polytropy of character (inconsistency), and hence flattery and cowardice.<sup>78</sup> In Greek philosophy, especially in Aristotelian ethics, as I have already pointed out, the concept of concept of the endurance of fearsome things is the mark of the courageous man. Such a man according to Aristotle, is in a state of health (ὑγιεινός) and is strong (ἰσχυρός).<sup>79</sup> Conversely an inability for such endurance in affliction suggests a weak (ἀσθενεῖς) sickly (νοσώδεις) and cowardly (δειλός) character (*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.11). As in Paul's inclusio 2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12, in 2 *Cor.* 6.4-10 the notion of endurance serves to draw attention to the brave, masculine or heroic nature of Paul's apostolic labours as well as his consistency of character. Unlike Aristotle, Paul however claims that such endurance is possible through divine grace,<sup>80</sup> which empowers his own weakness.

The recognition of endurance in its various forms as a positive and commendable moral attribute, is also re-echoed earlier in this part of 2 *Cor.* (i.e. 1-9),<sup>81</sup> as a noble characteristic of the

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<sup>77</sup> In this appeal Paul exhorts the Corinthians imploring them to ' . . . . Widen your hearts . . . . Provide us room!' (6.13, 7.2).

<sup>78</sup> For a discussion of the charges and the Pauline defence vide the ensuing part of this chapter, 'The Character of Moral Endurance: Wise and Foolish.'

<sup>79</sup> *Eth. Eud.* 3.1.10.

<sup>80</sup> Vide below.

<sup>81</sup> Vide n. 24 above.

suffering Corinthians (1.6). Likewise, the apostle makes constant exhortations calling his addressees to adopt this commendable "virtue" in the various adverse circumstances that they face (e.g. *1 Cor.* 16.13, *Gal.* 5.1, *Phlp.* 1.27-30, *Rom.* 12.12, *Eph.* 6.10-17).<sup>82</sup> Like the Greek sages, Paul recognizes the notion of endurance in adversity as one of the most commendable and praiseworthy attributes of the moral and heroic person. Like the Greek sage he can employ this notion both to commend others as well as in a self-praising fashion.

**iii. The Much-Enduring Apostle Paul:** Because of his life in accordance to reason it was considered that the potential magnitude of the sage's endurance in adversity, was considered to be so great that it was actually limitless. This demonstrated the superiority of the wise man over others, because it is precisely through this "great endurance" that he both demonstrates his reason and virtues and hence the ability to conquer any circumstance which others cannot even imagine to overcome, indeed are hopelessly enslaved by them:

Therefore leave off saying: "Will the wise man, then, receive no injury if he is given a lashing, if he has an eye gouged out? Will he receive no insult if he is hooted through the forum by the vile words of a foul-mouthed crowd? If at a king's banquet he is ordered to take a place beneath the table and to eat with the slaves . . . . If he is forced to bear whatever else can be thought of that will offend his freeborn pride?" No matter how great these things may come to be, whether in number or size, their nature remains the same. If small things do not move him neither will the greater ones. If a few do not move him neither will more . . . . having pictured how much you think that you can endure, you set the limit of the wise man's endurance a little farther on. But his virtue has placed him in another region of the universe. he has nothing in common with you. Therefore search out the hard things and whatever is grievous to endure . . . . the whole mass of them will not crush him, and as he endures / withstands them singly, so will he endure / withstand them in mass.' [*Constant.* 15.1-3].

In this capacity he transcends the realms of the ordinary person, into the status of extraordinary courage, heroism and inner strength or power (he is like a king). Like the much-enduring Greek or Roman sage, Paul too, in his apostolic work describes his endurance in terms of its magnitude. It is much endurance, it is great (or limitless?) endurance (ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ, *2 Cor.* 6.4c). However, the difference is in its origins. For the sage it is through his life of reason. For Paul it is a clear sign of his apostolic life in Christ. His "superiority" of endurance over his rivals deals not with his own virtues but simply because of the grace he has received as an apostle. His great endurance therefore authenticates his divine appointment (also *2 Cor.* 12.12).

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<sup>82</sup> With the exception of *Rom* 12.12 all the other exhortations to endurance cited above are in the form of military metaphors. I deal with *1 Cor.* 16.13, *Gal.* 5.1 and *Phlp.* 1.27-30 in some detail in the ensuing section of this chapter.

**iv. The Peristasis Catalogue and the Wide Context of Pauline Endurance:** Since one of the clearest means available to the Greek sage, to persuade his audience (whether literary or live), of his credentials in wisdom or reason, was to provide proof of his endurance in adversity, a most effective rhetorical devices at his disposal in this "boast" was the *peristasis catalogue*. This was a list of adverse circumstances itemized sequentially of the hardships and dangers which he faced without being overcome by them.<sup>83</sup> Typically these adverse situations involved one or several of the ensuing hardships - πόνος (strain or pain), κίνδυνος (danger), θλίψις (affliction), κόπος (labour). As such, the sage's endurance, in a variety of contexts of hardship, pointed to his reasoning capacities.<sup>84</sup> Thus, through the illustrative employment of the *peristasis catalogue*, Seneca can explain to Serenus, that not even Tyche / Fortuna can defeat the endurance of the rational man:

The man who relying on reason, marches through mortal vicissitudes . . . . has no vulnerable spot where he can receive any injury. From man only do you think I mean? No not even from Fortune, who, whenever she has encountered virtue, has always left the field outmatched . . . . we shall much more easily endure all other things - losses and pains, disgrace, changes of abode, bereavements and separations. These things cannot overwhelm the sage, even though they all encompass him at once. Still less does he grieve when they assault him singly. And if he endures composedly the injuries of Fortune, how much more will he endure those of powerful men, whom he knows to be merely the instruments of Fortune. All such things, therefore he endures (patitur) in the same way that he copes with the rigours of winter and to inclement weather, to fevers and disease . . . . ' [Constant. 8.3-9.1].

As is evident from Seneca's catalogues above, the lists of items that the sage is usually presented as enduring is varied and would include hardships associated with inclement weather, with physical deprivation, with loss of status, with persecution, with physical pain or disease, with dangers associated with travel or exile. Accordingly the sheer variety of hardships which a list of adversities incorporates, often constituted of various genres of hardships (occupational, punitive, travel, cupidity, health, etc.), helps to convince the sage's audience through such proof of

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<sup>83</sup> As Fitzgerald has pointed out in his definitive research on the Greek *peristasenkataloge*, several types of lists of hardships were employed by the Greeks. Among these were - catalogue of human hardships, catalogues of the hardships of national groups, catalogues of occupational hardships, catalogues of punishments, catalogues of the hardships of the passions, catalogues of particular celebrated individuals, the catalogue of the woes of the traveller or wanderer and the catalogues displaying the hardships of the sage. Most of these categories are employed by Paul in his own hardship lists, vide Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* passim, also below in present study. In the present section, due to limitations of space and time, I will not extensively deal with explications of this Greek rhetorical device, I will refer the reader to Fitzgerald's work. Here I will simply point to the most immediate and relevant issues, in absolute synoptic form.

<sup>84</sup> With Plato's Socrates we find the expansion of the contexts of courage and hence endurance from the military to a wide variety of adverse situations, incorporated within a list of hardships (including politics), vide *Lach.* 191D, also ch. 2 of the present dissertation.

complete self-control and endurance which he has cultivated through the exercise of reason and training (ἄσκησις). Thus the first-century Roman Stoic, Musonius Rufus, in an essay on the sage's physical and moral training in endurance (Περὶ Ἀσκήσεως) explains by means of a hardship list. It is interesting that Musonius stresses the need of the sage's endurance to be psychosomatic. Here we note again the inter-relationship between the classical "military" attributes - courage (& strength) and endurance:

Now there are two kinds of training, one which is appropriate for the soul alone, and the other which is common to both soul and body. We use the training common to both when we discipline ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, meager rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and endurance (ὑπομονῆ) under suffering. For by these things and others like them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring (δυσπαθές) hardship, sturdy and ready for any task. The soul too is strengthened since it is trained for courage (πρὸς ἀνδρείαν) by endurance (διὰ μὲν τῆς ὑπομονῆς) under hardship and for self-control . . . . ' [On Training 10-18].

The nature of Paul's great endurance in hardship (2 Cor. 6.4c-5f), is not only commendable by virtue of its esteemed value in the Greco-Roman world, but also in its prodigious manifestation in his apostolic work covering a wide range of circumstances of adversity and danger. Thus in his ensuing peristasis catalogue (6.4c-5f), not only does Paul express his apostolic endurance through the employment of one of the most common Greek rhetorical conventions to designate the sage's wise and great endurance,<sup>85</sup> but also covers many of the same diverse and adverse *Sitz im Leben* frequently cited in popular Greek and Roman philosophy. In contrast to the rest of the NT books where endurance is usually associated for the most part with persecution or with a martyrological context (punitive), it is evident here that there are many more elements of adversity envisaged by Paul (6.4a-5f):

- 6.4a: 'But we commend ourselves in every way (ἀλλ' ἐν παντὶ συνίσταντες ἑαυτοῦς),
- b: as servants of God (ὡς Θεοῦ διάκονοι),
- c: by means of **great endurance** (ἐν ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ),
- d: in (the midst of) afflictions (ἐν θλίψεσιν),
- e: in (the midst of) deprivations (ἐν ἀνάγκαις),
- f: in (the midst of) pressures (ἐν στενοχωρίαις),
- 6.5a: in (the midst of) beatings (ἐν πληγαῖς),
- b: in (the midst of) imprisonments (ἐν φυλακαῖς),
- c: in (the midst of) tumults (ἐν ἀκαταστασίαις),

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<sup>85</sup> Paul's concern to distinguish between wise endurance (as a commendable virtue) and unwise or foolish endurance (as a vice) will become clear in my discussion of 2 Cor. 11.1-12.12, below.

- d: in (the midst of) labours (ἐν κόποις),  
 e: in (the midst of) vigils / sleeplessness (ἐν ἀγρυπνίαις),  
 f: in (the midst of) fastings / hunger (ἐν νηστείαις). [2 Cor. 6.4a-5f].

I do not intend here to reduplicate Fitzgerald's analysis of this Pauline list of hardships,<sup>86</sup> except to point out the following most relevant features - some of which represent a new interpretation. The dative usage of endurance (ὕπομονή) - ἐν ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ - to describe the nature of his apostolic self-recommendation, being placed at the head of the ensuing list of hardships (6.4c-5f) is best read as instrumental, namely as describing exclusively the means by which such a commendation is primarily understood. On the other hand the dative framing of the ensuing nine individual items of hardship (and as I shall argue, the subsequent list of virtues and divine empowerments 6.6a-6.7b) is best read as local and immediately referring back and describing the nature of the ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ rather than as independent items without direct literary or thematic continuation with the concept of endurance. The preposition ἐν, here, which introduces the nine hardship items, as Furnish suggests, is best read as meaning "in the midst of" rather than "by means of."<sup>87</sup> The list of the numerous and wide contexts of hardship is therefore intended to describe Paul's great apostolic endurance and is syntactically subordinate to ἐν ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ.

This list appear to be structurally and thematically constituted in a tripartite format, each consisting of three items. The first part designates general (non-specific) contexts of adversity, through the employment of summary terms of hardship. Paul begins with the most generic and widest Greek term for hardship, θλίψις, which conveys the idea of affliction, oppression or distress.<sup>88</sup> This is followed by ἀνάγκη another summary term designating circumstances of enforced (cf. voluntary) great distress, physical pain, anguish, deprivation or constraint.<sup>89</sup> This item is intended to cover a multiplicity of adverse situations forcibly imposed upon the apostle. The

<sup>86</sup> For a detailed discussion of this peristasis catalogue, vide Fitzgerald *ibid.* 192-194. Vide also Furnish, *op. cit.* 343-344.

<sup>87</sup> Furnish writes: 'The preposition *en* which precedes each of the . . . . terms . . . . is best understood to mean "in the midst of" . . . . ' *Op. cit.* 343. The ἐν is exclusively meant to introduce ' . . . . the ways in which *endurance* is manifested in the Pauline ministry.' *Loc. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> *LS* (intermediate version) 367. Malherbe points that it can also suggest psychological (as well as physical) distress, vide *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1987) 65.

<sup>89</sup> *LS* (intermediate version) 53.

final item in the first triad, στενοχωρία, is perhaps the most psychological suggesting severe mental distress or pressure.<sup>90</sup> All these general or summary items of hardship which are designed to reflect a wide variety of circumstances of severe hardship, suffered by Paul in his apostolic διακονία, are intended to clearly reveal the prodigious and wise nature of endurance which Paul (and his co-workers) has capably exercised, and hence re-enforce his credentials and character as an authentic apostle of the suffering Christ, as an apostolic sign (2 Cor. 12.12), forming the basis for persuading the Corinthians to his immediate exhortations<sup>91</sup> - " . . . we commend ourselves in every way, by means of great endurance in the midst of afflictions, deprivations, pressures . . . "

The next triad of hardships listed by Paul, to convince his readers of his credentials as a wise and much-enduring apostle, deals with persecutory and potentially martyrological contexts, namely hardships endured because of the actual or possible violence of others against him. This sub-list may be characterized, in accordance with Fitzgerald's analysis of the genre of Greek catalogues of hardships, as a *catalogue of punishments*.<sup>92</sup> The first one - ἐν πληγαῖς - deals with unrestrained beatings and resultant physical wounds. In Greco-Roman times the sheer violent physical power suggested by the term πληγή is indicated in the Dio Chrysostom discourses who employs it in the context of championship boxing contests,<sup>93</sup> the beating of an animal by his master (*Or.* 15.2), turbulent Alexandrian mob violence (*Or.* 32.30), injurious blows (*Or.* 33.15), etc.<sup>94</sup> It may also refer to physical torture.<sup>95</sup> Paul gives more detailed description of the varied type of beatings he has experienced, in 2 Cor. 11.23c-25. They include mob violence as well as "official" corporal punishment. Accordingly, Paul explains that in the course of his apostolic διακονία, he (and his co-workers) encountered very severe beatings but in the midst of them, as in the case of the serene and steadfast Greek and Roman sage under torture he too demonstrates great endurance. Following

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<sup>90</sup> Scholars have suggested that this word appears last in this initial triad of hardships for dramatic purposes in creating a crescendo - it happens to be the longest of the three words. Vide A. Fridrichsen, 'Zum Thema "Paulus und die Stoa". Eine stoische Stilparallel zu 2. Kor. 4.8f.' *ConNT* 9 (1944) 28; also Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 192.

<sup>91</sup> Fitzgerald correctly observes: 'All three words are generic terms intended to indicate the multiplicity of the various circumstances in which Paul's endurance is manifested.' *Op. cit.* 192.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* 48, 193.

<sup>93</sup> *Or.* 29.12.

<sup>94</sup> Also 4.74, 8.18, 15.19, 32.20, 37.35 et al.

<sup>95</sup> E.g. *Diod. Sic.* 4.43.3, 5.

beatings Paul might find himself in prison.<sup>96</sup> The second item in his sequence of apostolic punishments in his list deals in fact with imprisonments (ἐν φυλακαῖς). As the Greek or Roman sage, however, in the midst of incarceration Paul (and his co-workers) exhibits endurance.<sup>97</sup> The third item in Paul's list of punishments in the course of his apostolic διακονία involves the facing of hostile mob riots (ἀκαταστασίαις). Parallel to the trend of the first triad of hardships the last item is also the longest word of the set, as well as potentially the most dangerous for it clearly suggests the possibility of martyrdom.<sup>98</sup> Hence it forms a literary crescendo. The implication here is that in the course of his missionary and preaching activity Paul at times aroused angry mob scenes against him, which placed his life in imminent danger.<sup>99</sup> In all these circumstances of aggressive violence, pain and loss of freedom, Paul (and his co-workers) in his capacity as innocent sufferer in the cause of his apostolate can claim that he demonstrated a most commendable virtue namely great endurance - 'we commend ourselves in every way . . . . by means of great endurance . . . . in the midst of beatings, imprisonments and riots' [2 Cor. 6.4ac-5abc].

The third set of hardships which Paul faces and demonstrates great endurance concern his craft. This sequence corresponds to that Greek variety of peristasis catalogue which Fitzgerald classifies as *occupational hardships*.<sup>100</sup> Paul's consistent refusal to accept any financial support from certain ecclesial communities added to his list of hardships, through his involvement with manual labour (tent making).<sup>101</sup> Accordingly he experiences labours (ἐν κόποις), sleepless nights

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<sup>96</sup> For instance in the record preserved by Luke the evangelist, following the beating by rods which Paul and Silas received at Philippi, they were cast into jail: 'The crowd joined in attacking them, and the magistrates had them stripped of their clothing and ordered them to be beaten with rods. After they had given them a severe flogging, they threw them into prison . . . . ' [Acts 16.22-23]; also 16.37.

<sup>97</sup> In the Lucan attestation of the Philippian imprisonment, Paul and Silas are portrayed as serene and undisturbed by the situation, for they pray and sing hymns in contrast to the other prisoners who in a helpless situation simply listen: 'About midnight Paul and Silas were praying and singing hymns to God, and the prisoners were listening to them.' [Acts 16.25]. As Furnish observes, the Philippian imprisonment appears to be confirmed by Paul himself in 1 Thess. 2.2, Furnish, *op. cit.* 354.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Acts 14.19; vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 193.

<sup>99</sup> Luke in fact specifically mentions such violent mob instances in his record of Paul's missionary activities, for instance in Pisidian Antioch (13.50), at Iconium (14.5-6), at Lystra (14.19), at Philippi (16.22), at Thessalonica (17.5-9), at Beroea (17.13) as well as in Corinth (18.12-17). Indeed the life-threatening, impact of the term ἀκαταστασία is re-enforced within the Lucan Gospel itself (21.9) where it is coupled with the notion of war (πολέμους καὶ ἀκαταστασίαις).

<sup>100</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>101</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Paul's endurance and manual labour, vide my discussion on 'Wise and Foolish Endurance,' below.

(ἐν ἀγρυπνίαις)<sup>102</sup> and because of his limited finances and difficulty in earning sufficient, which he describes in 6.10 in terms of poverty, even hunger (ἐν νηστείαις). What appears to distinguish this set of hardships from the rest in this peristasis catalogue is their voluntary nature, as St. John Chrysostom and Theodoret already pointed out in the early Byzantine period.<sup>103</sup> These hardships, for the most part, could have been avoided if Paul chose to receive financial support. Nevertheless, no matter their nature, throughout these great occupational hardships the apostle Paul can claim that he (and his co-workers) demonstrates great endurance.

The composition of this list which incorporates a large number of situations of suffering, is not accidental. In the Greco-Roman philosophical world, as Dio Chrysostom attests (*Or.* 25.3), the greater the number of contexts of adversity the greater the protagonist's capacity and ability to demonstrate heroic endurance.<sup>104</sup> Again, the greater the danger and the hardship involved the more praiseworthy the endurance.<sup>105</sup> Consequently Paul reflects this understanding, by characterizing his apostolic endurance, at the head of this diverse and relatively lengthy list of difficult hardships, as πολλή ὑπομονή.

<sup>102</sup> Furnish explains: 'The *sleepless nights* would be due to his need to use some nighttime hours either to work as his trade or - because others, too, would be work-bound from dawn to dusk - to preach and to teach . . . . note the Sunday night meeting in Troas (*Acts* 20.7-12).' Furnish *op. cit.* 355.

<sup>103</sup> Vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 194. The use of ἀγρυπνία and νηστεία suggest a voluntary form of deprivation. Dio Chrys. for instance employs "sleeplessness and fasting (βίον ἀγρυπνῶν τε καὶ ἀσιτῶν [cf. νηστεύων]) in terms of the voluntary hardships of a student of the Sophists in his labours of study (*Disc.* 38). Their voluntary nature is also attested by their religious status whether in a cultic and / or dietary framework and attested in the LXX, NT and the Greco-Roman world to designate vigils and fasts (e.g. *Matt.* 4.2, 6.16, 9.14, *Luke* 18.12, 21.36, *Acts* 13.2. Greco-Roman mystery religions also employed vigils in the initiation of the novice. In a sense they are "virtues" and hence form a natural bridge to Paul's ensuing list of virtues which are associated with his great endurance (6.6-7).

<sup>104</sup> One of the functions of the Greek hardship list was to demonstrate the protagonist's endurance. It is important to note therefore, that it is not necessary to find the vocabulary of endurance in these lists. This is clearly revealed by Dio Chrysostom in his *Disc.* 25. Thus in describing the abiding impact of Lycurgus upon the fortitude or endurance of the Spartans, he makes a brief list of hardships, without mention of the vocabulary of endurance: 'It is just as if you should call Lycurgus a guiding spirit of the Spartans - for at his command even now the Spartans are scourged (μαστιγοῦνται) and sleep in the open (θυραυλοῦσι) and go lightly clad (γυμνητεύουσι) . . . .' He then proceeds to immediately characterize these and summarize these hardships and others which the Spartans suffer voluntarily in terms of endurance: ' . . . . and endure (ἀνέχονται) many other things that would seem hardships to other people.' [35.3]. (Note: It is also evident in this passage that the more the adverse circumstances of endurance the more commendable the endurance). Likewise it is generally safe to say that the Pauline peristasis catalogue is intended primarily to demonstrate Paul's apostolic endurance, whether the term appears explicitly or is implicit. Furthermore the wide variety also demonstrates his "πολλή ὑπομονή."

<sup>105</sup> Thus Cicero could assert, ' . . . . the greater the difficulty the greater the glory.' (*De Off.* 1.19.64). For further references, vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 108 n. 172.



Paul's declaration of his apostolic endurance (whether explicit or implicit), is of course not unique to this list. All these items of hardships listed in this peristasis catalogue (6.4d-5f), except "riots" (6.5c), also appear elsewhere within peristasis catalogues in canonical 2 *Cor.* (4.8-9; 11.23b-29; 12.10) as well as in his other letters which further attest, in comparison to other NT documents or collections, to the wider context of Paul's endurance in hardship (*1 Cor.* 4.10-13 & *Rom.* 8.35).<sup>106</sup> Consequently a list of Paul's situations of endurance (implicit and explicit) as attested within his extant correspondence with the Corinthians, by his various peristasis catalogues clearly reveals the previous observations. His exhaustive hardship lists incorporate the following set and circumstances of suffering where endurance was manifested: (i) *Occupational hardships* - weariness (*1 Cor.* 4.12a), labours (*2 Cor.* 6.5b, 11.23b), sleeplessness (*2 Cor.* 6.5e), hunger (*1 Cor.* 4.11a, *2 Cor.* 6.5f), poorly clothed (*1 Cor.* 4.11), deprivations (*2 Cor.* 6.4e). (ii) *Catalogue of punishments* - held without honour (*1 Cor.* 4.10c), a spectacle to the world (*1 Cor.* 4.10), reviled (*1 Cor.* 4.11), slandered (*1 Cor.* 4.13a), persecuted (*1 Cor.* 4.12c), beaten (*1 Cor.* 4.11, *2 Cor.* 6.5a), beaten with rods (*2 Cor.* 11.23b), many beatings to the point of death (*2 Cor.* 11.23b), a stoning (*2 Cor.* 11.25), flogged (*2 Cor.* 11.24a), imprisonments (*2 Cor.* 6.5a, 11.23b), violent mob riots (*2 Cor.* 6.5b). (iii) *Catalogue of general human suffering* - afflictions (*2 Cor.* 6.4d), pressures (*2 Cor.* 6.4d, 11.28). (iv) *Travel hardships* - the woes of the traveller include homelessness (*1 Cor.* 4.11), thirst (*1 Cor.* 4.11), many journeys (*2 Cor.* 11.26a), danger at sea (*2 Cor.* 11.26g), shipwrecked thrice (*2 Cor.* 11.24c), 24 hours adrift on the open sea (*2 Cor.* 11.24d), danger from rivers (*2 Cor.* 11.26b), dangers in the desert (*2 Cor.* 11.26g), danger from the city (*2 Cor.* 11.26f), danger from bandits (*2 Cor.* 11.26c), danger from Jews (*2 Cor.* 11.26d), danger from Gentiles (*2 Cor.* 11.26e). (v) *Pastoral or psychagogic hardships* - anxiety for all the churches (*2 Cor.* 11.28b), dangers among false brothers and sisters (*2 Cor.* 11.26i)

<sup>106</sup> An example of a Pauline hardship list which suggests endurance in an implicit fashion is *1 Cor.* 4.10-13. However even here the vocabulary of endurance is employed in terms of a punitive (persecutory) item: 'We are fools for Christ (μωροὶ διὰ Χριστόν) we are weak (ἀσθενεῖς) . . . . we are without honour (ἀτιμοί). To the present hour we are hungry (πεινώμεν) and thirsty (διψῶμεν), we are very poorly clothed (γυμνιτεύομεν) and beaten (κολαφιζόμεθα) and homeless (ἀστατοῦμεν), and we grow weary from the work of our own hands (κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι). When reviled (λοιδορούμενοι) we bless, when persecuted we endure (διωκόμενοι ἀνεχόμεθα), when slandered we speak kindly. We have become the garbage of the world, the dregs of all things . . . . ' [*1 Cor.* 4.10-13].

However Paul does not necessarily always indicate his and his co-workers' apostolic endurance as well as the Pauline communities' endurance, in the form of hardship lists. Thus we find some of these hardship items included in other rhetorical structures (e.g. exhortations, comparisons). Accordingly it is clear that for Paul endurance embraces a wide context of hardship situations. It is not basically restricted to persecutory or martyrological situations. This element, as I have already noted, reflects fundamental similarities with the Greek and Roman sage's understanding of wise and great endurance which also covered similar sets of varied hardship situations.<sup>107</sup>

**v. Moral Endurance, its Associative Virtues and Divine Empowerments (2 Cor. 6.6a-7b):** As is evident from the analysis in Section I, in Greek philosophy, beginning with Plato's *Laches* moral endurance is seldom viewed as a sole virtue and most usually is understood, in philosophical circles, either as (i) a sub-category or key attribute of another virtue or, (ii) in conjunction with other associated virtues. The most usual pattern displayed both in Greek and Roman philosophy, is that in its militarized form - whether as a metaphor or not - it is associated with the aggressive virtue of courage (ἀνδρεία)<sup>108</sup> and at times with strength (ἰσχύς). In its demilitarized form, it is usually associated with self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια)<sup>109</sup> or the gentler virtues such as wisdom, nobility, goodness (φρόνησις, καλόν, ἀγαθόν),<sup>110</sup> with justice<sup>111</sup> as well as with reason (λογισμός)<sup>112</sup> or knowledge.<sup>113</sup> The same pattern is also evident in the letters of Paul. In its militarized form Paul will tend to associate endurance (usually expressed as "standing firm") with the aggressive virtues such as courage (*1 Cor.* 16.13, *Phlp* 1.28), strength (*1 Cor.* 16.13) or

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<sup>107</sup> For instance Dio Chrysostom (*Disc.* 3.57) speaks about the wise king's ability to endure toils (ἀνέχεσθαι πόνου). As I have already noted in Section I the Greek or Roman sage as innocent victim faced persecution, insults, beatings, tortures and even martyrdom with great endurance. Vide ch 4. This is already evident in Greek philosophic tradition with Socrates. Paul's employment of a peristasis catalogue to spell out his endurance in matters persecutory or potentially martyrological also corresponds with Greek lists of punishments (Plato and Glaucon). Like the wandering Greek sage Paul also experienced labours, physical deprivation (cf. Dio Chrys.'s peristasis catalogue) as well as travel dangers.

<sup>108</sup> E.g. Plato, *Lach.* 192B,D Aristotle, *Eth. Eud.* 3.1.5.

<sup>109</sup> *Eth. Nic.* 7.1.6.

<sup>110</sup> E.g. *Lach.* 192CD.

<sup>111</sup> E.g. *Resp.* 3.295B, 361E-362A.

<sup>112</sup> Plato, *Lach.* 193A.

<sup>113</sup> Plato, *Lach.* 193A.

freedom (*Gal.* 5.1). The association of a demilitarized endurance with the gentler and cognitive virtues also occurs within the Pauline letters, most notably at *2 Cor.* 6.6a-7b, following the hardship list. This tendency of understanding endurance in conjunction with a series of aggressive or gentle virtues is not characteristic of the Hebrew Bible, while it is a traditional aspect of Greek and Roman ethical discussion and treatises.

Irrespective of exegetical variances, the traditional way that scholars read the list of virtues and divine gifts (6.6a-7b), is to understand it either as a resumption of a separate catalogue initiated by ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ (6.4c) and hence as co-ordinate to it, or as thematically separate from the idea of endurance.<sup>114</sup> Accordingly it is seen as forming a second unit within the overall literary and thematic structure of 6.4a-10c. Having commended himself in terms of the virtue of "great endurance" qualified or described by the interruption of a hardship list (6.4d-5f), Paul now turns his self-commendation to the rest of his list of praiseworthy virtues. This reading of the list of virtues and divine gifts envisages a tripartite literary structure. Paul commends himself (i) beginning with "endurance," (ii) he qualifies this endurance by inserting a parenthetical hardship list (6.4d-5), and (iii) resumes his list of virtues with the mention of "purity" (ἀγνότης) (6.6a)<sup>115</sup> Accordingly the placement of endurance at the head of the virtue list is not perceived in any sense as thematically significant, but rather as a literary facilitation for his ensuing hardship list. The hardship list, in turn, simply qualifies the first virtue mentioned. I propose that an alternative reading is also possible, one already observed both by Hughes and Fitzgerald though not

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<sup>114</sup> So Furnish, *op. cit.* 344-349, commenting on the structure of 6.4b-10, considers 6.6-7a as one of the four independent "strophes" of the text, and hence separate from the notion of endurance, understanding the theme as the power of God at work in his apostolate: 'Paul commends his apostolate (a) for its *endurance* though many adversities (vv. 4b-5), (b) for its working with the *power of God*. (vv. 6-7a) . . . . ' 349 (note: Furnish's letter indicators of the various verses of *2 Cor.* 6.4-10 are not identical to mine); C.K. Barrett also thematically separates this virtue list from the concept of much endurance, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, BNTC (London, A & C Black, 1976) reprint, 186; Fallon also identifies the beginning of the virtue list as disconnected in any direct link with Paul's endurance, *op. cit.* 55; R. Bultmann likewise considers the beginning of the catalogue of virtues with Paul's mention of ἀγνότης, in his *The Second letter to the Corinthians*, ET by R. Harrisville (Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1985) 171; Fitzgerald on the other hand sees the list of virtues beginning with ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ followed by ἀγνότης, separated by the peristasis catalogue, *op. cit.*: 'Paul mentions a total of nine hardships and nine virtues and gifts. The first item in the list of virtues is "endurance," which has been separated from the rest and placed at the head of the catalogue. As a result of this placement, the *peristasis* catalogue is enclosed by a catalogue of virtues, with ὑπομονῆ and ἀγνότης serving as the frames.' *op. cit.* 194. Nevertheless Fitzgerald also acknowledges a qualificatory connection between endurance and the list of virtues, vide below.

<sup>115</sup> For example, vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 194.

elaborated, namely viewing the list of virtues as in some way referring back to Paul's great endurance: ' . . . . Paul has done more than simply endure his toils and affliction . . . . he endured with purity, out of knowledge, with patience, and kindness. There is thus a character and integrity to Paul's endurance that distinguishes it from mere withstanding . . . . '<sup>116</sup> However, unlike Fitzgerald, I would suggest that Paul's list of virtues and divine empowerments (6.6a-7b) does not begin with the mention of ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ, but rather with ἀγνότης. While this last observation is a position held by most commentators, nevertheless I qualify it. I would suggest that this list of virtues and divine gifts forms precisely the same function as the preceding hardship list. In other words I suggest an alternative possibility of reading the virtue list, namely as a direct description of Paul's great endurance. Accordingly the employment of the dative case here (as in the case of the preceding hardship list), forms a descriptive reference back to ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ rather than a direct continuation of an ongoing list of virtues, by which Paul is commending his apostolate. To sum up then, in this reading the mention of ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ (6.4a) at the head of the entire text ought not to be interpreted either as (i) the beginning or first attribute of a virtue and divine-empowerment list which is resumed at 6.6a, nor as (ii) thematically forming a separate unit independent of ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ. Rather for reasons which I have described above, namely the virtue-associative nature of moral endurance, I postulate that ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ forms the entire text's focal theme. That Paul intends the thematic content of 6.4a-10c to center around a description of the nature, origins and character of his apostolic endurance is already signaled by his introductory qualification of ὑπομονή as πολλή. This I suggest sets the pattern for the entire text. In other words the overall thrust of Paul's self-commendation in 6.4a-10c (inc. 6.6a-7b) appears to be exclusively in terms of his apostolic endurance. The hardship list and the ensuing list of virtues and divine gifts describe this endurance. Hence they are structurally inter-connected. Likewise the virtue catalogue also displays an internal design: (i) it is constituted of two categories. (ii) The first four references identify (human) gentle moral attributes as associated virtues describing the nature

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<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* 194. Hughes writes: 'Having drawn attention to the various kinds of tribulation and vicissitudes in which the faithful prosecution of his ministry of reconciliation has invoked him, Paul now sets down a list of the spiritual qualities, graces, and means whereby he has been enabled triumphantly to endure all these things.' P.E. Hughes, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1962), 1986 reprint, 226.

of the Pauline apostolic endurance. Accordingly it is an endurance at work with, motivated and strengthened by purity (ἐν ἀγνότητι).<sup>117</sup> It is an endurance which is inspired and based along the principles derived from knowledge of God's rather than a false human wisdom (ἐν γνώσει).<sup>118</sup> Thus it is a divinely wise rather than "foolish" human endurance.<sup>119</sup> It is characterized by forbearance (ἐν μακροθυμίᾳ) and operated by kindness (ἐν χρηστότητι). (iii) The ensuing four references mention the direct divine involvement, empowerment and origins defining Paul's great endurance. It is an endurance empowered by the Holy Spirit (ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ), especially through the greatest gift of the Holy Spirit, namely authentic love (ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἀνυποκρίτῳ). It is interesting that in Greco-Roman antiquity, with the exception of *T. Job*, the juxtaposition of love (ἀγάπη) and endurance (ὑπομονή) is unique to the letters of Paul.<sup>120</sup> Furthermore it is an endurance strengthened by the power of the Gospel which is the "word of truth" (ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας) and operates by the "power of God" (ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ):

My reading of 6.6a-7b reflects a recognition of the Greek and Roman sage's common and frequent understanding of the concept of demilitarized moral endurance in terms of associative (gentle) virtues. Furthermore Greek and Roman sages also recognized the involvement of the divine at work within the sage. However, the general and overarching principle of virtue and character formation, was the stress on the pursuit of the life according to reason. The sage through his own training and acquisition of wisdom, is able to demonstrate a great endurance in conjunction with other virtues. Paul, in keeping with his unique Christological conceptual

<sup>117</sup> The implication here is that it is an endurance which in part is assisted by his purity of life.

<sup>118</sup> In the *Laches* Socrates seeks to compare a wise form of endurance to a foolish one. The wise endurance displays preparation and knowledge (193A). Such wise knowledge perceives that which is and is not dreadful.

<sup>119</sup> This theme is taken up in Paul's *inclusio* within his letter of tears (2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12). I deal with this characterization of Pauline endurance in the ensuing unit, "The Character of Pauline Endurance, Wise and Foolish: Paul's *Inclusio* 11.1-12.12," Vide below.

<sup>120</sup> This association of love and endurance is re-echoed within the Corinthian correspondence. Accordingly in his ode to love, Paul defines ἀγάπη in the vocabulary of demilitarized endurance (στέγω and ὑπομένω): '(Love) It bears all things (πάντα στέγει) . . . . endures all things (πάντα ὑπομένει).' [*1 Cor.* 13.7]. Not only does he associate love (one of the gentle virtues) with demilitarized endurance, but, in another unique Pauline twist, he also links militarized moral endurance with the notion of love (*1 Cor.* 15.13-14, vide below for a discussion on this text). The only other incidence in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity, that I am presently aware of, where moral endurance presented in a metaphoric martial context is associated with love, occurs in *T. Job*. Vide ch. 4 in the present dissertation. Here it is couched within a metaphoric athletic context. Nevertheless, in Mediterranean antiquity, the juxtaposition of a "militarized" endurance and love is rather unique to Paul, and represents his original contribution to the evolution of the idea of endurance.

framework, spells out the origins of his great endurance. It is not through his life according to reason but rather through his life "in Christ" and his 'knowledge' of divine wisdom. Consequently his apostolic endurance is empowered through the Holy Spirit, the charism of love, as well as the power of the Gospel, that is the "word of truth" which he preaches. This is Paul's unique contribution to Greek and Roman understanding of endurance as an associative or subordinate virtue.

**vi. Paul the Much-Enduring, Divinely-Armed Warrior - Militarized Metaphor of Endurance (6.7cde):** Paul now continues in the description of his "great" apostolic endurance. Like the Greek and Roman sages he portrays his endurance with the aid of military imagery. In doing so he displays a certain affinity with a military motif which has a long and established tradition in Greek philosophy, namely that of the sage's armament. This was very likely developed from an earlier notion established by the Spartans concerning the moral armament resulting from their warriors' and inhabitants' virtues. In the philosophical versions of this theme, it is, (i) the sage's virtues which provide him with mighty and superior moral "weapons."<sup>121</sup> For instance, in a saying ascribed to Antisthenes, he sets down a general principle, namely that moral virtue (ἀρετή) is described as a 'weapon that cannot be taken away' (Diog. L. *LEP* 6.105). While endurance is not specifically mentioned in this maxim, which is intended as an overarching moral principle, nevertheless in the light of its generality neither is any other virtue. Nevertheless given the Cynic emphasis upon endurance as a chief virtue,<sup>122</sup> it would not be unreasonable to assume that Antisthenes would have considered it as a moral "weapon."<sup>123</sup> Certainly within Antisthenes'

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<sup>121</sup> The initial inspiration for this theme, in Greek philosophical thought, appears to be the Spartan views of virtue as moral armament (preserved around the time of Paul in popular apophthegms by such sages as Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus). In this tradition, the Spartans claimed that their city's true walls were its soldiers' courage and endurance (Plutarch *Sayings of the Spartans* 217E, 228E), while its inhabitants' virtues were its fortifications (Plutarch *Sayings of the Spartans* 210E). This Spartan theme of the virtues as moral armament would subsequently be elaborated by the sages, beginning with Antisthenes. For a discussion of the Spartan notion of military endurance vide ch. 1 of the present study, for its impact on philosophical thought, vide Rawson *op. cit.* and Tigerstedt *op. cit.*

<sup>122</sup> Vide pp. 111-119 of the present study.

<sup>123</sup> In the immediate context of this saying, prior to it he refers to the "brave" and "just" as worthy "allies" (Diog. L. *LEP* 613). After this succinct maxim or general principle, Antisthenes mentions two specific virtues in terms of moral fortification. "Prudence" (φρόνησις) is identified as a person's inner "fortifications" (Diog. L. *LEP* 613) while "reason" (λογισμός) as "walls of defence" (*LEP* 6.13). The latter theme, of course, (as I have already analyzed in ch. 2), would be developed by the later Cynics and especially the Stoics.

*Odysseus* and *Ajax* declamations, *Odysseus* (Antisthenes' ideal sage) displays great "militarized" endurance in situations of danger and for the benefit of others, which is considered a virtue.<sup>124</sup> This virtue is linked with his hero's chief "weapon" - his servile rags. His endurance permits him to be "armed" with the "proto-Cynic" cloak. In turn the hardships associated with the wearing of the garb as "weapon," facilitate the exercise of endurance.<sup>125</sup> A later Cynic, Dio Chrysostom, makes the link between endurance and moral armament more explicit. In an address (διάλεξις) most likely delivered during his period of exile, Dio deals with issue of how to reasonably deal with pain and distress (*Or.* 16). His general solution is not to yield to any particular attack of hardship, in other words to demonstrate endurance. In order to vividly describe this, he presents a military metaphor. A warrior who goes to battle is to be appropriately "armed" against the enemy's weapons. Part of this "armour" is the sage's capacity not to yield (εἶκω),<sup>126</sup> that is the capacity to display "militarized" endurance before the attacks of Tyche:

'So, just as when men go forth to war, it is no use for them to march out naked (i.e. without their armour) and then merely hope to dodge each flying missile, for it is impossible to guard against them all. But the soldier needs a sturdy breastplate and his full panoply too (δεῖ δὲ θώρακος στερεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἅλλης πανοπλίας), so that even if a missile does strike him, it may not penetrate. In the same way those also who have marched out into (Cynic?) life cannot possibly dodge or so guard themselves as not to be struck by any of Tyche's shafts, thousands of which are flying against each man. What they need is a strong mental constitution (διανοίας ἰσχυρᾶς), preferably invulnerable and yielding before no blow (καὶ πρὸς μηδὲν εἰκώσης) . . . . ' [Dio Chrys. *Or.* 16.6].

(ii) Another tendency concerns the divine origins of the sage's "weaponry" and hence their invincibility. Thus within the Cynic Pseudo-Crates tradition, a tradition which seeks to distance itself from Antisthenes and his hero *Odysseus* (being regarded as too soft), the author retains the Antisthenian motif of the garb as a weapon. Now however, he appropriates it in a Diogenean

<sup>124</sup> In the final section of his speech, *Odysseus* looks forward to the future, when a poet will laud his virtues, not least that of his great endurance which will earn him the epithet πολύτλας.

<sup>125</sup> In the contest for Achilles' "armour" (= contest of virtue) while *Ajax* is described as possessing heavy physical weaponry, *Odysseus* (who represents for Antisthenes the much-adaptable sage) executes his most significant exploits against the Trojans in an unarmed state (ἄοπλος). The implication here is that his real "weapons" in "battle" are his skills and virtues especially courage, self-sufficiency, ingenuity, adaptability, his great endurance. However it is his servile rags which are explicitly mentioned as the "weapon" of *Odysseus*." For a discussion of these Antisthenian declamations, vide pp. 120-122 of the present dissertation, also Malherbe, 'Antisthenes and *Odysseus*, and Paul at War' in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* esp. his section on 'Antisthenes and the Philosopher's Armament,' 95-101.

<sup>126</sup> Literally not to shrink from the fight. Vide *LS* (intermediate Lexicon) 228.

direction.<sup>127</sup> This cloak and wallet, which for the Cynics came to symbolize the sage's demeanour and willingness to suffer and endure hardships,<sup>128</sup> constitute the rigorous Cynic sage's "divine weapons." What is interesting however is that these "weapons" are said to be displayed by those who have been honoured for their character. In other words the Cynic's virtues allow him the possibility of receiving or being "honoured" with these divine "weapons:"

'Cynic philosophy is Diogenean, the Cynic is one who toils according to this philosophy. Consequently do not fear the name, nor for this reason shun the cloak and wallet, which are the weapons of the gods (τὰ θεῶν ὄπλα). For they are quickly displayed by those who are honoured for their character' [Ps. Crates *Ep.* 16].

In *2 Cor.* 6.7c, Paul appears to be reflecting an eclectic and decidedly unique fusion and version of these Greek traditions of the sage's armaments. He seems in part to be in continuity with the notion of virtue as a weapon. Like Antisthenes' much-enduring (πολύτλας) Odysseus at "war," or Dio's much-enduring and well-armed warrior, Paul's great endurance in his apostolic "combat" is associated with, and facilitated through (διὰ) the possession of certain other virtues, that is with and through the "weapons of righteousness," for these weapons derive from his state of righteousness before God as ὄπλα τῆς δικαιοσύνης. In that sense he is here re-echoing his previous statement at 6.6 where endurance is linked to a series of gentle virtues (purity, knowledge, patience, kindness).<sup>129</sup> A major difference now is the military imagery within which Paul explains this association between Paul's virtues. His great apostolic endurance is one of the "invincible weapons" at his disposal, in association with his other "armaments." He also seems to be in some continuity with the theme of divine weaponry. In the light of his theological perspective, because his apostolic "righteousness" derives from God, so does the extraordinary caliber of his "weaponry," namely his great endurance and associated attributes. Indeed these form a significant aspect of his divinely-strong armaments. Thus in *Rom.* (13.12) Paul mentions the "weapons of light" (cf. weapons of darkness) at his disposal, while elsewhere in the same letter (6.13) he exhorts the Romans to become God's "weapons of righteousness" (ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης

<sup>127</sup> For a discussion concerning the Antisthenian and Diogenean wings of Cynicism vide Malherbe *op. cit.* esp. 109-112.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* 112.

<sup>129</sup> It is possible however that with the use of the military metaphor of "weapons," Paul has other more "aggressive" virtues in mind here.



τῷ Θεῷ). It is instructive that in his military metaphor within the letter of tears (2 Cor. 10.1-6), having confessed his servility (ταπεινός) Paul also asserts his combative caliber by describing the weapons at his possession as being divine: ' . . . . I do not make war as the flesh does, for the weapons of our military campaign (τὰ ὄπλα τῆς στρατείας ἡμῶν) are not weapons of the flesh (τὰ γὰρ ὄπλα τῆς στρατείας ἡμῶν οὐ σαρκικά), but divinely strong (ἀλλὰ δυνατὰ τῷ Θεῷ) to demolish fortresses - I demolish reasonings (λογισμοὺς καθαιροῦντες) and ramparts raised up to withstand the knowledge of God.' (2 Cor. 10.3-5). In his state of weakness he nevertheless possesses the weaponry which is divinely powerful. Consequently, it may be that in 2 Cor. 6.7c, Paul is alluding to the previous list describing the divine empowerment enabling his great apostolic endurance, (6.6e-7b), including the action of the Holy Spirit, genuine love, the "word of truth" and the "power of God."<sup>130</sup> By contrast to his opponents' absence of "militarized" endurance before his divinely-strong weapons (a statement which was made by Paul in his letter of tears, 2 Cor. 10.3) in his letter of reconciliation he once more turns his attention to these powerful "armaments" (2 Cor. 6.7cde).<sup>131</sup> Despite his weakness, his divinely-strong weaponry offers him the possibility of a "combative" endurance" - ὑπομονῆ πολλῇ (2 Cor. 6.4c, 7c) against any of his opponents.<sup>132</sup> Accordingly he stands fully armed with powerful armaments "on the right hand and on the left" and is ready to endure any "military campaign"<sup>133</sup> in the course of his apostolic

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<sup>130</sup> It is interesting that in the military metaphor of endurance in *Eph.* 6.10-18 where the idea of military armament plays a significant role, the "word of God" (ῥῆμα Θεοῦ) is identified as the "sword of the Spirit" (μάχαιραν τοῦ Πνεύματος) (6. 1 7b).

<sup>131</sup> By comparison, Paul points out that his opponents in Corinth (the super apostles?) trust in their lofty "fortresses" built on their principles of reason. They are like the Stoic sage, trusting in their own "reason" thinking of themselves as residing in lofty, impregnable and much-enduring "citadels." Such "fortifications" and "ramparts" are "fleshly" or "earthly" in nature and hence can offer no resistance to Paul's divinely-strong weaponry. There is no endurance in his opponents defensive walls since the 'power of God' does not reside upon them. For a discussion of the much-enduring fortifications of the Stoic sage, vide ch 2 of the present study; also Malherbe *op. cit.* 112-119.

<sup>132</sup> The idea of empowerment to defeat one's enemies through powerful "weapons" is also evident in *Ep.* 23 of the Pseudo-Crates Cynic tradition. Here the cloak and wallet are entitled "the weapons of Diogenes" and are compared to "Hades' helmet" which gives the possessor extraordinary power: ' . . . . put on the weapons of Diogenes, with which he did drive away those who had designs on him . . . . For these weapons are terribly effective at overcoming such ones . . . . just as the helmet of Hades . . . . ' (*Ep.* 23).

<sup>133</sup> The image suggested here is of course that of the warrior armed for combat in an attacking rather than retreating posture. Furnish, *op. cit.* 346. Indeed R.G. Tanner suggests that this represents the figure of 'a legionary soldier's role standing in a battle line.' Vide R.G. Tanner, 'St. Paul's View of Militia and Contemporary Social Values,' in *SB* 1978 III, E.A. Livingstone (ed.) *JSNTS* Supp. 3, 377-82. I turn my attention to the apostle Paul's militarized endurance subsequently in this chapter.

διακονία:<sup>134</sup> ' . . . . . by means of great endurance . . . . . with the weapons of righteousness (διὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης) on the right hand and on the left.' [2 Cor. 6.7c].

**vii. Endurance in all Circumstances (6.8a-10c):** If 6.7c points back to the list of virtues and divine empowerments (6.6a-7b) then 6.8a-10c, as a new (fifth) sub-section of 6.4a-10c, re-echoes 6.4d-5f, namely Paul's endurance in circumstances of hardships. Paul now resumes his demilitarized qualifications of his great apostolic endurance by listing nine antithetical situations, introduced (in the first series of circumstances, 6.8ab) by the preposition διὰ (through) and in 6.8c-10c by ὡς. Structurally this sub-section terminates Paul's description of his ὑπομονῆ πολλῇ. These contrasting circumstances parallel the Greek and Roman sages' claim to possess the capacity to demonstrate endurance in all circumstances - whether favourable or unfavourable. The first two situations (the διὰ items) deal with the fickleness of the public treatment and opinion held toward the apostle (6.8ab) while the last seven circumstances (the ~s items) by and large concern the erroneous public perceptions (6.8c-10c). Like the Cynic sage, he too is often subject to the caprice of public fickleness and oscillating opinion - he is persecuted, and "dishonoured" (ἀτιμίας) yet simultaneously honoured by some (διὰ δόξης); publicly defamed or mocked (διὰ δυσφημίας) yet praised by others (εὐφημίας).<sup>135</sup> He is like the Cynic teacher *who* believes that the wise man ought to endure these contrasts.<sup>136</sup> Having explained his ὑπομονῆ πολλῇ in the face of oscillating public reaction, Paul now introduces a series of hardship situations which reveal the public injustice and misconceptions he must endure. Like some of the Cynic sages, he is accused of being a deceiver, a charlatan though he is authentic (ὡς πλάνοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς). He is treated as one who is an obscure figure devoid of fame and publicly rejected though he is well-known by God (ὡς ἀγνοούμενοι καὶ ἐπιγινωσκόμενοι). Because of the nature of his life as a servant of Christ he too is considered "dead" though he is "alive" in God (ὡς ἀποθνήσκοντες καὶ ἰδοὺ ζῶμεν). He

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<sup>134</sup> The military metaphor of a much-enduring moral protagonist as the recipient of celestial empowerment exists in Jer. 1.17-19. However in that instance the military images are in reverse to the present text. The weaponry of Jeremiah's opponents will not be able to demolish his divinely empowered much-enduring "fortifications."

<sup>135</sup> In 1Cor. 4.13 Paul characterizes the public treatment of his apostolate as one which is often in disrepute (δυσφημούμενοι).

<sup>136</sup> Pseudo Crates, for instance admonishes his students that by the power of the "weapons of the gods" they ought to withstand public dishonour or honour: 'δοζη δὲ καὶ ἀδοξία' and not to be "enslaved" by them for they are "mere shadows" (Ep. 16).

endures through constant punishments and persecution and yet not martyrdom (ὡς παιδευόμενοι καὶ μὴ θανατούμενοι).<sup>137</sup> Like the Greek and Roman sage though he may be attacked by grief he is not intimidated but is able to demonstrate great endurance to such a "passion" through joy. Such serene rejoicing, however, is made possible through the joy of the hope of eternal life (ὡς λυπούμενοι ἀεὶ δὲ χαίροντες).<sup>138</sup> Finally, he endures a state of economic poverty (though he is rich in spiritual matters). Like the much-enduring sage his true identity and state of being is not understood. Yet he too withstands these various circumstances of his apostolate.

I suggest in the light of my analysis, that this Pauline text (6.4a-10c) forms an inter-connected thematic unity. It serves to explain and describe the nature of the apostle Paul's great endurance. This unity is suggested by the consistent echoes of several important elements of the Greek and Roman philosophical conceptualization, expression and rhetoric of the virtue of endurance: (i) Like certain Cynic traditions reflected in the Greco-Roman pseudepigraphical epistolary collection, Paul understands moral endurance as a primary virtue, not necessarily associated with courage. (ii) Like the Cynic sage reflected in the Pseudo-Diogenes letters, he too considers the virtue of endurance as worthy of "boasting." (iii) Like the Cynic or Stoic sage, Paul expresses his πολλῇ ὑπομονῇ in association with a hardship list. (iv) Like Peripatetic and Cynic traditions of moral endurance Paul associates his endurance with cognitive and gentle virtues. (v) Like most traditions of Greek and Roman philosophy, Paul expresses his endurance here both in a demilitarized format (predominantly) but also in metaphoric or militarized terms. (vi) In its militarized format, Paul appears to be drawing upon certain Cynic traditions, which owe their origins with Antisthenes, in which virtue is symbolized as a "weapon," which in certain circumstance is also understood as divine in origin. (vii) Like the Greco-Roman Cynic sage he too endures the misconceptions, shifts in public opinion, mistreatment and accusations of the fickle mood shifts of Greco-Roman public

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<sup>137</sup> The idea of the sage's endurance through persecution is of course a consistent theme in Greek and Roman philosophy; vide. ch. 4 of the present study.

<sup>138</sup> The conceptual link between joy, hope and endurance in affliction is explicitly re-echoed in *Rom.* 12.12: ' . . . . rejoice in hope (τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες), demonstrate endurance in affliction (τῇ θλίψει ὑπομένοντες) . . . . ' A similar link is also evident in Paul's address to the gentile Romans (5.3-4): ' . . . . we also boast in our sufferings (καυχώμεθα ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν) because we know that suffering produces endurance (εἰδότες ὅτι ἡ θλίψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται), endurance character and character hope (ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμὴν, ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα) . . . . '

opinion. However like the Cynic sage he too is immune (endures) the attacks of vainglory and persecution.

**TABLE 2****The Apostle Paul's Great Endurance (2 Cor. 6.4a-10c)****I. Paul's apostolate defined in terms of demilitarized ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ.****(A. General prologue):**

- 6.4a: 'But we commend ourselves in every way (ἀλλ' ἐν παντί συνίσταντες ἑαυτοὺς),  
 b: as servants of God (ὡς Θεοῦ διάκονοι),  
 c: by means of *great endurance* (ἐν ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ),

**(B. Demilitarized ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ qualified by a hardship list:)**

- 6.4d: in (the midst of) afflictions (ἐν θλίψεσιν),  
 e: in (the midst of) deprivations (ἐν ἀνάγκαις),  
 f: in (the midst of) pressures (ἐν στενοχωρίαις),  
 6.5a: in (the midst of) beatings (ἐν πληγαῖς),  
 b: in (the midst of) imprisonments (ἐν φυλακαῖς),  
 c: in (the midst of) tumults (ἐν ἀκαταστασίαις),  
 d: in (the midst of) labours (ἐν κόποις),  
 e: in (the midst of) vigils / sleeplessness (ἐν ἀγρυπνίαις),  
 f: in (the midst of) fastings / hunger (ἐν νηστείαις).

**(C. Demilitarized ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ qualified by a list of gentle virtues and divine empowerments:)**

- Gentle human virtues → 6.6a: by purity (ἐν ἀγνότητι)  
 b: by knowledge (ἐν γνώσει)  
 c: by patience (ἐν μακροθυμία)  
 d: by kindness (ἐν χρηστότητι)
- Divine empowerments → e: by the Holy Spirit (ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ)  
 f: by genuine love (ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἀνυποκρίτῳ)  
 6.7a: by the word of truth (ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας)  
 b: by the power of God (ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ) . . . . .'

**II. Ὑπομονῆ πολλῆ Qualified by "Militarized" Imagery and Language****(D. Paul's Endurance in Association with and Possession of other "Weapons"):**

- c: having the weapons of righteousness  
 (διὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης)  
 d: on the right hand (τῶν δεξιῶν)  
 e: and on the left (καὶ ἀριστερῶν)

(cont.)

**TABLE 2** (cont.)**III. Demilitarized Endurance (Resumed)****(E. ὑπομονὴ πολλή through all Circumstances)**

- 6.8a: glorified and dishonoured (διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀτιμίας)  
 b: being in ill-repute and praised  
 (διὰ δυσφημίας καὶ εὐφημίας)  
 c: as deceivers and yet true (ὡς πλάνοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς)
- 6.9a: as unknowns and yet fully known  
 (ὡς ἀγνοούμενοι καὶ ἐπιγινωσκόμενοι)  
 b: as dying and yet see we live  
 (ὡς ἀποθνήσκοντες καὶ ἰδοὺ ζῶμεν)  
 c: as punished and yet not put to death  
 (ὡς παιδευόμενοι καὶ μὴ θανατούμενοι)
- 6.10a: as sorrowing but constantly rejoicing  
 (ὡς λυπούμενοι ἀεὶ δὲ χαίροντες)  
 b: as paupers but enriching many  
 (ὡς πτωχοὶ πολλοὺς δὲ πλουτίζοντες)  
 c: as having nothing yet possessing everything  
 (ὡς μηδὲν ἔχοντες καὶ πάντα κατέχοντες)

*F. The Twofold Character of Pauline Endurance  
Wise and Foolish: Paul's Inclusio 11.1 - 12.12*

In Greek philosophy, as I have already explained in Section I, a vital distinction was drawn between rational and irrational (unwise or foolish) endurance. Only the former was commendable since it alone arose out of the sage's exercise of his cognitive virtues, namely knowledge (ἐπιστήμην)<sup>139</sup> wisdom (φρόνησις)<sup>140</sup> and reason (λόγος)<sup>141</sup> Accordingly such desirable endurance could be regarded as virtuous, noble and good (*Lach* . 192C). On the other hand for Plato and Aristotle, certain expressions of endurance were also considered as irrational. For Plato such forms of endurance were "foolish" not being in accordance with φρόνησις. Indeed they are described as "criminal" (κακοῦργο) and "hurtful" (βλαβερόν).<sup>142</sup> For Aristotle these included those motivated by wrong attitudes or vices such as shame, hope, emotion, passions, desires, ignorance and anger (*Eth. Eud.* 3.1.15-18). Not being based on reason, such instances of endurance were considered by Aristotle as irrational.<sup>143</sup> Accordingly such expressions of endurance were not virtuous, for they were considered to be in complete antithesis to the exercise of reason. A similar dichotomous understanding between a virtuous and a pejorative expression of endurance is also made by Paul, in a lengthy *inclusio* (2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12) in his apologetic response to the various charges leveled against him by his missionary rivals in Corinth, the "super apostles."

**i. Paul's Inclusio and the Language of Endurance:** Given the absence of explicit punctuation marks in ancient Greek texts, it must be remembered that the modern reader of the Pauline letters (as well as other ancient authors using the Greek language) has inherited a subsequent editing of the original Pauline text in terms of paragraph and chapter divisions, which were simply not originally intended in the autographed text.<sup>144</sup> This later editing has on occasions

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<sup>139</sup> *Eth. Eud.* 3.1.9.

<sup>140</sup> E.g. *Lach.* 192C.

<sup>141</sup> E.g. *Eth. Eud.* 3.1.12-14.

<sup>142</sup> *Lach.* 192D.

<sup>143</sup> For a discussion of Aristotle's classification of irrational endurance and its motives, vide ch. 2.

<sup>144</sup> Concerning the earliest attempts at paragraph and chapter divisions S.K. Stowers writes: 'Literary works do not seem to have been divided into chapters and paragraphs until the second century C.E. and then only gradually. The origin of such editing appears to have been in legal documents whose chapter and article divisions were used for

led to serious misreadings of the Pauline text - a notable example being the arbitrary, rhetorically-insensitive and contextually erroneous division of the text of *Romans* at 2.1.<sup>145</sup> Indeed, the oldest chapter divisions (*kephalaia majora*) for the text of *Rom.*, such as that found in *Codex Vaticanus*, for instance, observes no textual break at 2.1. Another more subtle rhetorical system was available to the ancient scribe, of Paul's time, to indicate literary sub-units, when required. Among the various devices available for textual demarcation, the *inclusio* in all probability served such a purpose.<sup>146</sup> This provided the ancient reader of a text with certain conceptual or semantic indicators for perceiving a self-contained literary unit.

Most usually the demarcating literary parameters of *inclusios* are suggested by the emphatic repetition of a certain phrase or concept(s). The repetition may involve an identical word-for-word reduplication of the introductory statement or it may simply provide the reader with a clear conceptual re-echoing of its opening idea. At times the opening statement may be repeated as the *inclusio*'s medial statement. That which is contained within the two key repetitions (opening and concluding) represents the text of the *inclusio*. For reasons which I shall argue below, I suggest that 2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12 forms a Pauline *inclusio* within the "letter of tears."<sup>147</sup>

Two terms from the Greco-Roman vocabulary of endurance determine and set the textual boundaries of this *inclusio* as well as postulating its major theme - (1) ἀνέχεσθαι / ἀνοχή and (2) ὑπομονή. Paul's usage of these two terms is deliberate, predictive and systematic. One term (ἀνέχεσθαι / ἀνοχή) initiates the *inclusio* (11.1), the other (ὑπομονή) concludes it (12.1-12). Here, the one term (ἀνέχεσθαι / ἀνοχή) is exclusively restricted, in an ironic sense, to describe

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reference. Reference was probably the major reason for their later use in the New Testament . . . . ' in his *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews and Gentiles*, (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1994) 332 n. 22.

<sup>145</sup> Stowers writes: "The chapter division at 2.1, then, reflects an understanding that not only obscures Paul's diatribal rhetoric, but assumes a different understanding of Romans as a whole . . . . The division at 2.1 is a way of arranging the text that reflects a certain reading of Romans . . . . ' in his *op.cit.* 14-15.

<sup>146</sup> I am indebted to Prof. A. Malherbe for drawing my attention to this literary and rhetorical device, specifically in relation to 2 *Corinthians*.

<sup>147</sup> Fitzgerald has pointed out two further instance of the *inclusio* within the Corinthian correspondence, namely / *Cor.* 4.11-13 & 4.9-13. In the case of the former Fitzgerald explains that within the overall peristasis catalogue (4.9-13) a sub-unit is formed by the *inclusio* which contains 4.11-13. He writes: "The fourth sub-section is devoted entirely to the apostles (11-13). That these verses form a separate sub-section is clear from the *inclusio* formed with ἄρτι (ἀχρι τῆς ἄρτι ὥρας: 11; ἕως ἄρτι: 13). Within this *inclusio* occur three units . . . . ' Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 131). He also locates a longer *inclusio* embracing the entire peristasis catalogue (4.9-133). He argues in favour of the second *inclusio* based on the correspondence between ἐγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ (4.9) and τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν (4.13). *op. cit.* 131.



either the Corinthians' or his opponents' boasts of endurance. At no point within the *inclusio* does this term describe Paul's own endurance. The latter is exclusively characterized by ὑπομονή. This distinction in the choice of terms to designate the type of endurance demonstrated by the various groupings in Corinth (inc. Paul) reflects a calculated use of the Greek vocabulary of endurance and its semantic shades, and cannot be ignored. In the Greco-Roman world, among the various primary terms denoting endurance, ἀνέχεσθαι / ἀνοχή possessed the widest semantic range. Predominantly it was used to convey the meaning of a wise or meritorious form of endurance. In the Corinthian correspondence, and elsewhere within the Pauline epistolary corpus, we do find such a positive usage of this term. Thus in *1 Cor.* 4.12, as I have already noted, Paul makes use of the same term in a martyrological context of endurance.<sup>148</sup> Among its various shades of meaning it

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<sup>148</sup> Fitzgerald points out that *1 Cor.* 1.10-4.21 (within which ἀνέχεσθαι is employed in a martyrological sense: 4.12), is not an apologia, where Paul is defending himself against certain charges (in the manner of *2 Cor.*). Rather it is best understood as a letter of admonition and instruction written by Paul in his capacity as the Corinthians' spiritual father reproving his children's arrogance and inability to progress spiritually from the time that Paul established the church in Corinth. Fitzgerald writes: "The widespread view that 1.10-4.21 is primarily an apology by Paul is, quite simply wrong. Paul is concerned here with admonishing the Corinthians, with resolving the problem of their intra-mural strife (1.10-12), not with defending himself." Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 128. As Fitzgerald points out, the Corinthians, cannot still be fed "solid food" (3.2), but are only capable of drinking milk (3.2) due to their lack of wisdom. Their "worldly type" divisions within their community reflects this immaturity (3.3-4). Beginning at 3.5 as Fitzgerald points out, Paul uses covert criticism (though not consistently), in the manner recommended by Hellenistic rhetoricians to politely and safely reprove a powerful monarch to reprove his arrogant children. They think of themselves as "powerful," "perfect," "strong" and "wise," Paul thus employs the manner in which "powerful kings" should be addressed, politely criticized and instructed. His is to admonish and instruct them. The employment of his catalogue of hardships (4.9-13) is intended to supply instruction and admonition through his personal example, which they are encouraged to imitate. The crucial sub-section occurs in 4.11-13, (and forms an *inclusio*), where Paul lists a series of dishonours suffered by the apostles and the appropriate response. Among the hardships persecution is included (4.12b). Here the apostolic response is endurance. The verb that Paul employs to describe this apostolic martyrological endurance is ἀνέσχεσθαι: διωκόμενοι ἀνεχόμεθα (in persecution we display endurance). Clearly here, this verb is employed by Paul to describe a meritorious form of endurance. It is interesting that in Greek literature, the notion of martyrological endurance is usually designated by the term ὑπομένω, ὑπομονή. This is especially the case with the first-century Greco-Jewish martyrological text, *4 Macc.*. It is not surprising therefore that in *2 Thess.* Paul would make use of this term to describe the Thessalonians renowned endurance in the face of persecution: ' . . . . τῆς ὑπομονῆς ὑμῶν καὶ πίστεως ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς διωγμοῖς ὑμῶν . . . . ' (1.4b). However in the following sentence, when describing their endurance in afflictions Paul chooses the verb ἀνέχεσθε: ' . . . . καὶ ταῖς θλίψεσιν αἷς ἀνέχεσθε . . . . ' (1.4c). This demonstrates that Paul does not understand the term ἀνέχεσθαι in any specific tradition of endurance. Accordingly in his letter to the *Romans* Paul employs the nominal form of ἀνοχή to designate God's apocalyptic forbearance (ἀνοχή) which ought to lead the Gentile believer to repentance (2.4). Paul also employs this term in a soteriological context. Through Christ's sacrificial act of atonement, God revealed his forbearance (ἀνοχή) by passing over former sins (3.25). This same term from the language of endurance, is also employed by Paul in a psychagogic manner to instruct the Thessalonians in the forbearing manner which the "strong" are to deal with the "weak" (*1 Thess.* 5.14d). As I have already argued the concept of endurance as a proper or meritorious response to persecution and martyrdom, in Greek literature begins with Plato's Socrates, in the *Apol.*, and is extensively used subsequently in early Jewish literature such as *4 Macc.* Vide ch. 4 of the present dissertation. Nevertheless, it is evident from his letters that Paul uses this verb from the vocabulary of endurance in a wide sense.

could also denote endurance shown through forbearance or patience.<sup>149</sup> However it does not always denote such a positive endurance. It may on occasions signify an exaggerated or regrettable toleration towards evil, or an unwise or misguided form of endurance, which puts up with injustice and exploitation. Such a usage of ἀνέχεσθαι in Greco-Roman times is found, for example, in Josephus' historiographical accounts (*BJ* 4.165)<sup>150</sup> as well as in the philosophical essays of the Stoic sage Musonius Rufus (VII.22).<sup>151</sup> This latter trend is reflected here, within the opening and medial statements of the Pauline inclusio, where the term is ironically applied to his Corinthian readers for their misguided and unwise forbearance which they demonstrate towards the rival apostles as well as their unwise endurance in tolerating the exploitation and mistreatment they are experiencing by the same. To repeat, not only does the notion dominate the theme of the inclusio's textual boundaries, but it also signals the essential theme of the entire text, whose purpose is (i) to illustrate the superior character of Paul's apostolic endurance, in contrast both to the Corinthians' and that of the "super apostles," not the least through the medium of irony, as well as (ii) to establish a model of Christian endurance. Paul's use of certain rhetorical devices within the inclusio, such as comparisons and list of hardships also highlight this theme of endurance, albeit implicitly.

**ii. The Inclusio's Demarcating Statements and their Theme of Foolishness / Foolish Boasting and Endurance:** While the content of 2 *Cor.* 11.1-12.12 forms for the most part a series of συγκρίσεις (usually initiated by "boasts"), these comparisons are formulated and embraced within the overarching literary unit, an *inclusio*. The dual theme of "foolishness" / "foolish boasting" and "endurance" which characterizes the content of 2 *Cor.* 11.1,4 is also repeated in 12.11-12. These two statements mark the demarcation lines of Paul's inclusio in this letter. It is interesting that this inclusio also contains a medial demarcating statement (11.16-21).

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<sup>149</sup> Vide note above.

<sup>150</sup> Josephus however does not restrict the idea of irrational endurance to ἀνέχεσθαι but also employs other verbs from the vocabulary of endurance - ἀνεξικακία (*BJ* 4.165) and φέρειν (*BJ* 4.171). Vide below.

<sup>151</sup> In his essay on how to disdain the hardships, Musonius draws a distinction between a meritorious or "virtuous" form of endurance and that which is exercised towards an unworthy end. Here I too employed ἀνέχεσθαι to express the pejorative form of endurance. However the "Roman Socrates" also employs ὑπομένειν to designate unvirtuous endurance. Vide below.

Textually it follows his first "foolish boast" and his first item of comparison with the superlative apostles (though not his first (implicit) comparison),<sup>152</sup> namely, his unexploitative (free) apostolic service to the Corinthians. It functions as an introduction to his second and major "foolish boast" and points of comparison with the rival apostles (11.23-12.10). The medial statement in this *inclusio*, clearly repeats the juxtaposed theme of "foolish boasting" and "endurance", and even contains a list of hardships, imposed by the super apostles, which the Corinthians misguidedly endure. The *inclusio*'s final statement repeats this dual theme. Now however, it refers back to Paul's superior apostolic endurance and his "foolish boasting" (12.1 1-12), which have underlined his major comparison with the rival; apostles (11.23-12.10).

[1] **The *Inclusio*'s Introductory Statement (11.1,4)** - Paul introduces his *inclusio* with two successive pleas for his Corinthian readers' forbearance (ἀνείχεσθέ μου) (11.1ab)<sup>153</sup> concerning his imminent "foolishness" (ἀφροσύνης, i.e. foolish boasting 11.1a).<sup>154</sup> He seeks this forbearance from them on the grounds that they have demonstrated "much forbearance" (καλῶς ἀνέχεσθε: 11.4d), albeit in a misguided manner, to the incoming crafty rival apostles (11.4a), their boasting and erroneous teachings. Paul makes use of his first σύγκρισις here, to illustrate their misguided forbearance / endurance.<sup>155</sup> The comparison is based on the OT *Gen. Eden* narrative (3.4-13), and draws an identity between the crafty actions of the serpent, in beguiling Eve (11.3a), and that of his rival apostles in their beguiling of the Corinthians. According to Paul, this

<sup>152</sup> The first σύγκρισις in this *inclusio* is that between the "crafty serpent" and his rival apostles (11.3).

<sup>153</sup> Dio Chrysostom likewise appeals to his (Alexandrian) audience to bear with him as he plunges into a lengthy discourse: ' . . . . if you bear with me today (ἀνάσχησθε)' (*Or.* 32.8).

<sup>154</sup> While the rhetorical exercises dealing with comparison, encomium and commonplace was considered necessary, by and large Hellenistic and Greco-Roman cultural conventions held that self-praise or boasting was offensive. Plutarch's essay 'on Praising Oneself Inoffensively' offered circumstances which permitted self-praise, as well as techniques for softening the starkness of boasting. Among the legitimate circumstances discussed by Plutarch, which are relevant to the present discussion were: (i) Apologetic reasons, that is responding to charges against oneself. (ii) To demonstrate actions or character traits contrary to that which one is accused wrongly or shamefully. (iii) To inspire others to imitation. (iv) To demonstrate through boasting of one's concern of others. Among the devices, recommended by Plutarch, which soften the offensiveness of self-praise is the inclusion of weaknesses and failures within the boast. For a discussion of the Greco-Roman boast and the apostle Paul's usage, vide, Marshall, *op. cit.* 355-357; E.A. Judge, 'Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice,' in *ABR* 10 (1968) 37-50; Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* 107-114.

<sup>155</sup> In accordance with the rhetorical conventions of not naming one's opponents, Paul here is describing his opponent(s), whose name(s) would be well known to the Corinthians, simply as the "serpent" (cf. Augustus non-nominal description of Brutus and Cassius in his *Res Gestae* simply as "those who slew my father." *RG* 1.2. Vide my earlier discussion on the *periphrasis*, also below. Paul further describes his opponent(s) here, periphrastically, in terms of "ὁ ἐρχόμενος" who brings an alien message and spiritual experience (11.4abc).

comparison between the rival apostles "seductive" activities in terms of the "crafty serpent"<sup>156</sup> as well as the comparative identity between the Corinthians - the betrothed of Christ (1.2b) - and the seduced "Eve" is demonstrated: (i) by the Corinthians' eager and "glad" though "foolish" forbearance in accepting another Jesus than the one he preached (11.4a). Or, (ii) the reception of another Spirit than the one they received during his ministry to them ( 11 .4b), or another gospel than the one they originally received from him (11.4c).<sup>157</sup> Paul explains to the Corinthians that (i) they have and are still exercising such a level of (misguided) "worldly" (cf. spiritual) forbearance / endurance to these crafty and beguiling rival apostles, and (ii) they have tolerated the reception of a message quite alien to the one that he taught them. Consequently he draws an ironic conclusion. Surely he has the right of receiving their unwise forbearance. He thus pleads ironically for their misguided forbearance (as the one who "betrothed" them to Christ: 1.2), in his prerogative to begin to indulge in a little "foolishness" through his boasting of his (spiritual) "apostolic signs" (12.12). The opening statements, then, which juxtapose the concepts of "foolish boasting" / "foolishness" and "(foolish) endurance", lay the ground for Paul's subsequent first "foolish boast" of his "wise endurance" and his first **explicit** comparison with his opponents (11.7-15):

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<sup>156</sup> In early Jewish sapiential and apocalyptic literature, the "serpent" in the *Gen.* 3 Garden of Eden narrative, began to be identified with "Satan" or the "Devil" (e.g. *Wisd. Sol.* 2.24; *Apoc. Mos.* 16). This identification is presumed by Paul here (and is borne out by 11.14-15). Concerning the manner of Eve's deception, early Jewish apocalyptic as well as rabbinic texts suggest that it was in the form of a seduction (*1 Enoch* 69.6, *2 Enoch* 31.6, *Apoc. Abrah.* 23, *Abod. Zar.* 22b, *b. Sabb* 145b-146a, *Yebam.* 103b). Vide Furnish, *op.cit.* 487. Paul draws a further comparison between the crafty rival apostles who are "disguised" as apostles of Christ and the "much-disguised" Satan (11.14-15).

<sup>157</sup> There may also be an implicit comparison being drawn here between the rival apostles in the image of the "crafty serpent" in contrast to his own "non-crafty" ministry among them. In connection with the Jerusalem collection, Paul had already been accused of "craftiness" by his opponents and the Corinthians (ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχων πανουργός δόλω ὑμᾶς ἔλαβον). The term used by Paul's opponents to describe his "craftiness" is identical to that used by Paul, here, to describe his the "serpent's" (and thus by comparison his rivals') behaviour in Corinth (ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐξηπάτησεν Εὐαν ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτοῦ: 11.3b). This accusation was also a stock accusation by philosophers against the sophists. But, as I have already argued it was also the standard accusation leveled against the Antisthenian Odysseus, as model of the Cynic sage, by the more rigorist Cynics.

**(i) "Endurance" and "Foolishness":**

- 11.1a: **'Kindly demonstrate some forbearance to me while I indulge in a little bit of foolishness** (Ὁφελον ἀνείχεσθέ μου μικρόν τι ἀφοροσύνης)  
 b: **Indeed be forbearing towards me** (ἀλλά καὶ ἀνέχεσθέ μου).

**(ii) Illustration: Paul's Implicit Comparison with his Rival Apostles:**

- 11.3a: **But I fear that in like manner** (φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πως)  
 b: **as the serpent deceived Eve in his craftiness** (ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐξηπάτησεν Εὐαν ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτοῦ)  
 c: **your minds may be corrupted / lured away from the clarity and purity which is in Christ** (φθαρῆ τὰ νοήματα ὑμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπλότητος [καὶ τῆς ἀγνότητος] τῆς εἰς τὸν Χριστόν)

**(iii) The Corinthians' Misguided Forbearance / Endurance:**

- 11.4a: **If someone comes and preaches another Jesus than the one we preached** (εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἄλλον Ἰησοῦν κηρύσσει ὃν οὐκ ἐκηρύξαμεν)  
 b: **or if you receive another Spirit than the one you did receive** (ἢ πνεῦμα ἕτερον λαμβάνετε ὃ οὐκ ἐλάβετε)  
 c: **or another Gospel than the one you did receive** (ἢ εὐαγγέλιον ἕτερον ὃ οὐκ ἐδέξασθε)  
 d: **You put up with it / endure it gladly'** (καλῶς ἀνέχεσθε).

**[2] Medial Repetition of Introductory Statement (11.16-21):** Paul repeats his inclusio's initial comments (πάλιν λέγω: 11.16a), though now with some amplifications. The theme of endurance / forbearance and foolishness / foolish boasting remains constant however, as does his sense of irony, as he is about to introduce his second boast in his on-going explicit comparison, between himself and the opposing apostles. The medial statement of his overall inclusio is itself thematically structured in a two-fold manner. The first sub-unit focuses on the idea of "foolish boasting" (11.16-18) while the second sub-unit emphasizes the notion of endurance / forbearance (11.19-21).

Since many of his opponents have indulged in foolish boasting in a worldly manner (11.18a) more conducive to a "worldly" mind-set, comparing themselves with him,<sup>158</sup> he likewise will imitate their worldly way and boast (11.18b). But he laments that he is doing so as a fool rather than as one speaking in the (wisdom of the) Lord (1.17a). The practical pastoral situation in Corinth however demands it. As such he hopes they will not consider him a fool, but if they do then he is all the more entitled to boast (11.16d), since for Paul the apostle, only a "fool" "boasts".

<sup>158</sup> It was the rival apostles who initiated the notion of apostolic comparison, inventing themselves as the absolute standard of apostolicity (2 Cor. 10.12), vide below.

He has thus clearly defined his position in relation to the "super apostles". He is deliberately assuming the role of the "ἄφρων" in his boasting, but his opponents by their natural predisposition to boasting, have not assumed the role of the ἄφρων rather they have revealed their natural inclination towards ἄφροσύνη.

Having emphasized the idea of his "foolishness" / "foolish boasting" (cf. this inclusio's introductory statement: 11.1ab,4d), Paul now moves to the idea of endurance / forbearance. In the present context, as in the beginning of his present inclusio, Paul appropriates, for his own purpose, the Greek philosophic notion's of "wise" (desirable / worthy) and "unwise" (misguided / unworthy) endurance. As I have already explained this dual dimension of the Greek philosophic understanding of endurance, is already evident in Plato and Aristotle.<sup>159</sup> In Paul's time, Musonius Rufus in his essay concerning the disdain of hardship ("Ὅτι Πόνου Καταφρονήτεον") draws such a distinction between an endurance "towards unworthy / evil desires" (δι' ἐπιθυμίας κακάς) and one suffered "in behalf of virtue and goodness" (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆ καὶ καλοκάγαθίας). It is interesting that while employing a wide range of terms from the vocabulary of endurance, one of the verbs describing unworthy endurance ἀνέχεσθαι (ὑπὲρ οὐδενός τῶν καλῶν ἀνέχεσθαι) - is exactly the one employed by Paul, in this section of the inclusio, to designate the idea of the Corinthians' unworthy endurance. Musonius explains:

In order to endure more easily and more cheerfully those hardships which we may expect to suffer in behalf of virtue and goodness (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆ καὶ καλοκάγαθίας), it is useful to recall what hardships people will endure, for unworthy desires (δι' ἐπιθυμίας κακάς) . . . . and how much others endure (πόσα δ' ὑπομένουσιν) for the sake of making profit, and how much suffering those who are pursuing fame endure (κακοπαθοῦσιν) and remember that all these people willingly endure all (πάντες ὑπομένουσιν ἀυθαίρετοι) kinds of hardships. Is it not then monstrous that they for no honorable regard endure (ὑπὲρ οὐδενός τῶν καλῶν ἀνέχεσθαι) such things, while we for the sake of the ideal good . . . . are not ready to endure every hardship (ὑψίστασθαι) ? [That One Should Disdain Hardships VII.15-25 (=Lutz)].

Like Musonius Rufus, Paul also employs the *peristasis catalogue*, which was designed to demonstrate the sage's endurance in adversity, and applies it in the Corinthian situation, albeit in an ironic manner.<sup>160</sup> He explains to his readers that they, in their "wisdom" have gladly endured the foolish boasting of the super apostles. Here Paul is using irony in the depiction of the Corinthians' endurance in terms of the reverse image of the "wise man's" endurance, hence he sarcastically

<sup>159</sup> Vide ch. 2 of the present study.

<sup>160</sup> Vide my discussion on the philosophication of endurance, earlier in this study.

describes them as "φρόνιμοι" (11.19b). But their "wise endurance" does not stop at putting up with his opponents' foolish boasting. He proceeds to bring to their attention a list of hardships which they endure as a result of his rival apostles' despotic activity in Corinth (11.19-20). Here, again, Paul is inverting the Greek tradition of the sage's virtuous endurance by listing the type of circumstances which the wise sage would not consider as worthy to endure, that is irrational endurance.<sup>161</sup> Accordingly he constructs a *peristasis catalogue* consisting of the atrocities which they are misguidedly willing to endure at the mercy of his opponents' "tyrannic reign" in Corinth they endure slavery (11.20b), they endure being "devoured" (11.20c), they endure it when they are tricked (11.20d), they endure it when his opponents act arrogantly or presumptuously towards them (11.20e), they endure it when his opponents act violently and shamefully against them by publicly slapping their faces (11.20f). Accordingly such endurance of exploitative tyranny is, within the Greek notions of the sage's endurance, the reverse of the wise man's endurance, evoking mockery rather than praise.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, Paul is insinuating that through this misguided endurance, the Corinthians are perpetuating the tyranny of the "super apostles" over them. Likewise, Josephus records a speech by Ananias where the demonstration of endurance (ἀνέχεσθαι) of atrocities is not only mocked but offered as a reason for the perpetuation of tyranny:

'Why indeed should I live amongst a people insensible to calamities, who have lost the will to grapple with the troubles on their hands? When plundered you submit (ἀνέχεσθαι), when beaten you are silent . . . . What bitter tyranny! Yes, but why blame I the tyrants? For have they not been fostered by you and your endurance / forbearance (ἀνεξικακίας)? [BJ 165].<sup>163</sup>

For Paul, this form of "irrational:" or "foolish" endurance which the Corinthians exhibited, in the course of their Christian life, during the time of the "despotic reign" of the super apostles, for

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<sup>161</sup> Vide, my discussion on Plato and Aristotle concerning irrational endurance, earlier in this study.

<sup>162</sup> As I have already noted in the first section of this dissertation, within the Greek history of the development of the notion of endurance, the idea of misguided endurance, even precedes the philosophic schools, and has its origins in a military context, where certain types of endurance were considered as misguided. Thus in Plutarch's *Apoph. Lac.* (2208C) which preserves Spartan military traditions of endurance, when a criminal demonstrated endurance in torture Agesilaus is recorded as reacting: 'What an out and out villain the man is, devoting his endurance (ὕπομονή) and fortitude (καρτερία) to such base and shameful purpose.' For the Spartan military *weltanschauung* the demonstration of such endurance outside the context of the battlefield or the barracks represented a waste of energy; vide, ch. 1 of present study.

<sup>163</sup> Vide also BJ 4.171, 174. I am indebted to Prof. Fitzgerald for bringing the Josephus quotation to my attention, vide Fitzgerald *op. cit.* 206-207.

several reasons could never have arisen during his apostleship in Corinth. For one reason, as I shall explain below, he would never place unnecessary financial burdens upon them (2 Cor. 11.7-15). For another he would never use such a domineering psychagogic style, which would also weaken their faith (13.5). Accordingly under his more egalitarian apostleship, their endurance which was misplaced under the super apostles would be re-directed in its proper context, namely in the maintenance and defence of their Christian faith. Thus, following their return to Paul's apostleship, he can assure them that their endurance is now a noble and meritorious one. In his "letter of joy," using the image of the much-enduring warrior, which as I have already explained was widely employed in Greek and Roman philosophy (esp. Stoic) to metaphorically designate the "battles" of the sage in the defence of his virtuous life by the exercise of reason against the assaults of the passions or Tyche, Paul now appropriates this image, by invoking the idea of the warrior "standing firm" in combat (στήκειναι) - albeit in a Christocentric orientation - to describe the Corinthians new and "wise" endurance: 'Not that we dominate you (οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν) over your faith, we are partners with you (συνεργοί ἐσμεν) for your joy, for you stand firm / endure (ἐστήκατε) in your faith.' [2 Cor. 1.24].

Hence in the context of 11.16-21, Paul ironically remarks that if the Corinthians are willing to demonstrate such "wise endurance," which in reality is misguided and "foolish", both to the rival apostles' boasts as well as their exploitative and tyrannical deeds, then they at least owe him the same unwise endurance / forbearance in the role which he has assumed in imitation of his rivals by his own "foolish boasting". Yet, as Paul will proceed to explain in his ensuing boast, his apostolic endurance that he has demonstrated, both in his missionary activities in Achaia and beyond, is far "superior" and "wiser" in comparison to their "unwise" endurance and that which the "crafty" super apostles boast:



**(i) Paul's Foolish Boasting:**

- 11.16a: 'Again I say, (Πάλιν λέγω) (*referring back to his introductory remarks*),  
 b: let no one consider me foolish (μή τις με δόξη ἄφρονα εἶναι).  
 c: If not however (εἰ δὲ μή γε),  
 d: at least consider me as mindless (κἂν ὡς ἄφρονα δέξασθέ με)  
 e: in order that I too may boast a trifle (ἵνα καὶ γὰρ μικρόν τι καυχῶμαι).  
 11.17a: What I am saying, I say as one not in the Lord (ὁ λαλῶ, οὐ κατὰ Κύριον λαλῶ),  
 b: but rather - when it comes to the issue of boasting - in foolishness (ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν  
 ἄφροσύνῃ, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς καυχήσεως).  
 11.18a: Since many are boasting in a worldly manner (ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ καυχῶνται κατὰ σάρκα),  
 b: I too shall boast (καὶ γὰρ καυχῶμαι).

**(ii) The Corinthians' "Wise" Endurance in their List of Hardships:**

- 11.19a: For you gladly endure mindless people (ἡδέως γὰρ ἀνέχεσθε τῶν ἀφρόνων),  
 b: being wise yourselves (φρόνιμοι ὄντες).  
 11.20a: You show endurance / you endure: (ἀνέχεσθε γὰρ),  
 b: if someone enslaves you (εἴ τις ὑμᾶς καταδουλοῖ),  
 c: if someone devours you (εἴ τις κατασθίει),  
 d: if someone exploits you (εἴ τις λαμβάνει),  
 e: if someone acts presumptuously (εἴ τις ἐπαίρεται),  
 f: if someone slaps your face (εἴ τις εἰς πρόσωπον ὑμᾶς δέρει)

Paul would agree with Greek and Roman sages such as Plato, Aristotle or Musonius Rufus, that there are certain forms of endurance which are "unworthy" and some which are "meritorious" and "virtuous." The sage understands and discerns what situation of hardship deserves endurance and which does not. Consequently his depiction of the Corinthians displaying a "wise endurance" (11.19-20a) is clearly ironic, one which any Stoic or Cynic would concur with him. Nevertheless I wish to draw attention to an important distinction, here, between the sage's view of the origins of his capacity to display "wise" endurance and Paul's understanding. For a Plato, an Aristotle, a Musonius Rufus or a Seneca, the sage's "wise" endurance in adverse circumstances derives from his inner invincible fortress, namely his reason or reasoning faculties (λόγος / λογισμός). For Paul "wise" endurance derives not from any internal virtue or attribute of the Christian but rather comes from God, despite the believer's inner fragility and weakness (2 Cor. 10.1).<sup>164</sup> For Paul, the Corinthians' "unwise" endurance, not only represents a misguided tolerance of an "unwise" circumstance (a verdict which a Greek sage would also agree), but also is an endurance drawn from their own "worldly" rather than one deriving from God's power (here Paul parts company

<sup>164</sup> Vide Fitzgerald, *op. cit.* passim.

with the philosopher).<sup>165</sup> Furthermore Paul knows, as should the Corinthians, what and when to endure adversity, because of his "γνωσις" (2 Cor. 6.6b, 11.6) of the gospel of the crucified Christ, a gospel which he preached to them but from which they have departed, for they have now received "another Jesus" "another Spirit" and "another gospel" (11.4a-c) - and this error they "wisely" and "gladly endure" (11.4d).

**[3] Inclusio's Concluding Statement - Apostolic Foolishness and Endurance:**

The juxtaposed themes of "foolishness", "foolish boasting" and "endurance" introduced at 11.1 and re-echoed at 11.16-20, is now repeated again (12.11-12) in a final statement signaling a conceptual and linguistic closing to this extended Pauline *inclusio* (11.1 - 12.12). Accordingly I suggest, that the Greco-Roman (Corinthian) reader would more likely have read 11.1-12.12 as a literary unit, without the later chapter break at 12.1, whose key theme, (alongside "foolish boasting"), would have been understood as wise and irrational endurance.<sup>166</sup>

Having concluded his "foolish boasting" of his superior ("wiser") apostolic endurance, in a σύγκρισις structured by lists of hardships, Paul now reminds his Corinthian readers of the "foolish" character of the role which he has assumed by his καυχᾶσθαι / καύχημα - a theme which no longer finds repetition in the rest of the letter. In this way he initiates the first element in the termination of his present *inclusio*. In accordance with the Greco-Roman customs of offensive and inoffensive boasting, nevertheless Paul decides to declare himself, albeit ironically, as ἄφρων (12.11a). Again in keeping with the principles of inoffensive boasting, he softens his ironic self-definition by explaining that he did not volunteer this self-praise but on the contrary he was forced by them to indulge in such boasting (12.11b). He has been left with no choice, by them, since not only has he been verbally attacked and discredited by his rivals but they could have made the matter

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<sup>165</sup> I shall further elaborate on this distinction below.

<sup>166</sup> Furnish who concentrates more on the theme of "foolish boasting" rather than "endurance," and who does not interpret 11.1-12.12 as an *inclusio*, nevertheless is still able to argue for the literary unity of 11.1-12.12 (though he also incorporates 12.13). Furnish who is alone among modern commentators to have observed this unity, predictably, given his criterion, entitles the entire text "A Fool's Speech." He divides the text in a threefold manner: (i) «The Prologue» (to the speech) (11.1-21a). (ii) «The Speech Proper» (11.21b-12.10). (iii) «The Epilogue» (to the speech) (12.11-13). Vide Furnish *op cit.* 484, 512, 552. While (for different reasons) I coincide with Furnish concerning the interpretation of 11.1-12.12 (13) as a literary unity, I interpret the inner structure of the text somewhat (though not altogether) differently. Vide below.

easier for him (as his spiritual children), had they commended him to the "super apostles" and defended him against their charges and critiques. But they defaulted through their defection and disloyalty, which was fostered by their "irrational" or "worldly" endurance displayed in the face of a domineering "super apostleship" (12.11c). This absence of meritorious or "wise" endurance, by them - which was instrumental in their glad submission to the atrocities of his rivals' "apostolate" in Corinth and their boasts - is a further reason for his need to boast of his own endurance. As such he is forced to boast, since he is answering back accusations which discredited his apostolic credentials and authority. By looking back over his comparison, he now summarizes the gist of his intention - he is in no manner inferior to the "super apostles" (12.11d), precisely because of his demonstrable superior endurance (ὑπομονή 12.12b) (as illustrated by his lists of hardships), and which was demonstrated in Achaia (and beyond) (12.12a) even though they and his rivals consider him "a nothing" (12.11e). Thus Paul concludes his inclusio by explicitly returning to the vocabulary of endurance, which after all inaugurated his inclusio. The choice of different terms to describe the Corinthians' and his endurance (ἀνέχεσθαι / ὑπομονή) reflects Paul's desire to distinguish between his "superior" endurance (ὑπομονή) and their "irrational endurance" (ἀνέχεσθαι). While the Greek vocabulary of endurance does not make such a clear semantic distinction, nevertheless Paul chooses the most standard Greek term denoting endurance in action or in offensive mode - ὑπομονή!

**(i) Foolishness, Foolish Boasting and Paul:**

- 12.11a: I have become a fool (Γέγονα ἄφρων).  
 b: You forced me (ὑμεῖς με ἠναγκάσατε).  
 c: Rather I ought to have been commended by you (ἐγὼ γὰρ ὄφειλον ὑφ' ὑμῶν συνίστασθαι).

**(ii) Paul's Superiority Over the Super Apostles:**

- d: I am not the least inferior to the super apostles (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑστέρησα τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων).  
 e: even if I am nothing (εἰ καὶ οὐδὲν εἰμι).

**(iii) Paul's Superior Apostolic Endurance:**

- 12.12a: The signs of apostleship were performed in your midst (Τὰ μὲν σημεῖα τοῦ ἀποστόλου κατεργάσθη ἐν ὑμῖν),  
 b: in utmost endurance (ἐν πάσῃ ὑπομονῇ),  
 c: with signs and wonders (σημεῖοις τε καὶ τέρασιν).  
 d: and power (καὶ δυνάμεσιν).'

Certain questions, now arise. How does this distinction drawn between Paul's endurance and that of the Corinthians and his rivals manifest itself in the text of his *inclusio*? Does the theme of "wise" and "irrational" endurance play a significant role in the text? How, does Paul seek to demonstrate his superior apostolic endurance? What literary instruments does he employ in this forced demonstration? In the light of the charges leveled against him why does Paul choose to emphasis his endurance? How would the Corinthians have understood his *apologia*? What were the "signs of apostleship" which Paul endured? To these and related questions I now turn my attention.

*G. Paul's First Explicit Comparison:  
Paul, the Corinthians and the Super Apostles,  
Foolish Endurance, Wise Endurance and Manual Labour  
(2 Corinthians 11.5-15)*

**i. Introduction:** Following the introduction to his *inclusio* and the establishment of his major theme - "foolishness", "foolish boasting" and "endurance," Paul will now make use of several elements of the Greco-Roman σύγκρισις by constructing two explicit comparisons with the "super apostles" (2 Cor. 11.5-15 & 11.21-12.7) despite his earlier protestations not to indulge in comparisons, (2 Cor. 10.12).<sup>167</sup> While there are many complexities which motivate, shape and structure his comparisons, I suggest that the overarching aim here, as in 2 Cor. 6.4a-10c, is to demonstrate his "wise" (superior) apostolic endurance.<sup>168</sup> His method of achieving this is by supplying a series of specific illustrations or instances of this endurance (in contrast to his rivals or even the Corinthians themselves, who either lack endurance or else exhibit an irrational form) which to some extent overlaps with his list of hardships enunciated at 2 Cor. 6.4c-5f. The strategic and repeated employment of the language of inferiority, equality and superiority within the text of

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<sup>167</sup> Paul, here explains that while his rivals are indulging in comparisons his apostolic circle does not. 'Not that we have the audacity to class or compare ourselves with certain persons (οὐ γὰρ τολμῶμεν ἐγκρίναι ἢ συγκρίναι ἑαυτοὺς τισιν) who recommend themselves.' [2 Cor. 10.12]. Yet in the ensuing chapter Paul will be forced to construct a brilliant comparison with the super apostles, in an attempt to demonstrate his superior endurance, and in a manner that accords with many of the principles of the Greco-Roman σύγκρισις. Vide below.

<sup>168</sup> That other concerns and dynamics are also involved in 2 Cor. 11.5- 12.10 cannot be denied. However to some extent these other concerns do inter-act at some level with his desire to demonstrate his apostolic endurance. For example in his first explicit comparison with the "super apostles" (11.5-15), Paul is also interested in displaying his psychagogic superiority. However, even here, the theme of endurance is not absent. Vide below. Nevertheless, due to limitations of space and time, I will only focus here directly on the theme of endurance, since it helps explain many of Paul's other goals in this text.

11.5-12.12, such as "I am not in the least inferior" (11.5a; 12.11d), "I am a better one" (11.23ab) or "they work on the same terms as we do" (11.12c) etc., I will argue, signals that Paul has constructed the bulk of his present *inclusio* in the form of (two) comparisons. The first (11.5-15) deals with a Pauline psychagogic concern - the spiritual benefit and growth of the Corinthians. Paul is eager in the course of his apostolic dealings with the Corinthians and Achaians to renounce his "apostolic right" to financial support from them, in order not to place any financial "burden" upon them. As such, from the very inauguration of the church at Corinth, he decides to provide his apostolic service free of charge. He does this in order to eradicate any possibility for the exercise of an "irrational" or "foolish" endurance by the Corinthians. Thus in his first explicit comparison with the "super apostles," this pastoral concern stands in sharp contrast to the arrogant and self-centered motivations which govern his rivals' acceptance of financial remuneration, and which according to Paul causes the Corinthians to exercise an irrational form of endurance. Furthermore, in comparison to the super apostles, he demonstrates his own superior apostolic endurance by his willingness to endure the hardships of manual labour, the inter-personal tensions and the social abasement associated with this form of work - circumstances which his rivals, because of their self-centered pastoral principles are obviously not willing to endure. The second explicit comparison (11.23-12.7), which is more elaborate, complying with many of the principles of the formal Greco-Roman σύγκρισις, casts Paul implicitly in an Odyssean mould, and compares his "boast" of an epic-like endurance in contrast to the "worldly" standards of apostleship represented by the "superlative apostles."<sup>169</sup>

**ii. Paul's Prologue to his First Explicit Comparison 2 Cor. 11.5-6):** His first item dealing with the *inclusio*'s overarching theme of endurance is introduced in terms of the language of comparison. The initial statement of the comparison (11.5) is a denial of any inferiority to the "super apostles,"<sup>170</sup> a negation which is repeated almost verbatim in the concluding

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<sup>169</sup> Vide ch. 1, n. 41.

<sup>170</sup> I identify the "superlative apostles" with the immediately preceding description of rival apostolic activity in Corinth characterized with the preaching of "another Jesus" and "another Gospel" (11.4) and who in 11.20 are described as committing atrocities against the Corinthians. These rivals had entered Corinth after his initial departure, and were preaching "another Jesus" and "another Gospel" rather than any reference to the apostolic leaders in Jerusalem. A major objection to regarding these "superlative apostles" as the "pillars" of Jerusalem - Peter, James

statements of the *inclusio* (12.11d), and which clearly hints that Paul is launching into a σύγκρισις. As I have already explained one of the aims of the Greco-Roman comparison was to demonstrate inferiority, equality or superiority, not infrequently with opponents. In this instance Paul is "foolishly" claiming at least an equality, though as it becomes evident subsequently in this comparison (11.12c) as well as in the text of the ensuing one (11.23-12.7), that he is in fact seeking to demonstrate his superiority over his opponents (and specifically in terms of his apostolic endurance), which he ironically designates as "superlative apostles" (ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων) (a term which he most likely coined precisely because of their exaggerated boasts and claims).<sup>171</sup> Thus in the light of 11.1, Paul is now expressing the first of the boasts which he has previously requested his readers to ἀνέχεσθαι: ' . . . . I am not in the least inferior / I lack nothing (μηδὲν ὑστερηκένοι) (i.e. in comparison) to these superlative apostles (τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων).' [2 *Cor.* 11.5].

This denial of inferiority at the very beginning of this comparison, appears to have been instigated by one of the claims of inferiority leveled against Paul by his apostolic opponents and supported by the majority at Corinth, namely his inability in the use of proper or impressive oratorical skills (11.6a). I agree with Marshall that the textual hints, preserved in the Corinthian correspondence, suggest a tendency in the rivals' critique and comparative devaluation of Paul. His opponents appear to be employing a series of inter-related topics, drawn from the Greek σύγκρισις. One of the themes seems to have dealt with psycho-somatic excellence, namely physical appearance (2 *Cor.* 10.10c), education and oratorical eloquence (2 *Cor.* 10.10d). They

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and John - (Gal. 2.9) is Paul's concession in 11.6 concerning his inability in the skills of public speaking, in comparison to the "superlative apostles." Such a concession, albeit ironically, would hardly be necessary if Paul was being compared to the Jerusalem apostles. As Furnish explains: 'They (i.e. the Jerusalem apostles) could not have qualified as more polished orators than he - certainly not in Greek . . . .' *op. cit.* 504. For a detailed argument presenting both sides of the debate, vide Furnish 503-504.

<sup>171</sup> Furnish has pointed out that the preposition ὑπερ, is very frequent in 2 *Cor.*. He writes: ' . . . . fifteen of the thirty-four occurrences of such (ὑπερ) words in the seven undisputedly Pauline letters occur in 2 *Cor.*: seven times in chapters 1-9 . . . . and eight times in chaps. 10-13 . . . . "I am more of one" and "beyond what one sees me doing" . . . . Georgi (1964: 299) suggests that Paul's use of these expressions has been prompted by the claims of his opponents - who . . . . are intent on exalting themselves . . . .' *op. cit.* 490. Concerning the coinage of the expression "superlative apostles" I concur with R.V.G. Tasker that Paul is the most likely author of this rare term. Tasker writes that the occurrence of this strange word helps to ' . . . . describe the consummate conceit characteristic of the apostles in question.' And that, 'Paul may very well have coined this word . . . .' in *The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians* TNTC (Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press, 1983) reprint (1st edition, 1963) 149.

seem to have established this theme of "sophistication" or "cultured excellence" as their absolute "measurement" or "standard" of apostleship (2 *Cor.* 10.12).<sup>172</sup> It was from this "canon" that they measured and compared themselves favourably (2 *Cor.* 10.12) while pronouncing Paul as lacking and hence inferior to themselves (2 *Cor.* 11.5). Considering themselves excelling in these inter-related topics of comparison, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the content of their boasting consisted of their "cultured eloquence" which they offered as a vital element of their impressive credentials to apostolic status. This "cultured excellence" was a dynamic dimension of their "apostolic signs" which they manifested among the Corinthians (12.12).

The other important dimension of their "measurement" of apostolic comparison appears to have incorporated their claims for the performance of a religious or "charismatic" superiority. They boasted of super-natural "signs" and "wonders" including visions and mystical experiences (2 *Cor.* 12.1-7,12).<sup>173</sup> No doubt the majority of the Corinthians concurred with their definition and perspective of apostolicity, being impressed with their appearance, oratorical skills and boasts of super-natural "signs" and "wonders," in large part explains their defection from Paul as well as their lavish financial support as endorsement of their various impressive "apostolic signs."<sup>174</sup> From their criteria of these apostolic μέτρα, Paul in comparison was cast by his rivals in an inferior "religious" light and perceived as "unsophisticated" or "uncultured." As evidence of his religious inferiority they pointed to his ordinary religious life, devoid of any ecstatic mysticism and visionary experiences - a subject which he addresses within his second comparison (esp. 2 *Cor.* 12.1-7). Furthermore as proof of his "non-sophistication" they drew attention to his "weak / sickly" physical appearance, his unimpressive speech and the apparent inconsistencies, which among other elements was attested by his servility (2 *Cor.* 10.1, 11.7) and the perceived discrepancy between his word and deed character traits which in Hellenistic and Greco-Roman times evoked both the stereotype of the untrustworthy, adaptable and servile "flatterer" (2 *Cor.*

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<sup>172</sup> Marshall, *op. cit.* 326.

<sup>173</sup> D. Georgi has argued in favour of interpreting Paul's Jewish opponents in Corinth in terms of that category of the Hellenistic-Jewish religious ecstatic, the wandering "wonder-worker," the θεῖος ἀνὴρ; Georgi writes: "Their signs and wonders must have resembled those of the Hellenistic-Jewish and Hellenistic θεῖοι ἄνδρες" *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians*, ET (Philadelphia. Fortress, 1986) 236.

<sup>174</sup> Vide Georgi, *op. cit.* 238-242.

10.1, 10.11),<sup>175</sup> as well as that of the unscrupulous, "polytropic" (Antisthenian) Odysseus. What is relevant to the present enquiry, is that in both cases the dual charge of "inconsistency / flattery" was firmly associated with the charge of cowardice or absence of masculinity, which in Greek and Roman thought, as I have pointed out in the first part of the dissertation, indicates the absence of courage and endurance. The flatterer was associated with servility, which in turn was linked to an effeminate character.

10.10 For they say, "His letters are weighty and strong, but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech of no account" (ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος). (11) Let such a person count on this, that what we say in the words of our letters, when we are away, we also are in action when we are present. (12) Not that we have the audacity to class or compare ourselves with certain persons (οὐ γὰρ τολμῶμεν ἐγκρίναι ἢ συγκρίναι ἑαυτοὺς τισιν) who recommend themselves. Indeed when they measure themselves by themselves and compare themselves with themselves (μετροῦντες καὶ συγκρίνοντες ἑαυτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ) they have no understanding.' [2 Cor. 10.10-12].

His major response to his rivals' pejorative verdict, becomes the text of the present *inclusio* and his reactive employment of the σύγκρισις. For Paul the themes of their absolute standard or measurement of apostolic evaluation are "foolish" or "worldly." For Paul such μέτρα of comparison are of no benefit to the spiritual well-being of the Corinthian community and do not provide a valid measuring stick of Christian apostleship. Rather they are eventually based on arrogance, pride and self-centeredness. His measurement of comparison is what God has performed through him despite his "fragility" and "weakness." This not only provides the standard and model of Christian apostleship but also signals God's mighty dealings with the Corinthians.

Consequently he has no difficulty to concede his inability in speech (though he is about to demonstrate his mastery over rhetoric - at least in writing - through his brilliant usage of the Greco-

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<sup>175</sup> For a detailed discussion of the notion of "flatterer" (κόλαξι) O. Marshall, *op. cit.* 70 - 90. Marshall has persuasively demonstrated the link between servility, inconsistency and flattery in Greek and Roman antiquity. Also vide C. Glad *op. cit.* esp. ch. III.



Roman comparison),<sup>176</sup> nor does he protest their verdict of his "weak" physical appearance.<sup>177</sup> What is interesting however is that Paul is concerned to address their evaluation and critique of his "inconsistency" / "flattery" which questions his courage and endurance and hence casts doubts about his masculinity. Furthermore, he also addresses the issue of his rivals' super-natural boast by placing it in its proper order of apostolic priorities and attitudes. Paul achieves this by constructing his own rival μέτρον or measurement of genuine apostleship, which shifts considerably from the items of the Greco-Roman comparison which his rivals were apparently commending themselves. The overall issue of "cultured excellence" is deemed as "worldly" and "foolish" lacking in the power and knowledge of God. He thus redefines the meaning and standards of Christian apostleship in terms of his great and "wise" endurance (and courage) manifested under extreme apostolic hardships and performed in the power and knowledge of God. In his second comparison (11.23 ff.) he will emphasize this through the use of a *peristasis catalogue* (though in a sense it could be argued that his list of hardship begins at 11.7). In the context of this background, it is not surprising that Paul's first and second explicit σύγκρισις with the super apostles will "boast" and draw comparisons between his apostolic superiority based on his manifest "knowledge" (γνώσις) and intervening "power" of God and apostolic "endurance" rather than notions of "cultured excellence:" 'Even if I am unskilled in speaking (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ), I am not in knowledge (ἀλλ' οὐ τῆ γνώσει); in every way we have made this plain to you in all things.' [2 Cor. 11.6].

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<sup>176</sup> Scholars have suggested that this concession by Paul, concerning his inability for speech, is intended as irony. Paul concedes his oratorical limitations only to proceed masterfully to demolish his opponents arguments in the ensuing text. Furthermore they point to such parallels as Dio Chrysostom admittance in *Or.* 42.3. Here he refers to himself as "inexperienced" in public speaking, in fact unskilled (ἰδιώτης), and yet who proceeds to display his oratorical skills. I do not think, however that the text of 2 Cor. supports such a view. The opponents' critique here concerns Paul's inability in speech, not his literary capacities. Paul's opponents readily acknowledge his "weighty" letter writing skills (10.10). Furthermore Dio Chrysostom's *Or.* 42, represents the record of a speech presented before an audience. Many a writer can write brilliantly but is unable to convey his genius in speech. Paul concedes this for himself.

<sup>177</sup> A further dimension of Paul's "weak appearance" (ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενής; 2 Cor. 10.10) may very well involve the image of the inconsistent "flatterer" who takes on a deliberate though artificial servile (ταπεινός / ἀσθενής) demeanour, in order to profit from his patrons. Nevertheless it must be remembered that "physical appearance" was an item of comparison in Greco-Roman σύγκρισις. For a discussion vide previous chapter.

This "skillful γνῶσις" which Paul boasts about, does not refer to a "worldly" knowledge but rather a "knowledge of God" - γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ - which in 2 *Cor.* 10.5 is being opposed by his enemies in Corinth. It is a reference to his profound understanding of the revealed "gospel" about the crucified Christ (1 *Cor.* 2.2) which he has received. This divine "knowledge" which is characterized by the impact of the kenotic Cross, manifests itself in "all things" touching his apostolic work (11.6), that is in the outward behaviour of his "apostolic signs" (12.12). As explained and made evident by Paul in the self-commendation of his great apostolic endurance (2 *Cor.* 6.4a-10c) a link is drawn between his "γνῶσις" and his capacity for great endurance (6.6b). This γνῶσις contributes and leads Paul to an exercise of "wise" or apostolic endurance. Furthermore, it enables him to manifest a "wiser" endurance to that of the "super apostles" (12.12) and simultaneously provides a model for the Corinthians to follow, since they only demonstrate a "foolish" endurance. It also leads Paul to exercise correct psychagogic concerns, discernment and style for their benefit.

**iii. The First Explicit Comparison With the Super Apostles - Paul's Superior Psychagogic Concern Through the Eradication of the Possibility of "Irrational / Foolish" Endurance and Paul's Example of Authentic Apostolic Endurance in Manual Labour, in Inter-Personal tension and Social Abasement (2 *Cor.* 11.7-15):** The "super apostles" boast about their eloquence in public speaking and seek to enhance their reputations as cultured men, but only display a "worldly knowledge / wisdom / rhetorical eloquence" (cf. 1 *Cor.* 2.1) which is the opposite of a true "γνῶσις."<sup>178</sup> Consequently they care nothing for the spiritual welfare or benefit of the Corinthians. Rather they are only concerned for self-aggrandizement, profit and exploitation (11.19). In comparison he is concerned for them irrespective of his speaking skills and eloquence. By their outward show of eloquence, they disguise themselves as "apostles" and rather than being "super apostles" they are in fact "pseudo-apostles" (11.13-15). A similar psychagogic concern and line of argumentation is also evident in

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<sup>178</sup> Stowers explains that for Paul: '...false wisdom is any wisdom characterized by certain moral and epistemic vices. It is when the pursuit and use of knowledge is characterized by conceit, arrogance and bragging.' Vide 'Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,' *op. cit.* 258. Vide also P.W. Gooch, *Partial Knowledge. Philosophical Studies in Paul* (Notre Dame, Indiana, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1987) 40-42.

Paul's contemporary, the Cynic sage Dio Chrysostom, in his admonition to the Alexandrians. He warns them of the irresponsible and ineffective psychagogic benefit of men who come in the "guise of philosophers." While they speak eloquently and appear cultured they in fact are only concerned for their reputation:

Those, however, who do come before you as men of culture either declaim speeches intended for display . . . or else chant verses of their own composition, as if they had detected in you a weakness for poetry . . . but if in the guise of philosophers with a view to their own profit and reputation and not to improve you, that indeed is shocking.' [*Or.* 32.10].

Paul now describes the situation in Corinth, namely his exercise of a "wise" psychagogy based on the principles of Christ's divine humiliation and of love (11.11) in opposition to one dominated by "worldly" concerns for profit, reputation and exploitation (11.13-15, 20). As in the case of Paul's dealings with the Thessalonians, where guided by a "gentle" psychagogy, is concerned not to financially "place weight" / "burden" them (ἐπιβαρῆσαι: *1 Thess.* 2.9), Paul is likewise concerned in pastoral relationship with the Corinthians not to impose any unnecessary heavy "weight", he wants to be "a-heavy" (ἄβαρῆ: 11.9d), and not to apply any "pressure" upon them (οὐ κατενάρκησα: 11.9b) by relying upon them to supply his financial needs while in Corinth. Consequently his apostolic work was undertaken free of charge to them (11.7,9) by surrendering what he considers to be an apostolic right (ἐξουσία) in his apostolic activities among the Corinthians: 'But we did not use this right' (οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ: *1 Cor.* 9.12c). As in the case of the Thessalonian church, he relieves them from having to endure the weight or the pressure of his needs, despite their consistent approaches to assist him, because of his principles of a kenotic psychagogy. Consequently he is willing to humble himself by pursuing manual work (ἐργασία / ἐργάζομαι)<sup>179</sup> - presumably as a (σκηνοποιός (*1 Cor.* 4.12, *2 Cor.* 11.7, *Acts* 18.1-3):<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> This is the usual Pauline designation for his manual labour. That it carries the meaning of manual work is evident from the context in which Paul employs it. For example he explains to the Corinthians that his apostolic circle ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίας χερσίν (*1 Cor.* 4.12a); also *1Thess.* 4.11.

<sup>180</sup> R. Hock in an important article has argued in favour of interpreting σκηνοπιός (*Acts* 18.3) as involving cutting and sewing leather for tentmaking. Hock writes: "That Paul was a tentmaker (σκηνοπιός) we learn only from Luke (cf. *Acts* 18.3). Although there is no reason to doubt Luke at this point . . . the nature of Paul's trade is still not clear. Of the two options - weaving tentcloth from goat's hair (cilicium) or cutting and sewing leather to make tents - the latter is to be preferred." R. Hock, 'Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of his Social Class,' in *JBL* 97:4 (1978) 555 n.2.

'We work hard with our own hands (καὶ κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν) . . . . ' [1 Cor. 4.12a].

'Did I commit a sin by humbling myself (ἐμᾶυτόν ταπεινῶν) so that you might be exalted, because I preached God's Gospel without cost to you?' [2 Cor. 11.7].<sup>181</sup>

That ἐμᾶυτόν ταπεινῶν in 2 Cor. 11.7 is an indirect reference to his manual work during his Corinthian stay has been established by modern scholarship and so it is unnecessary to argue the case,<sup>182</sup> except to point out that it reflects Paul's attitude to manual labour.<sup>183</sup> Furthermore, even the residual needs which cannot be met through the wages of his manual labour, he is unwilling to receive from the Corinthians (2 Cor. 11.9a). For such financial support he turns to the church of Macedonia, which effectively amounts to Philippian assistance (2 Cor. 11.8-9, Acts 18.5).<sup>184</sup> Paul's intention therefore, by going to such elaborate measures in refusing their financial assistance, was not to place them in a situation where they had to endure the "weight" of his needs (2 Cor. 11.9). Such an endurance would, in accordance to Paul's psychagogic principles amount to an "irrational," "worldly" form of endurance. This pastoral concern for the Corinthians stands in sharp contrast to the rival apostles' insensitive, tyrannical and "unknowledgable" psychagogy which financially exploits and burdens them (11.20) - a situation which the Corinthians display unwise endurance / forbearance (ἀνέχεσθαι). This is precisely what Paul is seeking to avoid because of his pastoral love and concern for them (11.11). Consequently in comparison to the superlative apostles he is exercising a wiser psychagogy.<sup>185</sup> His consistent refusal to accept

<sup>181</sup> 'After this, Paul left Athens and went to Corinth. There he met a Jew named Aquila, a native of Pontus, who had recently come from Italy, with his wife Priscilla . . . . Paul went to see them, and because he had the same trade as them, he stayed and worked with them for they were tentmakers (καὶ διὰ τὸ ὁμότεχνον εἶναι ἔμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἠργάζετο. Ἦσαν γὰρ σκηνοποιοὶ τῆ τέχνη). (Acts 18.1-3).

<sup>182</sup> For example, Hock writes that in this verse " . . . . we have an indirect reference to Paul's working at a trade, though this time in the words «by demeaning myself»' (ἐμᾶυτόν ταπεινῶν). Similar interpretations are also found in A. Plummer, *A Critical Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians* ICC (Edinburgh, Clark, 1915) 302; H. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* 9th ed. (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924) 334; P. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* NICNT (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 19162) 384.

<sup>183</sup> Hock, has analyzed the language employed by Paul, with reference to his work, in order to determine his attitude to manual labour. His research shows that Paul considered his manual labour in terms of a social abasement. Vide Hock, *op. cit.* 555 - 64.

<sup>184</sup> Luke records that this assistance eventually liberated him for full-time apostolic activity (Acts 18.5).

<sup>185</sup> This comparison which appears to re-echo an on-going Greek philosophical debate between those sages (and especially the sophists) who charged for their services and those who refused payment, according to Betz, seems to cast Paul along a Socratic light. Paul thus identifies his rivals with professional sophists who in popular culture had been caricatured as charlatans and exploiters, while identifying his own role in Corinth in line with those sages who did not financially burden their hearers.

financial assistance from the Corinthians (esp. its wealthier members), as well as from the Thessalonians, in preference to manual labour (ἐργασία / ἐργάζομαι) as a means of financial autonomy (*1 Thess.* 2.9, *1 Cor.* 4.12, 9.12, 15,18, *2 Cor.* 11.7, 9, 12.14, *2 Cor.* & *Acts* 18.3) also reveals a further dimension of the performance of his apostolic signs among them - his superior or "wiser" capacity to endure the toils (κόποι) and hardships (μόχθοι) of manual labour. That Paul considered his manual work as a hardship (which for pastoral reasons he had to endure) is attested by his employment of the vocabulary of hardship, especially in the use of κόπος and μόχθος in the description of manual work, in several of his letters (*2 Cor.* 11.27a, *1 Thess.* 2.9, *2 Thess.* 3.8),<sup>186</sup> as well as other phrases denoting the exhaustive nature of his manual labours such as "working night and day:"

'Surely you remember brothers, our toil (τῶν κόπων ἡμῶν) and hardship (καὶ τὸν μόχθον); we worked night and day (νυκτός καὶ ἡμερᾶς ἐργαζόμενοι) in order not to be a burden on anyone (προς τὸ μὴ ἐπιβαρῆσαι τινα ὑμῶν) while we preached the gospel of God to you.' [*1 Thess.* 2.9].

Furthermore that Paul considered manual labour required endurance is suggested both by implicit and explicit indicators. Implicitly, endurance in manual labour is suggested by his inclusion of the category "ἐργασία / ἐργάζομαι" and its descriptive synonyms (κόπος and / or μόχθος) in his lists of hardships, on equal terms with such other adversities as poverty, homelessness, persecution etc. (4.12, *2 Cor.* 6.5d, 11.27.a):

'To this very hour we go hungry and thirsty, we are in rags, we are brutally treated, we are homeless. We work hard with our own hands (καὶ κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν) . . . . . ' [*1 Cor.* 4.11-12a].

For Paul, the nature of his manual work required physical and moral endurance. This is explicitly attested by Paul twice in his Corinthian correspondence, through his usage of the language of endurance in direct connection with his manual labour. Thus in *2 Cor.* 6.4c,5de he explicitly asserts: 'in much endurance . . . . in toil and sleeplessness" (ἐν ὑπομονῇ πολλῇ . . . . ἐν κόποις, ἐν ἀγρυπνίαις)'. This re-echoes his earlier statement in *1 Cor.* 9.12.

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<sup>186</sup> These two Pauline descriptions of manual Pauline descriptions of manual labour occur together both in *1 Thess.* (2.9) as well as in one of his Corinthian list of hardships (*2 Cor.* 11.27a). As P.N. Tarazi observes, both are references to difficult, exhausting and tiring activity involving labour. Vide P.N. Tarazi, *1 Thessalonians, A Commentary* (Crestwood, St. Vladimir's Press, 1982) 93. Nevertheless a certain distinction exists between the two terms: Κόπος has the meaning of the general effort involved in tiring activity. Concerning μόχθος, Tarazi explains that it ' . . . . . carries rather that of the weariness and exhaustion resulting from such work or labor.' *ibid.* 93.

### **III. The Apostle Paul's «Stand Firm» Exhortations: Endurance and The Warrior of Christ as Metaphor in Situations of External Combat and Danger**

#### *A. Military Language and Metaphor in the Writings of Paul*

**i. Paul, Military Imagery and Endurance:** I explained in the preceding part of this chapter that as part of his apostolic self-commendation (2 Cor. 4a-10c) the apostle Paul employed the notion of endurance with the assistance of military imagery (2 Cor. 6.7cde). However is this an isolated instance of Pauline militarized endurance? Given the stress, throughout the NT documents on the gentler and philanthropic virtues (e.g. love, mercy, peace, meekness, humility, long-suffering and self-denial) as well as Paul's own emphasis on his "weakness," it would seem somewhat incongruous to expect the notion of endurance (as well as courage) - one of the more aggressive moral virtues of the Greco-Roman world - being expressed in a militarized format. It would appear that the possibility of finding the depiction of the servant of Jesus Christ in the image of a much-enduring warrior or athlete, rather remote if not alien to a value system which emphasizes the "Gospel of love."

This observation, by and large, is true within the canonical sayings of Jesus, where the very use of military language and concepts is very infrequent. Here the notion of endurance as a moral attribute never occurs in the form of a martial metaphor. Nevertheless, as I have already indicated, within the letters of Paul (as well as in the Corpus Paulinum) one finds a radically different picture emerging. Indeed not only does Paul employ the notion of (aggressive) moral endurance in a demilitarized format to express a wide range of commendable moral actions, but furthermore is quite willing to express this combative virtue in a militarized format. Indeed, this forms an important aspect of Paul's general predilection towards the use of figurative military language.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> E.g. 1 Thess. 5.8, 1 Cor. 9.7a, 16.13, 2 Cor. 6.4,7, 10.3-6, Rom. 6.12-23, 16.7, Phlp. 1.27-30, 2.25 also Eph. 6.10-18. The same tendency is also found in the Corpus Paulinum, e.g. 1 Tim. 1.18, 2 Tim. 2.3-4. Besides military imagery, the letters of Paul and the Corpus Paulinum also describe the believer's *ἀγών* in Greek athletic imagery. Yet it is interesting that while the apostle Paul does not hesitate to appropriate the idea of the warrior's endurance he does appear to steer away from the use of the metaphoric image of the much-enduring athlete. Indeed this is the case for the entire Corpus Paulinum. The only exceptions are found in Heb. 10.32 & 12.1-3. In the first of these unique passages, the author reminds his reader of their former heroic endurance in the face of various afflictions (incl. persecution). He does this by expressing it in athletic language: 'But recall those earlier days when after you had been enlightened you endured a hard contest with sufferings (πολλήν ἀθλησιν ὑπεμείνατε παθημάτων).' In the second case the author exhorts the servant of Jesus Christ as one who is experienced in athletic

We encounter such warlike images as "fortifications" (2 Cor. 10.4) "weapons" (2 Cor. 6.7c) "warriors" (Phlp. 2.25), "warfare" (2 Cor. 10.4) or concepts such as "victory" (Phlp. 1.28), freedom (Gal. 5.1), "strength" (1 Cor. 16.13), "espionage" (Gal. 2.4), "soldier s wages" (Rom. 6.23) or "prisoner of war" (Rom. 16.7) etc., all serving to explain, in a figurative manner, the ethics of the servant of Jesus Christ.

As I have already indicated, among these Pauline metaphors, the image of the believer as a "warrior" demonstrating combative endurance is clearly found. Interestingly, for the most part the Pauline notion of militarized moral endurance occurs in the genre of the "stand firm" (στήκετε) moral exhortation. In this context, the apostle Paul assumes the role of a heroic much-enduring "commander" who exhorts his readers as "warriors" to "stand firm" in the threat of imminent (human) opposition (1 Cor. 16.13), in the face of persecution and potential martyrdom (Phlp. 1.27-30),<sup>188</sup> against the threat of subjection and enslavement to the Mosaic Law (Gal. 5.1) or against the menace of demonic attack (Eph. 6.10-18). The presence of these metaphoric exhortations ought to arouse some curiosity and call for an explanation. It is therefore puzzling that they have received very little scholarly attention in the past, and what attention they have received has been generalized. I now ask, what is the background for this "militarized" Pauline expression of moral endurance? Furthermore how does Paul employ them? Given the limitation of time and space I direct my present attention to two of these militarized exhortations for endurance - Gal. 5.1 and 1 Cor. 16.13. My contention, as set out in my introductory remarks to the present study, is

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competition and as one who displays athletic endurance. He exhorts his readers to display endurance as if they were athletes competing in an actual stadium race: 'Therefore since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us also lay aside every weight and the sin that clings so closely, and let us run with endurance (δι' ὑπομονῆς τρέχωμεν) the race that is set before us.' The author's ultimate paradigm of such heroic "athletic" endurance is the endurance which Christ demonstrated on the cross (12.2): 'looking to Jesus the champion and perfected of our faith, who for the sake of the joy that was set before him endured the cross (ὑπέμεινε σταυρὸν) . . . . ' As I have already explained such athletic metaphors of endurance were common in Greco-Roman philosophy as well as in such first-century Greco-Jewish documents as 4 Macc. and T. Job particularly in contexts of persecution and martyrdom. Vide chs. 3 & 4 of the present study. It is interesting however that the metaphoric image of the much-enduring athlete is absent from the Pauline letters.

<sup>188</sup> While the notion of standing firm does not appear at first sight as an exhortation (Phlp. 1.27) nevertheless it does stand within a literary passage which may be described as an exhortation. For instance, while rhetorically classifying 1.18b-26 as a *confirmatio*, Bloomquist categorizes 1.27--2.18 as an *exhortatio*. Vide I.G. Bloomquist, *The Function of Suffering in Philippians*, JSNTSS 78 (Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1993) 157. For Bloomquist the first exhortation section of this letter is indeed 1.27-2.18 which 'serves as the hortatory conclusion to the *confirmatio*. . . ' *ibid.* 157.

that these metaphors are best read and understood in the background of the Greek and Roman philosophical tradition of militarized moral endurance.<sup>189</sup> While in his usage of moral endurance in its demilitarized form, Paul shows affinity with Cynic traditions, in his presentation of militarized endurance, though still reflecting several of the elements of the Cynic military metaphor of endurance, nevertheless he also appears to participate substantially with later Stoic traditions of this notion.

**ii. Previous Scholarly Research:** While in the nineteenth century European scholars such as A. Fleury (1853),<sup>190</sup> F.C. Baur (1858)<sup>191</sup> J. Lightfoot (1869)<sup>192</sup> and J. Kreyher (1887),<sup>193</sup> drew attention between Paul's military language and the later Stoics, specifically Seneca, scholarship in the twentieth century has experienced a shift towards understanding these metaphors in the light of the Hebrew Bible. For Adolf von Harnack, who viewed Christianity as drawing its religious concepts almost exclusively from the "mother's womb of the Jewish religion,"<sup>194</sup> the origins of the apostle Paul's ethical usage of military imagery is ascribed to the prophetic traditions of ancient Israel: 'We encounter immediately with Paul, a number of warlike-sounding admonitions and images . . . . and we see that they have their origins in the images of the Old Testament prophets.'<sup>195</sup> However, Harnack while analyzing Paul's military metaphors from a general perspective ignored or overlooked the following facts: (i) While the idea of the warrior's endurance does exist in the Hebrew Bible, especially in the war chronicles of the *Deuteronomistic Historian*, as a heroic attribute of the ancient Israelite warrior, as well as an aspect of the pre-battle "do not fear . . . ." imperatives issued by Jahweh as Israel's military commander, nevertheless the metaphor of the much-enduring warrior, to describe the righteous Israelite, is with one

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<sup>189</sup> Vide pp. 27-28.

<sup>190</sup> A. Fleury, *Saint Paul et Sénèque, Recherches sur les rapport du philosophe avec l'apotre et sur l'infiltration du christianisme naissant à travers le paganisme* (Paris, 1853), 2 vols.

<sup>191</sup> F.C. Baur, 'Seneca und Paulus, Das Verhältnis des Stoicismus zum Christentum nach den Schriften Seneca's.' *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* Vol. I, 1858).

<sup>192</sup> J.B. Lightfoot, 'St. Paul and Seneca,' in his *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* 2nd edition, (London, Cambridge, Macmillan, 1869) 268-331.

<sup>193</sup> J. Kreyher, *L. Annaeus Seneca und seine Beziehungen zum Urchristentum* (1887).

<sup>194</sup> A. von Harnack, *Militia Christi. The Christian Religion and the Military in the First Three Centuries*, ET (Philadelphia, Fortress Press) reprint, 32.

<sup>195</sup> Harnack, *op. cit.* 35.



exception, absent from the prophetic literary tradition.<sup>196</sup> (ii) On the other hand this metaphor abounds in Greek (and Roman) moral essays, and through this eventually into early Jewish literature.<sup>197</sup> It is therefore difficult to make a case for the Pauline dependence of this metaphor upon the literature of ancient Israel. Furthermore the case of the military metaphor of endurance in a context of persecution or potential martyrdom *Phlp.* (1.27-30)<sup>198</sup> is quite significant in this debate. Here, Paul as "military commander," exhorts his Philippian "troops" to "stand firm" and be "courageous" in a situation of "warfare."<sup>199</sup> What is most interesting here, is that the image of the much-enduring "warrior" which Paul projects is that of the "citizen-warrior - a unique Greek

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<sup>196</sup> While the metaphor of the warrior's endurance applied to a human protagonist is almost totally absent from the Hebrew Bible, the idea of the warrior's endurance in a literal sense does exist. Indeed it features among the earliest found in the literature of the ancient Mediterranean, namely in the Land of Israel's foundational war chronicles *par excellence*, namely the biblical books of the Deuteronomic Historian - *Joshua* - *2 Kings*. Vide Appendix 1. For a brief discussion of *Jer.* 1.17-19 vide ch. 4 n. 41.

<sup>197</sup> Vide ch. 4 part III.

<sup>198</sup> That the notion of militarized endurance is set within a situation of the believers' persecution or potential martyrdom is made quite clear by the passage's immediate context. With the theme of life, death and suffering as background Paul now makes a series of exhortations to the Philippian community whose major theme deals with humility, persecution and martyrdom, (1.27-2.18). He presents Christ's kenotic crucifixion (2.8) and his own present suffering in prison (1.30) as well as his possible future martyr's fate ('being poured out as a libation upon the sacrificial offering' 2.17) as paradigms for the Philippians to continue in their "militarized" endurance (and courage). There are several similarities between the concepts in this passage and *4 Macc.* Both employ the idea of militarized endurance in a martyrological context. Both use the term ἀγών to designate the "warrior's" struggle (*Phlp.* 1.30, *4 Macc.* 9.23-24, also 13.15-16). The idea of a "citizenship" πολιτεύεσθαι (within a context of metaphoric military overtones) is also found in both (*Phlp.* 1.27, *4 Macc.* 2.8, 23, 4.23, 5.16. Furthermore besides the commendability of "standing firm" Paul also exhorts the Philippians to demonstrate courage (1.28, cf. *4 Macc.* 16.20 et al.). For Paul as in *4 Macc* such a victory is also pre-eminently assured through God's direct intervention in their "battle." Vide ch. 4, n. 52 in the present study; also Williams *op. cit.* 245-246. However I do not share Williams' view of Pauline dependence, here, on *4 Macc.*

<sup>199</sup> The military imagery of endurance is unmistakable here. As one responsible for them, now perhaps as an absent "imprisoned commander" sending word to his "fellow combatants" in the Gospel of Christ, he exhorts them to live a life worthy of the Gospel in expectancy that they will close ranks and forming one united spiritual front (ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι, μιᾷ ψυχῇ), will combat side by side (συναθλούντες), displaying endurance (στήκετε) and the absence of fear (μὴ πτυρόμενοι) in facing their enemies' (ἀντικειμένων) charge. Echoing the sage's transformed Greek militarized traditions of endurance and courage as the twin most potent and praiseworthy qualities for success in life's "battle," the apostle Paul now is able to confidently ensure them of their victory or deliverance (σωτηρίας) and their enemies' total defeat or destruction (αὐτοῖς . . . . ἀπωλείας). Like a "commander," the apostle Paul asks from his congregation, in this "struggle" (ἀγῶνα), nothing which he himself has not already endured in sufferings (πάσχειν). Indeed they are now participating in the same "battles" which they have seen him already experience. As their leader, he has set the example of endurance and courage, and now hopes they will similarly engage in the struggle: 'Now be citizens and the only thing is to let your life be worthy of the Gospel of Christ, so that whether I come to see you or absent from you I may hear of you that you stand firm / endure (στήκετε) in one spirit (ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι), with one mind / soul (μιᾷ ψυχῇ), combating side by side for the faith of the Gospel, and not being frightened in anything of the enemies' (cavalry) attack (μὴ πτυρόμενοι ἐν μηδενὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων) and this will be a clear sign to them of their destruction (ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐνδειξις ἀπωλείας), but of your deliverance (ὑμῶν δὲ σωτηρίας), and this victory comes from God (καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ Θεοῦ). For it has been granted to you for the sake of Christ not only to believe in Him but also to endure suffering (πάσχειν) for Him. For you are experiencing the same struggle (ἀγῶνα) which you saw and now hear to be mine.' (*Phlp.* 1.27-30).

Roman politico-religious institution where the expectation of endurance and courage in battle were viewed as an integral aspect of the warrior's civic duties or obligations.<sup>200</sup> In the early 1960's, Sevenster made a case, similar to Harnack's, not only for *Eph.* 6.10-18 (which he ascribes as Pauline) but also for the entire collection of the Pauline military metaphors. Sevenster who is perfectly aware of the Greek and Roman philosophic tradition of martial metaphors, nevertheless rejects any link between the metaphors of Seneca and *Eph.* 6.10-18. He explains that there is, 'not the slightest reason to assume that Paul has derived this imagery from the Stoic School. On the contrary it is made clear by *Eph.* 6, that if there is a source to which he is indebted, it is the Old Testament.'<sup>201</sup> Likewise he dismisses the possibility of drawing a relationship between Paul's and the Stoics' (Seneca) use of military metaphors.<sup>202</sup>

My point of departure from previous studies on Pauline and Deutero-Pauline martial metaphors, is that I approach them exclusively from the perspective of the notion of endurance, where it is applicable. This has not been attempted previously in the same detail, despite the fact

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<sup>200</sup> The ideals of Spartan militaristic life, as I have already explained, were appropriated and transformed into moral principles by the Greek and Roman sages (vide Tigerstadt *op. cit.* passim, Rawson *op. cit.* passim, also pp. 40-46 of the present study). Paul seems to participate in this philosophical tradition here, by his association between military endurance and "citizenship" (πολιτεύεσθε, 1.27). (i) The Spartan military ideal was a collective one (cf. Iliad) and the warrior fought as a member of a team for the security of his polis. The warriors' collective courage and endurance were thus the two attributes which contributed to this security and freedom. (ii) The Spartan elegiac poet Tyrtaeus summarizes the Spartan polis-ideal, in terms of the collective endurance of the citizen-warrior. Each warrior is obligated to stand firm with his fellow citizens in battle and not take flight. This endurance represents the highest service and duty offered to the polis: 'I should not consider a man worthy to be remembered nor think highly of him . . . . unless he was also valorous in arms, unless he could stand fast in battle . . . . That is the true virtue (ἀρετή) the highest reward that a man can obtain from his fellows. It is a good common to all, a service to the city and the people as a whole, when every man can stand firm on his two feet in the front line and rid his heart of all idea of flight.' (Frag. 12.1-10, 13-18). In short, the demonstration of endurance in combat, the Spartan warrior is not only providing security to his fellow-citizen ὀπλίται, but is offering the most valued and acclaimed social service or function to the Spartan collective - the security of his polis and its inhabitants. Paul reflects these ideals, in a transformed sense, within his present metaphor. (i) The idea of the "warrior-citizen" appears to lie at the core of the present metaphor and explains the entire metaphor in a more systematic manner. By exhorting the Philippians as "citizens" (πολιτεύεσθε) Paul evokes the idea of the obligations and duties of citizenship. (ii) At the heart of these obligations of citizenship as the collective ideal of "standing firm" in battle. Paul also expects the Philippians to "stand firm" and "fight" collectively as one 'side by side' and not to panic and abandon their post since that would endanger their fellow soldiers. Paul is here exhorting the "citizens" of Phillipi, to stand ready to fulfill their "military" obligations as "citizen-warriors" against the persecuting enemy (ἀντικείμενου) who are threatening the peace and harmony of the ecclesial polis. For a discussion of the idea of "citizenship" in *Phlp.* vide, Stowers 'Friends and Enemies in the Politics of Heaven,' in J.M. Bassler (ed.), *Pauline Theology, Volume 1. Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon* (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1991) 105-121, also P. Perkins 'Philippians, Theology for the Heavenly Politeuma' *ibid.* 89-104.

<sup>201</sup> J.N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1961), 162.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.* 162-163.

that in many of these metaphors the notion of endurance is central. Accordingly my conclusions differ from both von Harnack and Sevenster's analyses.

*B. From Coward to Commander of Heroic Endurance for Freedom  
(Gal. 1.13,23 & 5.1)*

**i. Introduction:** Within *Galatians* Paul makes use of the military metaphor of endurance and its absence in order to illustrate the heroic nature of his new status as apostle of Jesus Christ. He characterizes his days, prior to the "revelation of Jesus Christ" (1.12) in terms of a shameful "warrior" lacking in the heroic "military" virtues of courage and endurance. By contrast, in his new status as apostle of Jesus Christ, and as founder of the Galatian church, he assumes the language and conceptualization of a much-enduring "commander" exhorting the Galatians to "stand firm" in the battle for "freedom."

**ii. Paul the Zealous "Warrior" as Shameful Ravager of the Church:** In two statements within his autobiographical section in *Galatians* (1.10-2.21),<sup>203</sup> Paul describes his role as a savage persecutor of the young Church, in the days prior to his pivotal, protreptic, personal experience of the revelation of Jesus Christ (1.12,16),<sup>204</sup> within an aggressive and pejorative military-like cast (1.13,23).<sup>205</sup> In describing his phase as a persecutor, Paul admits its "excessive" character (*Gal* 1.13) - and proceeds to employ in a self-condemnatory manner, a provocative and

<sup>203</sup> For a detailed explication of the function of Pauline autobiography in the light of Greco-Roman literature, especially with reference to *Gal.* 1.10-2.21, vide G. Lyons, *Pauline Autobiography Towards a New Understanding* SBLDS 73 (Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1982) 17-176.

<sup>204</sup> While Luke locates this central and definitive event in Paul's life, as occurring along the road leading to Damascus from Jerusalem (*Acts* 9.3; 22.6), Paul himself gives no geographical reference and variously describes the event as being: (i) a *revelation* (ἀποκάλυψις): ' . . . . for I did not receive it (i.e. the Gospel) from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ (δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) . . . . (God) was pleased to reveal his Son to me (ἀποκαλύψε τὸν Υἱὸν αὐτοῦ) . . . . ' (*Gal* 1.12, 15-16); (ii) an *appearance*: 'Last of all, as to one untimely born, He (i.e. Jesus Christ) appeared also to me (ὠφθη κάμοι).' (*1 Cor* 15.8); (iii) a *vision*: "Have I not seen (έώρακα) Jesus our Lord? . . . . ' (*1 Cor.* 9.1.

<sup>205</sup> Paul's autobiographical portrait as a former persecutor of the early Church also occurs in *1 Cor.* (15.9) and in *Phlp* (3.6). Nevertheless his description of the character of his persecution, in these instance, is unqualified and of the briefest nature. He explains simply by the usage of the verb διώκειν that he was formerly a persecutor of the Church. In the former case, he ascribes his present status as the "least" of all the apostles, indeed his unworthiness to be called or acknowledged as an "apostle" precisely on his prior status as one who "persecuted the Church of God" (έδιώξα την έκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ). (*1 Cor.* 15.9). In the latter instance, his description of himself as persecutor is located within the overall literary context of a comparison with his opponents. Here the topics of comparison in which he "boasts" of his superiority constitute items which Paul designates under the overall category of qualifications "according to the flesh" which constituted the essence of his identity as a Pharisee (*Phlp.* 3.4) and his impressive ethnic (Judaic) background: circumcised (3.5a), a member of the people of Israel (3.5b), of the tribe of Benjamin (3.5c), born of Hebrews (3.5d), a Torah-observant Pharisee (3.5e), a zealous "persecutor of the Church" (κατά ζήλος διώκων την έκκλησίαν, 3.6a).

forceful term - a military *technicus terminus*, πορθέω<sup>206</sup> - which for the most part again has clear overtones of excessive and evil behaviour, namely the military excesses of a victorious though oppressive army, through its ruthless and unnecessary "destruction," "extermination" or "ravaging" of helpless and innocent human victims, property, agriculture,<sup>207</sup> as well as the notion of "plundering" and "sacking" of cities and homes:<sup>208</sup>

You have heard, no doubt, of my earlier life in Judaism. I was excessively persecuting the church of God (καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐδίωκον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ) and was trying to destroy / ravage it (καὶ ἐπόρθουν αὐτήν). [Gal. 1.13].

What did Paul mean by excessive? The juxtaposition of ὑπερβολὴν, ἐδίωκον and ἐπόρθον - one of the most powerful military terms or cruel destruction - suggests that Paul is more than implying that he formerly undertook some sort of crushing and violent activity, against members of the church in Judea / Jerusalem. The use of πορθεῖν casts this activity within a negative military-like framework. However, was he using this military language in a metaphoric or literal sense? Is he suggesting that within synagogues he had undertaken a campaign of such devastating theological attacks against the Messianic faith of the followers of Jesus, that he had been the cause

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<sup>206</sup> For instance, Hanson in his definitive study of one aspect of Greek military devastation, namely agricultural destruction, includes this verb as one of the key and general terms in the Greek military vocabulary of ravaging; vide V.D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*, BSA 40 (Pisa, Giardini, 1983) ch. 2.

<sup>207</sup> Concerning the pejorative character of this term, it is interesting that Hanson, in his study of agricultural devastation in Greek warfare, lists this verb among a collection of terms which unambiguously designate negative or evil activity. He writes: 'In reference to enemy activity, the general words ἀδικέω, κακώω, κακουργέω, πορθέω and φθείρω (the last two especially frequent in compounds) usually include ravaging of agriculture . . . .' *ibid.* 13. Indeed, as Hanson explains, ravaging in Greek warfare, by an invading army may be averted, at times, if sufficient monetary payment is made *loc. cit.* This too adds to the ignoble content of the term.

<sup>208</sup> According to *LS* the basic meaning of the verb connotes the idea of military destruction, ravaging, laying waste, ruining and plundering of a region or the annihilation of an urban center. It is used in this basic military sense already by Homer and Herodotus. Because such military devastation also involved the slaughter and / or dehumanizing mistreatment endured by innocent (non-military) victims, it also carried the idea of the physical torture suffered by the captured inhabitants - a usage of the term πορθεῖν, found especially in the tragedians. concerning these primarily military dimensions of the Greek verb, Menouand writes: 'Πορθεῖν has been in use since the time of Homer to describe the destruction of a region and the sacking of a town by an army on the offensive. This primary meaning is found throughout Greek civilization; in Hellenistic and Roman times we find it particularly in Philo and Josephus and the papyri. War does not spare the inhabitants of the countries where it is waged. That is why πορθεῖν, in classical tragedy, also means the ill-treatment and torture endured by those citizens who fall into the hands of the enemy.' P.H. Menouand, 'The Use of the Verb πορθεῖν (Gal. 1.13, 23, Acts 9.21),' in *Jesus Christ and the Faith: A Collection of Studies* PTMS 18 (Pittsburgh, Pickwick, 1978) 48. Indeed the term is still used to this day in modern Greek as a military concept, as for instance in the expression "ἀπορθητο κάστρο," indestructible fortress, (I am indebted to Rev. P. Souritzides for the latter information). For a discussion of the process of a specific case of ancient Greek military ravaging, namely agricultural devastation, vide V.D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Ancient Greece*, BSA (Pisa) *passim*.

for many of them to lose their faith?<sup>209</sup> Had he pursued a militant policy of literal violent persecution against the early Church members? For an answer I turn to two documents contemporaneous with Paul, written also by Jewish authors, using the verb *πορθεῖν*.

To begin with *4 Macc.* understands and employs this term in a concrete military and persecutory sense, to qualify the nature of a violent military repression - waging a war against an entire community (*4 Macc.* 4.21) - undertaken by a tyrant (Antiochus) against a helpless people, namely all the inhabitants of Jerusalem - the Jerusalemites (οἱ Ἱεροσολυμίται, 4.22). Implicit in this categorization is the inclusion of women and children. Accordingly, while *πορθέω* has clear military dimensions in its meaning, it does not inherently project the language of military heroism:

'At these things divine justice was angered, and brought Antiochus to war against them (*ἐπολέμωσιν*). For while he was waging war against Ptolemy in Egypt he (i.e. Antiochus) heard that upon a rumour of his death being spread abroad, the people of Jerusalem (οἱ Ἱεροσολυμίται) had exhibited the very greatest delight, and so he speedily marched against them. And when he had destroyed / ravaged them (*καὶ ὡς ἐπόρθησεν αὐτούς*), he issued a decree to the effect that any who were found living according to the law of the fathers must die.' [*4 Macc.* 4.21-23].

Nevertheless the verb need not always be used for the ravaging by an army or military action. It may be employed in a metaphoric manner to evoke the idea of the brutality of a military-like destruction, though the perpetrators need not necessarily be soldiers. In this instance the verb *πορθεῖν* however loses none of its physically violent connotations. Philo, another contemporary of Paul,<sup>210</sup> employs this term in precisely this fashion, within the context of a devastating and ruthless persecution. Accordingly, in describing the violent repression and mistreatment of the Jews in Alexandria by the Greek populace (A.D. 38), at the instigation of Flaccus the imperially-

<sup>209</sup> It may be used poetically, with the suggestion that Saul indulged in very aggressive tactics, though not necessarily to the point of shedding blood. A further possibility has been raised by P.H. Menoud, [vide his 'The Use of the Verb *πορθεῖν* (*Gal.* 1.13, 23, *Acts* 9.21)' in *Jesus Christ and the Faith. A Collection of Studies* PMTS 18 (Pittsburgh, Picklock, 1978, 47-60)]. Menoud does not understand the employment of *πορθέω* (in Luke which re-echoes Paul's usage of the verb), in any literary sense. Rather, he interprets the verb to mean Saul's 'causing of havoc' to the Jerusalem church, as a metaphor for a persecution through preaching. However, Menoud's argumentation leaves certain issues unanswered. It does not take seriously into account Luke's earlier description of a violence-inclined Saul (9.1), of Ananias' trepidation (9.13-14), of the possible Pauline sources concerning the "excessive persecutions" for the Lucan description in 9.23, nor does he fully explain the precise choice of this verb within the available range of persecution language (H. Conzelmann appears to support Menoud's position, though without offering reasons: 'Menoud would understand the word in a purely moral sense and exclude the actual shedding of blood: it does not mean persecution through actions, but through preaching.' H. Conzelmann, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* ET, Hermeneia Series (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1987), 74. It may also be used in a political sense. It would appear then that whether or not Saul shed blood in the course of his persecution of the "saints of Jerusalem", the depiction of Saul's activities as at least para-military in nature, is obvious.

<sup>210</sup> Philo Judaeus who was an inhabitant of the Greek-cultured city of Alexandria, lived from about B.C. 20 to around A.D. 50.

appointed viceroy of Alexandria, Philo paints the fate of the Jews in the likeness of a helpless vanquished people handed over as prisoners of war to the caprice of the conquering warriors. Here the term πορθεῖν though used to evoke a metaphoric military image, nevertheless still retains the meaning of a physical savaging and extermination of a helpless people:

'He himself (i.e. Flaccus) being everything - accuser, enemy, witness, judge, and executioner . . . . allowing any one who was inclined to proceed to exterminate the Jews as prisoners of war (ὡς ἐν ἀλώσει τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πορθεῖν Τουδαίους). [In *Flacc.* 54].

I suggest that this is the best way to understand Paul's autobiographical depiction, within *Galatians*, of his days as a persecutor of the Church. Unlike a Josephus, Saul the zealous Pharisee, was not a soldier, engaged in active service within a military system. Why then does he decide to make such a military-like comparison? In wishing to emphasize his personal "turn around" in Christ, and hence of the transforming power of the grace of Jesus Christ (cf. the Law), Paul the apostle and founder of the churches in the region of north Galatia,<sup>211</sup> contrasts between his early days as persecuting and destructive "warrior," and his latter days as "builder of the Church." He will do so in part through the aid of military imagery by reminding his readers of the shameful military-like character of his violent persecutions against those who confessed Jesus as the Messiah.<sup>212</sup> The usage of the military term πορθεῖν assists his purpose. The fact that Paul in *Gal.* chooses to repeat the same verb (*Gal* 1.23) soon after his initial usage (1.13), is reflective of his intent to emphasize the contrast in his attitude and demeanour towards Christ. Here he apparently reports and quotes the contrasting sentiments and words expressed by the church of Jerusalem to describe the excessive nature of his earlier "war of persecution" or "ravaging" against them: "The one who formerly was persecuting us is now proclaiming the faith he once tried to destroy / ravage (Ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς πότε νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται τὴν πίστιν ἣν πότε ἐπόρθει). [*Gal* 1.23].

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<sup>211</sup> Unlike most of his other correspondence, this letter is not addressed to a church community within a single Greco-Roman urban center (cf. *Romans*, *1 Corinthians*, *Philippians* or *1 & 2 Thessalonians*), or for that matter to an individual (e.g. *Philm.*), in this instance the letter's prescript makes reference to a plurality of ecclesial communities (ἐκκλησίας) in "Galatia." I adhere to an ethnic or North Galatian destination for this letter. The debate between a south and north Galatian address are not necessary for the present scope of this study. For a concise summary of the arguments posited by modern scholars vide, A. Cole, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians An Introduction and Commentary*, reprint, TNTC (London, Tyndale Press, 1969) 15-20.

<sup>212</sup> Reasons for Paul's persecution of the church.

**iii. The Early Paul as Ignoble and Cowardly "Warrior:"** In the final analysis, whether Paul is using the verb *πορθεῖν* to depict physical violence or simply devastating theological attacks, it does not alter the conclusion already drawn in part, but now in need of full explication. By the usage of the verb *πορθεῖν* - a potent military term designating cruel aggression - whether intended allegorically or as a literal autobiographical portrayal, to describe his excessive physical persecution of the church, Paul is characterizing his earlier days as a persecutor in stark military language and imagery. However such imagery is more becoming of a cruel and violent aggressor rather than of a "hero-warrior."<sup>213</sup> It would seem, therefore, in the light of this early

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<sup>213</sup> The Lucan tradition understands this in a literal sense, where it is amplified. Luke presents Saul as a violent anti-church activities in a thoroughly pejorative light. Saul is a cowardly warrior for the "traditions of the fathers." His tactics are far from the ideals of the heroic much-enduring warrior. The "pre-Damascus Road" Lucan Saul engages in systematic violence which could be described, at the very least, as para-military in nature (8.3; 9.1). While Saul is never referred to as a στρατιώτης, he is explicitly cast, nevertheless as a militant persecutor, not at all hesitant to pursue a course of systematic and apparently officially-sanctioned violence against his "enemy," though upon his initiative (Acts 9.1-2). The Lucan Saul is a type of the zealot-warrior engaged in a campaign to purge the land from what he perceives to be an undesirable apostate Messianic sect. The language and conceptualization employed by Luke certainly led to this warlike atmosphere, by depicting Saul's persecution, of church members in the mode of a brutal aggressor engaging defenceless and unarmed houses, swooping mercilessly onto its unfortunate inhabitants - not only men but also women. If successful in his campaign in Damascus, he has the authority to "capture prisoners" and even lead them back, tied and bound, in procession into the capital city (9.2). For Luke, this is not intended as metaphoric military imagery. He intends to portray an early biographical chapter in Saul / Paul's life, where armed para-military aggression and violence, constituted a real aspect of his personality. In the first Lucan literary unit, which proceeds immediately after the account of the martyrdom of Stephen, one finds the close juxtaposition between military and martyrological language and conceptualizations. The church members are subjected to a "great persecution" (8.1) causing them to "scatter" (8.1) while Saul "ravages" the church (8.3). It is very interesting that the Lucan term rendered here as "ravaged" (i.e. ἐλυμαίνετο denotes, in a superlative sense, aggressive or violent action. Indeed it may be used of "mangling" by wild beasts, vide C.S. Williams, *A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* (London, Adam & Charles Black, 1957) 115; also F.F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles: The Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary* 3rd edition (Grand Rapids / Leicester, Eerdmans / Apollos, 1990) p.215) and "captures prisoners": 'And Saul was consenting to his (i.e. Stephen's) death. And on that day a great persecution (διωγμός μέγας) arose against the church in Jerusalem; and they were all scattered (διεσπάρησαν) . . . . Devout men buried Stephen and made great lamentation for him. But Saul began to ravage (ἐλυμαίνετο) the church. entering house after house (τούς οἴκους εισπορευόμενος), he dragged off (σύρων) both men and women (τε ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας) and committed them to prison (παρεδίδου εἰς φυλακὴν).' (Acts 8.1-3). Meanwhile Saul, still breathing out murderous threats (ἀπειλῆς καὶ φόβου) against the Lord's disciples, went up to the high priest and asked him for letters to the synagogues at Damascus so that if he found any belonging to the Way, both men and women (ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας), he might lead them as bound prisoners (δεδεμένους) to Jerusalem (ἀγάγη εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ).' (9.1-2). But, perhaps the most intriguing Lucan description of Saul's para-military activities against the earliest church in Jerusalem, is that found in 9.21. Here it would appear that during the course of his pursuit and persecution of the followers of the Way, an armed Saul might not have been hesitant in employing blood-shedding violence: 'And all who heard him (i.e. Paul) were amazed, and said, "Is not this the man who used violence (ὁ πορθήσας), in Jerusalem, against those who called on this Name (εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο)' (9.21). The Lucan usage of the verb *πορθέω* here, to describe Saul's persecution activities is very significant, and in fact, as I shall argue, in all probability derives from Paul himself. Definition of *πορθέω* in Greek and Jewish antiquity.

ignoble military-like activity,<sup>214</sup> that we would quite reasonably expect in the later Paul:<sup>215</sup> a desire to either: (i) distance himself as far as possible from any further military allusions, images or motifs, whether in self-description of his later more mature years as a missionary-psychagogue (or in the description of members of his apostolic circle or communities), so as to de-emphasize or defuse his younger unheroic and shameful aggressive militant period, especially his violent and cowardly actions against the early church in Judah; or, (ii) a predisposition to contrast and rectify this earlier unheroic phase, by appropriating and drawing upon the heroic "military" language of the Greek and Roman sage, in his sketch of his new apostolic universe and mission in Christ. Paul chooses the latter course. Military metaphors abound in the letters of Paul (as well as in the deuterio-Pauline letters). Indeed as Adolf von Harnack already correctly observed several decades ago, the degree of images, concepts and language drawn from the military world is striking, where clearly the use of military metaphors as a didactic medium is more than abundant.<sup>216</sup> Furthermore, as I shall argue, the notion of the warrior's endurance, in a transformed moral sense, appears as one of the central and significant concepts in several of his military metaphors.<sup>217</sup> This antithetical and "diachronic" (before and after) autobiographical schema suggests to me that a conscious decision would have been involved in the employment of military metaphors and language including that of heroic endurance. Thus in accordance to this schematized pattern, Paul (followed by Luke), describes his days as a persecutor in the language and conceptualization of the shameful and cowardly warrior, but when employing military metaphors, whether to portray his later much-

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<sup>214</sup> The portrait of the early Paul in ignoble "military" cast is also evident in a Pauline autobiographical description of an adventurous episode immediately following his Christophanic experience. Thus his escapade from the Damascus wall in a basket (2 Cor. 11.20-33) is painted in the language of a "weak" or non-heroic "warrior" - albeit non-violent - who seeks an inglorious escape against overwhelming odds: 'If I must boast, I will boast of those things that show my weakness. The God and Father of the Lord Jesus . . . . knows that I do not lie. In Damascus the ethnarch, King Aretas guarded the city of Damascus in order to seize me, but I was let down in a basket through a window in the wall, and escaped from his hands.' [2 Cor. 11.30-33]. It may also be understood as an ironical or inverse reference to his "coronis muralis" - the highest military prize for bravery and endurance awarded to a Roman soldier, in being the first to climb an enemy wall, in the face of extraordinary danger. Another possibility may be that this text may represent a re-echoing of one of ancient Israel's most celebrated military escapes, namely that of Joshua's spies from the wall of Jericho. In either case we are dealing with a military-like setting not necessarily linked to heroic behaviour.

<sup>215</sup> As well as his disciples, writing in the name of Paul.

<sup>216</sup> A. von Harnack, *Militia Christi*, ET by D.M. Gracie (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1981).

<sup>217</sup> A. von Harnack, seems to have overlooked this fact, an oversight which led him to draw certain erroneous conclusions concerning the background of the apostle Paul's military metaphors.



enduring apostleship in Christ, or whether in exhorting members of the Pauline communities, in his capacity as paradigmatic "commander," Paul employs the metaphoric language of heroic military endurance. In accordance with his theological framework, the purpose in this schema, especially in *Galatians*, is to emphasize the transforming power of the grace of Jesus Christ. On the other hand while we do not find such "before and after" metaphoric military contrasts in his other letters, one cannot ignore his general principle, namely that descriptions of his latter apostolic world are inevitably cloaked in heroic concepts, especially that of endurance.

**iv. The Latter Paul as "Commander" and Exhorter of Heroic "Military" Endurance for the Sake of Freedom (*Gal. 5.1*):** I have already pointed out that in post-Homeric Greek warfare, the notion of the collective responsibility of the *polis'* freedom rested upon the ability of the warriors to stand firm without fear in the front line when facing the enemy. This endurance was considered to be the "protective walls" of Sparta (Plutarch *Apoph. Lac.* 210E). It was deemed as the highest virtue.<sup>218</sup> Military commanders would therefore exhort their troops to "stand firm" and be courageous, as a civic obligation.<sup>219</sup> In the process of the moral transformation of military endurance into a philosophical value, the notion of the sage as a freedom fighter became one of the elements of "militarized" moral endurance. From a synchronic perspective, a version of this topos is encountered in the letters of Seneca.<sup>220</sup> The Roman sage explains that the warrior enlisted to fight for his master and hence liberates land for his king or lord. However the sage's involvement in moral 'warfare,' has the aim of liberating him from the shackles or oppression of Fortuna or the infiltrating inner passions and vices that threaten the welfare of his soul and moral perfection. Such a defeat would lead to enslavement. Accordingly the sage is to 'stand firm" against such attacks, for the sake of his freedom. Paul appears to be drawing upon a similar motif here, when he exhorts the Galatians to "stand firm" collectively as "warriors" for the sake of freedom. Christ has already liberated them and hence has achieved

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<sup>218</sup> Vide ch. 1 of the present study.

<sup>219</sup> E.g. Tyrtaeus *Frag.* 10.

<sup>220</sup> Vide ch. 2.

victory over the foe. The Christian "warriors" are therefore obliged to defend and preserve this freedom against any attack.

What are the circumstance of this imminent "warfare" and who does Paul have in mind here as the potential or actual enemy? Clearly in the immediate context of this exhortation the major conflict which Paul addresses revolves around the issue of "subjection to the Law" (4.21), a theme which is metaphorically elaborated by a comparison between Hagar, the slave woman and her offspring, the free woman (Sarah) and Isaac her child of promise (4.22-31).<sup>221</sup> In particular Paul is concerned about circumcision as a symbol of religious slavery (5.2). Acceptance of circumcision necessarily demands an obligation to a full observance of the Torah (5.3). Such an observance however simultaneously implies a rejection or "cutting off" from Christ and hence from God's grace (5.4) since it does not rely exclusively on the action of God's Spirit working in the faith (s.6).<sup>222</sup> In this context Paul issues his exhortation to freedom (5.1) and re-echoes it in 5.13:

'Christ has set us free for freedom's sake. Stand firm therefore (στήκετε οὖν), and do not get yourself loaded with a yoke of slavery again . . . . As for you my friends you are called to be free (ἐπ' ἐλευθερία ἐκλήθετε) . . . . [Gal 5.1,1 3a].

It would seem therefore that the "enemy" would be those who espouse observance and hence "subjection" to the Torah. These are the so-called "Judaizers."<sup>223</sup> They threaten to capture and enslave the liberated Galatians, by restoring them back to their former pre-Christ status of slavery. While previously they were slaves to paganism (4.8), now they are in danger of becoming slaves to another 'fleshly' principle, namely subjection to the "works of the Law" (3.2,5,10,12). In effect they are rejecting the freedom which Christ has granted them (5.1 a). Having started with the power of the Spirit they are running the risk of ending with the principle of "flesh" (3.3). They are therefore exhorted to "stand firm" against any campaign to bring them back into captivity. Already in *Gal. 2.4*, Paul employs a military metaphor to describe a threat of "war" on the Galatians'

<sup>221</sup> In the Hagar - Sarah metaphor (4.22-31) Paul stresses that the believer is like Isaac a child of promise not born of a slave woman and hence a heir of the promised inheritance.

<sup>222</sup> For a discussion of Paul's Pneumatology in *Gal.* vide D.J. Lull, *The Spirit in Galatia* SBLDS 49 (Chico, Scholars Press, 1980).

<sup>223</sup> Concerning the identity of Paul's Judaizing opponents in Galatia, vide J. Munck, "The Judaizing Gentile Christians: Studies in Galatians" in his *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* 87-134. As his title suggests Munck explains that these Judaizers were not in fact Jewish but Gentile Christians. He writes: ' . . . the conflict that the apostle wages in that letter concerns a problem in the Gentile mission field that does not touch Jewish Christianity in Jerusalem . . . . The Judaizing opponents in Galatia are Gentile Christians. That emerges from 6.13 . . . ' 87.

freedom. He explains that "spies" are coming in to observe their freedom. Their freedom is therefore under imminent threat of "military" attack. The "stand firm" metaphor therefore suggests that Paul envisages a powerful conflict or combative situation erupting in Galatia. Through such a militarized endurance they can prevail over threats to their freedom.

*C. The Apostle Paul, the Corinthians  
and the Warrior's Endurance as Metaphor (1 Cor. 16.13)*

**i. Introduction:** What renders *1 Cor.* 16.13 a military metaphor I suggest is the unique Pauline juxtaposition of the classical Greek aggressive "military" values - courage, endurance and strength - in an exhortative style, as well as the choice of *στήκω* in this combative formula:

'Be watchful (*γρηγορεῖτε*), stand firm / endure (*στήκετε*) in the faith (*ἐν τῇ πίστει*), be manly / courageous (*ἀνδρίζεσθε*) be strong (*κραταιούσθε*). [*1 Cor.* 16.23].<sup>224</sup>

I suggest that here, this exhortation of "military" values is reminiscent of the Greek and Roman sage's transformed "pre-battle" exhortations spoken as a "military commander" preparing his "troops" for "battle." The language employed by Paul here, indicates that he envisaged an imminent "battle" in Corinth.<sup>225</sup> This militarized interpretation of *1 Cor.* 16.13, helps to clarify a problem faced by most commentators in addressing this exhortation.

**ii. The Exegetical Problem Associated with *1 Cor.* 16.13:** By failing to recognize its metaphoric "military" character commentators are consequently forced to read it as disconnected from the context of its immediate literary setting. Hence all types of interesting though for the most part fanciful interpretations have been given, by the major scholars dealing with *1 Cor.*. For example, H. Conzelmann reads the exhortation as an "unexpected" intrusion on the flow of the main passage in which it is embedded, and assigns its presence to Paul's 'customary loose formation of the conclusion of an epistle . . . .'<sup>226</sup> W. Schmithals takes it a step further. He resolves the issue by the use of literary criticism, considering that 16.13 does not belong here textually, but in conjunction with the rest of the canonical text (16.13-24) he places after 15.58,

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<sup>224</sup> The exhortation continues at 16.14: 'Let all that you do be done in love.'

<sup>225</sup> The command for "endurance" or more specifically "standing firm" in the faith, "courage" or "manliness" and "strength," pre-supposes a "battle" scene, though "vigilance" does not necessarily do so.

<sup>226</sup> H. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians. A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, HCHCB (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1975) 297.

which for Schmithals constitutes the conclusion of the so-called "Letter A." For Schmithals no connection exists between 16.5-12 and 16.15-18.<sup>227</sup> For reasons which I discuss below, I regard 16.13 as intrinsic to 16.5-18 and neither an intrusion nor displacement.

F.F. Bruce who incorporates this exhortation within an overall section of concluding remarks (16.5-24), though more specifically within a sub-section which he entitles "Further plans, Personalia and Exhortations" (16.5.14), while hinting at its "military" nature, does not explicitly acknowledge or develop the idea.<sup>228</sup> He regards the association of the presence of the three concepts - vigilance, endurance and courage (& strength) as 'commonplaces in NT paraenesis.'<sup>229</sup> However, with the exception of *Eph.* the successive textual linking of endurance, courage and strength, is nowhere to be found and hardly constitutes a New Testament "commonplace." Indeed it is very rare. Furthermore Bruce does not provide a specific thematic continuity between this exhortation and its immediate literary setting, beside it being an aspect of the concluding remarks of the letter. C.K. Barrett, views this Pauline exhortation as the thematic demarcation of two final Pauline sections of the letter. Accordingly he understands it to be the opening of the concluding section of the letter, which he entitles "Last Words to the Church, and Greetings."<sup>230</sup> He thus thematically separates it from what I will show to be a very relevant and inter-connected preceding section (16.5- 12). On the other hand by considering the exhortation as the opening of the final section of the letter (16.13-24), he likewise does not isolate the relevant portion of this text to which 16.13 is directly related, namely 16.15-18. The reason for this arbitrary textual separation of what I will argue to be a clear thematic unit (16.5-18,) arises from a misunderstanding of the nature of 16.13, which summarizes Paul's pastoral anxiety. This anxiety is displayed within a coherent literary unit (16.5-18). or Barrett, this exhortation is to be exegetically located within Paul's eschatological rather than immediate pastoral concern. As he explains: *To watch* (γρηγορεῖν) is often used in the New Testament . . . . not of a purely general, moral vigilance, but in the sense

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<sup>227</sup> W. Schmithals, *Gnosis in Corinth* 93f. For a summary vide, Conzelmann, *op. cit.* 294-295.

<sup>228</sup> Bruce draws a parallel between the notion of "standing firm" / "steadfastness" here and that of *Eph.* where it is manifestly "military." Vide, F.F. Bruce, *I & II Corinthians*, NCBC (Grand, Rapids, Eerdmans, 1987) reprint, 160.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.* 160.

<sup>230</sup> C.K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, HNTC (New York, Harper & Row, 1968) 393.

of looking out for eschatological events, expected to happen shortly."<sup>231</sup> While it is true that "vigilance" is used in an eschatological sense, as does the concept of endurance on its own (e.g. *1 Cor.* 15.52) I would argue that, at least in the undisputed Pauline letters the successive conceptual association of vigilance, endurance, courage and strength, does not. Indeed as I have already pointed out this is the only instance. Consequently to argue for a sudden eschatological exhortation (16.13) in the midst of a very practical pastoral unit (16.5-18), on the basis of isolating and making an argument from the perspective of the presence of single concepts in the exhortation, fails to appreciate the overall connected "military" conceptual unity of 16.13. On the other hand, while J. Murphy-O'Connor in his commentary, correctly identifies 16.10-18 as textually and thematically inter-related, he surprisingly, simply overlooks the conceptual relevance of 16.13 within this overall sub-section which he entitles "Various Brethren."<sup>232</sup>

In the light of my discussion in the previous section of this study, I consider the conceptual combination of 16.13 as unmistakably "military." It clearly draws metaphorically upon the classical attributes of the ancient warrior - *endurance* or *standing firm* in the face of the charging enemy and persevering in battle without retreat, *courage* (or manliness) not to be overtaken by fear or panic during the course of the battle, and *strength* or the capacity to overpower the enemy warrior. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, Paul's "stand firm" exhortation here in its original diachronic matrix belonged to the ancient oratorical genre of the "exhortation to war" or "pre-battle exhortation."<sup>233</sup> Thus during the Peloponnesian war, in the face of increasing pressure by the Athenians to reach a peace settlement, Pericles addresses the Athenians with his "exhortation to war." In his speech urging the continued participation of Athens in war he emphasizes the need of courage and endurance in facing the enemy (*Thuc. Pelop. War* 2.64.2-6).<sup>234</sup> As I have argued in

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<sup>231</sup> Barrett, *op. cit.* 393.

<sup>232</sup> J. Murphy-O'Connor, *1 Corinthians* NTM 10 (Wilmington, Michael Glazier, 1985) 157-159.

<sup>233</sup> This was not just found in ancient Hellas but is also common to all Mediterranean cultures. In the extensive record of the wars of ancient Israel as recorded in the books of the *Deuteronomistic Historian* the pre-battle exhortation is frequently found. What is interesting is that while the combination "strength and courage" exist in these speeches, delivered by Yahweh as "divine warrior" the combination "courage and endurance" does not occur. Vide Appendix 1 in the present study. Furthermore, the fact remains that with one exception (*Jer.* 1.17-19) nowhere within the Hebrew Scriptures or in early Jewish apocalyptic literature do I find such a metaphoric "pre-battle" exhortation invoking the concept of endurance, applied to a human.

<sup>234</sup> Vide ch. 1 in present study.

Section 1, this military motif was appropriated and transformed by the Greek and Roman sages in the service of various psychagogic functions.<sup>235</sup> By not recognizing the "military" nature of this Pauline exhortation scholars have therefore been forced to look for varied and generalized explanations.

**iii. A New Reading of 2 Cor . 16.13 Within the Context of 16.5-18:** In the light of the above analysis, if one asks: "For what battle is Paul exhorting or preparing his Corinthians?" I suggest that the immediate literary context (16.5-18) supplies us automatically with the answer. Leaving aside, temporarily 16.13, in reading 16.5-12, 14-18, it becomes fairly evident that Paul is pre-occupied with an immediate and very serious pastoral concern - his absence from Corinth as well as that of a recognized Pauline apostolic leader, during his present missionary activities at Ephesus.

Paul begins this section by discussing his intended travel plan to visit them (16.5-9). Two things prevent him from making an imminent appearance. To visit them soon would mean a hurried and brief stay in Corinth. Furthermore an important missionary opportunity has arisen in Ephesus which he does not wish to abandon, because there are many "adversaries" which he faces in Ephesus and who would want to destroy his ministry (16.9). Consequently he feels that the community at Ephesus would be at risk if he were to travel to Corinth before Pentecost (16.8). As part of his travel plans he would only "pass through" the Macedonian churches (16.5), churches which were not providing him with the pastoral anxieties that Corinth was. Accordingly he planned to "stay" at Corinth longer, perhaps even the entire winter (16.6). As it turned out, Paul did not manage to make this journey as planned - a source of future accusations of inconsistency - yet at the time of composition it is clear that he felt it was necessary to visit them and spend time with them.

He continues by admonishing the Corinthians to receive Timothy well upon his imminent though brief arrival at Corinth, and not to reject him (16.10-11). This acceptance is owing to Timothy since he is an authentic representative (ὡς κἀγὼ) of his (Paul's) Gospel and his

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<sup>235</sup> For the Cynic and Stoic usage of this moral exhortation vide, pp. 122-126 & 145, also Appendix 2 in the present study.

missionary activity and hence has his full imprimatur. Nevertheless it is clear that Paul is concerned that Timothy may very well experience rejection and conflict in Corinth, at least from members of that community:

'When Timothy comes, see that you put him at ease among you, for he is doing the work of the Lord, as I am (ὡς κἀγὼ). So let no one despise him. Speed him on his way in Peace.' [16.10-11].

Paul now moves to a second figure which meets with his apostolic approval, as a teacher, namely Apollos (16.12). While certain factions in Corinth may have been more impressed by Apollos rather Paul (*1 Cor.* 1.12), it is also true that Paul felt no threat or apostolic rivalry from Apollos. For Paul, this eloquent Alexandrian was an approved and harmonious co-worker complementing rather than opposing his apostolic work. Accordingly he "planted" while Apollos "watered" and hence are both Θεοῦ συνεργοὶ (*2 Cor.* 3.5-9). For Paul, Apollos is his "ἀδελφός" (*1 Cor.* 16.12). Paul would like to have had Apollos present with them in Corinth. Accordingly he explains that, he had "strongly urged" him (πολλὰ παρακάλλεσα) to make the journey, with the other "brothers" (Timothy?). But Apollos was presently unable to travel to Corinth (16.12). I think, in the present context this is as much concerning for Paul as it is to those Corinthians who had enquired about him in a letter sent to Paul at Ephesus.<sup>236</sup> Neither do consider this a deliberate ruse. Given the thrust of Paul's overall theme here, one cannot unambiguously conclude, that Paul's "urging" and Apollos' "refusal" to minister the Corinthians was "staged," as Barrett guesses, though admittedly not with certainty: 'It is a reasonable guess that Paul and Apollos had decided that the interests of Christian unity in Corinth would be better served by Apollos' absence than his presence; but we do not know.'<sup>237</sup> There is no reason however to doubt that Paul considered Apollos a trustworthy and indispensable apostolic colleague, who was presently needed in Corinth - why else Paul's "strong urgings" (cf. 16.15):<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> *1 Cor.* 16.12 appears to be answering a question sent to Paul by the Corinthians concerning Apollos. This forms part of a series of περὶ δε formulations which dominate the compositional structure of *1 Cor.* 7-16 beginning at 7.1, and which answer various issues raised by the Corinthians. Vide J.C. Hurd, *The Origin of 1 Corinthians* (Macon, Mercer University Press, 1983) passim.

<sup>237</sup> Barrett *op cit.* 392.

<sup>238</sup> Paul is seeking to convince Apollos' Corinthian supporters that he is not opposed to him. That may very well be part of his thrust here. Nevertheless this does not also prevent Paul from wanting Apollos' presence elsewhere.

'Now concerning (περὶ δὲ) our brother (τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ) I strongly urged him (πολλὰ παρεκάλεσά) to visit you, with the other brothers, but it was not at all his will to come now. He will come when he has the opportunity.' [16.12].

Following 16.13-14, Paul now turns his focus again on specific members of his apostolic circle, naming them.<sup>239</sup> This time it is the "household of Stephanas" (16.15-18). Paul urges the Corinthians to "subordinate themselves" (ὑποτάσσησθε) (16.16) and give "recognition" (16.18) to this group of people, who like Timothy and Apollos, are endorsed by Paul (16.15). Yet one of them, their leader Stephanas and presumably two of his associates, Fortunatus and Achaicus, are also not present in Corinth at the time of the composition of *1 Cor*. While Stephanas' visitation in Ephesus is joyful to Paul (16.17), it would also appear to be a point of concern - the Corinthians are without immediate pastoral guidance, a situation that appears to continue despite a brief interlude by Timothy. Furthermore while the return of Stephanas with Paul's letter will mean the presence of a representative of the Pauline circle in Corinth, nevertheless it does not seem that Stephanas constituted a member of the Pauline apostolic missionary workers.

This I suggest is the overall theme which renders 16.10-18 as a unit. What place does 16.13-14 therefore hold in this practical, non-eschatological setting. If one accepts that 16.13 is indeed an exhortation with a general eschatological perspective, then clearly this passage does not belong here - it is an intrusion. For this reason Schmithals would be correct to transfer 16.13 after *1 Cor*. 15.58. But if my estimation is correct concerning the figurative military nature of 16.13, then I suggest that it ought to be read in the context of 16.10-18 since it can be shown to be thematically related with this section's major concern - the apparent absence of a recognized Pauline apostolic presence in Corinth. Paul is concerned that the Corinthians are being left for too long on their own devices, unattended, unsupervised by his people. Conflicts and divisions had already occurred in Corinth, and the first part of *1 Corinthians* addressed this issue (1.10-4.21). Marshall has also argued that, even at this stage Paul had already alienated those he (i.e. Marshall) dubs as the

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<sup>239</sup> In accordance with the Greek rhetorical convention of "non-naming" or "periphrasis" Paul never mentions by name his opponents. Rather he anonymously makes mention of them in ironic terms (e.g. super apostles", *2 Cor*. 11.5,12.11) or pejoratively (e.g. 'false apostles" *2 Cor* 11.13) or indifferently ("some" "certain persons" etc. *2 Cor*. 3.1; 10.2, 7; etc.) That Apollos is named by Paul is a clear indication of friendship and acceptance.



"hybrists,"<sup>240</sup> over the issue of Paul's refusal of financial assistance and his involvement with manual labor. Paul was accordingly regarded as their social inferior.<sup>241</sup> According to Marshall already at this point of his dealings with Corinth 'Paul's relations with the Corinthians at this time were extremely fragile and were in danger of deteriorating even further in the face of a concerted attack on him by the hybrists.'<sup>242</sup> If Marshall is correct, then Paul understood the potential danger posed by the hybrists in seeking allies against his apostolic authority. At this stage however there appears to be no suggestion that Paul suspected the intrusion of "outsiders" - a situation which did actually occur and was addressed in *2 Cor.* (10-13).<sup>243</sup> In the possibility of an internal "battle" or "insurrection" led by the hybrists, Paul as their "commander" is now calling the loyal Corinthians to "battle stations." Accordingly while they do not have Paul, nor Timothy nor Apollos present, at least they have his letter and Stephanas. He thus exhorts them to be "vigilant" and recognize any moves for insubordination or rebellion against his apostolic authority.<sup>244</sup> The loyalists, as heroic "warrior's" are to "stand fast," show endurance in the faith which he has taught them, rather than let down their guard and face the possibility of the infiltration of "another gospel" (cf. *2 Cor.* 11.4). Furthermore in this expected "combat" they are also to demonstrate "courage" and "strength" in facing an "enemy" more powerful than them. However by these qualities victory is assured against any usurpers. The paradox however is that in such a "battle" the weapons" are "love" (16.14 cf. *2 Cor.* 6.6f). While *T. Job* associates "athletic" endurance with love, the unique contribution of Paul in the history of the notion of militarized endurance and moral warfare is his linking of this notion with love. The Corinthian "warrior" is to demonstrate combative endurance in accordance with the principle of spiritual love (cf. *1 Cor.* 13.7):

'Be watchful, stand firm in the faith, be courageous, be strong. Let all you do be done in love [*1 Cor.* 16.13-14].

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<sup>240</sup> Marshall identifies the "hybrists" as the wealthy and arrogantly powerful element within the Corinthian church, whom Paul addresses as "puffed up" and "strong" in *1 Cor.* 4.6-13.

<sup>241</sup> Marshall, *op. cit.* ch. 6.

<sup>242</sup> Marshall, *op. cit.* 262.

<sup>243</sup> Vide 'Paul's Deteriorating Situation and Increasing opposition in Corinth and the Literary Structure of 2 Corinthians,' earlier in this chapter.

<sup>244</sup> In *2 Cor.* 10.6 he claims he will "court martial" the insubordinate in Corinth.

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**SECTION 3**

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**CONCLUSION, APPENDICES & BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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## CONCLUSION

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### *A. Overall Scope*

From a diachronic perspective this dissertation undertook a study of the history, evolution and transformation of a Greek military attribute - endurance - into a major philosophical concept. Furthermore I investigated the place, function and rhetoric of this transformed notion in various branches of Greek philosophy and its expression in a "demilitarized" and "militarized" format. From a synchronic perspective I investigate this Greek notion's abiding impact upon Roman philosophy, early Jewish *martyria* literature (esp. *4 Maccabees* & *Testament of Job*), and in particular upon the earliest extant documents of Christianity, the letters of the apostle Paul (esp. *2 Corinthians* 6.4-10, 11.1-12.12, *Galatians* 5.1 & *1 Corinthians* 16.13).

My analysis began with an investigation of this heroic concept in its most natural matrix - the battlefield - first attested in European literature in the *Iliad* as well as in subsequent Greek literary and artistic descriptions dealing with warfare (esp. Tyrtaeus, Thucydides and Arrian). The warrior standing firm with courage in the thick of battle becomes a figure of praise, the archetypal image of Greek masculinity and heroism. Upon this capacity for battle endurance, rested the security and the freedom of the warrior's *polis* (in post-Homeric times). From its military setting this concept would exercise a widespread impact. It entered into the vocabulary and concepts of Greek athletics, art, poetry, drama but most importantly philosophy where it would undergo a radical transformation, becoming an aggressive moral virtue in contexts of conflict, hardship, danger, persecution and martyrdom. Diachronically I traced this process of appropriation and transformation from Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, to the Cynics and Stoics, especially Seneca.

Two basic tendencies were observed in this conceptual transformation. (1) Its military dimensions were retained, becoming hints of its matrix, though now metaphorically transformed. The sage figuratively portrayed himself as a warrior standing firm in battle against attacking

enemies, whether internal (passions, desires, vainglory) or external (the strokes of Tyche) - a basic "combat" motif which is almost never found in ancient Isrealite or Judahite literature (cf. *Jeremiah* 1.17-19). Likewise the sage assumed the figurative role of a much-enduring athlete engaged in rigorous sport or a military commander exhorting his disciples as troops to "stand firm" in their moral battles. Furthermore, "militarized" moral endurance was most frequently linked with courage. (2) A different tendency was also apparent. Moral endurance is now thoroughly "demilitarized," though still considered one of the aggressive ethical virtues. In this form, endurance was understood within the framework of certain characteristics (e.g. wise and foolish endurance; a separation from its links with courage) and specific rhetorical conventions (e.g. the comparison, *peristasis catalogue*, list of virtues and self-praise). The sage's appropriation of this military notion signaled a claim to a paradigm shift in the ancient Greek model of heroic endurance. The sage of endurance now declared himself as the new "virile man."

#### *B. The Apostle Paul, Endurance and Greek Philosophy*

In section 2, I analyzed the Pauline concept of moral endurance against the background of Greek and Roman philosophical traditions of endurance. I argued that Paul basically participates in many of the features of philosophical endurance rather than Hebraic notions of endurance (e.g. *Job*). It appears both in its "demilitarized" and "militarized" formats. It remains an aggressive virtue in contexts of hardship and conflict. In its demilitarized form Paul re-echoes many of the rhetorical and conceptual elements of the sage's endurance (esp. *2 Cor.* 6.4-10 & 11.1-12.12). In his militarized usage, Paul draws upon the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition of the "stand firm" exhortation. In this study I interpreted *Gal* 5.1 and *2 Cor.* 16.13 in the light of this established psychagogic tradition, offering a new reading for these exhortations.

Of the various philosophical expressions of moral endurance, it would seem to me that Paul's overall conceptualization of endurance corresponds most closely with that of the Cynics: (1) Like the Cynics Paul presents endurance in both a militarized and demilitarized format. The Stoics on the other hand tended to express moral endurance almost exclusively in a "militarized" format. (2) Like the Cynics Paul understands endurance as a more significant and commendable virtue than

courage. This is in sharp contrast to the Stoics who either considered moral endurance as (a) a subordinate virtue to courage which was considered a cardinal virtue, or (b) tended to fuse endurance with courage constructing the synthetic cardinal virtue of "brave endurance." Paul like the Cynics however tends, by and large, not to conceive of moral endurance in terms of courage. Like the Cynics, when courage is mentioned in conjunction with endurance it does not tend to be the dominant virtue. This is a unique characteristic of endurance in antiquity. On the other hand when employing the notion of endurance in a militarized format Paul also reflects certain elements of the Stoic tradition of endurance. (3) Like some Cynics Paul also appears to be "inclusive" in his moral exhortations to "stand firm." Female believers seem to be included in the Pauline call to become much-enduring "warriors." (4) Like the Cynics Paul also considers the concept of endurance as a sign of a revitalized human. While for the Cynics it is the "natural human" for Paul it is the "redeemed human." It is also important to remember, in understanding Pauline endurance, not to overlook the impact of Hebraic theology. The notion of God's empowerment of an "elected" individual with endurance is clearly reflected by Paul.

In the history of ideas, Paul's unique contribution in the development of this concept revolves around his Christ-centered ethics and the alliance of this aggressive moral attribute with the gentler charisma of love (ἀγάπη).

## APPENDIX 1

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### The Deuteronomistic Historian in Praise of Military Endurance

Like "courage" and "strength," the notion of "endurance" as a martial quality, is also mentioned and considered as an admirable quality within DH's war narratives. In the Hebrew text, when this martial concept is employed in positive language, it is usually expressed as a form of יָצַב ("to take one's stand," "to station oneself," "holding one's position"),<sup>1</sup> לָקוּם ("to rise up against")<sup>2</sup> or עָמַר ("to take one's stand," "to stand," "to station").<sup>3</sup> As such a warrior may be said to be able to "stand against" ( לָקוּם ) the enemy, "withstand" the opposing forces ( הִתְיַצַּב ), or "stand in one's place" ( יַעֲמֵר ) in battle. The Septuagint tradition employs ἵσταναι and / or its various compounds such as ἀνθίσταναι or ὑφίσταναι to render the idea of endurance conveyed by these Hebrew verbs. Thus ἀνθίσταναι ("to stand against," "to withstand," "to make a stand")<sup>4</sup> tends to translate יָצַב . Ὑφίσταναι ("to withstand," "stand under," "to resist," "to stand one's ground," "to face the enemy")<sup>5</sup> tends to translate לָקוּם , while ἵσταναι (to cause to stand)<sup>6</sup> generally reproduces עָמַר .

Predictably, as with courage and strength, in DH's account of the ancient wars of Israel, it too is determined in any particular battle by the level of obedience and loyalty to Yahweh and hence of His activity as Divine Warrior. Thus as a consequence of Gideon's obedience to Yahweh and his reconciliation of a hitherto apostate Israel with its God, through the destruction of the pagan altars

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<sup>1</sup> BDB 426; Lambdin *op. cit.* 321.

<sup>2</sup> BDB 878.

<sup>3</sup> BDB 763; Lambdin *op. cit.* 325.

<sup>4</sup> LS (Intermediate version) 70-71.

<sup>5</sup> LS (Intermediate version) 852. The same verb is employed by Thucydides in a martial situation to denote the idea of endurance.

<sup>6</sup> J.W. Wenham, *The Elements of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), 180; I.S., "to cause to stand," "to stand," "to be set," "to stand up," etc.

(*Judges 6.25-27*), Israel can now contend with the overwhelming forces of Midian. Hence the handful of Israelite warriors are strengthened to endure or "stand their ground" firmly (7.21). The implication in the text is that this exhibition of daring martial endurance, which for DH comes as a direct empowerment from Yahweh, causes the enemy force to flee:

'And the three companies (i.e. the Israelites) blew the trumpets and broke the jars, holding in their left hands the torches and in their right hands the trumpets to blow; and they cried, "A sword for Yahweh and Gideon!" Every man stood his place (firmly) (MT יַעֲמֵדוּ / LXX ἔστησαν) around the camp, and all the army ran, they cried out and fled.' [*Judges 7.20-21*].

However, at least within the text of *Joshua*, the more usual form of describing endurance is in terms of its deficiency or absence in battle situations. The Hebrew describes this either in negative language such as "not standing before their enemies" or by the idiomatic "turning their backs before their enemies." At times, however, both expressions are juxtaposed within the one sentence (*Joshua 7.12*).

As a consequence, within the description of the conquest of the land "promised to Moses" (*Joshua 1.3*), the indigenous people who worship other deities and hence are distant from the Law of Moses, irrespective of their martial training and capabilities, once they face the Law-abiding Israelites in battle, will not be able to withstand / endure their attacks. By divine assistance this absence of Canaanite, Hittite, Hivite, Perizzite, Amorite, Jebusite or Girgashite martial endurance, will result in the Israelite occupation of a substantial portion of their land:

'Your territory will extend from the desert to Lebanon, and from the great river, the Euphrates - all the Hittite country - to the Great Sea on the west. No one will be able to stand against you (לֹא יִתְיַצֵּב / οὐκ ἀντιστήσεται) all the days of your life.' [*Josh. 1.4-5*].

When Gideon sought Joshua's help against the coalition of the five western city-state kingdoms, the most powerful and united force to challenge Joshua's conquest of Canaan, Joshua prepared for battle with his finest warriors ( גִּבּוֹרֵי חַיִל ). Irrespective of the calibre of his warriors, Yahweh explains to Joshua that He has already defeated the enemy ('I have given them into your power'), and hence not one of the enemy warriors shall be able to endure / withstand the Israelite charge:

'So Joshua went up from Gilgal, he and all the military force with him, all the burly warriors. Yahweh said to Joshua, "Do not fear them, for I have given them into your power and not a man of them shall be able to endure / withstand you - לֹא יַעֲמֵד אִישׁ מֵהֶם / οὐκ ὑπολειφθήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐθεὶς ἐνώπιον ὑμῶν." ' [*Josh. 10.7-8*].

On the other hand, if the Israelites disobey God the same fate awaits them, in terms of a lack of endurance in battle. Thus DH in connecting Achan's disobedience in the plunder of Jericho to the unsuccessful initial battle of the Israelites against the forces of Ai, explains that the lack of endurance or incapacity to *stand against* their enemies at Ai, was a direct result of this offence against Yahweh's commandments:

' . . . . . about three thousand men went but they were routed by the men of Ai . . . . . They chased the Israelites from the city gate . . . . . and struck them down on the slopes . . . . .

The Lord said to Joshua: " . . . . . Israel has sinned, they have violated my covenant, which I commanded them to keep . . . . . That is why the Israelites cannot endure / stand against ( לָפְנֵי אֹיְבֵיהֶם / ὑποστήναι) their enemies; they turn their backs and run . . . . . ' [*Josh* 7.4-5,10,12].

Similarly in a DH narrative of the immediate post-Joshua conquest of Canaan according to *Judges*, the Israelites are described as being in a state of apostasy against Yahweh, turning to Canaanite deities:

' . . . . . another generation followed who did not acknowledge the Lord and did not know what He had done for Israel. Then the Israelites did what was wrong in the eyes of the Lord and worshipped the Baalim. They forsook the Lord . . . . . and went after other gods, gods of the races among whom they lived; and bowed before them and provoked the Lord to anger; they forsook the Lord and worshipped the Baal and the Ashtaroah.' [*Judg.* 2.10-13].

As a direct result of their apostasy, the Israelites were rendered unable to endure or withstand the Canaanite attacks:

The Lord in His anger made them the prey of bands of raiders and plunderers . . . . . they were no longer able to withstand / endure ( וְלֹא-יָכְלוּ עוֹד לְעִמָּר לָפְנֵי ).' [*Judg.* 22.14]

Whereas in the Greek war narratives, especially in the Homeric epics, descriptions of heroic feats of martial endurance by a lone warrior or a small group of individuals standing their ground in battle before a more powerful enemy attack are not rare, they are nevertheless absent in both *Joshua* and *Judges*. In the latter instance, this is particularly puzzling for here, one would expect to find such accounts of endurance. Thus, for instance, while DH admires and describes Samson's great strength in his single-handed combat whether with a lion (*Judg.* 14.6,18), or with Philistines (15.14-15 & 15.4), endurance as an associated martial quality is not mentioned. However, the picture changes somewhat in the later chapters of DH's war narrative (*1 Sam.* - *2 Kings*).<sup>7</sup> Here

<sup>7</sup> However in the narrative describing the single-handed combat between David and Goliath (*1 Sam.* 17.1-55) where again one might expect to hear about David's endurance, only courage is alluded (*1 Sam.* 17.3). Here again the language of endurance is absent from DH's description of single-handed combat.



certain texts not only emphasize endurance as a most significant attribute for an Israelite warrior, but also stress this quality with descriptions of solo combat. The following instances in DH's later chapters are the clearest and most noteworthy.

While Jonathan's single-handed attack on the Philistines in DH's text stresses his courage and faith in Yahweh as Israel's divine warrior (*I Sam.* 14.6 - 14), nevertheless the theme of endurance is not absent (*I Sam.* 14,9). Jonathan prior to attacking the Philistine post, seeks guidance from Yahweh as which of two strategies he must chose. The one demands courage (i.e. climbing up the hill towards the Philistine warriors), the other endurance (as well as courage). That is, the latter involves standing firm in his present position (as well as his armour bearer) - **וְעָמְדָה תְּהִיָּנוּ** , while the Philistines rush down in attack (*I Sam.* 14.9). The former tactic is chosen. Nevertheless, it is interesting that in this pericope, DH does employ the vocabulary of martial endurance in association with an individual warrior (Jonathan). The fact that an alternative strategy is eventually decided upon (which primarily focuses upon courage rather than endurance) is irrelevant to this discussion. What is significant in this present analysis is not only that for DH (like the Greek war chroniclers), courage and endurance are associated martial virtues,<sup>8</sup> but also the acknowledgment that in a context of battle, an individual Israelite warrior may very well be called upon to demonstrate feats of heroic endurance, albeit that Yahweh would empower the individual warrior with the necessary endurance.

But more significant for the present discussion of Hebraic solo combat and martial endurance is the roster of David's most heroic warriors (*2 Sam.* 23.8.39). In this tripartite list of the thirty foremost warriors ( **הַגִּבּוֹרִים** ) in David's army,<sup>9</sup> the first section (*2 Sam.* 23.8-11) honours the three most heroic. These, the most-praised among the elite warriors of the Davidic army are collectively designated as "the Three" ( **הַשְּׁלֹשָׁה** ; *2 Sam.* 23.8). They are identified by name - Jeshbaal the Hachmonite (*2 Sam.* 23.8), Eleazar son of Dodo (*2 Sam.* 23.9) as well as Shamma son of Agee (*2 Sam.* 23.11) together with a synoptic description of a heroic martial deed which

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the Iliadic and Spartan association of these two military virtues; vide ch. 1 of the present study.

<sup>9</sup> The composition of the list suggests a strong Judahite (esp. Bethlehemite) geographical bias, so K. Elliger, 'Die dreissig Helden Davids,' in *Palestinajahrbuch*, No. 31, 1935, 47.

they performed, presumably their most celebrated feat in a combat situation. The selection of a heroic deed which justifies these warrior's most-honoured status is very instructive. It reveals an evaluatory scale which determined what martial qualities were most-highly applauded in David's time.<sup>10</sup> What is most interesting is that after Jeshbaal the latter two are lauded and memorialized by the Davidic tradition which preserves their memory as the greatest warriors in all of David's army precisely in terms of their awesome endurance in solo combat against overwhelming enemy forces. Their heroic deed is contrasted, in both cases, to the lack of endurance displayed by the rest of their comrades who "flee" or "withdraw" from the scene of the battle. In other words, the criteria of their extra-ordinary martial credentials, received by DH, is exclusively evaluated and couched within the framework of the vocabulary of martial endurance, and demonstrates the esteem in which this attribute was regarded in the martial culture of David's time, especially when performed in a solo combat situation. It is noteworthy that of the few others among the Thirty warriors mentioned whose heroic deed(s) accompany their name in the text, courage and strength are alluded though not in explicit language as are Eleazar's and Shamma's endurance (expressed by the verbs **קָם** and **יָצַב**):

'After him (i.e. Jeshbaal) among the three warriors was Eleazar son of Dodo the Ahohite . . . . When the Philistines gathered there (i.e. at Pasdammim) for battle, Israel withdrew / retreated (**יָצָא**), but he stood his ground (**קָם**) and slew Philistines until his hand grew tired and stuck to his sword. Yahweh brought about a great victory that day, and then the army crept back to him - only to plunder the slain!' [2 Sam. 23.9-10].

'After him was Shamma son of Agee the Hararite. The Philistines assembled at Lehi . . . . The army fled (**יָצָא**) from the Philistines, but he took up a position in the plot and held it (**יָצַב**) defeating the Philistines. Yahweh brought about a great victory.' [2 Sam. 23.11-12].

In both cases DH's theology of the Divine Warrior is also relevant - this martial endurance displayed by both these champion warriors which brings victory to the Israelites must be credited to Yahweh, who "brought about a great victory" through both Eleazar and Shamma (2 Sam. 23.10,12).

In DH's overall description of Hebraic endurance in battle, nevertheless unlike the Greek epic and historiographic accounts of war, it tends to be mentioned and understood more frequently as a collective rather than an individual attribute exhibited single-handedly. Furthermore it is manifested

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<sup>10</sup> Concerning the antiquity of the memory preserved in this list, vide, P.K. McCartner, *op. cit* 501.

in direct proportion to Israel's obedience to Yahweh. The presence or absence of this martial quality, is seen by DH, as a description of the corporate behaviour of an army in keeping with the Deuteronomic code of obedience-disobedience. The source of military endurance is Yahweh.

## APPENDIX 2

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### **The Mechanics of the Process of the Moral Transformation of Military Endurance into a Philosophic Virtue A Suggested Reconstruction**

By depicting the sage or sage-martyr's brave endurance within the framework of military (and athletic) language and metaphors, Greek philosophy appropriated and transformed various nuances of heroic military endurance, though now redirected in the service of the moral world of the sage. From the discussion in section 1 of the present study, it is possible to draw the following observations concerning the derivative nature of that expression of Greek moral endurance which I have designated as "militarized:"

[1] In a physical sense, military endurance was one of the necessary aggressive virtues employed in an actual battle situation, which suggested danger, pain, hardship and a life and death situation. When employed as a positive moral attribute, it remains one of the aggressive Greek moral virtues, signaling the presence of circumstances of opposition, hardship, danger and toil.

[2] As in the case of actual battle, where the demonstration of endurance / standing firm, reflected the heroic or authentic warrior (in contrast to the fleeing coward), so too, within military metaphors, the demonstration of the sage's moral endurance in the various situations of conflict and adversity, functions in a verificatory or authenticating manner. It manifests the sage's heroic manly endurance and the magnitude of his moral "warfare." He now appropriates the heroic mantle of much-enduring "warrior." Again, as in the case of actual battle, the sage's or the novice's absence of endurance in his moral "warfare" was considered as shameful. By fleeing from the harsh and dangerous circumstances that arise, he reflects the mark of a moral coward or charlatan.

[3] As the warrior's endurance necessarily implied the capacity to withstand the fearful oncoming enemy and the ensuing give and take of combat, so the writings of the Greek and

Roman sages, in the context of military metaphors of endurance, most usually depicted the sage or novice facing extreme opposition, hardship and danger. These "battle" circumstances were generally of two types: (i) external opposition, whether actual or potential (e.g. public mockery, rejection, slander, persecution [human or supernatural], martyrdom and the strokes of Fortuna) as a result of bold affirmations of convictions, or (ii) an internal opposition (the so-called "battle of the soul") stemming from the invading passions, desires or vainglory. Moral endurance represents, in these "struggles" one of the sage's - now depicted as "warrior" - most powerful "weapons" or heroic attributes, against defeat and the consequent "enslavement" or "death." The sage's endurance characterizes therefore his heroic struggle for freedom against "captivity" from the "enemy."

[4] Prior to a great and definitive battle it was not unusual for warriors to be addressed and exhorted by military commanders to "stand firm" and be courageous. At times such exhortations occurred in the middle of a crisis in battle. The purpose of this exhortation was to ensure, inspire and re-invigorate the warriors towards victory. The commander who issues such an exhortation must necessarily himself be a paradigm of heroic battlefield endurance and courage and hence must have already proven himself in many campaigns as capable of standing firm in combat. In Greek literary descriptions of war the usual vocabulary of such exhortation to heroic endurance in battle includes the verbs ἵστημι and μένειν. Among the epic warriors, Odysseus becomes one of the chief exhorters of endurance in battle. In Hellenistic warfare, Alexander becomes the most celebrated paradigm of the exhorter of the cry to "stand firm" having himself proven his heroism consistently, and hence able to convince and inspire his soldiers. In the process of the philosophication of the idea of military endurance, similar nuances were also incorporated in a moral direction. Thus the sage of paradigmatic and proven endurance (e.g., the Cynic Crates), could exhort his disciples, in his capacity as "general" or "commander," to "stand firm" in the "battle" against external and / or internal "attacks" and "enemies." At times such an exhortation for endurance would be issued by the sage to disciples experiencing a situation of crisis in "combat," and under threat of being overwhelmed or "surrendering." The call is meant to inspire and motivate the novice or disciple. From a Weberian sociological perspective, in both physical or moral

warfare, the exhortation to "stand firm" is issued by a superior to an inferior. Yet in this case, the superior's authority to issue such a *cri de guerre*, is grounded and legitimized upon the commander's "charismatic" rather than official power. In other words in both the case of actual military or in the sage's moral warfare, the command to "stand firm" needs to be issued by one who himself is a tested and proven much-enduring "warrior" (cf. Darius who is unable to inspire his men because of his own cowardice and absence of endurance on the battlefield).

[5] One of the essential elements of military victory, and hence freedom from subjection of one's *polis* to ravaging, pillaging and slavery, was the individual warrior's courageous display of endurance. Among the many ingredients or consequences of this successful and triumphant virtue was its formidable, awesome and intimidating function, evoking a sense of fear in the enemy. Sometimes it brought kingship. This function of endurance was also incorporated by the Greek philosophers in their appropriation of endurance. In their various "battles" the display of moral endurance was an assurance of intimidating the "enemy" and achieving "victory."

[6] Furthermore such demonstration of endurance held both a social and redemptive quality. The steadfast defence of his *polis* was considered as one of the Greek citizen-warrior's noblest duties. Indeed in the Spartan "politeia" it was regarded as the highest virtue of the citizen-warrior in preserving the freedom of his state. When philosophized this original dimension remained, though transformed. Now the demonstration of "military" endurance in a martyrological setting possessed both a social and redemptive quality (e.g. Socrates' death), for it offered the opportunity to free present and future generations from certain fears as well social injustices.

[7] Standing guard in vigilant alert watch or in anticipation of the slightest signs of an approaching enemy force, long before it strikes, was one of the duties of the guard-soldier. This was related to endurance and courage. The guard was to fight any temptation to fall asleep on his guard or to abandon his post and flee at the spotting of the advancing enemy, usually under cover of the dark. Rather his responsibility was to sound the alarm and awaken the sleeping or resting soldiers. Furthermore the situation of a vigilant and steadfast guard, pre-supposed a covert form of enemy action. These military functions associated with the much-enduring and alert guard were

also incorporated into the sage's moral transformation of endurance. Thus the sage as a "guard" was to stand firm in his "appointed post" and not desert at the sign of danger or the approach of the "enemy" (e.g. Socrates).

[8] As the formation of a warrior's endurance was undertaken by military training in times of peace, in order to prepare the trainee soldier to stand firm in actual battle situations, so the Stoic *proficiens is* likewise trained in moral endurance. The opportunity for such training (*exerceas*, ἄσκησις) is during times when Fortune has declared temporary peace from her violent assaults, against the novice philosopher. Likewise even the experienced soldier, in times of peace or cease-fire, was not to slacken and fall prey to comfort and pleasure (e.g. Hannibal's rest), for this would spell defeat in subsequent military engagement. The experienced sage is not to go on "furlough" but to dedicate himself to military matters, persevering in training their military skills and attributes (e.g. courage and endurance).

[9] Ancient war was not always fought in a field where the two armies faced each other in battle formation. At times the setting was one of siege. Here not only the warrior's endurance but also that of the fortifications was paramount. The more impregnable the walls and the gates, against the offensive weapons of the enemy (e.g. stones hurled by catapults, fiery arrows, battering rams), the more secure the besieged city. Any weakness in the fortifications would be exploited. This image of military endurance was also philosophized, primarily by the Stoics. The firmly-fixed sage, because of his life in accordance with Nature and hence dominated by the dictates of reason, was imbued with virtues. These virtues, especially courage and endurance, formed his unshakable fortifications. Accordingly any attacks by Fortune would be easily resisted, resulting in no injury, insult, grief or loss. His possessions (i.e. his virtues) cannot be conquered or looted. This endurance becomes evidence of his firmly-fixed soul, his *constantia*. Any breach in his fortifications suggests a lack of endurance, hence a lack of courage, reason and virtue, and hence inconsistency of soul.

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